TOWARD A THEORY OF APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE URBAN
GOVERNANCE

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ABSTRACT

Abstract
Urban governance and governance itself are complex phenomena in the political science and Public Administration. A public management approach in many cases does not explain and delve into the problem of urban governance. The comparative method of urban governance practices in cities in Asia, which pays special attention to its effectiveness of urban governance. Effective urban governance is one which is democratic and accountable as well as creating a city that is safe to live in. The expectation is that a comparison of urban governance practices will help in the process of developing a new logically inductive theory. Study findings show that it is not possible to apply the same standards with respect to urban governance practices in a similar matter. The definition of governance has been popularized since 1980s. The theory which the comparison of urban governance creates is unique and can be generalized.

Keyword: governance, urban governance, effective governance, innovation.

I. INTRODUCTION

This article attempts to explore the contribution of the theory on urban governance practices in various countries, a topic that has drawn a lot of research interest lately due to its special nature/uniqueness. The special nature of urban governance lies in the complexity of the problems and the large number of organizations or government units that are involved (Nurmandi, 2006 and Proud’s Homme, 1996) as well as knowledge in planning research, architecture, economics and environmental science (Thames and Hudson, 2010). The academic
debate on New Public Management and governance is by itself not sufficient to provide an elucidation on problems of urban governance.

Urban governance from a traditional perspective encompasses three important players the government, the private sector and the general public. To that end, research on urban governance is extremely vast and wide-ranging. Urban government itself as one of the actors does not constitute unitary a single actor, given the fact that it consists of executive and legislative institutions (Leach, et al, 1994; Eliassen and Kooiman, 1993; Stoker, 1991). Urban government in the context of urban governance networking must interact with higher tier government institutions and Ministries. Complex organizational networks make coordination difficulties unavoidable. Based on various case studies on urban governance, it is apparent that extant theories are able to explain the complexity of urban governance phenomenon. Kearns and Paddison (2000) stated that governing cities has also been made more difficult by the growing complexity of social life.

The author will compile and analyze that were published by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, as well as attempt to develop an appropriate and fitting generalization of governance types for promoting the welfare of urban dwellers/population. This article will put more emphasis on methodology than methods. Methodology is the phylosophical use of selected methods (Haynes, 2008) to discuss selected issues.

Methodology deals with the context of discovery and context of justification. Context of discovery relates to the de facto history of discovery of urban governance with the implication that empirical findings are accepted and used by countries in accordance with requirements and developments in such findings in line with the history of developments in knowledge (Budianto,
By conducting an analysis of extant case studies, the article will endeavor to find answers to some key important questions as to whether urban governance has achieved certain qualities in terms of effective administration and open and accountable politics which has been given greater emphasis in the past few years (Kearn and Paddison, 2009, p. 849). First, producing effective and responsive decision-making in the context of rapidly changing circumstances, thereby secondly raising the quality of local democracy is a way in which a city or cities within a particular state, can seek to gain an edge and add value to their activities; it can boost their international credentials as desirable and decent places in which to live, work and invest (Kearn and Paddison, 2009, p. 849).

II. THEORETICAL REVIEW

Urban governance has become one of the interesting areas in public administration, political and policy science. Governance mechanisms have always existed and in this sense governance is nothing new (Imrie and Raco in Kearn and Paddison, p. 847). Rhodes (1997) contends that governance serves a variety of approaches, which include: governance as a minimal state; governance as corporate governance; governance as the new public management; governance as 'good governance; governance as a socio-cybernetic system; governance as self-organizing networks. Essentially, governance highlights the minimal role of urban government in regulating cities. This perspective is not in line with the reality that governing cities has also been made more difficult by the growing complexity of social life (Kearn and Paddison, 2009, p. 846).
One of the definitions of governance is as public management. This approach employed by Public Management and New Public Management in conducting studies and research on urban areas, was drawn from public administration and political science, referred to as urban management, and became very popular during 1980s. The managerial approach in conducting studies on urban governments place strong emphasis on the design of city government organizations in an effort to pressing urban problems they faced. The approach has a tendency to ignore formal organizational structures as stipulated in local government laws of each country, and give preference to the roles and functions which city governments could play as one of the actors in urban development (Nurmandi, 2006). The Urban Management Programme (UMP), is a United Nations Organization under the UNHCS considers city governments as vital players in urban management. Besides, the involvement of two actors: NGOs and the private sector, is vitally important in efforts to find solutions to problems that people who live in cities face. UMP with its various programs, research and consultations with city governments, attempts to introduce a new approach which places a lot of emphasis on cooperation between governments and non government actors and the private sector in finding solutions to problems cities/urban areas face in developing countries. Jon Pierre (1999) defines UMP as a managerial model. The urban management approach is drawn from NPM (new public management) thinking which is underpinned by generic management philosophy because it argues that all management has similar challenges and hence should be resolved in similar ways in public and private organizations (1998).

Based on institutionalism theory, urban governance is viewed as an understanding of the relationships between institutions, behavior and outcomes. There is a crucial link between institutions (as contextual constraints) and outcomes (as consequences of collective choice) in
behavior (Diermeier and Krehbiel, 2001). The method of building institutional theory in urban governance is as follows

![Figure 1: The Method of Building Institutional Theories](image)


Pastly Healey (2004) an experts who is not satisfied with the extant concept of urban governance and its relationship to creativity or innovation, poses some key important questions: what types of governance infrastructure have the capacity to release imaginative and innovative activities in city regions?; what interventions help to transform governance culture to generate such capacity?; and what imaginative resources and mobilising power help to enrich context to foster the mainstreaming of successful experiments? Healey’s important finding is that governance and creativity are not opposed but intertwined phenomena.

