

The Current Practice of Citizen Participation in Indonesia Netizen and Selected Cases of Local Democracy in Indonesia

Eko Priyo Pumomo^{}, Achmad Nurmandi^{**}, Andi Luhur Prianto^{***},
Solahudin^{****} and Moch Jaenuri^{*****}*

Abstract

After the waves of local democratizations over the past decade, the current mayor of Bandung city and Jakarta, introduced a new way of CSO or citizen participation in local governance through social media. By using ARVIN (association, resources, voice, information, negotiation) framework, the aim of this paper is to investigate and compare the social media initiative as a new model of electronic citizen association in Jakarta and Bandung. By connecting via social media, the governor or mayor encourages the creation of citizen associations based on common interest in public deliberation. Legal citizen engagement in political affairs creates a new model of governance which acts as a low-cost two-way interactive

^{*} JK School of Government Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

^{**} JK School of Government Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

^{***} Department of Government Affairs, Universitas Muhammadiyah Makasar, Indonesia

^{****} Department of Government Affairs, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, Indonesia

^{*****} Department of Government Affairs, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, Indonesia



platform with the governments through a common infrastructure of ICTs, and is the backbone of a networked government. Although the role of social media in local governance is not a legally established space for dialogue or a public forum by local regulations, the Governor of Jakarta and the Mayor of Bandung city have introduced a new model of free public deliberation, publishing and distributing views on what subject in what context and when.

Keywords: Netizen, Social Media, Local Democracy and Decision Making



Introduction

The Republic of Indonesia is the world's largest archipelago country by area and by population. It is also the world's most populous Muslim-majority nation and is home to 240 million people living across more than 17,504 islands in an area of 1,910,931.32 km. Despite its diversity, which includes 300 distinct ethnic groups and more than 700 languages and dialects, Indonesia has managed to develop a shared national identity.

The fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998 marked the beginning of Indonesia's "remarkable transition from repressive dictatorship to possibly the most dynamic and successful democracy in Southeast Asia" (Liddle, 2012). Far-reaching political, economic and judicial reforms have contributed to the country's rapid democratic consolidation. A massive decentralization program in the early 2000s has transferred political power to the local level. A member of the G-20 with an estimated GDP of US\$ 846.8 billion in 2011, Indonesia's economy is the largest in Southeast Asia. In the past 15 years, the region's most populous nation has turned from "Southeast Asia's economic basket case in 1998" into one of Asia's most promising emerging markets with annual growth rates at more than five percent. Indonesia's rapid urbanization, young demographics, and increasingly affluent middle class are driving its economy to become the world's seventh largest by 2030 (UNESCAP, 2013). Indonesia's economic growth from 2009 until 2012 of was 6.2% per year with a GDP per capita of US\$ 3,557. This makes Indonesia a lower middle income country.

Historical Context of Democratization and Decentralization



Democratization and decentralization are two variables that are related each other. Decentralization in some countries has been pursued by national elites for a mixture of reasons, including democracy, making government more efficient, and reducing state expenditure (Selee and Tulchin, 2004). In the history of Indonesia's decentralization, there has been a unique relationship between the central government and local government independence. In the period of 1945-1949, local governments had broad autonomy in managing their abundant local resources. The system of the Dutch colonial administration of the so-called East Indies consisted of a simple top-down structure. Within this administration, around 300 Dutchmen in the Interior Ministry (Binnenlandsche Bestuur) managed the main functions of government in Jakarta (then called Batavia by the Dutch) and staffed the territorial administration down to the level of regency (Furnivall 1944:ch. 9) Local administration below the regency level was carried out by the indigenous aristocracy (pangreh praja), which was led by regents (bupati) and assisted by their bureaucrats (wedana) (Rohdewohld 1995, p. 3; Sutherland 1979). At the beginning of the twentieth century, liberal movement in Netherland pushed new policy to more human colonial policy called Ethical Policy and introduced The Decentralization Law (Dezentralizatie Wet) of 1903 provided the legal basis for this first autonomy experiment according to which the territory was divided into three administrative units (Gewesten, Plaatsen, and Gemeenten). Also in 1903, the municipality of Batavia became the first local government authority, followed by the municipality of Surabaya in 1905. By the year 1939, 32 urban municipalities had been formed (Furnivall 1944, p. 291).



These municipalities and 18 residencies (kabupaten) were allowed to form local councils (RAAD), which were intended to serve the interests of their European majorities (Legge 1961, p. 6).

The Japanese occupation in the 1940s had a radicalizing effect on this decentralization process (Bunte, 2006). First, the provinces and regency councils were abolished, and the territory divided into three administrative units, which ran parallel to the military subdivision of the country. Second, the Indonesian aristocracy (pangreh prajah) moved up into senior positions while nationalist leaders (including Sukarno) became part of the government. At the same time, the authoritarian bureaucracy was extended down to the level of hamlets and households. With this step, “every household, neighborhood association, hamlet and village, all of which had previously fallen outside the formal administrative structure, was incorporated into the all-encompassing single administrative pyramid dominated by the Japanese Army” (Sato 1994, p. 28).

