CHAPTER III

THE JAPANESE CHANGE IN POLICY FROM PACIFIST TO A MORE ACTIVE SECURITY AS RESPONSE TOWARDS NORTH KOREA’S THREATS

Many had change over the course of 70 years. Since the end of WWII the world experience many threats especially in term of security, starting from proxy wars, bilateral dispute, cyber crimes, and terrorism countries are now unsafe. The Japanese land is no exception, with ongoing terrorist attack around Europe, United States, and South East Asia, Japan could be the next target of violent extremism. In recent decades the Japanese government had made various changes in the Japanese policy concerning security.

A. The World and The North Korean Missiles

Kim Jong Il had demonstrated to the world that a country like DPRK is a country not to be taken lightly, with their mass development of military arms which includes nuclear warheads and Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), their development had come to be noticed by world leaders. In the minds of the North Korean leadership, the correctness of pursuing nuclear weapons as tools to enable room for political maneuvering was likely reinforced by the international political pressure brought to bear to compel them to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985. Until the time when nuclear weapons would become available, it appears that the North Korean leadership still viewed chemical weapons and expanding conventional armed forces, combined with emerging asymmetric capabilities, as the primary means of deterring the threat of US nuclear weapons.

Before Kim Jong Un became the leader of DPRK, the
Kim Jong Il administration manage to conduct a nuclear weapons test twice, which was in 2006 and 2009. The tension of the world was at a high point, and demanded DPRK to suspend their Nuclear developments in order to maintain peace and security in the region. However, arguments begin to rise whether or not what DPRK should suspend their nuclear development completely and be brought back into signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1994, North Korea was one of the countries to sign the NPT and agreed upon the framework, the 10th of January 2003, the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT and is effective immediately, it had left DPRK free from the safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic, Energy Agency (IAEA)\(^{26}\).

After widespread speculation, the DPRK followed its December launch with a third nuclear test on February 12, 2013. Since mid-2012, activity at the Punggye nuclear test site had given analysts advance indication that the DPRK was likely planning another nuclear test. After the test, the DPRK official news organ announced a “successful” underground detonation, while seismic monitoring equipment in the vicinity registered a 5.1 magnitude earthquake with waves similar to the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.

Based on a report from the Common Reporting Standard (CRS)

The South Korean Ministry of Defense estimated that the test yield was between 6 and 7 kilotons. North Korea claimed that the February 12, 2013, nuclear test was to develop a “smaller and light” warhead. At a minimum, the test would likely contribute to North Korea’s ability to develop a warhead that could be mounted on a long-

\(^{26}\) The event was reported by Kelsey Davenport the Director for Nonproliferation Policy on 2018
range missile. It is unclear what impact a third nuclear test would have on future negotiations, but it would make their success far less likely, and the UN Security Council was discussing additional sanctions measures.

Observers are also waiting for evidence from test emissions that might show whether the North Koreans tested a uranium or plutonium device. This information could help determine the type and sophistication of the North Korean nuclear warhead design about which little is known. Two U.S. experts, Hecker and Pabian, have assessed that North Korea used plutonium in both the 2006 and 2009 tests, and that without at least one additional successful plutonium test, the North would not have confidence in its miniaturized plutonium design. Other experts believe North Korea may choose to test highly enriched uranium-based devices. Testing of a uranium device might indicate a clandestine supply of highly enriched uranium, potentially from an enrichment facility in North Korea. If venting of the nuclear test site has occurred, air samples could indicate what kind of material was used.

Following the 2013 test, all UN Security Council members approved a press statement condemning the test and pledging further action – setting the stage for negotiations over a fourth round of sanctions. While Russia announced it was ready to support additional sanctions on the DPRK’s nuclear program, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister said it would “oppose any sanctions damaging normal trade and economic relations with North Korea.”

Furthermore, in a 15-0 vote on March 7, the UN
Security Council passed sanctions that further constrained DPRK trade, travel, and banking, while imploring countries to search any suspect DPRK cargo. The vote came just hours after the DPRK, angry with the proposed resolution and annual US-ROK joint military exercises, threatened for the first time to carry out “a pre-emptive nuclear strike” on the ROK and the US.

According to UN Security Council diplomats, the latest resolution is intended to make the DPRK sanctions regime similar to the tough sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program – which they argue have been more effective than previous DPRK sanctions – using the Iranian sanctions used as a model.156 However, similar US sanctions on Iran have been judged to be ineffective, at least in stopping Iran from nuclear development, according to US Central Command head General James Mattis.