Jon Pierre (1999) using institutional theory, describes practices in Europe and America which create different urban governances that are based on four models which include: managerial, instrumental, corporatist, progrowth and welfare governance. Managerial and progrowth governance are both market-conforming forms of urban governance, whereas
corporatist and welfare governance are seeking to control or contain market forces (Jon Pierre, 1999, p. 390).

Table 1 Models of Urban Governance: Defining Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defining characteristics</th>
<th>Managerial</th>
<th>Corporatist</th>
<th>Progrowth</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy objective</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy style</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of political exchange</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of public-private exchange</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Concerted</td>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local state-citizen relationship</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary contingency</td>
<td>Profesionals</td>
<td>Civic leaders</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>The state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key instruments</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>Deliberation</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern of subordination</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key evaluative criterion</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>Equity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Managerial governance accords only a minimal role to elected officials: the emphasis is on output performance according to private management standards (Pierre, 1999, p. 350). Corporatist governance portrays local government as a political and democratic system for the inclusion of social groups and organized interest in the urban political process (Pierre, 1999, p. 381). Progrowth governance is the structuring of concerted, public-private actions to boost the local economy (Pierre, 1999, p. 384). Meanwhile, welfare governance refers to the governance of this particular type of anticapitalist sentiment and uses networks within higher echelons of government to compensate for the eroded tax base (Pierre, 1999, p. 387).

Contemporary studies perceive urban governance as an autopoietic, self-organizing network (Rhodes, 1996). Stacey, et al (2000) does not differentiate between micro and macro levels governance, including urban governance or what is referred to as complex responsive
processes (CRP). This perspective on urban governance is considered as: processes of action and interaction through which people in organizations act jointly, transforming their environment and their identities.

![Diagram of CAS modelling frameworks](image)

Fig. 2. General CAS modelling frameworks


CAS is a complex system of organizing, capable of adapting overtime, allow analysts from different disciplinary backgrounds to examine the cases and develop theirs own perspectives on the nature of participants, actions and outcomes (Rhodes, 2008, p. 363). A literature review of ADB research reports on best practices from the public management perspective fosters an elucidation of various governance practices in Asian cities. The author attempts to drawn an interesting conclusion on the nature of urban governance that supports public social welfare by comparing cities in Asia.

Strengthening local government and improving its performance requires action across a
wide range of areas of local government management and operation. Priorities will vary depending on the particular capabilities of the local government concerned. Programs for strengthening local government are primarily the responsibility of the local authority itself (Roberts and Kinsley, 2006: 456).

Methodology

This article is comparative study to compare urban governance practices of cities, which are considered best practice by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Urban governance research should benefit greatly from the more widespread use of existing descriptive methods and techniques, which produce results that are easy to compare across cities, and thus expand the basis for *inductive theory building*: the high cost of such methods discourages comparative research designs with multiple cases, a similar but more cost-effective research method -- which has advantages and disadvantages -- is discussed (Gissendanner, 2003).

The case study method is a research strategy, the use of which is based on analysis of problems. The form of research very much fits such questions as “how and why in a certain social context and setting”. The object of the research is determined purposively based on findings of previous research by research institutions. Yin elucidates that:

Case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between (the) phenomenon and context are not clearly defined”. (1994)

As Yin points out a case study is an empirical inquiry that ‘*investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident*’ (Yin, 1994: 13). The phenomenon of urban governance is
investigated within the real-life context of urban governance taking into account that the boundaries between the local government and central government are not clearly evident.

**Comparative Case Studies: From Poor Governance to Unified Governance**

Case studies of “good practice” urban regional development from 12 countries in Asia which aimed to highlight examples of good practice that demonstrate elements of sustainability and that may be transferable in part, or as a whole, to other cities and countries, there are seven sustainability criteria which are the main focus of studies. These are good governance, urban management, infrastructure and service provision, financing and cost recovery, social and environmental sustainability, innovation and change, and leveraging ODA. However, this paper will base the analysis only on good governance and urban management. Overall, urban management shows a more significant implementation from the twelve countries than good governance toward some programs in their countries published by Asian Development Bank (Roberts and Kinsley, 2006). This paper will describe the good practices of urban governance which are effective, transparent and accountable in a way to achieve a well-governed city which is comfortable and worthy of investment.

In terms of good governance, most of examined countries have good governance by applying 3 sustainable urban management programs in each country Cambodia, People’s Republic of China, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam. Meanwhile, India, Indonesia or Malaysia apply only 2 programs of good governance in their countries followed by Bangladesh, Lao PDR with only 1 program and Pakistan with none (Roberts and Kinsley, 2006: 9-10).
The Root Cause of Urban Problems: Poor Governance

Bangladesh has only a recent record of planned urban development. Efforts were made in the 1960s and the 1970s for a national urban planning system, which would have taken into consideration such aspects as location, size, spacing, and function of urban centers. Instead, planned development was considered on an individual city basis. The four largest cities were brought under master plans in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Each city was given an urban planning and development authority to prepare master plans and to develop the cities in keeping with such plans. The authorities are RAJUK for Dhaka, Chittagong Development Authority for Chittagong, Khulna Development Authority for Khulna and Rajshahi Development Authority for Rajshahi (Islam, 2006: 43).

