

## **CHAPTER III**

### **SINO-JAPANESE EAST CHINA SEA TENSION OVER SENKAKU/DIAYOU ISLANDS**

This chapter aims to explain the detailed background and the development of Japan relation with People's Republic of China as the dominant influencing variable toward Japan foreign policy in security aspect. It includes the exploration of the Sino-Japanese tension in East China Sea over the Senkaku-Diayou Islands.

#### **A. The Background of The Senkaku-Diayou Islands Dispute**

Senkaku-Diayou Islands is a disputed island between People's Republic of China and Japan at the moment. Senkaku is the Japanese name for the islands, while Diayou is the name given by Beijing. The Japanese name of "*Senkaku*" was derived from the "Pinnacle Islands" translation, a name given by the British Navy while seeing the islands during the sailing mission in Far East during mid 19<sup>th</sup> century, while Chinese name "*Diayoutai*" is literally translated as "Fishing Platform" (Shaw, 1999).

Senkaku/Diayou Islands is located in East China Sea, approximately 120 nautical miles northeast of Republic of China (Taiwan), 200 nautical miles east of People's Republic of China and 200 nautical miles southwest of Okinawa, Japan. The islets consists of 8 smaller islands, with 5 small inhabited islands and three barren rocks (with Japanese and Chinese name); Uotsori Jima/Diayou Dao, Okino Kita-Iwa/Da Bei Xiaodao, Okino Minami-Iwa/Da Nan Xiaodao, Tobise/Fei Jiao Yan, Kita Kojima/Bei Xiaodao, Minami Kojima/Nan Xiaodao, Kuba Jima/Huangwei Yu, Taisho Jima/Chiwei Yu as seen in these maps below (Lipin, Klein, & Beslagic, 2012).

Figure 1 3.1 The 8 Islands of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands



Figure 2 3.2 The Regional Map of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands



Source: Lipin, M., Klein, A., & Beslagic, D. (2012, September 28). *The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands - An Interactive Map*. Retrieved December 21, 2017, from Voice of America: <https://www.voanews.com/a/senkaku-diaoyu-islands-map/3632772.html>

The Senkaku Islands had been stated to be the part of Japan through the cabinet decision in 1895; therefore the Japan government had taken gradual and consistent control over that

Island for decades as the integrated part of Japan territory. Since 1885, Japan had conducted a research and field survey on the Senkaku Islands, with a result that stated the Senkaku Islands had not been inhabited by any nations, including the Qing Dynasty of China (Ikeda, 2013). After 10 years of research, finally the Japan Cabinet accepted the statement that the Senkaku Islands was integrated into Japan territory as the islands was *terra nullius* (Pan, 2007). Hence, Japan's action toward the Islands was basically legitimate since it was in accordance with international law to claim the territory with no ownership (*terra nullius*), similarly like what the British did in occupying Australia (Banner, 2005). Ever since, the Islands had been legally under Japan control except for the period of 1945-1972, the Senkaku Islands were under United States occupation.

Following the Japan's lost in World War 2, the entire Japanese mainland was under the United States occupation, including the Senkaku Islands. It was under the United States control from 1945 until 1972 as the part of Okinawa Prefecture. The United States began to administratively in change of The Senkakus on 1953 following the Article 3 of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951 (Shaw, 1999). The United States occupation on this land was ended under the "Treaty of United States and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands" or famously better known as the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, signed on June 17<sup>th</sup> 1971 (Lee & Ming, 2012).

For about 76 years of the Japanese and United States occupation of the Senkaku Islands since 1895, neither People's Republic of China or Republic of China had shown any behavior in claiming the islands. Before 1971, none of them had stated that the Senkaku Islands was part of their territorial sovereignty. Also, there was no any objection of the Japan control and legitimacy of the Islands as well.

