CHAPTER IV
RE-INTERPRETATION AND CAUSE FOR THE CHANGINGS IN JAPANESE POLICY

These past decades we have seen many countries raise their security towards any kind of news that may be a threat towards their sovereignty. This is what is known as securitization. It is when a state sees an event or a behavior made by other states as a threat towards their own security, thus giving them justification to raise their security. Using a Constructivist perspective, it is unique how a state sees the activity of another state, and that the label of that state—whether they are considering them as friend or foe—gives an impact towards their views of that state. For example, the US sees Great Britain as a friend even though they have numerous nuclear war heads where as DPRK is seen as an immense threat towards the US security even with the fact they only have some Nuclear war heads. This leads to changes in policies.

A. Re-Interpretation Towards The Treaties and Agreements of The Japanese Pacifism

Japan was deemed as a pacifist country in term of military involvement after WWII. The role of Japanese military was limited due to the reason of Japan’s character in having an aggressive military actions which leads to imperialism. Beginning from the first Sino-Japanese War to the most recent WWII, the Japanese military had always been a mark of brutality toward the countries that they occupy and have conducted many activities that violates human rights, and thus the International community limits the Japanese military movements.

The Japanese government alongside 50 delegations from around the world had established the San Francisco
Peace Treaty in which the treaty led Japan to give their military power and as a change for the Countries security, the US will be the “shield” for Japan covering their territory and creating a peaceful and secure matter in the Japanese people\textsuperscript{33}.

In 1960 the Japanese government and the US government made a bilateral agreement regarding the two states relationship in terms of maintaining peace and security through military activities. The treaty was the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security\textsuperscript{34}.

The original U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was a ten-year, renewable military agreement that outlined a security arrangement for Japan in light of its pacifist constitution. U.S. forces would remain on Japanese soil after Japan regained sovereignty. This early security pact with Washington dovetailed with the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy for postwar Japan laid out by then prime minister Yoshida Shigeru that saw Japan rely on the United States for its security needs so the country could focus on its own economic recovery.

The revision in 1960, The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security grants the United States the right to military bases on the archipelago in exchange for a U.S. pledge to defend Japan in the event of an attack\textsuperscript{35}. The partnership has endured several geopolitical transitions, rooting its framework in the postwar security environment and expanding in the aftermath of the Cold War with the rise of China and a nuclearizing North Korea. Cooperation during the Gulf and Iraq wars and the March 2011 Tohoku earthquake

\textsuperscript{33} A working paper that discuss about how the Japanese Government and other related government reacts towards the mutual security alliance treaty sign by Japan and the US by author John Price, \textit{A Just Peace? The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty in Historical Perspective}, 2001

\textsuperscript{34} University of Pittsburgh made a journal with the title \textit{Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia}, 1993, it discusses on the issue of Japanese government towards the San Francisco Treaty

reaffirmed the strength of the alliance, but challenges remain. The U.S. military presence on Okinawa, North Korea’s nuclearization, territorial disputes with China, and Japan’s recent push to upgrade its defense preparedness have all challenged the alliance’s resilience as the Obama administration considers the direction of its strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region.  

Pacifism also became the creed to which Japan, a defeated aggressor state with expansionist designs, could begin identifying itself as a reformed, benign power fit to be welcomed back into the postwar international order. The ensuing intensification of the Cold War and the increasing awareness of the danger of nuclear weapons further facilitated the Japanese embrace of pacifism. As the only country to come under nuclear attack, anti-nuclear arms sentiments became a built-in component of Japanese ideology.

In current situations however, most historians today would not contest then prime minister Shigeru Yoshida’s conclusion that the peace treaty was fair and generous to Japan. It did not exact heavy reparations nor did it impose any post-treaty supervision over Japan. Indeed, half a century later, the U.S. And Japanese governments continue aggressively to defend the treaty. Its supporters, including the U.S. and Japanese governments, plan a major commemoration in San Francisco on the fiftieth anniversary of the signing.

The underlying spirit here is this: We are a peace-loving nation, but we have been pushed into a corner by circumstances beyond our control, and we must be resolved to

36 Bein A Xu made a journal titled The US-Japan Security Alliance, 2014. The journal discusses on the military realtions between the 2 countries after WWII.


38 A speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Makiko Tanaka at the Opera House in 2001
go to war heroically, although reluctantly. This pacifist verse lamenting Japan’s course toward war would be recited by Mutsuhito’s grandson Hirohito in front of military and political leaders on the eve of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.