The root of these problems can be traced to one or more major concerns. The absence of urban planning, lack of financial resources and the weak implementation of plans, if any, aggravate the above crises (Islam, 2006: 55). However, ineffectual urban governance is probably the single most serious cause of such problems due to lack of accountability or transparency and inefficiency on the part of those responsible for governance and the lack of awareness and the absence of organized movements among ordinary people. There is lack of adequate devolution of power and authority to urban local bodies from the central government and similarly within the city authority to devolve power and responsibility to the lower-level hierarchy, such as the wards. Inadequacy of qualified professionals is also a major limitation in establishing good governance. Absence of good leadership at the city level is a very major concern (Islam, 2006: 55). The issue of urban governance in Bangladesh is absence of good leadership, staff skills, relationships with central government and planning capabilities. In the perspective of the theory,
the approach of New Public Management was not appropriate for analysing the case of urban governance in Bangladesh.

Like in Bangladesh, in Cambodia the issue of leadership became also a key element for urban governance and more in the case of Cambodia, particularly as presented in the case studies of re-urbanization of Cambodia are presented: Phnom Penh Municipality Planning for All, Battambang Town Decentralization Program and Kratie Growth Pole Study (Khemro, 2006:

Governance and public institutions in Cambodia had to be reestablished at the end of the Khmer Rouge period with very limited human and financial resources. This has proven difficult and problems of government effectiveness and responsiveness are still inhibiting development and the provision of infrastructure and services. Governance problems are widespread in such areas as appropriate laws and regulations and their consistent implementation, public participation, and economic and financial management. There is a limited and poorly exploited revenue base and poorly functioning expenditure controls and weak transparency and accountability. Development and investment in Cambodia are being constrained by insecure property rights, time-consuming and unproductive regulations and widespread corruption in contracting process. These problems are compounded by inadequate infrastructure and services (Khemro, 2006: 76).

The government has begun implementing a program of reforms in an effort to promote and improve governance in all government agencies. Decentralization and deconcentration programs are two ambitious policies toward good governance emanating from the central to the local governments. As a result, nationwide commune elections were conducted in 2002-for the first time in the history of Cambodia-to elect representatives of the local population. Moreover, in an attempt to spread development at the grassroots levels, two key development reforms have
also been introduced: the Social Fund program and the SEILA program. The aims of these programs include coordinating all overseas assistance and aid to support the decentralization and de-concentration policies (Khemro, 2006: 76).

Key activities of SEILA included strengthening the legal framework and regulations; working out systems and principles; capacity building; integration of management data; monitoring and auditing; and strengthening partnerships among national, provincial, municipal and communal level (SEILA 2005). To further delegate decision-making power to the local level, the Prime Minister has in recent years proposed that responsibility for making decisions concerning financial investments below $2 million will be decided at the provincial and municipal levels. Such decentralized decision making, although not yet fully implemented, will undoubtedly provide local government with further power to manage its own business (Khemro, 2006: 76-77).

**Unified Governance: Neighborhood Participation**

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the most populated country in the world and is undergoing rapid economic development and urbanization. Some issues facing urbanization in the PRC and three case studies introduced are Revitalizing the Inner City-Case Study of Nanjing, Shenzen; Building a City from Scratch; and Reviving Rust-belt Industries in the Liaodong Peninsula (Laquian, 2006: 101). The three case studies show the importance of adopting intergovernmental political and administrative mechanisms to make metropolitan and regional governance more efficient and effective. Unified metropolitan governance is used in all cases to coordinate the delivery of urban services, with special concentration of key urban functions that are region-wide, such as water and sewerage, transport and solid waste disposal. Financial mechanisms are also important, illustrating how a regional approach can improve the
financial viability of metropolitan governance, improve sharing tax revenues and bring about more equity among local governments in a metropolitan area (Laquian, 2006: 134). These three mechanisms address to handle the main problem in regional economic governance in the PRC is the proliferation of government agencies, which creates administrative and political fragmentation. There is functional fragmentation where agencies in charge of water, transport, energy, solid waste management and other urban services pursue their policies and programs independently. There is also vertical fragmentation where central government ministries and bureaus as well as local authorities at the provincial, prefectural, metropolitan, city, town, district, municipal and neighborhood levels exercise their own authority and power. Governance is complicated further by the presence of special authorities responsible for specific functions (water boards, electric companies) as well as agencies with exclusive authority over affairs in designated geographic areas (port authorities, SEZ authorities) (Laquian, 2006: 113).

As in other countries, the primary instrument that the central government uses in intergovernmental economic relations is control over budgetary and expenditure functions. Traditionally, the bulk of central Government income came from operations of state-owned enterprises, custom duties and the center’s share in local tax proceeds. These resources were allocated to local governments on the basis of need. Central governmental allocation of funds, of course, did not encourage local units to raise their own local revenue (Laquian, 2006: 113).

According to the mode of ‘two levels of government and three tiers of management’ in Shanghai, the Street Office has been converted from a subordinated agency (paicujigou) of district government to the baselevel government. As a result of the devolution of state power, the Street Office has gained a comprehensive set of regulatory functions. Rather than responding to
commands from ‘hierarchical’ government departments as it did in the past, the Street Office can now act as a ‘comprehensive’ and ‘territorial’ entity (Wu, Fulong, 2002, p. 1087).