At first, People's Republic of China recognized Senkaku Islands as part of Japan territorial sovereignty. In 1950, according to a governmental meeting note taken by Jiji News Agency, Chinese officials were referring the Islands as "Senkaku Islands", recognizing that it was part of Okinawa

(Ikeda, 2013). Later on 8 January 1953, three years after the establishment of communist People's Republic of China, an article in *People's Daily* issued under Communist Party of China, had written that Senkaku Islands was Japanese territory (Shaw, 1999). In addition, the *World Atlas* produced in People's Republic of China in 1960 also included Senkaku Islands into Japanese territory (Ikeda, 2013)

This territorial dispute has been tensional since the discovery of the Senkakus oil resource in 1969 by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) based in Bangkok. After ECAFE officially released the findings in 1971, both People's Republic of China and Republic of China (Taiwan) were showing their standoffs in attempt to claim the Senkaku-Diayou Islands (Roy-Chaudhury, 2016). Before the discovery of the resources, both People's Republic of China and Republic of China did not show any intention to be aggressive toward the Senakakus. However, after the discovery the Senkaku-Diayou dispute has been one of the most tangible sources of the Sino-Japanese relation irritation. During the Cold War period, there would be three major clashes between People's Republic of China and Japan on 1970-1972, 1978 and 1990. After the cold war, the tension resurfaced since 1996.

## **B. The Development of the Dispute from 1971-2013**

The first conflict broke out officially on July 17<sup>th</sup>, 1970 when Japanese ambassador to Republic of China (as on that period Japan had not normalize the relation with People's Republic of China) sent a diplomatic message to Taipei Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that the Senkaku Islands was under Japanese sovereign territory, asserting the ownership of the disputed islands. Later in September 1970, a group of Chinese people planted Republic of China flag on the disputed islands as a form of protest against the Japanese claim (Pan, 2007). The nationalist sentiment of Japanese and Chinese grew significantly ever since regarding the dispute. Later there was a worldwide "Diayoutai Island Movement" by Chinese around the world in a form of rally defending their

island from foreigners breaching their sovereignty (Chen, Hu, & Wang, 2013).

The tension among Chinese and Japanese reached its peak when Japanese got its full authority of the islands back from the United States in May 15<sup>th</sup>, 1972 as the Allied forces occupation of Japan over Okinawa had ended (Lee & Ming, 2012). In response to this, many Chinese students, majorly from Hong Kong and Taipei, were rallying and demonstrating in United States central cities protesting the United States decision to hand over the Senkaku/Diayou Islands back to Japan during the heating tension among the two (Drifte, 2014). However, none of the People's Republic of China, Republic of China official protest or any "Diayoutai Island Movement" could overshadow or push United States to withdraw its stance to hand it over to Japan.

In 1972, it was also the crucial moment for global community since it was the moment where People's Republic of China started to get a bigger recognition as "China" from the most country in the world, including United States. Japan was also attempting to re-establish the diplomatic relation with Beijing and de-recognized Taipei. Due to that, from People's Republic of China perspective, it tended to put aside the Senkaku-Diayou Islands dispute issue in preventing the Tokyo-Beijing diplomatic tie re-establishment to be disrupted (Shaw, 1999).

Later on April 12<sup>th</sup> 1978, the crisis re-erupted as hundreds of Chinese fishing vessels were fishing around the Senkaku-Diayou Islands waters (Rothmanl, Vyas, & Sato, 2017). What made it even worse was the fact that Japan and People's Republic of China were in a negotiation to sign "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" (Arai, Goto, & Wang, 2013). Political experts analyzed that the action of the Chinese in intruding the disputed islands during a crucial time was aimed for protesting the domestic Japanese anti-Treaty movement that insisted that the treaty could not be signed unless the Senkaku-Diayou Islands dispute was resolved (Shaw, 1999).