The United Nations blame North Korea for the increase in tension that they have brought on the international world, compromising the security of many states and creating a complex security issue added on top of the terrorism and extremism issues. However, in DPRK’s defense, they blame the US for creating insecurity in the minds of the North Korean Government. They blame the US for having many Nuclear arsenal and can freely use it with any kind of justification that they feel is enough to be justified, this can lead into a misuse in their nuclear arsenal.

Another reason for this, is many of the countries that holds Nuclear are western countries, super power countries that already has an advantage over other peripheral states. A counter balance was felt needed by the DPRK government and is being supported by the Iranian Government that the world needs a counter balance in order for a same equal to counter the Super Powered States.

North Korea’s intentions for the development of the Nuclear armaments seems defensive, more over, taken into consideration that south of DPRK are Republic of Korea and Japan in which they are both backed up by the USA, and north
of DPRK is Russia, obtaining Nuclear Armaments may make the people and the government of DPRK feel more safe. However, bearing in mind that Japan made a security treaty with the USA in order for the Japanese citizens be protected, the rising tension in the Korean peninsula, and the extensive missile testing by DPRK, worries Japan. Fearing that an incident may occur thus compromising the safety of the Japanese people is looming above them.

**B. Japan’s Response towards The North Korean Missile Testings**

In previous chapters, the writer had emphasized on how the the Missile testings conducted by the DPRK threatened peace and security all over the region, especially close neighboring countries and in this case Japan. Japanese government and the International society have tried to stop the tests through sanctions, though it proved to be unprogressive. The United States of America had conducted numerous military drills in cooperations with south Korea. The military drills were momentarily suspended due to the ongoing winter Olympics. However, The US and South Korea agreed to put the annual military drills on hold after North and South Korea announced they were talking for the first time in two years. The initial talks involved the North's proposal to send an Olympic delegation to the Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea

The Japanese government however, has limitations on their Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). Though they had been gone through changes in 2016, the limitations of which set part from the SDF and a normal military still remains. The changes and the mandate can be seen below.

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27 Ben Westcott, a reporter from CNN made a report on the ongoing issue in the Korean Peninsula with the title *US, South Korea to resume military exercises after Winter Olympics, 2018*
### Table 3.1 Policy Changes in Japanese Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Previous Policy</th>
<th>New Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support Activities</td>
<td>1. SDF is allowed to provide transport and medic aid to other military troops of other states</td>
<td>1. SDF is allowed to provide aid in the form of ammunition supply, oil or fuel, transportation assistance, and medical aid</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. SDF can only provide Logistics to the USA, as an alliance</td>
<td>2. SDF is allowed to save the troops of other states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Role in the Peace Keeping Operations (PKO): provide support for cease fires, elections, medical aid, etc.</td>
<td>3. SDF is allowed to provide logistics to all states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. SDF is allowed to participate in peace operations under the United Nations PKO,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Peace cooperation activities</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Role in PKO: protecting civilians, protecting individuals, provide advisory guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Japan may participate in peace and security cooperation operations outside the UN PKO, with terms that only upon request from:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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28 (Kusumastuti, 2017)
From the table above we can conclude that the Japanese Government have made the Japanese SDF into a more flexible military troop, many believe that this will continue to evolve until the end of Shinzo Abe’s administration. The goal of acquiring a normal Military of their own is real.

In terms of the security and peace, Japan upholds it to the point that the elite are willing to change the system, whilst trying to change the mindset of the Japanese people that acquiring a normal military is something normal, even though Japan is protected by the USA. However, it is unnormal for a country to be protected by other countries, in this case, Japan is face to face with a threat very close to their borders.
Japan could manage several strategies that does not need the involvement of any military offensive towards DPRK, though, still needs the use of military movements and military showcases. In the near future, DPRK’s missile may effect the lives of Japanese citizens, and it is a good thing that Japan had bought several anti-missile equipments. These are several ways that Japan could do.

The first response Japan could mount is to attempt to shoot down the next missile that overflies the country. Japan’s ballistic missile defenses (BMD) is second only to that of the United States in capability, and the country has six Aegis destroyers with SM-3 ballistic missile interceptors. Theoretically, two of these destroyers could mount a defense of Japan that could shoot down the next medium or intermediate-range ballistic missile that overflies Japan.

Japan’s ship-based BMD capability has always been more notional than operational, and the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) would have to adjust to the concept of constantly having enough destroyers to respond to a BMD launch event. These destroyers would have to be in position and their crews at a high state of readiness to intercept a North Korean missile. This need not be a 24/7 requirement: there is some evidence the United States knew the latest missile test was set to occur days before it actually did, theoretically giving the MSDF the time to scramble destroyers from Yokosuka.