Compared to other countries, the PRC lags behind in the use of people’s participation in urban governance. Essentially, urban management in PRC cities is vested in Communist Party officials although increasingly, highly trained professional planners and managers are taking over urban management functions. The uniqueness of the PRC situation is quite apparent. While NGOs and community-based organizations may not be active in the PRC, many structural mechanisms licit people’s participation in decision making. At the most basic level, the neighborhood associations serve as excellent mechanisms for local decision making. They are also efficient transport channels for disseminating information on urban policies and programs. In the performance of key functions, such as maintaining cleanliness and hygiene, community beautification, control of crime and juvenile delinquency and maintenance of local road and community facilities, these neighborhood associations work very effectively by mobilizing local human and financial resources (Laquian, 2006: 134).

Meanwhile India and Indonesia with the one populous state has different urban governance. India is federal state. Indonesia is unitary state. Best practice in India is experience by issuing municipal bond to finance infrastructure. Urban infrastructure and services in India have historically been financed by direct budgetary support. Few, if any, of the institutions responsible for infrastructure provision have been able to generate surpluses for financing them. Faced with resource compression and growing economy-wide demands on urban infrastructure and services, important initiatives have been taken in recent years, which, on the one hand, have introduced new modes and instruments of financing infrastructure and, on the
other hand, focused on creating an environment for enhancing efficiency and equity in managing urban development (Mathur, 2006: 135).

The first case study is concerned with the issuance of bonds by municipal governments, using the strength of the potential revenue streams. The second looks at substituting the rental basis of assessing property values by area characteristics, assumed to be closer to the market prices; and the third considers wide-ranging structural and systemic reforms, with the purpose of eliminating those impediments that have constrained the functioning of land and housing markets and the flow of private investments into urban infrastructure (Mathur, 2006: 135).

India faces an enormous challenge in having to meet the requirements of a large and growing urban population base. The two initiatives, the issuance of municipal bonds and reform of property taxation, demonstrate how governments can improve their revenue base and utilize the nascent but growing capital market for infrastructure financing. NURM aims to eliminate the numerous impediments that have blocked investments in cities and city-based infrastructure. The long-term task, however, lies in coming to grips with the urban phenomenon as it is likely to develop in the face of open borders and external influences. How to absorb them, ensuring that their gains are spread equitably among the different civil society groups, is the challenge that needs to be recognized (Mathur, 2006: 154).

Indonesia’s decentralization and democratization efforts have been so dramatic that they effectively changed the way the country is governed at all levels. New institutions were created and old ones terminated. Numerous existing laws and by-laws currently require modification, amendment, or even replacement, some of them urgently. Government officials and stakeholders at all levels need to learn what their roles are in the new system of development and governance. Members of civil society have become more vocal about their role in the
development processes. Members of civil society have established various urban forums to provide an additional vehicle for participation in development. Even private enterprises-domestic as well as international-find themselves needing to adjust to the new environment, not only in the form of more transparent ways of doing business or working with local governments more than ever before but also in responding to the increasing demand to assume corporate social responsibilities (Sarosa, 2006: 158).

Most city governments-and also kabupaten (county) governments that cover a significant proportion of urbanized areas-have been overwhelmed by the ever-increasing demand for urban services, infrastructure, housing and facilities and employment. The urban informal sector, within which most rural-to-urban migrants find refuge, has become ubiquitous in Indonesian urban landscapes but has not been seriously or strategically addressed by many city governments (ILO URDI 2005, UNDP URDI 2004) (Sarosa, 2006: 158).

Indonesia has taken up the opportunity provided by the late 1990s crisis to build a more sustainable basis for development through democratization and decentralization and, to some extent, privatization. The ensuing strengthening of local governments is crucial in view of the challenges posed by continuous urbanization. Indeed, democratization – including the implementation of good local governance – and decentralization could be seen as one of the prerequisites for successful urbanization (Sarosa, 2006: 183-184).

The three local good practices discussed provide the following lessons:

- By transferring authority and necessary resources to the city/local governments, decentralization has provided opportunities for city/local governments to pay much more through attention to problems faced at the local level than could any central government.
• The Tarakan case highlights the real possibility of balancing economic, social and environmental considerations in development – something that as been frequently said but rarely consistently applied in many rapidly growing economies.

• The Sleman case demonstrates that intergovernment cooperation can work to benefit all parties involved and shows that implementation of good governance principles can have positive outcomes for local governments.

• The Jembrana case shares lessons of efficiency and effectiveness while, at the same time, illustrating that it is possible to combine short-term objectives with long-term goals, even by a poor local government (Sarosa, 2006: 184).

The progress on decentralization has been rapid in Indonesia, but there have been enormous problems that will take many years to solve. The lack of institutional capacity and resistance to change, shortage of skills in local government agencies and deficiencies in the decentralization laws are major factors contributing to the slowness in implementing many aspects of decentralization and improving the management cities (Sarosa, 2006: 185).

**Design from the Top: Lao and Malaysia**

The Lao people’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) has been a slow transition to a socialist market economy, including the adoption of the Lao PDR constitution in 1991. The changes to the economy have led to increased urbanization, which is placing pressure on local governments to meet the growing demand for improved urban services to encourage industrial development and new investment opportunities (Mabbitt, 2006: 189).

The case studies illustrate different aspects of urban and regional development planning at three scales. In the Vientiane case study, attention is focused on participatory village improvements. The Luang Prabang case study looks at the achievements and problems of urban
upgrading and heritage management projects working alongside each other in a medium-sized secondary town. The third study examines the broad objectives of the international East-West Economic Corridor and how it is affecting the development of the country’s second city, Savannakhet, and its hinterland (Mabbitt, 2006: 189).

