

Former Rebellion Movement In Power: *A Challenge Of Performance Proofing*

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Abstract

Some nation-states are still facing rebellion movements that saying they walked in the different path of history of the state and/or disappointed to the regime's performance. For this reason, arm conflict, separatism, and other effort to form a new regime happened.

Giving a specific autonomy to the rebellion movement to govern in a specific region is a common alternative to reduce the worse impact. It is a kind of recognition that they know well their needs. Sending the former rebellion movement to power is an attempt to aggregate their interests that not accommodated for a long time. It is hope that it will reduce the tension between the central government and the movement as well as the spread of violence to be a regional or international issue. In some cases, however, it did not work, even counter-productive. The new regime's performance changed from a solid, fast moving and responsive opponent to be a corrupt and full of intrigues administration.

This paper aims to study management pattern of governance led by the former rebellion movement activists. It is an attempt to do theory building in conflict management. Comparing MNLF in the Philippines, HAMAS in Palestine, and GAM in Indonesia will be useful to fulfill the need.

Keywords: Rebellion movement, intrigues management, regime

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Introduction

The rise of political armed-based rebellion movements to the national political stage in some countries has brought more attraction to many parties. One of many is discourse of political management, which elaborated by armed-based rebellion movements in their effort handling their executive roles.

MNLF, a rebellion movements in Mindanao lead by Nur Misuari, gained its power after a Final Agreement in 1996, and therefore facilitated the formation of ARMM (*Autonomous Region for Mindanao Muslim*). In early 2006, born was a rebellion regime in Palestine, HAMAS, which gained its power after winning a general election. This regime also showed a very-unique government management pattern. After series of processes in Helsinki Agreement, rebellion regime of GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) in Indonesia has come in to a new phase where more elites of GAM

won district-head officer election in either provincial level or regency level at the end of 2006.

A regime built by Misuari in ARMM, supporting by its MNLF armed-based rebellion movement, along in their way has encountered serious problems, on either internal Mindanao interests or its interaction with Luzon regime. Finally, this situation made Misuari desperate and led him back to his original tradition that runs rebellion movement against the central government in Manila.¹ MNLF political rival in Mindanao, MILF, follows this behavior then. Murrad Ibrahim of MILF, who replace Misuari's position as ARMM governor after the conviction of Misuari as a result of his activities in triggering armed rebellion, do the same thing that is fight Luzon regime back with his armed-forces. In addition, so does HAMAS regime under Ismail Haniyya. They got a very serious pressure from outer part; massive boycott action from US regime and its alliance applying support embargo and currency circulation flowing to Ismail Haniyya regime's wallet.²

Meanwhile, Israel as the true rival of HAMAS elaborate some agreed historical reasons, which gained from the previous Palestine regime, FATAH, to resist HAMAS. Various numbers of boycott actions and armed-forces clashes

between FATAH and HAMAS faction frequently happens. Abbas' proposal for conducting an earlier election to melt frozen political situation in Palestine contradictorily has arisen a never ended conflict. So far, HAMAS regime is still capable of withstand in the middle of political and economic intrigue conducted by international and regional regimes and its competitor in national level.

What do happen with ex-GAM regime in Indonesia? After the Helsinki Agreement, GAM as security political organization has relatively been frozen. GAM's political ceremony and attribute formally being prohibited to present amidst the public. Fortunately, Indonesian government's breakthrough in giving new politic space for the local party has provided a chance for GAM to transform itself to be a political party.³ This effort is quite effective for GAM to play a political role at the local level. No more than 1/2 year after the Helsinki Agreement, some independent candidates who are relatively come from GAM could win in district election in Aceh.

So far, SBY-JK regime is still giving positive respond toward the victorious GAM-affiliated candidates although the military and political elites has released warning in order that they do not resurrect GAM considering their aim to built a country of Aceh. Indonesian gov-

ernment has prepared an Aceh Government Act to construct Aceh after the Helsinki Agreement.