A longer term option is that Japan purchase or develop a weapon to destroy North Korean missiles on the launch pad. The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has hinted—and coyly denied—it would like to purchase Tomahawk cruise missiles for this purpose, and Abe’s argument will only be bolstered by this latest overflight incident. Japan is close enough that these missiles could be based on land, although embarking them on the country’s excellent Soryu-class diesel electric attack submarines is another possible deployment strategy. Japan could also develop its own missile system, perhaps using ramjet technology from the new ramjet-powered
XASM-3 anti-ship missile.

As a pacifist country, there are obvious problems with Japan procuring cruise missiles. That having been said, the country was able to justify its creation of an amphibious brigade—previously considered an offensive weapon of war—on the grounds it could be used to reinforce or take back Japanese territory. Cruise missiles, Tokyo might argue, could be used to pre-emptively strike North Korean missiles in a crisis when a launch is imminent.

A naval show of force in the Sea of Japan (East Sea) is another option. Japan has one of the largest surface force fleets in the world, with nearly fifty destroyers, and deploying them off the coast of North Korea would send a powerful message. Although these ships do not carry surface-to-surface missiles, they could certainly carry Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles in the future.

Mounting a show of force is less dangerous than it sounds, but not completely without risk. Despite North Korea’s large armed forces there are few weapons that could actually hit a Japanese naval task force, let alone find it. The only possible exception are North Korea’s copies of the Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missile, known to the Pentagon as the KN-01. Even then, Japanese anti-ship missile defenses are some of the best in the world, and are almost certainly up to the task of identifying and destroying incoming an ASCM threat.

Yet another option is scheduling regular, annual exercises with the United States designed to support a Korean war contingency. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is well known to loathe the annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian wargames. A U.S.-Japan exercise designed to complement Ulchi Freedom Guardian could spark similar North Korean resentment.

The U.S.-Japan exercise could simulate, for example, the evacuation of American nationals and casualties from the Korean peninsula to Japan, the deployment of U.S. naval power from Japan and Okinawa to the Sea of Japan, the beefing up of security at military bases in Japan and even
coordination with South Korean forces. The exercises could become a bargaining chip for Japan against North Korea, forcing it to give up something in order to halt the exercises.

C. A Change in the Japanese Policy

The solutions may have a connection or direct involvement with military personnel or some may say violence, this is mainly due to the nature of the issue that is being faced at hand. The change of shifting pacifism has been an objective from the Liberal Democratic Party and has been so for the past decade. Although a change in the constitution (article 9) is very hard to do, especially with concerns from various parties. The shift in identity can be done without the procurement of an amendment in the constitution.

In April 2014 the total ban on arms exports was ended by the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Following this Japan made moves to sell Sōryū-class submarines to Australia and Kawasaki P-1 maritime patrol aircraft to the United Kingdom, but these attempts were not successful\(^{29}\). Two retired MH-53E helicopters of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force were sold to the US in 2015 for their components. The US was running short of parts for its own fleet of the aging aircraft. The JMSDF plans to lease at least five TC-90 aircraft to the Philippines to conduct maritime patrols\(^{30}\). From November 2016 to November 2017 six Philippine Navy pilots were trained to fly the aircraft at Tokushima Airport. Maintenance staff were also trained. Two aircraft were transferred free of charge in March 2017, and three more will be transferred in the future. There are also efforts to sell the Shin Maywa US-2 military flying boats to India, and New Zealand has expressed some interest in the Kawasaki C-2 aircraft and the Kawasaki P-1 maritime patrol.

\(^{29}\) Fackler Martin with his report entitled *Japan Ends Decades-Long Ban on Export of Weapons*, 2014

\(^{30}\) Jaime Laude a reporter for the Phillipine Star with the report entitled *Japan to lease 5 surveillance aircraft to Philippines October 26, 2016, 2017*
aircraft. In 2016 there were efforts to sell an air-defense radar manufactured by Mitsubishi to Thailand. There are also attempts to sell the C-2 to the United Arab Emirates.

The way that Japan shifts their identity does not create more unexpected problems, many countries respect Japan’s move in shifting their identity in terms of military usage or how active are they using their military arsenal. Allies like the United States have further support Japan’s move, more so as giving a statement that the majority of US troops will go back to the US, leaving a handful of military troops to train the Japanese forces and guide them in warfare tactics. President Donald Trump on several of his campaign even ask the question of why does the Japanese government only pays 50%, why not 100%, it is after all for their own good.31

“You know we have a treaty with Japan where if Japan is attacked, we have to use the full force and might of the United States,” Trump said. “If we’re attacked, Japan doesn’t have to do anything. They can sit home and watch Sony television, OK?”32 Donald Trumps statement opens a road towards more change in the Japanese pacifism.