The planning and development of the Lao PDR has been driven from the center since the socialist regime came into power in 1975. Most administrative functions and decisions currently operate from the central government through line ministries at the provincial and district levels. While provincial authorities enjoy some decision-making powers, there is little autonomy at the district level. There are no regional authorities in the Lao PDR (Mabbitt, 2006: 197).

As mentioned above, the system of national 5-year plans prevail as the major tool guiding the country’s growth. Although the philosophy of the 5-year plans system is one of consensus building with inputs from the provinces and districts, the principal decisions are taken and targets are set centrally. The committee for planning and investment (CPI) oversees the review and combination of proposed policies, program, and projects included in the draft 5-year plans for consideration and approval by the National Assembly (Mabbitt, 2006: 197). While the process of decentralizing administration is well underway, similar processes for revenue raising and budget control are not far advanced. Significant hurdles may remain, therefore, because provisions of the local administrative law appear to conflict with already existing, legislation, such as the Budged Law (Mabbitt, 2006: 197). The creation of UDAAs, the designation of the Savan-Seno special economic Zone in Savannakhet (see below), the move toward the establishment of municipalities are expected to spearhead the financial decentralization process (Mabbitt, 2006: 197).
In Malaysia, the city of Putrajaya is not separated from the role of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, who had the vision of Malaysia's next capital city. He wanted to separate the functions of the capital from the city as the capital of business: Kuala Lumpur-capital cities in the world. The establishment of the new capital was done programmatically where government became the main actor in the development of the city. Three case studies demonstrate sustainable aspects of urban region development: planning of Petaling Jaya satellite new town; Putrajaya Wetland Lake development; and innovation and change involving the Cyberjaya Multimedia Super Corridor. The Malaysian government has continuously given attention to avoiding environmental degradation from overdevelopment while seeking innovative ideas to build sustainable cities. The three case studies showcase some of those efforts: community participation in local agenda 21 PJ, and Cyberjaya as an intelligent garden city achieving the broader goal of urban development and sustainability. They are primarily aimed at making cities work better for all who live, work, to approaches that are being implemented at various levels-from local to metropolitan and regional-to meeting existing concerns and challenges (Yuen, etc., 2006: 241).

**Pakistan: Leadership from Below in Urban Governance**

The current state of towns and cities in Pakistan is at complete odds with the rich heritage of urban planning that flourished in the subcontinent for more than a millenium. Cities once known for manicured gardens and exquisite fountains today reek of unmanaged solid waste and sewage. Due to resource constraints, sanitation and water supply have not been given top priority for the disenfranchised urban poor in Pakistan, who face poverty, disease and lack of opportunity. The
case studies that demonstrate good practice in sustainable urban development in Pakistan related to water supply, solid waste management and sanitation (Haider and Haider, 2006: 247).

The three case studies are examples of successful community involvement in municipal service delivery. The local governments were unable to offer vital municipal services. Each community realized a need, formed a leadership structure and started delivering the services. The merits of community-based initiatives have been recognized globally. The Copenhagen convention, a project involving the world’s leading economist and offering solutions for the most pressing challenges, also endorses community-based solutions. CBOs check corruption and excessive pricing by eliminating intermediaries and by encouraging the community to invest labor, time and expertise (Haider and Haider, 2006: 266).

The government needs to work together with CBOs. In neighborhood-level sanitation, the local government offered assistance to connect local sewer lines to the trunk sewers. In the case of water supply, the community laid out the internal network, which the local government linked up with the municipal water supply network (Haider and Haider, 2006: 266).

The pioneering role and intellectual leadership of Akhtar Hameed Khan of OPP is evident in the Faisalabad water supply project and Lodhran’s sanitation project. Even after his death, Dr. Khan, through his writings, continues to inspire community workers. Dr. Khan influenced Mr. Wattoo, the force behind the Faisalabad project and Jahangeer Khan Tareen, who founded LPP (Haider and Haider, 2006: 266).

Intellectual leadership is the crucial along with role of community mobilizers whose job is to win the trust of the community and mobilize them toward a common goal. In this regard, the key role of the late Hafeez Arain of OPP needs to be recognized. Mr. Arain worked tirelessly in communities across Pakistan. He earned their confidence before he proposed any plans for
infrastructure development. Mr. Arain laid the foundation of trust in Lodhnanand in Faisalabad that allowed local leaders, such as Mr. Wattoo and Mr. Tareen, to proceed with the development (Haider and Haider, 2006: 266-267).

In the case of solid water management in Lahore, a local entrepreneur, Asif Farooki, provided the leadership role in a slightly different capacity. The project was based in a middle-income community demonstrating willingness to pay for an improved service. Mr. Farooki provided the entrepreneurial leadership to offer a service that the municipal authorities failed to provide (Haider and Haider, 2006: 267).

Regional economic governance and intergovernment financial relations in Philippine and Thailand