Typology of Rebellion Movement

We propose that several basic characters support the three rebellion movements that are successfully gaining their power to conduct new regimes⁴. The first is rebellion movements tend to identify themselves as armed forces. This choice tends to be a tool in the bargaining process toward absolute claim. In reaching those claims, military-based organization as an option has become a very fundamental need. MNLF design itself as an armed forces who claim to have well-organized combatants in amount of 15.000. This effort is effective since almost for 20 years MNLF is still exist in maintaining its organization dynamics coping with the political and military pressure by Luzon regime.⁵ Alike MNLF, Salamat Hashim, during his separation from MNLF faction, also designed MILF as military civilian movement. In fact, the armed forces belong to MILF are larger in number. Observer predicts that MILF will be able to mobilize a civilian military movement almost 40 thousand of personnel, both of military and of combatant.⁶

HAMAS also design itself as an armed forces post Intifadhah in 1988. Escalation of HAMAS as political

armed forces was so dominant in order that HAMAS become a very considerable factor by either Israel or its competitor, FATAH, who also design itself as armed forces. Counting on this military power, HAMAS is capable of articulating their autonomous political options.⁷

GAM is also an organization that design itself as armed forces. GAM fights for Aceh freedom by doing bargaining activities through military instruments. Political option of GAM is achieve their option for independence and always rejects autonomy option that some Aceh political elites gradually accept in the context of nation-states of Indonesia.⁸

Secondly, rebellion organization also designs itself as a political organization. This relates to their effort to develop themselves as an embryo of a new government. It manifests by the appearance of Shadow Cabinet concept in rebellion organization. Even more in some areas, they have also designed their national song, proclamation draft, national attributes such as flag and basic concept about a nation and its constitutions. GAM, MNLF or HAMAS have this attributes complete with all its interpretation as an element of a mobilization process to gain internal, regional or even international support.

Thirdly, rebellion organizations have multi-faceted design of themselves. This fact is very clear in HAMAS but not in MNLF or GAM.⁹ HAMAS is an organization binding with spiritual bond. Later on, this bond transformed into social, economy, political, and military bond. As organization having exclusive bond with Ikhwanul Muslimin, HAMAS relatively, use manhaj Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt. HAMAS have a very complex charity board in education, medical, social and culture. That is why HAMAS cannot be identified as an ordinary military movement. HAMAS grows in civilian environment not in military environment.¹⁰

To some extent, this multi-faceted design of HAMAS will give positive contribution when this regime gets some opportunity to run a government management. Experience in civilian management will be a *political learning* for government management.

MNLF and GAM relatively look like non-civilian movements. Various economic and social activities, which permanently and professionally built in the organization, are rare. From the beginning, GAM and MNLF are organizations built by similarities of political perspective in viewing some problems they have. Option of military-based organization is not a metamorphosis process but it is the only option

in coping with repression from the government, the invader regime.

In a limited area, multi-faceted rebellion organization tends to have immediacy in constituting an effective regime compare to rebellion regimen, which only based on military and politics. Transparency and accountability of multifaceted rebellion regime tend to be more developed and it is not a trials and errors action. Therefore, appreciation of the civilians demanding an effective regime performance fulfilled.

Infrastructure of Rebellion Movement

In the effort to describe the structure of rebellion organization, we use five big variables. These variable is important as tools measuring immediacy of one rebellion movement in entering a new phase where it is totally in-charge in governing and managing all aspects of a society. Handling a government in a limited area is much more complex than to managing rebellion regime. Politic of *scapegoat*, which is familiar in rebellion movement, is very hard to apply in a government regime and so does

Table 1. Typologies of Rebellion Movement

Field of Organization	GAM	MNLF	HAMAS
Military	√	√	√
Social and economy	-	-	√
Politics	√	√	√

some accomplishment of various government problems are not enough to be relied merely on commitment and solidarity. So far, withstanding ability of rebellion regime in coping with "colonial" regime's pressures¹¹ tend to rely more on solidarity power compare to other powers.