After independence each region wanted broad local autonomy. From 1950-1965, there were local secessionist movements or rebellions throughout Indonesia. The rebellion of PRRI Permesta (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/ Piagam Perjuangan Semesta (Universal Struggle Charter) in Sumatera and Celebes was a revolt involving the army which was dissatisfied with the central government in Jakarta (Fryer,1957). The role of these areas in the revolution is very important for the nationalist movement outside Java after independence; however, the central government policy ignored their role in the independence



movement (Amal, 1993). One important case triggered a local rebellion in Sumatra was the appointment of a governor from Java, Ruslan Mulyoharjo, to be the governor of the western region of Sumatra in the 1956 (Amal,1993). The PRRI rebellion and the Permesta in Sulawesi, which led by Kahar Muzakar, had the goal of central government recognition of the Sulawesi community in Indonesia (Amal, 1993). Similarly, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was triggered by unjust distribution of oil and gas revenues, the secessionist movement was formed in Aceh in 1976, just as a large natural gas facility was beginning its operations.




Figure 1: Regional Rebellion 1958 - 1959

Source: Robert Gibb, *Digital Atlas of Indonesia History*, Niaspress, 2007

After successfully military enforcement encountering separatism activists of PRRI Permesta in Sumatera and Sulawesi, demands for greater self-management were accommodated, Sukarno stipulated regional



autonomy laws in the 1950s that were revoked in 1959 when Sukarno implemented ‘Guided Democracy’ (Legge 1961, p. 209). In Guided Democracy, the relationship between the central government and local governments was not changed in terms of devolution and administrative decentralization. The central government had authority to appoint governors and mayors or regents similar to the colonial Dutch era. All local government had same delegated authorities transferred by the central government. Under Guided Democracy, the military played an enhanced role in governance, through Nation’s presence in the cabinet, through the appointment of military officers as provincial governors, and through the army’s control of the enterprises seized from the Dutch in 1957, which were subsequently nationalized (Cribb, 2010).

New Order

The coup attempt of 1 October 1965 gave the army, now led by General Suharto, the opportunity to seize power from President Sukarno. A major feature of the New Order, therefore, was the removal of the once powerful party presence in the administration and its substitution with a military presence (Cribb, 2010). Indeed, under New Order era, the Suharto regime’s objective was to attain political order through military dual-function, political structure, and governing process (Mas’oed, 1989). The new political structure was designed into a controlled bureaucracy, a solid military organization, controlled democracy, a house of representative, and a limited number of political parties. The first controlled bureaucracy



strategy was to centralize the decision making process at the central government, to limit devolution process and to control local government. The central government appointed military personnel (active and retired) to positions throughout the government. They were especially prominent in the Department of Internal Affairs (Dalam Negeri), holding positions ranging from governor down to village chief (Cribb, 2010). In sum, The New Order stopped short of doing away with political parties and elections, but allowed both to continue only under tightly controlled conditions (Cribb, 2010).

In this way, the New Order stipulated Law No. 5 Year 1974 as very centralized local government law. The central government played an important role in recruiting governors, regents, or mayors through appointing active or retired military personnel to local government. Through this mechanism, the central government was able to effectively control the governing process. District officials often liken this assignment of functions to a farm animal that has been entrusted to another's care, with the owner insisting that he must continue to hold onto the beast's tail (*terus pegang ekornya*) (Ferrazi, 2000).

Era Reformasi (Reform Era)

On May 20 1998, Suharto resigned from his presidential position due to strong civil pressure. BJ Habibie was the next president. BJ Habibie formulated the new law on democratic decentralization. Between May 1998 and October 1999 he managed to lay the foundation for a more



democratic and decentralized political system, and Indonesia emerged from that transitional period to join the ranks of the world's democracies, not its failed states (Malley in Bland and Arnson, 2006). Based on MPR Decree No. XV/MPR/1998, in November 1998 BJ Habibie instructed his minister of home affairs to put together a team of civil servants, academics and advisors to formulate a draft of Law No. 22/1999 regarding regional governance. Simultaneously, the Finance Ministry started work on a reform of the system of intergovernmental finances and formulated the draft for Law No. 25/1999 on the "Fiscal Balance between the Centre and the Regions" (Bunte, 2008). In May 1999, Laws No. 22 and 25 were passed by parliament in great haste and with a minimum of debate. Indeed, no substantial changes were made from the government's original draft legislation (Rasyid 2003, p. 63).

JICA (2001) noted that there were five important changes in Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999. Namely, autonomy to local governments with emphasis on their diversity; distribution of authority and redistribution of personnel between the central and local governments; distribution of authority and redistribution of personnel between the central and local governments. Law No. 22/1999 states that the fields of government that must be covered by regencies and municipalities including public works projects, health, education and culture, agriculture, transport and communications, industry and trade, capital investment, the environment, land, co-operatives, and manpower affairs, and these fields may not be devaluated to the provinces (Article 11 (2) and the note thereto). In principle, the head of a local government is now elected by a majority vote



of the local council, leaving little room for the central government to intervene. (ii) The head of a local government is now accountable to the local council. If the fiscal year-end administrative report by the head is rejected twice by the local council, the head is forced to resign. As a result, the local council now has significant bargaining power over the head of the local government. (iii) The regional budget over which a local council has the auditing right has been increased after the regional allocations increased in absolute terms and the percentage of block grants to total subsidies from the central government has grown. (iv) The potential opposition within the local council to the head of the local government has increased because various political parties now have representation. Finally, Under Law No. 22/1999, the field agencies of central government ministries have been abolished except for those in five fields, and in addition it has become difficult for the central government to intervene in elections for governors, chief executives, and mayors.