Despite the fact that the crisis was highly tensional among Japanese media and society, it was portrayed by

People's Republic of China government as a less critical and sensitive issue among its society. Vice Premier of People's Republic of China, Di Bao , three days later stated that the intrusion of Chinese fishing vessel was "fortuitous incident" and promised for that to never happen again in the following times. At the end of the crisis, the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" was eventually signed on August 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1978 (Soeya, 1996). Following that agreement to sign the treaty, the following Vice Premier, Deng Xiaoping confirmed that the issue of Senkaku-Diayou dispute would be put aside for the sake of the bigger and more vital bilateral agreements in the coming future. It was stated on the press conference during Deng Xiaoping visit to Japan on October 25<sup>th</sup>, 1978 as he said;

*"Our two sides agreed not to touch upon this question when diplomatic relations were normalized between China and Japan. This time when we were negotiating the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the two sides again agreed not to touch on it... We call it Diaoyu Island but you call it another name. It is true that the two sides maintain different views on this opinion ... It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten years... Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all (Shaw, 1999)" .*

The tension resurfaced in September 1990 when Japanese's Maritime Safety Agency planned to pass a policy to establish a new lighthouse within the Senkaku Islands proposed by the *Nihon Seinensha* or Japan Youth Federation, a right wing group in Japan that later would keep pushing the government for installing the lighthouse as in 1996 (Kesine, 2011). This action by Japan was responded by People's Republic of China government as it pressured Japan through its diplomatic channels. Preventing the disrupted bilateral relation with the emerging power state, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu on October 25<sup>th</sup> 1990 stated officially that Japan would portray a "cautious attitude" concerning the lighthouse and not recognizing it as the official navigation

indicator of Japan (Shaw, 1999). By this statement, the tension among the two countries could be pacified.

6 years later in 1996, the tension reheated among People's Republic of China and Japan in regard to the Senkaku-Diayou Islands. In July that year where Japan ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Nihon Seinensha formed a five meter aluminum made lighthouse in the Senkaku-Diayou Islands with a demand to make it as the official navigation point of Japan (Lee W.-c. , 2014). In response to this, in September, People's Republic of China activist planned a retaliation to erect their national flag within the dispute island to project their power in claiming the territory. Knowing this, the Japanese Coastal Guard automatically blockade the path toward the Islands, therefore the Chinese activist tried another direction to avoid the blockade (Gargan, 1996). In result unfortunately, the alternative path taken by the Chinese activist was a stormy yet dangerous sea area to pass, caused the activist got drowned immediately (Farley, 1996). This was later extremely escalating the tension since it was the very first moment the dispute caused a collateral damage, a death of a citizen. Added by the fact that the drowned activist occurred in a very unfortunate yet sensitive scenario, a large scale of anti-Japan demonstration erupted in the major cities in People's Republic of China (including Republic of China). Fueled by an image that it was caused by the Japan Coastal Guard blockade, the tension rise was inevitable. Finally on October 7<sup>th</sup> 1996, the Chinese activists were able to erect the flag of People's Republic of China in the disputed islands (Lin, 2012). However, the flag was taken away by the Okinawa authorities several days following the plantation of it.

Ever since, both Japanese and Chinese civil and political group were constantly competing in visiting the Islands to project their sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diayou Islands. On April 27<sup>th</sup>, 1997 a group of Japanese citizen consisted of a member of city assembly of Ishigawa City, Okinawa and a newspaper journalist of *Sankei Shinbun* landed quickly on the Islands (Pan, 2007). Weeks later on May 7<sup>th</sup>,

another group of Japanese citizens led by Japanese opposition party Diet member landed on the Islands (CNN, 1997). In response to this, on May 27<sup>th</sup> a group of Chinese citizens attempted to land on the Islands (Shaw, 1999). Nevertheless, their attempt failed since even before they reached the Islands, the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency stopped them. A month later, a group of Chinese activists were attempting to fly over the Islands and land down using a parachute to avoid the Japan Maritime Safety Agency blockade in the sea. The airborne attempt occurred on September 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1997 using Philippines Subic International Airport as its departing point (Shaw, 1999). However, this attempt also failed due to the plane engine failure which forced them to turn back to the airport avoiding a bigger crash.