Three case studies of good practice of urban city region development as experienced by Bacolod, Naga and Iloilo are presented, followed by a discussion on key lessons learned and strategies to enhance urban region development (Mangahas, 2006: 273). These cases will explore urban governance from regional economic governance essentially favoring a policy of consolidation rather than fragmentation of administrative regions and key areas in the country. This manifested in the MTPDP 2000-2004, which delineated nine regional groupings that cut across and overlap with the existing administrative regional delineations. These new regional groupings were based on the extent of existing and potential economic interaction, level of development, cultural and ethnic factors and natural resources features like watersheds and river basins (Mangahas, 2006: 280-281). The President also appoints seven Presidential Assistants for Regional Concerns to advise her on regional development concerns. These are “liaison officers”
The recent regional groupings seem to convey the importance of enhancing cooperation and connections rather than fragmentation among regions and key areas in Phillipines. They seek to foster greater inter-and intra-regional connections that have been more or less diminished by the practice of dividing the country into as many regions as possible for the sake of administrative convenience (Mangahas, 2006: 281). One policy instrument, regional economic governance is intergovernmental transfer. Most LGUs (local government unit) rely on IRAs (internal revenue allotment) to finance their operations. The existing system of intergovernmental transfers does not facilitate the development of integrated and well-coordinated plans and programs across the different tiers of government. The IRA formula has also been criticized for being inequitable, inefficient and incapable of promoting local tax effort. Provinces and cities each get 23% share of IRA. The cities, however, have more taxes and a richer tax base than do provinces. The equal sharing component of IRA encourages greater local government fragmentation and discourages local government mergers that could lead to more efficient provision of local goods and services. Finally, there are indications that IRA tends to substitute or decrease local tax effort. For LGUs not inclined to put up new project or improve their services, the IRA is enough to meet their operational requirements (Mangahas, 2006: 285).

In spite of the authority of LGUs to incur to debts and raise equity, many LGUs seldom utilize the credit market for development financing. Most LGUs prefer to secure grants and donations. The PDAF is among the most popular sources of funding for many local projects. Such projects do not pass through local or regional development councils, bypassing prioritization procedures and possibly crowding out crucial projects (Mangahas, 2006: 285).
A major factor constraining LGUs from borrowing is their lack of technical capability to formulate development plans and package project proposals for acquiring loans or other types of financing, such as BOT (built operate transfer) programs. Many LGUs do not have updated local development plans and many development plans are not supported by sound financing programs. There is limited knowledge of the policy implications and general technical content of the different means of credit financing. For small and medium-sized LGUs, budgets are not available for preparing project feasibility studies (Mangahas, 2006: 285-286).

In addition to the the internal constraints of LGUs are legal and administrative constraints from the national Government. One major constraint is the annual appropriation for debt service to 20% of the regular income of an LGU, thus hindering the local government from implementing even self-liquidating and/or self-supporting projects that require sizeable capital outlay (Mangahas, 2006: 286).

The Commission on Audit and Central Bank regulations requiring LGUs to maintain their deposits with government financial institutions constitute another restriction. This requirement effectively disallows private financial institutions from availing of the IRA mechanism that serves as collateral for LGU and weakens the power of LGUs to negotiate or search for the cheapest borrowing rate (Mangahas, 2006: 286).

The bond market is an alternative source of capital financing for LGUs, but such offerings are seen as high credit risk. The private sector sees LGU management, operations and financial record-keeping as weak. In addition, LGUs and private financial institutions use different financial and accounting systems. Investors are aware that long-term credit obligations will not be compounded by the absence of an independent LGU credit rating agency and the lack of a secondary market for LGU bonds (Mangahas, 2006: 286).
Even with the ongoing decentralization process, Thailand’s central Government is still highly involved—either directly through line agencies or indirectly through state enterprises—in regulating, planning and funding many local services. A significant share of local expenditures thus remains centrally mandated, with the largest portion devoted to personnel expenses (representing 30% of local budgets, on average). Subnational revenues include locally collected tax and nontax revenues, as well as centrally collected taxes and shared taxes (Vorratnchaiphan and Villeneuve, 2006: 353).

Central government and local sources of revenues are both available to local governments. However, in Thailand, as in many other developing countries, local government authorities have limited tax resources at their disposal. By law, they cannot levy seven taxes locally: on house and rent, land development, signboards, animal slaughter, gasoline, tobacco and entertainment. Shared taxes include value-added tax and sales tax, special business tax, natural resource tax, exercise taxes and vehicle tax, all of which accrue to local governments. In addition, local authorities are authorized to collect licence fees, fines and user charges and permit fees (Vorratnchaiphan and Villeneuve, 2006: 353).

For major capital improvements, such as bridges and drainage systems, there is usually a capital cost-sharing arrangement between central and local governments. With the delivery of services being either directly provided or regulated by the central Government, local administration is often assigned the maintenance of such projects upon completion (Vorratnchaiphan and Villeneuve, 2006: 354).

Through a detailed approval procedure of projects and subsequent budgets, the central Government retains considerable regulation of major decisions by local government administration for spending on development services. The Ministry of Interior and Bureau of
Budget must approve any budget or project amendments proposed by local government prior to implementation. This process applies to both regulation of development and the revenue structure of local government (Vorratnchaiphan and Villeneuve, 2006: 354).

Regarding intergovernmental transfers, the effect of the constraints imposed by the central Government is that local administration cannot determine accurate funding levels (revenues) to support local government services. This is mainly due to delays in establishing the criteria for distributing the allocations from the central to the local governments (Vorratnchaiphan and Villeneuve, 2006: 354).

Local governments may borrow domestically and internationally, with prior authorization from the Cabinet and issue debt securities and borrow from official, external bilateral creditors for development projects. In practice, local debt financing is somewhat limited, including that from domestic capital markets. The primary source of borrowing has been local development funds managed by the Ministry of Interior. Subnational governments have more recently borrowed from commercial banks and public revolving funds (Vorratnchaiphan and Villeneuve, 2006: 354).