The Habibie administration promoted a big bang autonomous model through Law No. 22/1999. This law stipulated several radical changes: the declaration of regency/city governments as autonomous regions which are not hierarchically subordinate to the provincial government; election right of local legislative body for regents, mayors, and governors; and strong power of local councils. Article 4 (1) Law 22/1999 stated that in the context of the implementation of the decentralization principle, province, regency and city shall be formed and authorized to govern and administer in the interests of the local people according to their own initiatives based on the people's aspirations. Article 18 (1) states that



the local council (DPRD) shall elect regional government heads. However, implementation of Laws 22 and 25 had several problems. Hidayat and Antlov (2003) noted that devolution initially led to deterioration in the provision of services, exacerbation of inequalities between districts, the capturing of economic benefits of regional autonomy by local elite, the absence of local accountability, and the dominance of local councils. Finally, the central government confirmed that Laws 22 and 25 as a “over acting autonomy (otonomi kebablasan) (Hidayat and Antlov, 2003).

Issue	Law No.22/1999	Law No.5/1974
Status of local representative body (regional assembly)	Local government consists of local government head and apparatus for autonomous region, which assumes function as local executive body Local parliament is local house of representatives	Local government is local government head and local parliament
Definition of decentralization	Decentralization is transfer from central government authorities to autonomous local governments (regions) within frame of unitary state of Indonesia	Decentralization is transfer from government matters from central government to local governments or from upper to lower level local governments



Issue	Law No.22/1999	Law No.5/1974
From and scope of central and local government authority	Local governments authority covers all governmental authorities, except those of foreign affairs, defense, justice, finances and religious affairs	Local government has right, authority and responsibility to manage their own affairs Assignment of certain governmental affairs to local government is determined by central government regulations

Table 1: Comparative between Law No.22/1999 and Law No.5/1974

Source: Syarif Hidayat and Hans Antlov, "Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia", in Philip Oxhorn, et al, Decentralization, Democratic Governance and Civil Society in Comparative Perspective Asia Africa and Latin America, Wodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C. 2004, p. 286.

Due to the weakness of the act's implementation, the government's proposed changes to the act, namely the position of local councils as an element of regional government administration. and the election model of heads of local government. Article 56 (1) of Law mentions that "the regional heads and deputy regional heads shall be democratically elected in the one pair of candidates through direct, free, secret, honest and fair manner".






Figure 2: Timeline of the act's implementation

Two autonomy acts have been causing much political change in the local level. Local governments in particular have become more independent than before and more democratic at the local level. Many experts noted the successful approach of big bang theory has at least empowered many to build local areas with the limited central government control. A 2008 survey funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development found that trust in local officials grew from 42% in 2006 to 55% in 2008. 70% of respondents said that local government executives were accountable to the people of their area, an increase from 61% in 2006. Some successful stories of locally autonomous policy implementation are the creativity of local governments in handling specific local problems, such as street trader management in Solo city with Joko Widodo, information technology use introduced by Yogyakarta' mayor Herry Zudianto in Yogyakarta, and local agriculture policy done by Damassara as a new autonomous region. Bennett (2011) noted that the



hope for decentralization in Indonesia was that with greater autonomy at the local level, constituents could increase the accountability of their local leaders. Along with the authority given to regional governments, however, these authorities have not been balanced with accountability, there for the cases of corruption in the local government. In line with the majority of the theoretical literature, we argue that the monitoring of bureaucrat's behavior is an important determinant of the relationship between decentralization and corruption (Lessman and Markward, 2009).

Year	Act	Main Characteristics	Context
1948	The First Constitution of Indonesia, Article 18	Guarantee of local autonomy under the constitution	Principle of statutory reservation
1948	Local Autonomy Law No. 22/1948	Institutionalization of local autonomy	Liberal democracy, balanced development, and administrative efficiency
1957	No. 1/1957	Election of local government heads	Liberal democracy
1965	No. 18/1965	Suspension of local autonomy and dissolution of local councils	Authoritarian rule
1974	No. 4/1974	Indefinite postponement of local autonomy	Military authoritarian rule



Year	Act	Main Characteristics	Context
1999	No. 22/1999	Election of local government heads	Liberal democracy
2004	No. 32/2004	Election of local government heads	Liberal democracy
2014	No. 23/2014	Election of local government heads	Liberal democracy

Table 2: A Chronology of Indonesia's Local Autonomy Development

Act No. 23/2014 stipulated clearly community participation in Article 354 as follows:

To inform local government affairs to public

To enhance civil society actively participation in local governance

To institutionalize civil society participation in decision-making processes in form of

- 1) Local policy and regulation formulation
- 2) Planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of local development
- 3) Asset management and natural resources development
- 4) Public services.

The following method of public participation such as, public consultation, policy deliberation, public engagement, controlling and other public engagement are the most common in Indonesia. This legally civic



participation in local governance affairs is a tremendously step forward compared with the preceding act that does not regulate public participation clearly.