Firstly is ideology complexion in rebellion movement. Ideology will play an important role to determine policy options in problem solving. Ideology is more than a scope of belief system, but also a set of norms that will sublimate a measured government management. MNLF and GAM in limited scope developed Islam-based ideology. Nevertheless, these developed Islam ideologies are too weak.¹² HAMAS developed a more specific and unique structure of Islamic ideology. HAMAS adopt Islam belief-system in the structure dimension and way of thinking of mahzab Hambali, a unique thinking structure in their politic performance.

Ideology developed by GAM tends to refer to Tenku Daud Beureueh's perspectives in century of 20s. These perspectives then continued in application by Hasan Di Tiro who claimed himself having a religious authority in the same way of Daud Beureueh. However, in the context of religion politic, it is hard to find clear information about Hasan Di Tiro competence as a religious leader

who has an authority as a *mujtahid*. Hasan Di Tiro is more apparently to be a symbolic politic leader than a spiritual leader.

MNLF is apparently to be the same. Religious authority developed by MNLF is also relatively weak. In drawing their fight, Misuari tend to rely more on Moslem's primordial aspect at a broader context. Thus, his politic decision tends to be inconsistent to fit ongoing politic demands. In some limited areas, MNLF ideology sometimes applies Islam Socialism that is of Khadafi. However, sometime MNLF apply another ideology to achieve more support from Middle East countries.

Secondly, leadership structure is a determining variable in the process of decision-making, implementation mechanism, and decision controlling. Emerson (2001) found two kinds of leadership skills that very significant in transitional regime. A leader with capacity to mobilize people is important to develop solidarity. However a leader having managerial skill is more important in post-colonial regime.

Leadership structure based on rationality consideration tends to run decision-making process in collegial way, and bureaucratic power holds significant role in implementation mechanism. To some extent, rational bureaucracy will propose effectiveness in the process of

public services.¹³ Nevertheless, in the context of the third world, bureaucracy is an acute problem. Bureaucracy is not a tool of rational and efficient public service but a nest of inefficiency, even more it is the root of all corruptions.

Leadership structure based on charismatic consideration tends to put the decision-making process on elites of personal, political, and religious goodness. People believe that their decision is the best. Decision implementation process then also rely on some aspects of obedience in the manner of spiritual and personal. Conducted bureaucracy does not have emphasis on formal aspects, but it builds merely based on custom and trustworthiness.

Personally, Misuari appears to be a merely academic personage of a University and is not an absolute religious figure. MNLF does not come as derivative form of a religious tradition but as political response toward discrimination on Islamic group in Mindanao. Misuari gained his position of ARMM governor from the application of rational legitimacy after a treaty in 1996. To role a government in Mindanao, Misuari is really counting on capability and capacity of bureaucracy, which more or less reflects Luzon bureaucracy.

We can see the same thing in the regime of Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar in Aceh that is definitively

get their power through a political process. Therefore, they have rational legitimacy. Irwandi must govern with structure of bureaucracy, which tend to reflect character of bureaucracy in Indonesia. Whether he likes it or not, Irwandi must accept this reality since he cannot built his own.

The weakness of traditional regime relying on its rational bureaucratic power is on its ability of actuating and controlling. It is very likely unfriendly to other political options drawn by the elites. Due to its legal formal relationship, it is very likely that the ability to control of the elites on the mass will be a legal formal one. If the elites fail in interpreting the rational bureaucratic options, it is very likely that the bureaucracy will boycott the decision made by the regime.¹⁴ Distortion in bureaucracy will be a very complicated and energy wasting problems. This will lead many parties to disappointment.

HAMAS also gained its authority through a process of election and then HAMAS will also facing some bureaucracy dilemma. Even more, due to bureaucracy in Palestina this is applying FATAH bureaucracy. However, in limited scope, HAMAS is having a very unique leadership compare to that of GAM and MNLF; a leadership based on charisma and personal trust. HAMAS handles bureaucracy by doing

investments in charismatic leadership from in-formal elites, which are master of mind. Elites in the midst crowd of political options, bureaucracy still have its influence reserve through solidarity power. Differ with GAM and MNLF; it is very hard to use solidarity power post this parties gaining their authority.