The tension did not stop until 2000s. In 2006, a group of Chinese activist named “Action Committee for Defending the Diayou Islands” aimed to land on the Islands in which, as usual, was blockaded by the Japanese Coastal Guard (Wong, 2006). Later in 2008, Chinese Coastal Guard protecting Chinese activist approached the Islands until within the 740m near the coast, pressured the Japanese in regards to their sovereignty (Hsiu-Chuan & Wang, 2008). The same thing happened in 2011, when Japan Coastal Guard vessels accompanied by a helicopter pushed five Chinese patrol vessels back to Republic of China (Blanchard, Kubota, & Nishikawa, China lambastes Japan after Taiwan boat confrontation, 2011).

The tension reached its highest peak in 2012 when Tokyo Prefectural Government, led by Governor Yoshihiko Noda decided to purchase the 3 of the Senkaku Islands as the Islands were previously privately owned (Ryall, 2012). This Governor Noda decision later caused a huge anti-Japanese demonstration in major cities in People’s Republic of China. The anti-Japanese demonstration in 2012 concerning the purchase of the Islands expanded into the threat toward Japanese assets and companies operating in People’s Republic of China (Taylor, 2012). It was the moment where the tension escalated significantly into a higher political tension among




Japan and People's Republic of China government since for decades it had been major between Chinese activist and Japan officials.

Beside the rise of anti-Japanese demonstration around Beijing as the reaction to the issue, it caused the maritime security patrol increase among Japan and People's Republic of China over the Senkaku-Diayou Islands. The power projection by sending patrol vessels and aircraft over the border has been done ever since by both parties, in which it constantly escalates the regional tension among the two major powers in East China Sea. In September 2012, 16 People's Republic of China surveillance vessels gathered around the Senkaku-Diayou Islands challenging Japan authority in the Islands. It was the biggest number of People's Republic of China vessel to come challenging Japan in the Islands (Fackler, In Shark-Infested Waters, Resolve of Two Giants Is Tested, 2012). This extraordinary intrusion by Chinese vessel caused Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda to held an emergency meeting and later called on People's Republic of China ambassador in Tokyo for crisis diplomatic talks (Harlan, 2013). Japan government stated that the Chinese vessels action as an "invasion in an extraordinary scale".

The escalating tension includes the new involvement of jet and aircraft in the power and sovereignty projection over the Senkaku-Diayou Islands by People's Republic of China and Japan. In November 2013, People's Republic of China set " East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) " over the disputed Senkakus in which it was perceived as a "very dangerous" action People's Republic of China take, according to Tokyo perspective (Iwata, 2013). Air Defense Identification Zone, generally, is a specific air area over water and land of a country territory in which the authorized government of that state is required to do identification and the air traffic control, aiming to maintain the national security (Rinehart & Elias, 2015). Therefore, this Air Defense Identification Zone enables People's Republic of China to send force jets and fighter planes in the name of patrol

purposes, in which it did over the Senkakus as the map below shows (Park, 2013).

*Figure 3 3.3 East Asia Air Defense Identification Zone released by People's Republic of China*



Source : Park, M. (2013, November 27). *Why China's new air zone incensed Japan, U.S.* Retrieved October 14, 2017, from CNN News: <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/china-japan-island-explainer/index.html>

As we see above, the Japan's and People Republic of China's Air Defense Identification Zone was overlapping over the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands territory. In accordance with the definition of Air Defense Identification Zones above, it would increase the tension of the dispute since it would expand the area of collision not only in the maritime area but also among the patrolling jets in the air. This would be conflictive since anyone, especially Japanese jets, flying over the People's Republic of China claimed Air Defense Identification Zones would be required to ask for permission through radio to the People's Republic of China authority, in other words it is a

strong intervention toward other state's territory (Gupta, 2013).