However, the election of local government heads is regulated in Government Regulation No. 1/2014 with the significant change particularly in elections. This regulation stipulates only the election of local government's head and does not stipulate the pair candidate of regent/mayor/governor and vice regent/mayor/governor. The vice regent/mayor/governor is appointed from high rank public officials based on the proposal of elected regent/mayor/governor.

Civic Engagement in Local Governance

We try to use the ARVIN (association, resources, voice, information, negotiation) framework to present a more detailed methodology for assessing civic engagement enabling environments (Einhorn, 2007). The ARVIN acronym synthesizes the complexity of multiple conditions that affect the ability of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to engage in public debate and in systems of social accountability (Thindwa, 2003). The enabling environment analytical tool facilitates a comprehensive assessment of the legal and regulatory, political and governmental, socio-cultural and economic factors affecting civic engagement. It is based on an analytical framework that identifies five critical dimensions that are 'enabling elements' of civic engagement. They are:



Association (A): the freedom of citizens to associate

Resources (R): their ability to mobilize resources to fulfill the objectives of their organizations

Voice (V): their ability to formulate and express opinion

Information (I): their access to information (necessary for their ability to exercise voice, engage in negotiation and gain access to resources

Negotiation (N): the existence of spaces and rules of engagement for negotiation, participation and public debate.

Item	Legal and Regulatory Framework	Political and governance context	Sociocultural characteristics	Economic conditions
Association	Freedom of association	Recognition accreditation and procedures	Social capital, barriers, genders and illiteracy	Cost of legal registrations and accreditation, cost of convening and procedures meetings and forum
Resources	Tax systems; fund-raising, and procurement regulations	Government grants, private funds, contracting and other transfers	Social philanthropy, history of associational life, self-help and gap-filling	Size of and stresses in the economy, unemployment, impact of economy on contribution by



Item	Legal and Regulatory Framework	Political and governance context	Sociocultural characteristics	Economic conditions
				members, infrastructure and cost of communications
Voice	Freedom of expression, media and information and communication technology-related laws	Political control of public media	Communication practices (use of media by different social groups)	Free associated with expressing views in media (advertisements versus op-eds), cost present, publish and distribute views (petitions, newsletter, radio announcements)
Information	Freedom of information; rights to access to and provision of public information	Information disclosure policies and practices, ability to demystify public policy and budgets	Information networks, illiteracy, word of mouth	Cost/fees for access to information
Negotiation	Legally established dialogue spaces (referendum, lobby)	Political will, institutionalized dialogue and social accountability	Social value and hierarchies that establish who can speak on what subject	Bargaining power, impact of economic constraints on



Item	Legal and Regulatory Framework	Political and governance context	Sociocultural characteristics	Economic conditions
	regulation, public forum and so forth	mechanism, capacity of parliament and national government to engage	in what context and when	autonomy and advocacy

Table 3: Table the ARVIN Framework: A Way to Assess the Enabling Environment for Civic Engagement

Source: Thindwa, Jeff, Carmen Monico, and William Reuben. Enabling Environments for Civic Engagement in PRSP Countries. Social Development Note 82, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2003.

Netizen in Local Governance

Citizen involvement in governance is a focal point to ensure better governance accountability through broad space of social media for public participation. Social media is defined as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content (Kaplan & Michael Haenlei, 2010) “Web 2.0” refers to Internet platforms that allow for interactive participation by users. “User generated content” is the name for all of the ways in which people may use social media. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development



(OECD) specifies three criteria for content to be classified as “user generated:” (1) it should be available on a publicly accessible website or on a social networking site that is available to a select group, (2) it entails a minimum amount of creative effort, and (3) it is “created outside of professional routines and practices.” (OECD, Participative Web and User-Created Content: Web 2.0, Wikis, and Social Networking¹⁸ (2007) [hereinafter OECD Report] (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p. 61)

There are different types of social media, such as collaborative projects, virtual worlds, blogs, content communities, and social networks. Joseph (2012) noted several advantages of social media. First, it has expanded access to information in an important new way. Secondly, information can be spread faster and farther both within and outside social media. Thirdly, social media expands access to evidence of human right abuses beyond that offered by the mainstream media or NGOs. Fourthly, social media amplifies the message of its users. Finally, an important new platform for information access is taking shape with the emergence of WikiLeaks. Another type of opportunity provided by social media for openness and anticorruption is the increased opportunities for citizen journalism. Through social media, citizen journalism can report when the traditional media fails, such as when the media are strongly influenced or controlled by the state or those in power or when the media provide insufficient coverage of a story (Bertot et al., 2010). Social media tools have created opportunities for collaborative governance and have the potential to facilitate governments in their efforts to reach citizens, to shape online debates and e-participation, to empower citizens, groups, and communities,



and even to revive or demand democracy or e-democracy (Banday and Mattoo, 2013). Each type will be explored in the following section.

