CHAPTER II
JAPANESE PEACEFUL PACIFISM ERA

Japan was feared throughout the whole Asian region for their military brutality and expansionism. Many of the South East Asian countries suffered from their aggression and fall into the Japanese expansion of their territory. Regions in the era like the Dutch East Indies—now Indonesia—suffered years of aggression and an all-out war with the Japanese soldier. At the end of World War II the Japanese army retreated and admits defeat to the US, giving birth to new Nations.

A. Japan in the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces Era

Pre-World War II was a time where the Japanese empire had an immense tradition of valor, mainly derived from the time of the Samurai. This tradition was still in motion in the century of modernization, the battles fought in the pacific was described as “a war without mercy”. Before the dropping of the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, imperial fighters did not surrender, nor did they show fear towards their enemies, in fact, their kamikaze\(^\text{13}\) strategy worked effectively in spreading fear upon their enemies, whilst providing last resort opportunities in pushing the allied forces back.

Despite their great sacrifice and service, Japan finally subdue to the allied forces on August 15, 1945. Emperor Hirohito made a public announcement about the surrender.

\(^{13}\) Kamikaze was an act of the Japanese aviation as a last stand in crippling their enemies. The kamikaze technique was basically a suicide of a pilot, aimed at allied war ships in order to cause heavy damage in both physical, and moral.
Hirohito stated to his Council for the Direction of the War, “I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer.” \(^{14}\) After Japan had subdued, it was stated in the postdam treaty that allied forces must be in charge in the occupied state. Howard B. Schonberger states:

> Soon after the devastating explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima, President Harry Truman, after much hesitation, Decided to appoint General Douglas MacArthur, then head of American forces in the Pacific, as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. With the approval of the heads of state of Great Britain, China, and Russia, the president sent MacArthur his first directive as SCAP on 15 August 1945. The general was to require the emperor, through his representation, to sign an instrument of surrender of Japanese armed forces, “the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state will be subject to you… You will exercise supreme command over all land, sea and air forces which may be allocated for enforcement in Japan of the surrender terms by the Allied Powers concerned.” \(^{15}\)

Hence, bearing in mind that the a country who was once an enemy and is now assigned to take care of a country that they have defeated is no easy task, many have speculated that there will be numerous uproars in the Japanese society, demanding for the allied forces to be dispatched else where, thus giving the governing power back to the Japanese royal family. However, that was not the case of Japan and the United States. In fact, the Japanese people welcomes the American team to build their nation together.

\(^{14}\) (Finn, 1992)

\(^{15}\) (Schonberger, 1989)
Building the Japanese economy from the beginning needs not only the help and cooperation of the business men, but also how society perceive work, social aspects, and education. The Japanese people of all ages and even giving equal chances for both men and women in working environments. Figures from the Japanese Information Network show that women are active in Japan’s modern economy: “According to the 1995 edition of the Ministry of Labor’s Hataraku josei no jitsujo (The Labor Conditions of Women), 50.2% of women aged 15 or over had a paying job in 1994, 2.6 percentage points more than in 1980. Women comprised 40.5% of the total work force in 1994, up 1.8 points from 1980.”

On the educational side of the US occupation, the Us introduced their educational system, the 6 years of elementary, 3 years of Junior High, 3 years of Senior High, and 4 years in university. This created a standard through out Japan, as so does the curriculum that consist of social and exact sciences. However, Japan does have its differences with the US, their culture for example, and that is the reason for differences in studies implemented, and the diciplinaries in schools. The successfulness of this educational reform can be represented by the percent of students attending an education institution: “Almost 99% of students enrolled in public elementary schools.”

Hence, the educational restoration performed by these governments will help restore Japan in the far future as it nurtures the young a knowledge of any kind. The new educational system also gives benefits to those who suffer from loses of previous jobs, many Japanese citizen seek in applying as a teacher in schools, teaching from mere basics in elementary, to advance studies in University, leaving a way for

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16 The data was acquired from the Japanese Information Network, http://jin.jcic.or.jp/today/society3.html
17 Ibid
these institutions to grow in the future.

The US also helped Japan economically, by disbanning their military division and reallocating their military budget to other uses. This elimination of the military helped the economy grow by alleviating the strain on Japan’s economic resources. Military personnel joined the labor force after the disarmament and aided in the recovery of the economy. It helps in creating an increase in moving their economy rate, especially helping small scale businesses grow.

Through many doubts that the US will fail in managing its former adversary, it is in fact proven that with the US aiding Japan after WWII, Japan has strongly become a very close partner of the US. Its benefits for the country in many years to come, and even has the chance to surpass the former mentor. Instead of punishing for their acts in the war, the US had given a chance for Japan to renew their image in front of the world.

**B. Japan Under the New Japanese Government**

After the SCAP era ended in 1952 with the reason that the United States no longer sees Japan and the idea of re-armed militants is a threat to the world, the United States sees the another threat in Asia, which is the creeping of communism. Thus the US leaves Japan under the new reign of Japanese leaders to make their move in the international society whilst still heavily monitoring their movement.