Many experts argued that People's Republic of China decision to be assertive and expansive by the establishment of East China Air Defense Identification Zone was to duplicate People's Republic of China strategy in claiming South China Sea territory. In South China Sea, People's Republic of China had been able to dominate Philippines in several disputed territories by constantly and blatantly sending powerful vessel to the disputed areas, downsizing Philippines power in claiming the territories in South China Sea (Harlan, 2013). In East China Sea, People's Republic of China tried to apply the strategy using the excessive number of aircraft as well aiming to downsize anyone claiming the Senkaku-Diayou Island.

Japan's government presumed the establishment of East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone as a crucial threat toward the regional security, as it significantly escalated the level of the tension between both countries. Japan's ministry of foreign affairs officially affirmed this statement by saying "*Setting up such airspace unilaterally escalates the situations surrounding Senkaku Islands and has danger of leading to an unexpected situation*" (Grammaticas, 2013). Seeing the conflictive situation, the dispute seemed to be unsolved in a short period of time.

### **C. Senkaku-Diayou Islands Value for People's Republic of China and Japan**

The previous part of this chapter mainly describes the background and the fluctuation of the dispute among People's Republic of China and Japan. By the data given in subchapter A and B, this research portrayed that both parties were less likely able to let go the Senkaku-Diayou Islands. However, it was not yet mentioned the vital value of the Islands and what the urgencies for both parties to keep the Islands from outside intervention. Therefore, in this subchapter this research would like to disclose the importance of the Islands for People's Republic of China and Japan.

The most dominant point in regards of the vital value of the Islands was the abundant amount of natural resources within that area. It is known that within the Senkaku/Diayou Islands surrounding lied an abundant number of Bonito fish and most importantly vast amount of potential oil and gas reserves. It was strongly alleged that East China Sea itself contained about hundreds million barrels oil reserves stock in which would be sufficient energy sources for incoming five to eight decades. It was very vital for People's Republic of China since by having a full ownership of the Islands, it could cover People's Republic of China energy consumption for at least eight years. That energy reserve was also very essential to support People's Republic of China agenda in establishing national power in international community, especially its policy of expansionism (Haruki, 2010). The Senkaku/Diayou Islands, the resourceful islands, was also very important for Japan to keep since Japan by default had a very low number of resources since 80 percents of Japan energy consumption was imported from foreign countries.

*Figure 4 3.4 The Map of Chunxiao Gas Fields*



Source : Almond, R. G. (2016, September 13). *South China Sea: The Case Against an ADIZ*. Retrieved December 23, 2017, from The Diplomat: <https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/south-china-sea-the-case-against-an-adiz/>

Having a full authority of the Senkaku-Diayou Islands would instantly escalate the ownership of the energy resources as well. The name of the energy resources was *Chunxiao* gas field or in Japanese named as *Shikaraba*, a gas field that People's Republic of China was unilaterally developed in 2004 (Ueki, 2006). As we can see on the map released by People's Republic of China Ministry of Defense, the Chunxiao/Shikaraba Gas Field was divided into two parts within the current status quo. It means, if People's Republic of China could push Japan sovereignty from the Senakau/Diayou Islands, it could own the entire gas field as it could double the gas ownership as well. It worked vice versa for Japan.

In addition, the control over the Senkaku/Diayou Islands would provide a strategic and prominent geopolitical power in East China Sea. It would allow anyone authorized in Senkaku/Diayou Islands to put total surveillance and navigation within the strategic East China Sea (Badkar, 2012). It is also as strategic as being the battle tipping point among United States primacy and rebalancing Asia pivot against People's Republic of China expansionism (Roy-Chaudhury, 2016). It clearly shows how crucial this region is, since whoever controlling this place could control figuratively the entire Asia.

#### **D. Grand Vision : Balancing People's Republic of China in East China Sea**

By the explanation of the core cause, track record and the urgency of the conflict, these phenomenons could be seen with the balance of power concept. As mentioned in chapter 1, balance of power is a concept that describes a condition where one or more state power is used with the aim of balancing the power of the other state to reach the stability in the international system (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011). Seen from the

bigger picture, it mainly portrays the attempt of Japan to use its power in balancing People's Republic of China effort to challenge the status quo in Senkaku/Diayou ownership. It also could fit with the concept in vice versa where People's Republic of China and Republic of China were using its power to crack Japan stronger control of the disputes Islands.

