


LAMPIRAN

Lampiran 1 : Fasilitas Nuklir Iran



(Sumber : Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011)

Lampiran 2 : Prinsip dasar Strategi Uni Eropa melawan Proliferasi Senjata Pemusnah Massal



COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 10 June 2003

10352/03

LIMITE

PESC 315
CONOP 18
CODUN 13
COTER 24

NOTE

from	:	Secretariat
to	:	Delegations
Subject:		Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Delegations will find attached a document entitled "Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" as resulting from the meeting of the Political and Security Committee on 10 June 2003.

Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

On 14 April 2003 the Council instructed the Secretary General/High Representative, in association with the Commission, and the Political and Security Committee, to pursue work on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with a view to making proposals for submission to the European Council. Member States have contributed a number of specific proposals.

Drawing on these, as well as on the targeted initiative to respond effectively to the international threat of terrorism, adopted by the Council on 15 April 2002, the Council Secretariat and the Commission have drawn up a set of basic principles defining the broad lines for an EU strategy against proliferation of WMD. In addition to these basic principles an Action Plan has also been elaborated. It contains a series of short and medium term specific measures for action in the months to come.

Basic Principles

1. The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (i.e. biological, chemical and nuclear weapons) and means of delivery such as ballistic missiles constitutes a threat to international peace and security. These weapons are different from other weapons not only because of their capacity to cause death on a large scale but also because they could destabilise the international system.
2. The acquisition of WMD or related materials by terrorists would represent an additional threat to the international system with potentially uncontrollable consequences. Armed with weapons or materials of mass destruction terrorists could inflict damage that in the past only states with large armies could achieve.
3. An EU strategy against the proliferation of WMD needs to be based on a common assessment of global proliferation threats. The EU Situation Centre has prepared and will continuously update a threat assessment using all available sources; our intelligence services should keep this issue under review and remain engaged in this process.

4. To address the new threats, a broad approach is needed. Political and diplomatic preventative measures (multilateral treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent international organisations (IAEA, OPCW, etc.) form the first line of defence. When these measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role.
5. The EU is committed to the multilateral system. We will pursue the implementation and universalisation of the existing disarmament and non-proliferation norms. With regard to biological and chemical weapons, we will work towards declaring the bans on these weapons to be universally binding rules of international law. We will work towards the universalisation of the NPT. We will also promote measures to ensure that any possible misuse of civilian nuclear programmes for military purposes will be effectively excluded.
6. We are committed to the multilateral treaty regime, which provides the normative basis for all non-proliferation efforts. If the regime is to remain credible it must be made more effective. This means working with those who share our interest in preventing proliferation; and it also means dealing with those who cheat. At the same time we should consider carefully the position of those who do not belong. The EU will place particular emphasis on defining a policy reinforcing compliance with the multilateral treaty regime. Such a policy must be geared towards enhancing the detectability of significant violations and strengthening enforcement of the norms established by this treaty regime. In this context, the role of the UN Security Council, as the final arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance – as foreseen in multilateral regimes – needs to be effectively strengthened.
7. To ensure effective detectability of violations and thereby deter non-compliance we will make best use of existing verification mechanisms and systems. We will also support the establishment of additional international verification instruments and, if necessary, the use of non-routine inspections under international control beyond facilities declared under existing treaty regimes.