Politicians and government agencies in the United States of America and UK Councils are using social media extensively to interact with and to inform citizenry. In the United States social media use boosted Barack Obama's grassroots presidential campaign (by using the Facebook page <http://www.facebook.com/barackobama> and the Twitter handle @BarackObama) in the year 2008. However, former US Congressman Anthony Weiner's career collapsed after it was revealed that he had sent lewd photographs and messages to at least six women online (Srivastava, 2013,). In Canada, Glen Murray, the Minister of Research and Innovation for the province of Ontario, wanted to find a way to bring the public into the discussion. Murray and two other ministers created a crowd sourced wiki to help create an official policy paper on what the government's approach to social innovation should be. Like Wikipedia, any user can add articles or edit submissions in a collaborative effort to create official policy. Gov.politwitter.ca is a companion tool to Politwitter that tracks social media activity by Canadian government institutions & organizations (Srivastava, 2013). In Russia, all items on the agenda of the presidential commission are available for online discussion via the official website i-Russia.ru, where those interested in what is happening can post their comments via social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and VKontakte id). Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has a Facebook page at www.facebook.com/dr.manmohansingh that is frequently updated with both political and personal updates. It has around 382,223 likes which suggests that the



citizens are interested in engaging in political and policy discourses. The PMO maintains the Facebook page and all information regarding important bills, legislations, PM statements, press releases, official visits, and photographs are regularly updated. PMO India has a twitter handle too <http://twitter.com/pmoindia> (Srivastava, 2013). In researching the use of social media by Regional Police in Jakarta, Lestarie (2013) found that social media achieved its intended goals by serving as an efficient and effective tool for information dissemination, providing easier information access to citizens, and encouraging public participation and collaboration in government work.

According to the Ministry of Communication and Information, as of November 2013 Indonesia had 20 million Twitter users and 65 million Facebook users. Of the estimated 187 million voters, about 12% will be first-time voters aged 17 to 20, according to Central Statistics Agency data. Social media users swell the total youth vote (those aged below 30) to about 54 million, or a third of the electorate. At least six out of ten of these young voters are plugged into social media, according to a Jakarta Post report.



Facebook face-off

Politicians in India and Indonesia, two countries with among the fastest-growing number of Facebook users in the world, are paying unprecedented attention to the use of social media for the upcoming elections.




Figure 3. India and Indonesia Social Media Role in Election

Source: <http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-report/indonesia/story/indonesia-scramble-online-followers-20140301#sthash.6gmQeZdE.dpuf>

In the government's sphere of influence, the Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, or SBY as he is known, joined Twitter in 2014. Within two weeks of his joining Twitter, SBY had over 1.7 million followers and a spike in his popularity. In the 2014 general election for Indonesia's President saw Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla win the election for President and Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia for the period 2014-2019. These candidates have successfully gained popular support and initiated voluntary political movements (outside political parties). Once elected, Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla launched a new form of communication with social media (Facebook Jokowi Center) to build a new-populist Cabinet. In



this way, Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla is attempting to get public responses and complaints from the community in order to provide input on the proposed ministerial candidates. Indonesia, particularly Jakarta, is one of the places in the world which is most densely colonized by social media. Jakarta reputedly generates more tweets than any other of the world's big cities. In a nation of 240 million people, Facebook has more than 60 million active users, but creativity only goes so far. Merlyna Lim (2014), a digital media expert at Canada's Carleton University, said while Jokowi's online supporters are funny and innovative, Jokowi's opponent has outmanoeuvred him online. "Prabowo has been better in mobilising [online support]," she said. "They're more systematic ... they have more organised attempts to attack [Jokowi] (al Jazeera.com). Katapedia, the research centre for social media noted that the winning pair of Jokowi-JK has shown in the last ten days before election that items posted by those Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla were shared in social media 770,491 times, compared with 709,294 times for Prabowo Hatta Rajasa (2014). Voting for Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla via hashtag #AkhirnyaMilihJokowi (#finally vote for Jokowi) has become a trending topic.

No	Item	Bandung	DKI Jakarta	Banyuwangi	EastKutai	Bogor
1	Starting Twitter	Ok-2009	Jan-10	Jan-12	Sep-12	Jan-10
2	Update					
	Update/tweet per day	21	5	40	4	7
	Update/tweet per week	148	35		7	
	Update/tweet per month	593	150		12	



	Total tweet	35,570			678	
3	Followers twitter head of government	3590100 0	183000 0	13400	113168	1483
4	Mention twitter					
	Daily mention	7	275	20 s/d 30		
	Weekly mention	49	1400			
	Moonthly mention	210	1675			
5	Favorite twitter	1740000 0	219	122	219	
6	Number of photo and video	2,641				
	Type of information					
	a. Photo				13	
	b. Program				17	7
	Type of retweeted					
	a. Information				32	7
	b. Input				45	1
	c. Complaint				11	

Table 4: Table Institutionalized Use of Social Media in Local Government

However, not all local governments get the benefit from social media. Bekasi municipal government, for example, is a city that had not taken social media to enhance the performance of city government. This is despite the fact that the city is often mocked by its own citizens by the use of such topics trending on Twitter as Bekasi city.