The anguish Japan felt at wanting to remain in the exclusive, white club of great powers was apparent in the way the country kept contributing considerable resources to intergovernmental organizations, such as the League of Nations. But equally powerful was the feeling of somehow being cheated out of the chance to become an even greater power, in the old-fashioned way, just as it had finally mastered the imperialist craft\(^39\). On the eve of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the young parliamentarian and future prime minister Prince Fumimaro Konoe, deeply suspicious of the moralizing claims attached to the League of Nations and convinced that the racist Anglo-American powers were bent on freezing the international political map in their favor, wrote provocatively in a political journal, urging Japan to “reject the Anglo-American peace.”

The treaties that have been made and signed by the Japanese government in terms of security can be re-interpreted to fit in current situations. In the year 2016 the Japanese government issued an amendment towards their policy in security and made it more active in participating world peace\(^40\). The changes in world views towards certain parties contribute the most in this re-interpretation of the treaties. After WWII North Korea raised security tensions between them and the US making them adversaries, it does not contribute towards security issues in Japan, however with Military testing’s conducted by DPRK, the interpretations of a non-harmful party changes.

\(^{39}\) A reference that was acquired from a Journal made by Ra Mason entitled \textit{A Change in Japan Military}, 2016

\(^{40}\) Kirk Spitzer is a Journalist that specifies on International Political issues, this was cited from his journal entitled \textit{Japan Ends Ban on Military Self-Defense}, 2014
B. The Impact by North Korea’s Kim Jong Il

Before the today’s kim jong un rule the democratic people republic of Korea (DPRK) with an iron fist, his father before him, kim jong il, ruled north Korean in his own way, though not many differences in the manner of leading the country, however, the outcome and the focus of the country has seen to be different in the eyes of the international society41. These political strategies are most felt by countries that are neighboring with north korea, Japan, south korea, and Russia are some of the countries who are paying close attention towards north korea.

Many analysts argue that North Korea is a unique political system. Certainly, it is distinct politically to the extent that each country has its own specific characteristics. But North Korea also has significant commonalities with various regime types and authority structures. Pyongyang is a highly centralized and militarized bureaucratic regime organized around an all-powerful leader42. This monograph examines the leader and the system. The author identifies the regime type and analyzes its key elements. He contends that North Korea’s political system is best conceived of as a totalitarian regime that although weakened, remains remarkably resilient. The monograph argues that the greatest test that the system is likely to face will come after the death of Kim Jong Il. While the totalitarian regime may not long survive Kim’s passing, one cannot assume that the system will collapse. Rather, the end of totalitarianism may simply mean that the DPRK will enter a new “post-totalitarian” phase similar to the paths taken by other communist systems such as the Soviet Union and China following the passing of Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, respectively.

A central element of the regime and the critical

41 Cited from Kim Jong Il Biography made by the A&E Television Network, 2018
42 Acquired from John Sanford in his journal North Korea’s Military threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, 2007
element of the coercive apparatus is the military. North Korea’s military is not examined in this monograph but will be the focus of the next monograph in this series. Suffice it here to make two observations. First, the DPRK is “undoubtedly the most militarized [regime] on earth.” Second, although communist regimes are typically dubbed “party-states” (because the communist party and government bureaucracies tend to be heavily intertwined or enmeshed), it is more accurate to call these regimes “party-military-states” to underscore the prominent role routinely played by the armed forces. In short, the role of the military in North Korea is so important that it merits a monograph devoted exclusively to the subject. The political landscape of the DPRK is dominated by three massive bureaucratic organizations “the Party” (the Korean Workers’ Party, or KWP), “the State” (the DPRK), and “the Military” (the Korean People’s Army, KPA, or Army).

Kim Jong Il appears very much in control of North Korea. While there have been periodic reports since Kim Il Sung’s death in July 1994 that the younger Kim’s power and influence were eroding, there is no firm indication that this was or is the case. In late 2004, for example, speculation was rampant about the reason behind the removal of many public portraits of Kim Jong Il. Reporters and analysts overlooked a more mundane explanation: that the portraits may have been taken down for cleaning or updating.