8. The best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them. If possible, political solutions should be found to the problems which lead them to seek WMD. The more secure countries feel, the more likely they are to abandon programmes: disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programmes can lead to an arms race. To this end, we must actively foster the establishment of regional security arrangements and regional arms control and disarmament processes. Our dialogue with the countries concerned should take account of the fact that in many cases they have real and legitimate security concerns, with the clear understanding that there can never be any justification for the illegal development of WMD. We will encourage these countries to renounce the use of technology and facilities which might cause a particular risk of proliferation.
9. We are aware that finding political solutions to all of the different problems, fears and ambitions of countries in the most dangerous regions for proliferation will require persistent efforts. Our policy is therefore to contain proliferation while dealing with its underlying causes.
10. Positive and negative security assurances can play an important role: they can serve both as an incentive to forego the acquisition of WMD and as a deterrent. These security assurances need to be further explored.
11. Proliferation of WMD is a global threat, which needs a global approach. However, as security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean, we should pay particular attention to the issue of proliferation in the Mediterranean area.
12. An common approach and co-operation with key partners such as the US and the Russian Federation is essential in order to effectively implement WMD non-proliferation regime, and constitute an important ground for reinforcing transatlantic relations.
13. Our strategy against proliferation will therefore be based on the following key elements:
 - Pursuing universalisation of disarmament and non-proliferation agreements while stressing the importance of effective national implementation thereof;
 - Ensuring compliance with non-proliferation commitments by making best use of, and, when appropriate, strengthening international inspection/verification mechanisms;
 - Strengthening export control policies;

- Introducing a stronger non-proliferation element in relationships with some partners;
- Having a focused dialogue both with countries suspected of proliferation activities and with those whose co-operation is vital to effective policies against proliferation;
- Expanding co-operative threat reduction initiatives and assistance programmes;
- Ensuring that appropriate resources and support are allocated to international organisations and arrangements active in non-proliferation such as the IAEA, the OPCW, the CTBTO PrepCom and the HCOC;
- Promoting close co-ordination with the United States;
- Pursuing an international agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
- Considering, in case political and diplomatic measures have failed, coercive measures, including as a last resort the use of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

(Sumer : Council of The European Union, 2003)

Lampiran 3 : Dokumen Joint Plan of Action

Joint Plan of Action

Preamble

The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by-step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme.

There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including, among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Council's consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.

Elements of a first step

The first step would be time-bound, with a duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent, during which all parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations in good faith.

Iran would undertake the following voluntary measures:

- From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF₆ to no more than 5%. No reconversion line.
- Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.

- Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant¹, Fordow², or the Arak reactor³, designated by the IAEA as IR-40.
- Beginning when the line for conversion of UF₆ enriched up to 5% to UO₂ is ready, Iran has decided to convert to oxide UF₆ newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period, as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.
- No new locations for the enrichment.
- Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D practices, which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.
- No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.
- Enhanced monitoring:
 - Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran's plans for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source material. This information would be provided within three months of the adoption of these measures.
 - Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40, to the IAEA.
 - Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.
 - Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.
 - IAEA inspector managed access to:
 - centrifuge assembly workshops⁴;
 - centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and,
 - uranium mines and mills.

In return, the E3/EU+3 would undertake the following voluntary measures:

- Pause efforts to further reduce Iran's crude oil sales, enabling Iran's current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services.
- Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on:
 - Iran's petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services.⁵
 - Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services.
- Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran's auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated services.
- License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated services. License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well as associated services.⁶
- No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.
- No new EU nuclear-related sanctions.
- The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.
- Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran's domestic needs using Iranian oil revenues held abroad. Humanitarian trade would be defined as transactions involving food and agricultural products, medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign banks and non-designated Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the channel.
 - This channel could also enable:
 - transactions required to pay Iran's UN obligations; and,
 - direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students studying abroad, up to an agreed amount for the six month period.
- Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed amount.

*Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution**

The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing no more than one year after the adoption of this document, would:

- Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.
- Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.
- Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear-related sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy, on a schedule to be agreed upon.
- Involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical-needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon.
- Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40. No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.
- Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Iranian parliament).
- Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed R&D practices.

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

* With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" applies.

(Sumber : The Institute for Science and International Security, 2014)

Lampiran 4 : Dokumen Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

PREFACE

The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation. In this context, the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran's peaceful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.

The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively allow them to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran's nuclear programme, including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the E3/EU+3's concerns, including through comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification.

The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.