The Japanese people was left with various kinds of people who sees the future of Japan differently, in a journal written by Akiko Hashimoto\(^{18}\), there are 3 different kinds that

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\(^{18}\) Akiko Hashimoto is a sociologist with a long-standing fascination for the different ways people identify with their own cultures and histories. She had lived and studied in Japan, Germany, England, and the United States, and taught cultural, comparative, global sociology at the University of Pittsburgh for 25 years. She writes about the feelings and memories that ground people’s national and cultural identities in today’s world. We become the people we are by remembering our past experiences as individuals, families,
are eager to move Japan to a certain direction, those are nationalism, pacifism, and reconciliation. These three kinds or groups are leading Japan through various ways. However, nowadays, we begin to see the spectrum of these groups in the political stage, for example Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s way on handling international issues regarding security and national military is many consider to be right-winged.

Internationally, the parallel horizons of the three paths were jolted into collision by the new realities of the new millennium when military threats and belligerence throughout the Western Pacific increased with a multitude of events: the missile launches from China and North Korea, the Gulf War followed by wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, 9/11 and the “war against terror,” and territorial disputes involving Japan with China, Korea, and Russia.

Thus, the writer feels the need of understanding these 3 groups in order to understand on the matter of when Japan moves from a country that has a pacifist military, to a more active military in present day, understanding these groups spectrum will also gives insight on the Japanese governments struggle to maintain their national identity.

a) The Nationalist Path

The nationalist path subscribes to the notion that furthering the national interest is the best solution to overcoming the past. Thus the nationalist vision is to cultivate strong national belonging to move forward into the future. It emphasizes shared belonging and collective attachment to a historical community, and derives a social identity from that “traditional” heritage. People adopting this approach tend to use the language of national pride, and resent the loss of communities, and nations – especially experiences of conflict and change. This is what my work is about. It has appeared in articles and books, most recently in my book *The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan* published by Oxford University Press in 2015.
national prestige and international standing that came with defeat seven decades ago. They vary along a spectrum of intensity from aggressive hardliners to moderates in their search for respect, and vary from realist to idealist in seeking the competitive edge over other nations, like those in neighboring East Asia. Many proponents of this approach today are neonationalist public figures including politicians, intellectuals, and cultural critics.

From aggressive neo-nationalism to moderate civic and cultural nationalism, this approach partakes of a certain cultural resistance to cosmopolitanism. National The nationalists’ impetus to inculcate national pride and patriotism in the country is readily explicable when we consider the erosion of support for traditionalist sentiments over many decades. Surveys show that national pride has declined in recent decades from 57% in 1983 to 39% in 2008, and it is consistently lower for the younger generations.\(^{19}\)

b) The Pacifist Path

The pacifist path subscribes to the notion that promoting healing and human security is the best solution to overcoming the past. Thus the pacifist vision emphasizes a radical antimilitary ethos and anti-nuclear creed to make a fundamental break from Japan’s war history. This moral vision is a source of humanist pride as well as a collective identity that allows Japan to recover its moral prestige from the deviant past.

As a people-centered vision, it focuses on all victims of war violence and nuclear threats, and uses the language of human suffering and human insecurity wrought by military action. People adopting this approach vary along a spectrum of intensity from aggressive to moderate in their protest of military violence, and from national to international in their

\(^{19}\) A survey report that is being stated in Kono Kei’s book *Gendai Nihon No Sedai: Sono Sekishutsu to Tokushutsu*, 2008
images of victims, like those killed by atomic bombs and air raids and the refugees in Syria. These proponents tend to be public leaders, from politicians to intellectuals and cultural critics who deeply mistrust the state as an agent for peaceful conflict resolution.

The accusation by the West that Japan is suffering from collective self-pity in its vow never to allow another war that would create more Hiroshimas and Nagasakis, misses the significance of pledging disarmament for a country with seven hundred years of military tradition and three victories in international wars. The pride in this radical break with the past is such that a citizen’s group nominated Article 9 for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2014.\(^\text{20}\)

Article 9 came to function as an important constraint on the government that allayed those fears. What emerged over time was an anti-war pacifism based on a desire for human security, regret for a violent past, and a pledge to be model global citizens in the future. Peace is therefore a civic identity and a strategy of moral recovery, expressing contrition as well as an aspiration for an elevated moral status in the eyes of the world. This multifaceted discursive practice of peace is therefore fundamentally different from an anti-war pacifism based on questions of war responsibility.

More recently, high-profile civic organizations and networks have sprung into action to defend the integrity of Article 9 and the constitution in response to the cabinet’s decision to reinterpret Article 9 to permit SDF to participate in international collective defense (2014). Those civic groups, consisting of scholars, public intellectuals, students, activists, and other public figures who are mostly of the postwar generation, vow to safeguard constitutionalism and constitutional democracy, and hold the government accountable to them. Organizations such as “Save

\(^{20}\) An interesting fact the writer found in Alexis Duddens report called The Nomination of Article 9 of Japan's Constitution for a Nobel Peace Prize, 2014
Constitutional Democracy” represent this updated brand of pacifism that seeks a broader constituency to hold off further challenges to Article 9 by the nationalists in government. In this perspective, constitutional pacifism embraced by popular, democratic choice constitutes the ultimate moral recovery from the long defeat.

c) The Reconciliationist Path

The reconciliationist path subscribes to the notion that enhancing transitional justice and moral responsibility in East Asia is the best solution to overcoming the past. This approach emphasizes rapprochement, an ethos of civil courage to face past wrongs, and prioritizes improved relations with Japan's regional neighbors. To different degrees, people in this category realize that accepting responsibility for past wrongs is indispensable to moving forward, and the only viable way for Japan to build mutual trust in the global world in general, and among the victims of Japanese wars throughout the Asia-Pacific in particular.