Since the death of Kim Il-sung, plenary sessions of the Party Central Committee have not been convened even once. Plenary sessions were not called even when extremely important decisions were being made, such as the appointment of Kim Jong-il as General Secretary. This situation has continued through the 2010s. This means that none of the

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43 (Scobell, 2009)
44 Ibid P.7
changes made in the membership of the Party Central Committee and the Politburo during this period have been based on the procedures prescribed under party rules. It can be inferred from this that the symbolic function of the party discussed above has also been dramatically downgraded.

However, due attention must be paid to the fact that importance was being attached to the military as a political means (tool) and that the military itself was not being elevated to the role of political leadership. That role was strictly reserved for the “headquarters of revolution” centered on Kim Jong-il as the “Guiding Leader” and the successor to the Suryong, and the highest mission of the military was defined to be that of “safeguarding” the leadership. Therefore, “military first” did not imply political leadership by the military, nor was it being used as a concept to legitimize a military regime. Moreover, it would be correct to conclude that the realities of North Korean political management at the time differed from any such interpretation of a military regime.

It is reported that Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in August 2008 and was temporarily incapacitated. It was not until October that his activities were again made public. What happened during this period remains unclear. However, there is no doubt that the change in his health status marked the start of full-fledged efforts to prepare a candidate for succession. It is notable that in the following year, 2009, a song lauding Kim Jong-un were popularized. While there are various conflicting theories on when and through what process the succession of Kim Jong-un was finalized, it can be said that inside North Korea, the public generally became aware of him sometime between early 2009 and spring of the same year.

The “150-day battle” and the “100-day battle,” two propaganda-led campaigns for increased production, were implemented in close succession during 2009, and it was during the latter that the abovementioned redenomination of the currency was enacted.

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46 Ibid p.18
In September 2010, a Party Conference was held after a lapse of 30 years, the first time it had been convened since the Sixth Party Congress of 1980. One day before the Party Conference, Kim Jong-un was appointed General of the Korean People’s Army, together with Kim Kyong-hui, a sister of Kim Jong-il, and senior party leader Choe Ryong-hae (later appointed Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army)\(^\text{47}\). This marked the first time that Kim Jong-un’s name appeared in official reports. Immediately after the Party Conference had adjourned, the official positions of Kim Jong-un were Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party, and ordinary member of the Central Committee. Thus, at this point, he was not a Politburo member, let alone a member of the Presidium of the Politburo. However, the coverage of Kim Jong-un in the North Korean media was there after gradually elevated to approximately the same status accorded to his father, clearly indicating that the position of Kim Jong-un was a special one.

It is interesting to compare the position of Kim Jong-un at the death of Kim Jong-il versus the position of Kim Jong-il at the death of Kim Il-sung. In all factors relating to leadership and ascendancy, such as posts held, personal authority (charisma), past accomplishments, leadership experience and relationship with members of the leadership group, Kim Jong-un stood far behind the level achieved by his father. It is notable that Kim Jong-il had already been highly active for a total period of over twenty years at the time of his father’s death. That is, he had been active for several years before the formal decision on succession and for the subsequent six years before his official debut at the Sixth Party Congress. Following this, he was energetically engaged in his duties for 14 years leading up to the death of Kim Il-sung. Compared to this, Kim Jong-un succeeded his father less than three years after he was generally recognized as heir-apparent and was given a period of about one year to prepare from his

\(^{47}\) A report by a reporter from the Daily NK Kim Ge Young, 2016
official debut. Thus, the differences between the two in terms of positions and status prior to succession can be said to have been unavoidable.

C. The Core Threat of The Whole Missile Crisis

The early months of Kim Jong-un's dynasty were filled with turmoil, to say the least. According to reports coming out of North Korea, Kim Jong-un was informed that the assistant chief of staff of the Ministry of the Peoples Armed Forces was found drunk during the mourning period for his father, Kim Jong-il. The younger Kim ordered that the officer be executed "to leave no trace of him behind down to his hair." The individual was horrifically executed using a mortar round, a method that literally blew him to pieces.\(^{48}\) Purges continued into the summer of 2012, when the reported purge of NKPA Chief of Staff Yi Yong-ho was reportedly purged in July. Yi was widely assessed as a member of the "inner circle" of the Kim Family regime. Perhaps even more importantly, he was reportedly a mentor of Kim Jong-un before his father's death.\(^{49}\) Though still unconfirmed, there are also reports that gunfire erupted when Yi was relieved of his post.\(^{50}\)