Thirdly, organization of hierarchy will determine the effectiveness of a decision implementation. Effectiveness of elite's controlling structure below him determines the hierarchy level of decision-making. The higher hierarchy of elite, the higher is the ability to control the structure below him using his formal and informal logic authority in achieving his organization goal so that the organization effectively conducted. In the context of MNLF, Misuari is facing a hidden trap due to treaty clauses which demanding some combatants to be military personnel of Filipina. Meanwhile, ARMM become a non-autonomous organization which hardly to move since Filipina officials has not yet put an amendment on their constitution to legalize their country as a federal-based nation. These organizational traps have lead ARMM government to ineffectiveness. Their welfare index is not improving even worst.¹⁵

The HAMAS regime possesses an organization hierarchy, which formally

and informally is very strong. Although Mahmud Abbas regime put organizational interference to Haniyya Regime many times, HAMAS can be very well in handling these situations. HAMAS regime is capable of doing bargaining with FATAH regime, which tends to be destructive towards HAMAS government. During time facing bureaucratic strikes and protests problems because of various intrigues, HAMAS regime still possesses autonomous informal resources which has been established to role its governmental functions.

What is about Irwandi Yusuf regime in Aceh? In a limited scope, organization problem faced quite similar to that of Misuari regime in ARMM. There is a problem of non-autonomy of organization due to the form of the nation does not refer to federalism. Irwandi Yusuf has also to face trap of Constitution of Government of Aceh that he has to accept *taken for granted*. Although he has already proposed an amendment, the authorized regime in Indonesia has not yet given any response since the constitution itself is still very new. If Irwandi regime is not capable and not having a sure vision to overcome some acute problem in Aceh within 100 first days, especially post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation after the earthquake and tsunami, therefore the effectiveness of Irwandi regime

will be easily unstable.

Fourthly is the networking strength of the rebellion regime to measure its bargaining capability with the interest-opposite regime. It is important to know networking strength of the rebellion regime before it is entering its new space of authority. The systemic international networking they have the more chance they have to survive against the national and international intrigues.

GAM, in some limited boundary, has international networking power, through the power of Hasan Di Tiro who uses mass media to expose problems in Aceh. Nevertheless, in some cases, Hasan Di Tiro failed in constructing systemic networking in the international forum so that comparison between the number cases in Aceh which are blew up become internal affairs are lessen in number to that of cases in Papua and Timor Timur.

Besides, international network assistances for GAM are relatively short and not systemic. Many parties in Indonesia believe that a GAM relation with Libya is a temporary one. Even more, OKI as International Islam Organization is not on its position to help the struggle of GAM but it has more roles in the effort overcoming the conflict.

The same thing happens to MNLF, the nature of international network of MILF is more personal to its elites. It

has not found any hierarchical organization relationship with MNLF. Internationalizing ability of Mindanao conflict by Misuari in decade of 1970s closely related to his ability of lobbying in numerous summits of Islamic Countries. Misuari's relationship with Khadafi is merely a personal relationship sharing the relatively same way of perspective in encountering problems they have. Nevertheless, this way of perspective does not make MNLF relation with other international power become a systemic one. MNLF relation with Libya then relatively weaker when later on Libya has a closer relationship with US regarding Lockerby problem, that is Libya is willing to pay compensation charge on a plane, which hijack by Libya citizen so that Libya will be free from any designed embargo by the US. Libya then keep the distance of their relationship with MNLF when US conducting cooperation with the Philippines regarding a war against international terrorists which is targeting Mindanao rebellion movement.