(Sumber : US Department of State, 2015)

Lampiran 5 : Periode waktu dalam Document Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 2015

Table A-1. Summary of Timeline

IMPLEMENTATION	COMPONENTS	DATE/EXPECTED
Finalization Day	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Date on which JCPOA announced. • Joint Commission established comprised of representatives of Iran and the P5+1, with the EU High Representative. • Coordination led by EU High Representative. • Meet on quarterly basis or at request of any JCPOA participant. • Decision and work subject to U.N. rules of confidentiality. • Among other things, in charge of dispute resolution and establishing procurement channel. 	July 14, 2015
JCPOA submitted to U.N. Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • P5+1 will "promptly" send JCPOA to U.N. Security Council (UNSC) for review and adoption "without delay." 	Resolution 2231 submitted on July 15 and adopted on Monday, July 20, 2015
Adoption Day	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 90 days (or earlier if agreed by P5+1 and Iran) after endorsement of JCPOA by the UNSC. From this date, participants start making preparations for implementing commitments. • EU to adopt regulation terminating nuclear-related sanctions with effect from Implementation Day. • U.S. President to issue sanctions waivers to take effect on Implementation Day. • Iran to prepare nuclear related commitments and notify IAEA that it will apply Additional Protocol provisionally with effect from Implementation Day. 	October 18, 2015
Implementation Day	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simultaneously with IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures, U.N. sanctions terminate, EU sanctions terminate (in some cases only suspended), U.S. "ceases" application of nuclear related sanctions. 	Not tied to any date, but expected to occur within 4-6 months from Adoption Day. Roughly in the first half of 2016. Occurred on January 16, 2016
Transition Day	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 years after Adoption Day or the date when IAEA submits a report that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities (whichever is earlier). EU terminates remaining sanctions. U.S. terminates or modifies remaining sanctions. Iran ratifies Additional Protocol. 	Expected mid-October 2023
U.N. Security Council Resolution Termination Day	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 years from Adoption Day, the UNSC resolution endorsing JCPOA terminates—provided no U.N. sanctions have been reimposed. UNSC "would no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear issue." 	Expected mid-October 2025

¹³³ Appendix prepared by Christopher Mann, Research Assistant, CRS; adapted from European Council on Foreign Relations.

(Sumber : Congressional Research Service, 2017)

Lampiran 6: Annex IV – Komisi Bersama

Annex IV – Joint Commission

1. Establishment, Composition, and Coordinator

- 1.1. The Joint Commission is established to carry out the functions assigned to it in the JCPOA, including its Annexes.
- 1.2. The Joint Commission is comprised of representatives of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), together, the JCPOA participants.
- 1.3. The Joint Commission may establish Working Groups in particular areas, as appropriate.
- 1.4. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ('High Representative'), or his/her designated representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission.

2. Functions

- 2.1. The Joint Commission will perform the following functions:
 - 2.1.1. Review and approve the final design for the modernized heavy water research reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories prior to the commencement of construction, and review and approve the fuel design for the modernized heavy water research reactor as provided for in Section B of Annex I;
 - 2.1.2. Review and approve, upon request by Iran, development, acquisition, construction or operation of hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 21 of Annex I;
 - 2.1.3. Review and approve plans submitted by Iran to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel, as provided for in paragraph 26 of Annex I;
 - 2.1.4. Review and approve, upon request by Iran, projects on new types of centrifuges to proceed to a prototype stage for mechanical testing, as provided for in paragraph 43 of Annex I;
 - 2.1.5. Receive information in advance about the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow, as provided for in paragraph 44 of Annex I;
 - 2.1.6. Receive information about the conceptual framework of stable isotope production at Fordow, as provided for in paragraph 46.1 of Annex I;

(Sumber : European External Action Service, 2015)

Lampiran 7: Pertemuan Delegasi Uni Eropa, Iran, dan Kelompok P5+1



(Sumber : US Department of State, 2015)