For almost six decades, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has pursued a nuclear program that has gradually developed in size, complexity and capabilities from a small scientific research effort into a comprehensive effort to produce nuclear weapons. At present, North Korea is estimated to possess an inventory of 10-16 nuclear weapons that could rapidly expand by 2020. As this nuclear program has evolved, the North Korean leadership and the Korean People’s Army (KPA) have also gradually developed a nuclear strategy for deterrence that

\(^{48}\) (Ilbo, Kim Jong-un's Barbaric Purge of 'Unsound' Military Brass, 2012)
\(^{49}\) (Takahashi, 2012)
\(^{50}\) (Ilbo, N.Korean Army Chief Refused to go Quietly, 2012)
appears to have progressed from viewing these weapons as primarily political tools to deter an attack from the United States to operational strategic defensive weapons to inflict unacceptable losses upon attacking forces and assured retaliation, and possibly today, into viewing nuclear weapons as both strategic political weapons and for use in a range of strategic, operational and “battlefield” (i.e., tactical) situations during wartime.

During March and April of 2013, the North Korean military and propaganda services engaged in brinkmanship that startled the region and the world. The North Korean propaganda services threatened "all-out war" with the United States (including a nuclear attack), and the military began deploying ballistic missiles on the DPRK east-coast. In response, the United States deployed Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems to Guam and took other initial defensive actions. On April 6, the North Korean government told foreign embassies in Pyongyang "to consider the possibility of evacuations if tensions flare up. The previous day North Korea had loaded two intermediate range missiles on mobile launchers and then hidden them inside a facility on the east coast. By April 11, Pyongyang had placed at least one missile in an upright position on its mobile launcher on the east coast. It should be noted that the missile, named the "Musudan," has a range of 4,000 kilometers and could hit Guam - thus the BMD deployed to Guam earlier in the month. Also on April 11, the North Koreans were reported to have moved two Musudan missile launchers in and out of sheds located near the east coast city of Wonsan. According to experts, the Musudan can be on "standby" for up to a week once it is fueled, a thirty minute operation. Also spotted were other launchers for other ballistic missiles, including Scud and No Dong launchers. With up to five Scud and No Dong missiles on mobile launchers detected, there was a total of seven missiles being prepared for launch on the east coast.

In the era of Kim Jong Un, the amount of weapons testing especially their ballistic missile development went in
an estagering rate and made significant results from the previous leader. As shown from the data below.

Figure 4. 1 North Korea's Missile Tests Timeline

![North Korea's Missile Tests Timeline](image)

*Source: Amanda Erickson-A timeline of North Korea’s five nuclear tests and how the U.S. has responded-April 14 2017-washington post* \(^{51}\)

Kim jong Un has made his military developing process more and more complex and quick, however, with maximum progress in military development, surely it will spark attention in neighboring region states. The U.S has made preemptive mobilizations towards North Korea and takes South Korea by their side in preparations for the worst.

The success of each missile varies, however, the international society has already put sanctions against DPRK in order for them to end their Missile testing. The United Nations had set upon several resolutions that sanctioned DPRK for their Nuclear testing, these sanctions are, but not limited to: resolution 1718, resolution 1874, resolution 2087, resolution 2094, resolution 2270, resolution 2321, resolution

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\(^{51}\) (Erickson, A Timeline of North Korea’s Five Nuclear Tests and How The U.S has Responded, 2017)
What makes these missiles feared by many states is their ability of damage that they can cause, and the range of missiles, as the illustration below demonstrates.

*Figure 4. 2 Distances of North Korea's Missile Arsenal*

DPRK’s newest and most advance missile can carry the payload as far as the United States, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Russia, and other countries. It needs to be stopped or the world may face a more challenging settlement to peace in the future, especially when conflicts starts to arise from states that are nearby the DPRK. The International Institute for Strategic Studies said the missiles were a "proven system which can hit all of South Korea and much of Japan". More capable missiles followed with the development of the Musudan range, which was most recently tested in 2016. Estimates differ dramatically on its how far it can fly, with Israeli intelligence putting it at 2,500km and the US Missile
Defense Agency estimating about 3,200km. Other sources suggest a possible 4,000km. Another development came in August 2016 when North Korea announced it had tested a submarine based "surface-to-surface, medium-to-long-range ballistic missile", called the Pukguksong\textsuperscript{52}.