It is very different to that of HAMAS. As a part of organization of Ikhwanul Muslimin, HAMAS relatively have vast international network. Although Ikhwanul Muslimin is a forbidden organization in Egypt, actually this organization has its influence on some Islamic countries. Ikhwanul Muslimin,

which is formerly not engaged in practical politics, in the meantime of half decade of 1990s tends to involved with some massive politic activities.¹⁶ The nature of network organization relationship of Ikhwanul Muslimin tends to be hierarchical, systematic, and permanent. (a simple example for cases in Indonesia, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera as a politic party which is having relatively same vision and mission to that of Ikhwanul Muslimin struggle. PKS, very enthusiastically, concerns about Islamic problem and especially Palestine have to win public sympathy. For almost all politic parties In Indonesia, concerning about international issues relatively does not bring a very significant result. PKS statement and action of one-dollar movement to help HAMAS government funding in the middle of crisis it has then is done systematically.

HAMAS are able to survive in the middle of intrigues by moving its network machine to bring new construction about HAMAS. HAMAS factually has recognized by the UN as a terrorist movement. On the contrary, many Islamic countries know HAMAS with its own legal government. Support for HAMAS will be stable unless the US did not resist by applying embargo on money flow for HAMAS government.

Fifthly, in the counter with regimes which are namely as regimes of

colonialist or imperialist, rebellion organization more frequently used guerrilla war tactics compare to direct confrontations. Organization designed tends to be closed and mobile in nature. This nature makes the process of administrative identification hard to conduct. The latent nature of the organization pattern tends to interfere whenever the rebellion regime must carry out the manifested organization. Guerrilla rebellion tactics in some cases have effectively brought destruction to the colonial regime, but it implicitly shows that the rebellion organizations are not powerful. Guerrilla war tactics has become a representation that if we conduct a direct attack towards the enemy, the probability of winning the war becomes relatively small. Guerrilla war will save energy and win the propaganda in utilizing the conflict issue. The ability to survive longer in the conflict will strengthening bargaining position of the rebellion regime against he authorized government in concession sharing.

MNLF in its fight against Luzon regime used guerrilla war tactic more frequently with its more relatively latent organization form. It is understandable that the organizational ability of MNLF is relatively unable to counter Luzon regime penetration. Guerrilla war done by Nur Misuari is a device to show its existence to either Moro People in

Mindanao or international Islamic community in order to gain sympathy and support. MNLF effort is the other way around with that of NPA (National People Army), a communist wing in South Filipina, which conducts a rebellion against Luzon regime. However, until this moment, has never been involved in any form of negotiation and concession sharing. It is complicated for Misuari to design MNLF organization become a bureaucracy in ARMM, which is relatively a rational and structured organization. It is possible for the appearing of a cultural lag.¹⁷ On one side, they must restructure their regime professionally. Nevertheless, on the other side, their decision will not be able followed by rational way of thinking.

Moreover, so does rebellion organization of GAM, which uses guerrilla war tactic frequently. The process of marginalization of Indonesia government against GAM by DOM (District of Operational Military) is quite effective in transforming GAM become peripheral movement. But to keep the existence of the movement, GAM then change their war tactic against Indonesian government using guerrilla war tactic so that GAM are able to withstand in a very long period and waste the energy of Indonesian government. His ability to withstand has brought him become the actor in the agreement with Indone-

sian government. Before the negotiation, the Indonesian government said for several times that it was not a negotiation between actors. Factually, it is true that GAM has become the actor in the series of negotiation until its final at Helsinki agreement to put the conflict to an end.

Regime of Irwandi Jusuf is very likely facing a very serious problem with the structure of GAM organization which recently become CAR (Committee for Aceh Rebellion) while welcoming the new era. Various regulations that are not compatible with the goal of CAR rebellion must synchronized to Indonesian basic interests. Irwandi in for some reasons finally meet some dilemmas of bi-loyalty. Once he makes mistake with his political policy, it is enough to bring him down by either Indonesian government or other political power in Aceh. As we know, the couple of Irwandi and Nazar only got 34% of the total votes. There is about 66% of swinging voter. Interestingly, there is about 30% of vote belong to independent candidate who came from former membership of GAM. Meaning to say that if Irwandi start to leave all GAM aspiration, he will loose his legitimacy from the organization he brought up. Finally, similar to MNLF, Irwandi-Nazar regime will also sensitive to cultural lag syndrome.