The prerequisite of the balance of power to exist also fitted with the precondition that existed prior to both state's attempt to challenge each others' power projection over the Senkaku Diayou Islands. The pioneer of this concept, an international politics scholar, Hans J. Morgenthau pictured the 2 primary prerequisite for the balance of power to exist; (1) society high demand for the presence of balancing actor and (2) without the presence of the balancing power, the other party will overshadow and dominate the opponent party (Morgenthau, 1985). It fits because first, there was a huge demand by both Japanese and Chinese side to balance each other control in East China Sea over the Senakaku/Diayou Islands, proven by the anti-Japanese rally in People's Republic of China and pressure from right wing groups in Japan. Second, it suited the concept because clearly without the attempt of Japan to maintain its control over Senkaku/Diayou Islands, the two China will clearly control the Senkaku/Diayou Islands. Proven even with Japan legal control of the Islands, People's Republic of China still attempted to challenge it by establishing unilateral East China Sea ADIZ.

The military export ban lift in 2014 by Shinzo Abe basically shifted the total arm export to be back using "The Three Principles". However, the principles established in 1967 and the one re-created in 2014 has a major difference. The one drafted in 1967 was basically aimed to maintain the global security environment *per se*, while the 2014 one was also concerning about the Japan national security inward instead of idealistically contributing international peace maintenance (The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, 2014).


The establishment of the new three principles that concerned more about Japan viewpoint of security was highly

associated with its insecurity toward its surrounding, dominated by People's Republic of China aggressiveness. Following the insecurity, came an idea that the major reason for this policy is to achieve the balance of power against People's Republic of China in East China Sea. It was triggered by the problematic situation in East China Sea where the imbalance of power occurred.

In 2013 People's Republic of China started a massive military buildup and modernization, aiming to win the two regional conflicts, South China Sea against Southeast Asian countries and East China Sea against Japan by 2020 (Bowman, 2013). From 2005-2009, People's Republic of China had already increased their military budget on the 15-20 rate every year, before it turned out to be 10 percent annually on the following year including the one in 2013 with 10.7 percents increase, making People's Republic of China military budget the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest in the world after United States (Cao, 2013). The Pentagon said that this military buildup had not shown any sign of slowing down, in which by this huge budget People's Republic of China would focus on adding more number weaponries in strengthening nuclear deterrence and long range conventional assaults, aircraft carrier, integrated air defenses, undersea battle, increasing navigation and training on its naval, army and air forces (Baron, 2013).

The People's Republic of China excessive military buildup had created its neighbor to be anxious, especially Japan in East China Sea (Blanchar & Ruwitch, 2013). Japan's power, by People's Republic of China excessive military buildup, was oversized and dwarfed. By number in 2013, the Japan military budget was still twice smaller than the People's Republic of China military budget. It could be seen from the budget and power comparison below :

*Figure 5 3.5 Top 10 Military Budgets in 2013*



Quartz | qz.com

Data: IHS Jane

Source: Kuo, L. (2014, March 5). *Why China's new \$132 billion military budget isn't quite as scary as it looks*. Retrieved January 6, 2018, from Quartz: <https://qz.com/184204/why-chinas-new-132-billion-military-budget-isnt-quite-as-scary-as-it-looks/>

Not only from the budgeting perspective, from the weaponry number of ships, submarines and aircrafts in which very essential in maritime tension, Japan property also had been overshadowed by People's Republic of China military growth, as Japan's was stagnant or even shrinking, as the Foreign Policy Research Institute military comparison statistic on Table 1 until Table 4 shown below:



Japan and China Naval-Aircraft Power Comparison 1995-2015\*

*Table 1 3.1 China Naval Weaponries*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Ship</i>	<i>Submarines</i>
<i>1995</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>56</i>
<i>2000</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>64</i>
<i>2005</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>61</i>
<i>2010</i>	<i>78</i>	<i>56</i>
<i>Ordered for 2015</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>69</i>

*Table 2 3.2 Japan Naval Weaponries*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Ship</i>	<i>Submarines</i>
<i>1995</i>	<i>62</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>2000</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>2005</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>2010</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Ordered for 2015</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>17</i>

*Table 3 3.3 China Aircraft Weaponries*

<i>Year</i>	<i>≤3G Fighters</i>	<i>≥4G Fighters</i>	<i>AEW&amp;C</i>	<i>Tankers</i>
<i>1995</i>	<i>5,500</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>2000</i>	<i>3,138</i>	<i>125</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>2005</i>	<i>1,513</i>	<i>334</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>2010</i>	<i>1,098</i>	<i>507</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Ordered for 2015</i>	<i>864</i>	<i>913</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>13</i>

Table 4 3.4 Japan Aircraft Weaponries

Year	$\leq 3G$ Fighters	$\geq 4G$ Fighters	AEW&C	Tankers
1995	160	165	10	0
2000	110	160	14	0
2005	110	200	14	0
2010	65	245	14	4
Ordered for 2015	60	240	17	4

Source : Chang, F. (2013, September 5). *A Salutation To Arms: Asia's Military Buildup, Its Reasons, and Its Implications*. Retrieved January 6, 2018, from Foreign Policy Research Institute:

<https://www.fpri.org/article/2013/09/a-salutation-to-arms-asias-military-buildup-its-reasons-and-its-implications/>

\*This data was released in 2013; however it could also present the under-production weaponries that were expected to be launched in 2015.

By these military budget and weaponries comparison of Japan and People's Republic of China, it could be seen that People's Republic of China has a lot of advantages in number over Japan. Contextualized to balance of power concept, People's Republic of China power could dominate Japan in East China Sea, prone to the failure to achieve balance of power in the region. It fits the situation where there is a need of a bigger power to balance the other state power to achieve the stability. Therefore, the status quo is prone to be called as imbalance of power that needs to be balanced by Japan.

In achieving stability, diplomatic talk had been tried. However, the situation did not get any better by the rigid and frozen diplomatic ties of Japan and People's Republic of China in deescalating the tension in East China Sea. Akihisa Nagishima, Japan Deputy Defense Minister in 2013 was even stating that they do not have any solution or any way out resolving this dispute (Ford, 2013). An analyst in International Crisis Group, Yangmei Xie, stated that since Japan nationalization of the Islands from the private in 2012, the

diplomatic maneuver in resolving Senkaku/Diayou Islands dispute remained deadlock and less likely to change due to the extreme position disparity among two; People's Republic of China wanted to challenge the status quo by expecting Japan to admit that the Senkaku/Diayou was disputed while Japan wanted to maintain the status quo, pushing People's Republic of China vessels and aircraft out from 'Japanese territory'. (Domínguez, 2014). Japan firmly stood on an idea that Senkaku Islands was clearly Japanese territory and there was no point where it could be disputed with other country (Scoville, 2014). By this deadlock, other means of achieving balance of power was vital to be achieved by these two parties.

From the legal perspective, the usage of international law in resolving this dispute was also found to be unhelpful. It could be broken down into three major layers of explanation. First, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was not accommodative in resolving Senkaku/Diayou dispute that was located in a strategic yet resourceful geographical location in East China Sea, otherwise it inflamed the conflict (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008). It was because based on the UNCLOS article 56-57, a country was allowed to declare an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) up to 200 nautical miles offshore to explore and exploit the natural resources within, fueling any ambition for Japan and People's Republic of China to take Senkaku/Diayou control (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982). Second, the international customary law in territorial occupation had encouraged a state to show more domination to be stated as the more legitimate owner of the territory, causing the tension more heated (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008). It motivated Japan and China to take control of the Islands since the first three of the 5 territory acquisition ways international customary law recognized (occupation, prescription, cession, accretion, and conquest) were relevant in the dispute (Manjiao, 2011). Third, the existing international law had allowed both Japan and People's Republic of China to take any legal basis partially and only the ones that fits their interest, discouraging them to

bring this case to a higher international legal body due to the unpredictability (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008).