The place North Korea’s missile and nuclear program holds in the national psyche can be understood in part through the esteem in which scientists are held in the country. There are many high-profile residential construction projects devoted to scientists and their families. State-run media report on the honors they receive after nuclear tests and missile and space launches. They get parades like the one in Pyongyang in May.

Whatever the motivation, the results are impressive. Consider this: In 2016, North Korea tested 26 missiles; 16 were successful and 10 failed, according to a database maintained by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. That’s an approximately 62 percent success rate. There have been 18 tests in all so far this year: 12 successes, five failures, and one unknown. That’s a 67 percent success rate. Those figures underscore what Pollack said about North Korea being “determined to break through.” Another thing to consider—the number of tests so far this year.

It is clear that the development of a nuclear weapons strategy in North Korea has occurred within an environment that is based upon a set of overriding strategic principles that inform and influence all aspects of life within the nation, especially political decision making. These principles are made by Joseph S. Bermudez., Jr\textsuperscript{53}: 1) the survival and

\textsuperscript{52} (BBC News, 2017)

\textsuperscript{53} Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is Co-founder and Chief Analytic Officer of AllSource Analysis, Inc. and an internationally recognized analyst, author and lecturer on DPRK defense and intelligence affairs and third-world ballistic missile development. Mr. Bermudez has
continued leadership of the Kim family dynasty; 2) deterrence of the United States and its allies; 3) elimination of internal threats; 4) economic development of the nation; and 5) reunification of the Fatherland. Within that context, the evolution of North Korean thinking about the role of nuclear weapons in its defense strategy has taken place in roughly six periods. While these periods are not hard and fast, they present a logical means by which to understand this complicated issue.\textsuperscript{54}

D. Nuclear Weapons as a Means of Diplomacy

Pyongyang’s nuclear program entered a new phase at the end of 1980’s. Numbers of personnel sent overseas earlier to train in fields useful for developing a domestic nuclear program declined. The majority—many born during or immediately after the war and raised in a system that viewed the US as wanting to use nuclear weapons against the North—would now come out of domestic educational programs that continued to expand. Planning had also begun for a third phase of nuclear infrastructure development including construction of additional reactors and facilities (e.g., a 200 MWt reactor, waste storage facilities, etc.). Complementing this thinking was the acquisition of MiG-23 and MiG-29 aircraft, Scud B ballistic missiles, the establishment of a domestic ballistic missile production infrastructure and planning for longer-range ballistic missiles that supported KPA thinking about the need for nuclear weapon delivery systems.

\textsuperscript{54} (Joseph S. Bermudez., 2015)
As Pyongyang’s nuclear development program advanced and missile and aircraft delivery systems were acquired, the KPA initiated a systematic study of US, Soviet and Chinese nuclear warfare concepts and strategies. By 1989, a rudimentary deterrence strategy had been developed that focused on the political and diplomatic utility of nuclear weapons rather than as tools to fight a war. The view appears to be supported by Kim Il Sung’s reported pronouncement during this period that nuclear weapons could not be used on the Korean peninsula due to its small size. In the minds of the North Korean leadership, the correctness of pursuing nuclear weapons as tools to enable room for political maneuvering was likely reinforced by the international political pressure brought to bear to compel them to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985. Until the time when nuclear weapons would become available, it appears that the North Korean leadership still viewed chemical weapons and expanding conventional armed forces, combined with emerging asymmetric capabilities, as the primary means of deterring the threat of US nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{55}

On May 25, 2009, the DPRK issued the following statement: “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test on May 25 as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every way as requested by its scientists and technicians.” The DPRK also expelled nuclear inspectors and declared it would “never” return to the Six Party Talks. The US Intelligence Community assessed that the DPRK probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of Punggye with an explosion yield of approximately a few kilotons.

Furthermore, in a 15-0 vote on March 7, the UN Security Council passed sanctions that further constrained DPRK trade, travel, and banking, while imploring countries to

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
search any suspect DPRK cargo. The vote came just hours after the DPRK, angry with the proposed resolution and annual US-ROK joint military exercises, threatened for the first time to carry out “a pre-emptive nuclear strike” on the ROK and the US.

According to UN Security Council diplomats, the latest resolution is intended to make the DPRK sanctions regime similar to the tough sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program – which they argue have been more effective than previous DPRK sanctions – using the Iranian sanctions used as a model. However, similar US sanctions on Iran have been judged to be ineffective, at least in stopping Iran from nuclear development, according to US Central Command head General James Mattis.