26,000 spectators cram in the foothills of Mt. Fuji in order to watch the Japanese self defense forces in action, conducting a live military exercising drill. The drill applies to every aspect of the military, land, sea, and air, the drill even uses live heavy caliber rounds such as anti tank missiles and anti aircraft cannons. The crowd gave a positive response on the military exercise. It may seem that Shinzo Abe’s plan to slowly pan the identity of Japanese pacifism had worked to the scale of the Japanese citizens.

31 A report made by a Reuter reporter that reference a speech from Donald Trump, 2018
32 A statement by US president Donald Trump as reported by Japan Times Jesse Johnson in the news titled Trump rips U.S. defense of Japan as one-sided, too expensive, 2016
D. Reason for a Change in Policy

The United States had been an ally of the Japanese people since the second world war, they have since protected Japan from harm, due to the reason that Japan could not have a normal military force. This constraint makes the US forces in Japan to be the barrier between violence and the people of Japan.

However, with the rising tensions near the border, a change in identity is needed, for more that the US had made a statement of the withdrawal of their military troops, or make the Japanese Government pay the US troops. Logically, rather than paying a foreign army to protect them, why not utilize their financial power to develop their own national forces? With the growing Japanese self-defense forces and with Shinzo Abe’s change in policy regarding the Japanese SDF in 2016, the SDF have become more and more active in the fight on upholding peace and security in the international world.

The Japanese military also has many arsenal of weapons, whether it be long ranged, short ranged, and/or equipment for the troopers. The Japanese navy also has destroyers capable of disabling any kind of sea attacks, even DPRK’s Missiles, the interception ability of these ships are remarkable, launching a counter attack would also be possible. However, launching a preventive strike or participating in an offensive attack will violate the Japanese constitution.

The PRC has sprinted past Japan and now spends upwards of four times as much on the military. Moreover, Beijing possesses a modest nuclear arsenal. Although in a war between the two Japan would be no pushover, its defense outlays have remained roughly constant in real terms, ensuring a growing bilateral gap. Warned Jeff Kingston of Temple University in Tokyo: “There is right now a one-sided arms race that China is winning.” (Without irony, China Daily USA editorialized against the “bellicose Abe” for increasing military outlays even though Japan “certainly doesn’t need such military equipment for national security.”)

North Korea adds another challenge. Although
Pyongyang’s conventional forces have little reach beyond the Korean Peninsula, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea possesses a nascent nuclear capacity as well as chemical and likely biological weapons. Missiles make Japan a possible target as an ally of the United States or victim of extortion.

The worsening security environment creates increasing pressure on Tokyo to do more. Since becoming premier in late 2012, Abe has pushed his country into a more active role. He proposed increased military outlays, acquisition of new weapons and broader SDF responsibilities. The military is particularly interested in adding Aegis Ashore missile defense systems, Tomahawk cruise missiles and F-35 fighters.

In 2014 the Abe government changed its interpretation of Article Nine to allow a limited form of “collective security,” including assisting American personnel under attack. Tokyo followed with legislation and revised Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation the following year.

A closer ally however puts Japan in a position that the need of having a normal military as fast as possible is needed, the Japanese ally that has assisted in defending their country from various outside threats, the USA. Trump said in March that the U.S. would not maintain military bases abroad unless allies like Japan and South Korea coughed up more money to retain them. Japan will need to expand its military expenditure, and if Japan still maintain their US protectionship, the monetary funds will go to the US.

Hence, not only DPRK and the US statements that they want Japan to pay for the protection provided that makes a Japanese shifting in identity, other threats such as cyber warfare and the rise of Chinese military are also key parts in this change. China is also increasingly perceived as a threat. According to December 2005 polls conducted jointly by Gallup and Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun, 72 percent of Japanese said they did not trust China (the lowest numbers since the poll began in the 1970s), and 73 percent feel relations will deteriorate further before they improve. Tamamoto agrees on
the chilliness of relations, though he adds that "nobody wants a bad relationship with Beijing." The problem, he says, is that "the political class is stuck"—both because of Koizumi’s repeated, controversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine, and because of mutual intransigence surrounding a recent textbook spat.

Finally, there are increasing concerns from within Japan that the United States might not always embrace its role as Japan’s protector, should the political landscape in East Asia begin to crumble. "There is some concern that the U.S. might not be there when Japan needs its support," says Yuko Nakano, research associate at the Center for Strategic & International Studies. "When there was a [North Korean] Taepo Dong missile launch in 1998, a conspiracy theory appeared in the Japanese press that the United States was aware of the launch but didn’t inform Japan in a timely fashion. So yes, I think this is a concern of the Japanese."