HAMAS from beginning has de-

veloped a technique and method of rebel, which based on open-direct confrontation. After gaining its authorities, they tends to be able to take political option, which are not dilemmatic for FATAH regime, nevertheless it is dilemmatic for FATAH regime, which is still inseparable from political faction in Palestina. Reluctance of HAMAS to follow International policy platform of FATAH regime, which tend to be accommodative toward Israel has escalate the clash between HAMAS and FATAH. HAMAS strictly set the Israel as an aggressor. In the contrary, FATAH consider Israel as inseparable partner. Although HAMAS get a big pressure from many parties, they are unable to shift HAMAS regime's policy paradigm toward Israel. At this moment, HAMAS regime is still exists although surrounds by political contractions, which apparently distracts the performance of the regime.

Intrigues and Management Intrigues

In its transformation process from rebellion regime to authority regime, a

very significant pattern is the absence of approval from conflicting parties. Filipina government in some cases facing dilemmatic relationship whether to rejecting or accepting ARMM. GAM in Indonesia, Xanana Gusmoau in Timor Leste, and HAMAS regime in Palestina face this kind of situation. Psychology partition finally transformed to be an unfriendly politic policy. HAMAS regime takes very massive pressure from FATAH regime supported by Israel, US, and British. Several political and economic intrigues are released to undermine HAMAS regime's legitimacy.

MNLF regime also takes some dilemmatic realities. Since economic crisis hit the South East Asia, the financial ability of Luzon regime to meet its promises in the Final Agreement then becomes weak. Indirectly, that inability influences the durability of that regime. Luzon regime releases intrigues so swift so that more conflicts are arisen. Even more, disharmonious relationship between MNLF and MILF is politically

Table 2. Infrastructure of Rebellion Organization

Variables	GAM	MNLF	HAMAS	Syiah Movement
Ideology	Unclear	Unclear	Clear	Clear
Leadership of Elite	Rational	Rational	Rational and Charismatic	Charismatic
Organization	Tightly structured	Tightly structured	Loosely structured	Loosely structured
Networking	Centripetal	Centripetal	Centrifugal	Centrifugal
Techniques and Methods	Guerilla	Guerilla	Direct confrontation	Direct confrontation

useful for Luzon regime to ask the legitimacy of MNLF regime in ARMM. MILF then appear to be dialogue partner since it is considerably more legitimate on the eyes of Mindanao people.

The most dangerous intrigue is one, which built by the international power. International regime which is not friendly to rebellion regime is the most significant factor to bring rebellion regime down. The rising of Islamic regime in Iran post Islamic Revolution in 1979 has brought the wave of intrigues from the both regional and international power. Iran in some cases has become a common enemy for international community which then it influenced the process of achievement of the national interests. If the rebellion regime failed in fulfilling the national interests, it is hope that its government will loose its legitimacy and its own citizen will bring it down at the end.

However, the experience of rebellion regime in Iran that later on becomes the ruling regime is appropriate to be a model of how a rebellion regime could have its role as an authorized regime, which manages the intrigues very well. At least there are three instruments used by Ayatollah Khomeini's regime in managing intrigues.

Firstly is using solidarity maker power that used effectively in the mean-

time of rebellion regime. Many rebellion regimes become failed authoritative regime because of the lack of ability in issue-management. However, a thing to remember is that power syndrome of the elite must be limited. Abbas' regime and Misuari's regime then failed to run their regimes because of corruption violation amongst their poor society. HAMAS' regime very closely indicated by a corruption case, but later on this issue was not proper to trusted since it was only a procedure-related problem.

In the middle of war and embargo trap, Khomeini's regime was able to develop a massive simple way of life, imitating the elites. The slowing down economic situation, which was because of the lack of foreign investment later on, solved with promoting higher hardworking spirit to find alternative partners. Patron-client relationship between elites and the mass gradually built in purpose of bringing both psychology and political proximity.