Seeing the inefficiency of diplomatic and legal approach in past actions, the hard military approach was taken by Shinzo Abe, namely lifting the decades self-imposed military export ban in 2014. According to the balance of power concept, a state may attempt to balance the other state power by the internal military buildup (Lobell, 2014). Thus, military export was aimed to accelerate Shinzo Abe ambition for Japan remilitarization agenda as the part of Japan internal military buildup (Kelly & Kubo, 2014). This military export ban lift by Shinzo Abe was believed to be a good step for Japan in modernizing its defense industry and capabilities in the rapid change situation on its surrounding in 21<sup>st</sup> century since it would trigger a more efficient production and better quality weaponries (McNeill, 2014).

The decades restriction of arm export had blocked Japan major military contractor such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and IHI from their overseas market, leaving Japanese Defense Force to be the only customer they had, causing a very high production cost for those companies (Takenaka & Kubo, 2014). Narushige Michisita, a security specialist from National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies stated that by this arm export ban relaxation, it would cut the unit cost of each products and push the uncompetitive contractors out from the production (McNeill, 2014). Michisita also stated that this cost efficiency would stimulate Japan defense military technology improvement since creating high-tech weaponries by default would cost a lot more without this international arm export (McNeill, 2014). These data showed that Japan was attempting to achieve the balance of power against People's Republic of China though a more efficient and prominent internal armaments.

Besides balancing through armaments, balance of power concept also recognizes the alliance improvement as the method of achieving balance of power (Morgenthau, 1985). By this military export ban lift, Shinzo Abe also aimed to have

a closer military ties with the countries that was having conflict and prone to have one with People's Republic of China, namely Southeast Asian countries and also India. Yusuf Unjhawala, a geopolitics and strategy expert from India Defence Analysis stated that the pursuance of closer relationship would be achieved by Japanese military weaponries exports towards the conflicting countries against People's Republic of China as Shinzo Abe already planned to have \$20 billion aid and investment for ASEAN countries including the military defense projects (Unjhawala, 2014). In detail, below mentioned the Japan arm export activities as a strategic measure to balance People's Republic of China:

- India : In a short period after the release of the new principles, India had also approached Japan for the a deal in U2 amphibious aircraft (Takenaka & Kubo, 2014). Later in 2016, Indian Navy had been progressive for the deal of the U2 amphibious aircraft from ShinMaywa, aiming to project power against People's Republic of China in Indian Ocean (Nagao, 2016).
- Vietnam: In August 2014, Japan provided Vietnam with six patrol boats following its dispute with People's Republic of China over Exclusive Economic Zone in South China Sea (Hiep, 2017). It also put an interest to purchase Kawasaki P-1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft to face People's Republic of China in Haigyang oil rig and to secure its Eastern Seaboard coastline (Mizokami, 2015).
- Philippines : Japan voluntarily lease 5 units of T-90 patrol aircraft to Manila as in March 2016 Japan and Philippines signed landmark agreement on technology transfer, as the Japan military export ban was lifted (Parameswaran, 2017). This T-90 aircrafts were strategically aimed to challenge People's Republic of China assertiveness in South China Sea (Blanchard, China expresses alarm at Philippines-Japan aircraft deal, 2016).

By those arm transfer and export to the countries that were currently and similarly having tension with People's Republic of China, Japan arm export would be expected to contain the People's Republic of China to gain more power through its expansionism, therefore the stability could be improved (Matsumura, 2017). Therefore, the military export ban by Shinzo Abe in 2014 would lead Japan to its goal in balancing People's Republic of China since it stimulated Japan defense buildup and military ties with vital actors that were against People's Republic of China.