Figure 4: Picture of Citizen Complaint to Bekasi City Government

Citizen complaining in social media originates from hot weather and traffic jam. Citizen aspirations were conveyed through social media as a form of citizen complaint to municipality government performance. They want to enjoy their lives in a livable and healthy city. People want to know that the leader is not merely talking or enjoying the term of office, but is actually working to improve governance. Responding to this message in social media, the mayor of Bekasi, Rahmat Effendi, cynically stated that Bekasi city's citizens lacked the proper knowledge to criticize their city development (detik.com, 12/10/14)






Figure 5: The Number of Topic Bekasi City in Social Media

Source: Google Trend

Social Media Use in Jakarta Metropolitan Government

After Joko Widodo and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama became governor and vice-governor in Jakarta Metropolitan Area in 2012, they have introduced e-participation through social media. One platform that they used to cultivate citizen participation is YouTube. In their research on the YouTube presence of Jakarta's government, Chatfield and Brajawidagda (2013) analyzed 250 government-generated videos on YouTube, which were viewed and liked by 7.8-millions of Jakarta's net-savvy citizens. These videos were then classified into seven categories, as follows



(1) High-Level Political Meetings, which refers to high-level internal meetings with internal and/or external stakeholders (e.g. policy makers, politicians, decision makers and senior public administrators) to discuss key political issues of interest to the public from perspectives of “The New Jakarta” reform visions.

(2) Community Engagement activities, which aim to promote informal social interactions and exchanges between the Governor (or less frequently, the Deputy Governor) and local citizens through community events.

(3) Site Visits, which are defined as direct observation activities for face-to-face fact-finding with citizens and government officials alike, engaged by the Governor (or on rare occasions by the Deputy Governor) outside his Executive Office.

(4) Press/Media Conferences, which refers to news media interviews given by either the Governor or the Deputy Governor.

(5) Ceremonies, which includes activities of the government officials who represent the local government in sponsoring an official ceremonious event.

(6) Public Speeches, which includes invited keynote speeches delivered by the Governor or the Deputy Governor at seminars and workshops.

(7) Making/Hosting Honorary Visits, which includes official gubernatorial visits to a place or an event to represent the government to



interact with other parties or agencies, as well as official gubernatorial receptions for other parties or age.

The 250 government-generated YouTube videos attracted a total of 7,815,549 viewers during the 80-day data collection period of this research. They found that the High-Level Political Meetings, the Community Engagement, and the Site Visits categories attracted the highest (48,773), the second highest (29,161) and the fourth highest (21,022) average number of viewers.




Figure 6: Basuki PurnamaAhok Basuki TPurnama Twitter Followers

Source: http://www.socialbakers.com/twitter/basuki_btp

Basuki, the governor of Jakarta, has 1,869,306 followers on Twitter, and follows 36 other users, while have posted 2126 tweets (Socialbaker.com). He also designed special hotline phone numbers to accept complaints from citizens: 0811944728, 081927666999, and 085811291966.





Figure 7: Basuki PurnamaAhok Basuki TPurnama special hotline phone numbers to accept complaints from citizens

Source: Ahok.org.

Bandung City: Evolution of CSO Participation in Bandung City from Direct Participation to Virtual Participation

Takeshi (2006) did field research on CSO participation in Bandung city during early decentralization implementation in 2004. He found that the city government worked with the Citizen Forum for Prosperous Majalaya (Forum Masyarakat Majalaya Sejahtera, or FM2S), a trustee-type group and traditional religious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah. The experiment of Kab Bandung demonstrates that the involvement of CSOs in local governance can successfully reconcile vested interests and unwanted



competition within the district government. Vested interests and unwanted competition are the roots of bureaucratic inertia and thus they are impediments to local governance reform. I argue that the process of local governance reform is not linear or static but rather it is entangled and dynamic with various actors competing for power. That is to say, reform initiatives are shaped by contests over power, and thus are susceptible to vested interests of Bupati, district parliament, regional planning board, the line agencies, and CSOs (Takoshi, 2006).

How is Bandung city civil society involved in the current information era? After waves of local democratizations over the past decade, the current mayor of Bandung city, Ridwan Kamil, introduced a new way of CSO or citizen participation in local governance through social media. In his tenure, he has used social media as a tool not only to connect more deeply with people but also to manage the city and to enable better and faster communication. He also decided that every department in Bandung municipality government should have a Twitter account that was utilized for various activities such as information sharing and submitting visual reports of the work that needed to be done in the course of the city's development. Mr Kamil recognized that being connected is crucial to the future of a city, and installed 5000 free WiFi hotspots across the city of Bandung.






Figure 8: Ridwan Kamil Twitter Followers

Source: <http://www.socialbakers.com/twitter/ridwankami>

Twitter name: @ridwank has 932983 followers and is following 2353 other users. His account has created 35649 tweets over its lifetime (5 years 1 month 22 days). The following performance of each department's response to social media was done by Bandung Voice (Suara Bandung) (suarabdg.com).






Figure 9: Response and Sentiment Rate of Bandung City Departement via Twitter in November 2014

Source: SuaraBDG.Com

We can see in the ARVI framework that social media introduces a new model of electronic citizen association in Jakarta and Bandung. By connecting via social media, the governor or mayor encourages the creation of citizen associations based on common interest in public deliberation. In the case of <http://Ahok.org>, the Jakarta governor's metropolitan



government website, it creates interest in city issues among the common citizens. Legal citizen engagement in political affairs creates a new model of governance which acts as a low-cost two-way interactive platform with the governments through a common infrastructure of ICTs, and is the backbone of a networked government. Although the role of social media in local governance is not a legally established space for dialogue or a public forum by local regulations, the Governor of Jakarta and the Mayor of Bandung city have introduced a new model of free public deliberation, publishing and distributing views on what subject in what context and when. Local government-generated YouTube videos captured and dynamically communicated the government's central message and greatly increased the transparency of the Jakarta metropolitan government (Chatfield and Brajawidagda, 2013).