**Low Capacity of Urban Governance in Sri Lanka and Vietnam**

Sri Lanka is an island country that has been affected significantly in recent years by natural disasters and civil unrest. The uncertainty created by these events has made it difficult for Sri Lanka to attract foreign investment for the development of new industries, which is a factor contributing to its low level and rate of urbanization. However, like other Asian countries, Sri Lanka is expected to experience increasing urbanization in the future (Horen and Pinnawala, 2006: 309).
The case studies examined concerned with urbanization in Sri Lanka are the neighborhood health and environment project (Green Star Homes Project) and the Clean Settlements Program, both in the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) area and a community-based solid waste management program in Dehiwala Mount Lavinia Municipality to the south of Colombo City (Horen and Pinnawala, 2006: 309).

Analyses of governance institutions in developing countries reveal that they are too rigid and are insufficiently adaptive to changing imperatives at the micro-or metropolitan levels (McCarney 1996). Thus, they are poorly equipped to manage poverty reduction interventions, such as urban improvement initiatives, effectively. Consequently, even after capacity building has taken place, governance institutions typically fail to facilitate the effective integration of low-income settlements into the urban fabric or ensure the continuity of the settlement improvement process (Horen and Pinnawala, 2006: 338).

The six areas noted above are critical for ensuring the longer-term continuation of the process and the subsequent improvement in urban areas. Some countries in Asia have decentralized power to the local level, but have not built capacity at this level, with the consequence that local government is unable to deal with issues at the local government level (Horen and Pinnawala, 2006: 338).

If institutional capacity is not developed, then it is only a matter of 2 or 3 years before the infrastructure starts falling apart and the community will be no better off than before the development intervention began. Similarly, a local government that lacks the capacity at the local level does not devolve to the local level (Horen and Pinnawala, 2006: 338).

The level of urbanization in Sri Lanka is lower than those in most Asian countries; however, many urban areas of the country are experiencing serious environmental and urban
development problems. With further improvements expected in the economy in future, urbanization rates are projected to rise. This will present a significant challenge to national and local governments in trying to ensure that urban and regional development is sustainable. Most local governments do not have the capability to manage and provide basic services to meet the needs of communities and/or support local economic development. The general failure of central Government to fully embrace decentralization also presents significant challenges to the development of the country (Horen and Pinnawala, 2006: 340).

In the context of decentralization, building institutional capacity is critical to ensure that the longer-term development continues. If institutional capacity is built and the six areas noted earlier are addressed, then the long-term improvement process has a good chance of continuing. Furthermore if the six areas are addressed and skills and knowledge are developed within local governments and poor communities, then both local governments and poor communities will be able to work toward more sustainable future (Horen and Pinnawala, 2006: 340).

Viet Nam is a long, narrow country with an area of 331,000 km$^2$ and a population in 2005 of approximately 83.6 million. Ravaged by more than 30 years of war and civil conflict since the 1940s, it remains one of the least-urbanized countries in Asia. However, the advent of doi moi (renovation) in 1986 triggered the transformation of the nation’s economy and accelerated a process of rapid urbanization, much of which is not sustainable (Lang, 2006: 369).

The case studies related to urbanization in Viet Nam and some of the difficulties pose for sustainability of urban development are Institutional Building in Urban Upgrading in Phu Thuong Ward, Hnoi; Environmental Improvement of Nhieu Loc-Thi Nghe Basin, Ho Chi Minh
City; and Urban Upgrading, Environmental Impact Assessment in Van Mieu Ward, Nam Dinh City, Nam Dinh Province (Lang, 2006: 370).

The weakness and unwillingness of local governments in Viet Nam to take control of urban development has led to much indecision on how to address serious urban development problems. There have been tensions in central and local governments about:

- Conservative versus more innovative approaches to addressing urban problems;
- Upgrading versus redevelopment and new building involving clearance;
- Benefits of urban development to society, community and the private sector and the extent to which developers should contribute to the provision of community infrastructure and services;
- Demand for urban services and financial capacity and willingness of governments, business and communities to pay for these;
- Urban development and protection of agricultural land; and
- Urban development and environmental protection (Lang, 2006: 379).

Most local governments have a poor understanding of the nature and causes of urbanization. Some municipalities understand urbanization simply as a process of migration to towns resulting from overcrowding in the countryside. Few appreciate that urbanization is being driven by major structural changes in economy and by powerful forces resulting from globalization and foreign direct investment. Many local governments lack of necessary skills to develop appropriate policies responsive to the development of market economy. There are still strong ideological differences in national and local government over the extent to which the state should control the development or hand over greater responsibility for urban development to the private sector (Lang, 2006: 379).
People Participation in Urban Governance of Brazil

Under Brazil’s Constitution, municipalities are given the opportunity to establish “organic” laws, by which they may structure their own operations and set up what are called “municipal boards”. These boards, in turn, have the formal function of mediating between the local government and organized civil society. A study of the organic laws of the fifty largest Brazilian cities in the mid-nineties observed that all except three had created municipal boards, six housing boards, two sanitation boards and thirty-five environmental boards. The most important functions of these boards were health and education (defined in the new Constitution as municipal powers), with forty-five and forty, respectively, having been created in the fifty cities studied (Stren, 2000: 7).