They use a range of language from human rights and redress to friendship and pluralism, and emphasize the requirements of good relations with regional neighbors. Embraced by an eclectic mix of internationally-minded leaders in politics, business, scholars, grassroots networks, and civic activists, people vary along a spectrum from aggressive to moderate in their quest for redress and justice, and from realist to idealist in pursuing rapprochement. This approach is cosmopolitan, presupposing justice as a universal value, whether it comes from religious belief, feminism, socialism, transnational intellectual sensibilities, or declarations of international agencies.

Recent polls show that only a small fraction of

21 (Fujiwara, 2010)
22 A Statement acquired form a Japanese News Corporation called Asahi Shinbun, the article was written on 18 April 2014
Chinese and South Korean people (less than 11%) actually believe that Japan embraces pacifism or is committed to reconciliation, while much larger proportions (one-third to half of respondents) believe that Japan upholds militarism. At the same time, many in China and South Korea point to Japan's “history problem” and the territorial disputes as obstacles that stand in the way of building better relationships.23

d) Shinzo Abe on Japanese Pacifism

Shinzo Abe is known for his national pride and patriotism towards his country, he and his fellow party member of the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP) are considered to be a national controversy in Japan, they promote the use of active military and economics that has relations with armaments. After lifting the export ban in 2014, Shinzo Abe has moved a step further in attaining his goal of having a normal military in Japan, some believe to amend article 9, others also believe that a simple re-intrepretation of the article is enough to achieve the active military goal.

Abe added a further significant qualifier before the United National General Assembly, the National Diet, and the Davos Forum in late 2013 and early 2014: Japan would also become a “positive pacifist” country.2 In order to do that, it would have to delete or fundamentally revise the pacifist

23 Those who thought of Japan as a pacifist society were 10.5% in China and 5.3% in South Korea; those who thought of Japan as a reconciliationist society were 6.7% in China and 3.9% in South Korea. Those who believed that Japan espoused militarism today were 36.5% in China and 53.1% in South Korea. In China, respondents believed that the “history problem” (31.9%) and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (64.8%) were major obstacles for developing a good relationship; in South Korea, the respondents ranked Takeshima/ Dokdo Island (92.2%) and the “history problem” (52.2%) highly as major obstacles for building friendships. These data were acquired from http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/forum_1407.pdf
clause (Article 9 in its constitution), reinforce its military strength (its military budget is already the fifth highest in the world), and reconstitute its existing Self-Defense Forces as a National Defense Army, ready for global missions alongside U.S. forces under a doctrine of Collective Self-Defense.24

Many states face the challenge of interpreting dark episodes in their past and relating it to their vision for the present and future. In Japan, the National Diet did not seriously address its dark past until the early post-Cold War years, between 1992 and 1995. During this period, the long postwar hegemony of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) weakened and then fractured, albeit temporarily. In this window of opportunity, the Diet adopted a resolution of apology for Japan’s past colonialism and aggression. It also admitted state responsibility for the comfort women system during World War II under which the Imperial Japanese Army recruited large numbers of women across Asia, often forcibly, to serve its soldiers sexually.

Textbooks began to cover previously untouched questions of Japan’s modern history, including comfort women; the Nanjing Massacre, which occurred in December 1937 when the Imperial Japanese forces killed large numbers of Chinese civilians during their capture of Nanjing; Unit 731, the notorious chemical and biological warfare unit based at Harbin in Northeast China where thousands of prisoners were deliberately infected with diseases and then killed; and the truth about the Battle of Okinawa, in which roughly one-third of the prefecture’s population died in the futile attempt to delay the allied invasion of mainland Japan and were in the

24 Article 51 of the UN Charter confers on states a temporary (pending authorization by the Security Council) “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if subject to armed attack.” Abe has been keen to use this as loophole to allow the dispatch of Self Defense Force (currently restricted to territorial defense of Japan) to the aid of the United States in future Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq cases.
most notorious cases ordered by Japanese military units to commit suicide.\textsuperscript{25} A national consensus of contrition over these matters appeared to be emerging.

In what follows, therefore, we consider salient aspects of the first (2006–2007) and second (2012–present) Abe governments, the implications of Abe thinking for educational policy, the role of U.S. policy and planning in forming the bifurcated Japanese identity, and the role of the Japan specialists in the United States—who have become known as Japan handlers—in guiding and maintaining the system built on that contradiction.

\textsuperscript{25} (Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, 2012)