The interaction could be improved through social media users with high social capital. The management and control of this ICT infrastructure will serve the role of the infocracy. The remaining organizations of the public administration will be restructured in the coming decades to meet new organizational and technological demands, and will be draped like flesh around this backbone (Dick and van-Beek, 2008). The use of social media by governments can be made more open, more transparent, more responsive, and more accountable. These acts can provide a quick, cost-effective, two-way interactive platform for discussions and interactions of the governments with its citizens, which will help to inform better policy formulation and implementation. By evolutionary change, the use of social media may introduce virtual organizations that occur as a result of virtual




communications in organizations, communities, and their relationships (Fulla and Welch, 2002).

Musrenbang: Making Civic Engagement in Local Budgeting Process in Gowa Regency, South Sulawesi and Malang City, East Java

In the following, we first discuss the links made in the literature between civic engagement and local democracy, in local budget deliberation particularly. Public participation in formulating local budgets (termed Musrenbang in the Indonesian context) is defined in various regulations, including the 2004 law no. 32 and 33 on Local Government and the Financial Balance between the Central and Local Governments; the 2007 Home Affairs Minister Regulation No. 59 on the Changes of the Home Affairs Minister Regulation No.13 on the Manual on the Local Financial Management the 2004 Law No. 25 on the National Development Planning; and the Joint Letter between the National Planning Board and the Domestic Minister no. 1354/M.PPN/03/2004050/744/SJ on the Manual for the Implementation of Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan (Musrenbang) forum and Local Participative Planning (Sopannah, 2012). Musrenbang is a deliberative multi-stakeholder forum that identifies and prioritizes community development policies (USAID, 2013). It aims to be a process for negotiating, reconciling and harmonizing differences between government and nongovernmental stakeholders and reaching collective consensus on development priorities and budgets. There is a hierarchy of these forums



for synchronizing between ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ planning. The following figure illustrates the schema and schedule on Musrenbang.



Process in Gowa Regency, South Sulawesi and Malang City, East Java

This section is a comparative study attempt to assess the actual structure, working, and content of some arenas of civic engagement in different local budget deliberations. Musrenbang implementation analysis are based on the case Gowa Regency, which is located in South Sulawesi and Malang city in East Java Province. As an effort to increase transparency and participation institutionalization in local governance, Gowa’s regency government has stipulated the local regulation No. 3/2004 on transparency and No. 4/2004 on community engagement in local governance. These regulations are based on the initiative of international donor agencies and



the World Bank, under Initiatives for Local Governance Reform Program (ILGRP) which have been operated in 14 regencies/municipalities all over Indonesia from 2002 - 2012.

However, the existence of those local regulations on transparency and participation have not brought a significant change to the quality of local governance, even though the public now has the right to get information on local government budgets through local public radio and local newspapers. The practice of transparency and participation follows the standards required by the donor. The procedures for transparency and participation are formally engaged with the elite of local politics, the local bureaucracy, NGOs, and a few limited local public figures. The public has some difficulties in accessing local government documents (65 information budget items) based on Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No.13 Year 2006, due to officials' reluctance to make budget documents available. The head of each department perceives that it was only required to make general or resume budget documents available, not detailed budget documents (Pradana, 2015). When assessing budget information using ICT (information communication technology), Wibowo et.al. (2014) found the official website of Gowa regency's government also provided very limited information on Local Government Budgets. One important NGO's was sued in a local court by Monitoring Committee for Development and Corruption Transparency (KAPAK) for publishing accountability report of School Operational Assistance Fund Utilization in 2013. Finally, the NGO lawsuit won the case in local court and local government had to open budget report to the public.



Participatory Budgeting in Malang City

To understand the relationship between the state and civil society in the APBD (Local Budget and Expenditure) policy deliberation can be explored through the stages of its process. Based on the Internal Affairs Ministry Regulation No. 37/2012 on manual drafting for APBD's 2013, Musrenbang objectives is aim to draft the annual plan, annual policy, and working plan.

Musrenbang aims to figure out the development issues that are being encountered by the Malang city government. The urgent and strategic issues are deliberated through a bottom up community meeting. However, not all of the issues discussed and proposed by stakeholders in these meetings are able to be prioritized in annual city plan. In sum, the criteria for policy issues that are prioritized to become an annual city program are both that (1) the programs have been listed in long term plan (RPJMD) and annual plan (RKPD), and that (2) the programs are in accordance with the national and province policy priorities.

Village Participatory Budgeting (Musrenbangdes) and Sub-District-level Participatory Budgeting (Musrenbangcam)

Musrenbangdes is an annual deliberation forum of stakeholders in order to plan village development for the year. According to the Malang city regulation, the objectives of Musrenbangdes are (a) to rank in order of importance the proposals made by the village, (b) to determine priorities for village activities funded by the local budget, and (c) to determine priorities for village activities that will be proposed and discussed in the



higher level sub-district participative budgeting process. In reality, there are some city development programs in 2013 budget year that are not appropriate for community needs. The Head of Neighborhood stated that:

“The existing program is a self-help project that had been done last year. Last year, we expected to get cash flow from villages administration to run the agenda, and today, they include the agenda into the district Musrenbang result as today’s development program. This program is not based on our proposal as a member of the neighborhood unit. The neighborhood unit knows nothing about this. We were never asked to get involved in Musrenbang, which means that it is a fictitious program. If we had had the budget last year, it would have been easy for us to build house. Last year, we donated Rp. 350000 per household to build it. If you don’t in me, just ask the community. If the budget is distributed, we will be happy. Sometimes, the budget is allocated based on the relationship. You will not get the program or the budget if you have a close relationship, a family member, or a close person for them”.