Aside from the promotion of municipal boards, eighteen of the fifty cities instituted the “participatory budget” – by which neighborhood and then higher level committees discuss and finally decide on the allocation of a proportion of a city’s capital allocation, on a regular basis. Among public management reforms over the last two decades, argues advanced experiment in the democratization of local governments”. The same researcher conducted a survey in 1994 of 832 delegates to nine “regional forums” in Belo Horizonte; of the total, 45% were women, most had low levels of schooling (thus making the group broadly representative of the entire population of the city), nearly 60% had resided for no fewer than 10 years in their current neighborhood and 70% stated that they normally participated in voluntary organizations of one kind or another. In the Belo Horizonte case, the participatory budgetary system reinforced the establishment of the 9 regional (decentralized) administrations in the city, since the local populations were brought into a more direct relationship with administrators (Stren, 2000: 7).
But the most well known of the Brazilian cities practicing the participatory budget system is Porto Alegre, a city of about 1.3 million in the south of the country. According to an article by Rebecca Abers, the system is based on the work of 16 forums based on local regions of the city; there are in addition five thematic forums (created in 1994) involving education, health and social services, transportation, city organization, and economic development; and a municipal budget council with representatives from the regional and thematic forums. The system was originated in 1989 by the Union of Neighborhood Associations, resulting in some 400 people participating in 16 assemblies and 14,000 more in further meetings to negotiate compromises between the demands of one region and another. The system is complex and continues virtually throughout the year. The regional forums even micro-manage the actual implementation of capital projects. According to the municipality, more than 70 cities elsewhere in Brazil and throughout the world (including Buenos Aires, Barcelona and Saint Denis) have adapted this system to their own needs. The current mayor of the city claims the popularity of the participatory budget system has contributed to a tripling of the tax revenues of the city; and an outside study of the city demonstrates that even from 1992 to 1995, the city increased its total tax receipts by 34% (Stren, 2000: 7-8).

The serious and comparative study of urban service management seems to have begun in Asia and Africa, but by the early 1990s publications on urban management and the special problems of urban services began to appear in Latin America. A problem with the urban management approach was that it was never closely defined. In some ways this led to ambiguity, confusion and overlap, but from another perspective, the openness of the concept gave considerable flexibility to operating agencies (Stren, 2000: 2).
The research possibilities attached to the concept of urban management were, however, very rich. The Bank, IDRC and a number of other agencies supported studies of the operation of different public services – in particular, refuse collection and disposal and water distribution were popular subjects. Economics, geographers and public administration specialists were involved in these studies. It was not a foregone conclusion that wealthier cities would be more successful and poorer cities less successful with service delivery. As the World Bank argued in an important publication, “the deficiencies in urban services in the cities of developing countries are a reflection not merely of absolute resource constraints but also of other constraints, particularly the institutional arrangements of urban service delivery”. These institutional arrangements could range from formal organizational rules, to incentive structures, to the location of a service in the public or the private domain (Stren, 2000: 2).

Local government plays a central role in the welfare and amenity of urban communities. They directly affects local economic development and employment through its impacts on locational competitiveness and the local investment climate. It affects the cost of establishing and operating business enterprises and their profitability. An important objective of local government should be to improve the income and employment effects of urbanization by reducing barriers to productivity growth. Local government also plays an important role in protecting the poor and most disadvantaged members of the community, in affecting the supply and availability of infrastructure and services, and guiding and regulating the social, environmental and spatial effects of the growth. Virtually all the case studies were dependent in one way or another for their success on local government (Roberts and Kanaley, 2006: 455).

The challenge for local government in Asia, as elsewhere, is to increase the welfare of citizens. To fulfill its responsibilities, it requires the capacity to assess community needs, plan
strategically for future community development, set priorities, balance numerous and sometimes competing interests, and provide infrastructure and services. Local government needs to approach those roles flexibly to plan ahead, manage risk and focus on outcomes. Its roles will vary depending upon circumstances. In some cases, it will be a provider of services or regulator of activities and in others, indirectly guide development or act as an enabler of service provision (Roberts and Kanaley, 2006: 455).

Strengthening local government and improving its performance requires action across the wide range of areas of local government management and operation. Priorities will vary depending on the particular capabilities of the local government concerned. Programs for strengthening local government are primarily the responsibility of the local authority itself (Roberts and Kanaley, 2006: 456).

Table 2. Summary of Urban Governance Practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Factors</th>
<th>Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low/Bad/unclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role of central government</td>
<td>Indonesia, Lao, Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic boundary</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating mechanism</td>
<td>Indonesia, Lao, Philippines, Srilanka, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial relations</td>
<td>Srilanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital requirement</td>
<td>Cambodia, Lao, Pakistan, Philippines, Srilanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Cambodia, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Division of government functions</td>
<td>Lao, Pakistan, Philippines, Srilanka</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>Cambodia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Lao</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

From analysis of comparative data above based on issues which is prominent in each country, it can be concluded that several key factors affecting the urban governance are the role of the central government, the existence of an enabling environment, the division of the functions of the government, geographic boundaries, coordinating mechanisms, financial relations, capital requirement, urban management and leadership. Propositions that can be lodged is as follows:

P1. The greater capacity of the national government in facilitating between levels of government and with special authorities, the more effective urban governance will take place.

P2. The structure and operation of the enabling environment is central to the functioning of urban governance and in setting the culture of operation of local authorities (Robert and Kanaley, 2006: 453).

P3. Efficient service delivery will effectively be attained by appropriate community representation which balance regional, local government and special purpose authorities (Robert and Kanaley, 2006: 453).

P4. Effective coordination among government agencies can be achieved through formal and informal consultation (Robert and Kanaley, 2006: 454).
P5. Effective urban governance is predominantly affected by the capacity of city leadership.

In order to answer paper’s question on what is effective and appropriate, it can be summarized as an enabling environment which lead to proactive and responsive decision-making in the context of rapidly changing circumstances and lead by responsible city leader, thereby, the quality of local democracy can be heightened ensuring a desirable and decent place to live, work and invest.

References