Secondly, he developed an open and moderate political system. Khomeini in the political tradition of Shiite has the highest position, marja'i taklid. It means Khomeini can overtake the authority and run Shiite political model rigidly. However, Khomeini just applies moderate political policy by following referendum tradition in designing the coun-

try and in constructing the constitution. Besides, Khomeini take Sunni's political tradition about Maslakhah which never be known in the Shiite's political tradition. This option of moderate policy strengthens Iran regime's legitimacy in the crowd of political intrigues. As a result, royalist party who is pro Shah Reza did not take sufficient support although this faction posses its approval to be involved in the political system in Iran. Communist Party of Iran (Tudeh Party) still flourishes in Iran, but also has no support.

Thirdly, which is also unique is by developing political economy system in accordance with the tradition in the meantime of rebellion regime. Nowadays, Iran is a regime without foreign debt and become a sterile country from the external pressures. This consistency, in some cases, has been able to create a strong system and encounter many intrigues. MNLF and FATAH regimes considerably have lost its vital élan to operate their developed values.

HAMAS is a rebellion regime that copy many intrigues management techniques developed by Iran. Whether HAMAS will come to a winner or a looser, the history will tell. GAM regime through Irwandi Yusuf and M. Nazar also tell to the history, whether this regime will succeed in managing intrigues or defeated by the intrigues.

Conclusion

A weakness in managing conflict and intrigues is the most common threat for the former rebellion movement in power. Charismatic leadership is somewhat important. By the way, it is not the one and only single factor. Character and infrastructure of the former rebellion movement in power will induce its ability to cope with conflict management. A multifaceted rebellion movement will be more capable in countering intrigues. This ability will better develop on rebellion organization supported with established organization infrastructure.

Therefore this paper develop a theory of regime management of post-colonial regime from Donald K. Emmerson based on capacity of policy maker broaden to the capability of the organization.

Endnote

1 Interview with Hatimil E. Hasan, new chairman of the MNLF, on 6 October 2004 in Cotabato City: MNLF Mj. Gen. Abdul Sahrin, Message to the Bangsa Moro National People's Congress, 23 December 2003, Davao City, reprinted in *The Bangsamoro Parsugpatan*, 2(1), 30, 21. See also Oquist, P (2002, October 23) 23 in Santos Jr., S.N.

2 The latest case causing a commotion is accusation to HAMAS spokesman, Sami Abu Zuhri, on bringing a Rp 7.5 billion international aid. Mass media blew up an issue that HAMAS elites are corrupt.

3 See UU Pemerintahan Aceh 2006.

4 For a depth analysis, see Hunter, S.T. (1988)

5 For further reading on MNLF and MILF as armed-forces power, see Garcia (2004).

6 For a brief reading on HAMAS profile, see Ridho, A. (1996).

7 Sukma, R. (2004) *Policy Studies 3*

8 Rido, *op.cit.*

9 *ibid*

10 HAMAS calls Israeli "colonial regime" and so do GAM to Indonesia and MNLF to Luzon regime, especially under Marcos.

11 Its homepage does not explain about Islamic ideology but its way of thinking is very similar with Ikhwanul Muslimin and Hambali. See also Azra, A. (1997).

12 Weber, M.(1947) & Toha, M. (2003).

13 HAMAS experience was very clear. The bureaucrats are on strike because of three months delinquent payments.

14 See Malapit, HJL., Clemente, Tina S., & Yunzal, Cristina (2003), retrieved September 15, 2005 from www.chronicpoverty.org

15 Ikhwanul Muslimin broaden its influence to Syria, Qatar, Algiers, Palestine, and some East Asian Countries, including Indonesia.

16 See Surwandono, (2006), Jebakan Politik terhadap HAMAS, *Republika* [Januari 25, 2006]

17 It adopts Oghburn terminology in comparing material and immaterial culture.

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