For example, in Merjosari village, Lowok Waru district, there is a drainage construction which is supported by the neighborhood head and the village apparatus, although the community did not approve it. This project is financed by the World Bank with a budget of around Rp 300.000.000. The neighborhood residents who live adjacent to the drainage construction project actually want to have a mosque for their daily prayers. This is similar with Sopianah’s (2012) findings in Probolinggo regency. The musrenbang discussion was still controlled by administrators, lawyers, and



special interest groups. The musrenbang forum merely serves as a “magnet” (i.e. to draw the crowd) and a symbol of the importance of participation. However, it provides no real power for the participants themselves to enact policy (Sopannah, 2012).

Musrenbang at District level are primarily an arena of mass media, academics, and Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Islamic Council Association), including Muhammadiyah and NU. Formally, the meetings are open to the public. As passive members of the community, village heads, representatives of local NGOs, journalists, and academics are invited to be present in the district level Musrenbang. Presence at this stage of the planning process is to ensure a formal degree of openness rather than a forum for deliberation and discussion (Sindre, 2012).

Musrenbang at City Level

The proposals that are collected below district level (i.e. at the subdistrict level, village level, and community level) are eventually compiled by Bappeda (Planning Office) of the district administrative office and discussed at a district meeting along with proposals from the technical departments (Sindre, 2012). Indeed, this office has prepared the city government budget before the Musrenbang forum is done. In fact, Bappeda of Malang city tried to balance some strong interests of the local elites in the local budget. This finding was similar with some research findings that confirmed that public involvement in holding such a Regency or city-level musrenbang is limited through a delegate system. First, several reports



question the real participatory aspect of the Musrenbang process emphasizing that the process is largely driven by local elites, politicians, and bureaucrats. Second, in contrast to various models of participatory budgeting, Musrenbang does not actually provide opportunities for participatory budgeting, only the early-stage planning identification of development projects. The third critique concerns the limitations inherent in the planning processes in bringing about broader social and political change, especially with regard to the type of projects that are allocation (Sopanah, 2012; Sindre, 2012). This means that having a Musrenbang venue in which to participate does not guarantee that the participant will have a voice in shaping administrative decisions (Buckwalter, 2014)




Figure 11: Budgeting Relations in Musrenbang

Lohk Mahfud, as a member of city council stated that most of the Musrenbang agendas did not run well because the city's mayor, Peni Suparto, had strong influence on both executive institutions and on the city council. As a board of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, the Indonesian Struggle Party city branch, (the dominant party in the city council) he had the capacity to have a good political lobby with the Democrat party and the Golkar party.

However, the formal civic participation via Musrenbang has encouraged bottom-up participation as Antlöv & Wetterberg (2011) pointed out in a different story. They found that there are encouraging signs that civil society engagement in government planning and decision-making processes is becoming more common after the decentralization era. From only around 35 percent of CSOs said they had been involved in public consultations and planning meetings (Musrenbang) in 2005, more than 80 percent had done so by 2009. One case study in Madiun city, Antlov and Wetterberg (2011) found that the CSO engagement with the state is providing important budget data to local government in order to improve the quality of the city budget. Also in Jepara, the CSO created a Citizen Forum called Jaran (Network for Budget Advocacy [used the Medium-developed Simrandasoftware]) publicized the Simranda budget analysis through community radio. In early 2009, they made presentations to the Regional Development Agency and the local council on the findings of the Simranda analysis of the 2007 - 2009 budgets. The Regional Planning Agency was so impressed with the results that it planned to use the Simranda software in upcoming public hearings on the 2010 local budget. Jaran made



plans to train the newly-elected councilors in using the software. In the case of Pattirol (MacLarren, 2011), a CSO role in Semarang and Pekalongan, is for mapping the agents and political positions and seeking alliances with reformers within the bureaucracy, Parliament and mayoral circle. In both places, a BAPPEDA planning official championed legislation within the bureaucracy, which was among the most resistant to change in both places. Similar research findings found by Buckwalter (2014) in Pennsylvania and Kentucky show that the closer citizens and administrators start to come in interaction and purpose, the more likely citizens are to be able to influence agency decision.

By comparing and analyzing those cases above, we propose the several important theoretical propositions about the potentials for citizen centered local governance.

Local citizen participation in local government is affected by the level of substantive citizen empowerment manifest, although its regulations are vacuum (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Antlöv & Wetterberg, 2011; Sindre, 2012; Buckwalter, 2014);

The level of substantive citizen empowerment is strongly affected by the style of leadership and by whether or not the CSO engages in capacity building between citizens and administrators.

The use of ICT or social media is able to strengthen local citizen participation in the form of community and leader-organized citizen participation under the transformational local leader.



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