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The Challenges of Social Sciences in a Changing World

THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL SCIENCES IN A CHANGING WORLD

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INTRODUCTION

Assalamu'alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh

It's a great pleasure to welcome you to **International Conference on Social and Politics 2016** organized by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta. On behalf of the Faculty, I wish to extend our heart-felt thanks for your presence at this Conference.

The world is changing. The shifting landscape of global politics, the rising world population, declining resources, changing climate, the skyrocketing development of communication technology at cetera arenow reshaping where we live and how we live.On a global scale, we need to find a way in which 7 billion people can live a high quality of life that is less demanding on our planet. And to adapt, we need to know where to place our energies – locally, nationally and globally–to mitigate the coming challenges. This will require knowledge from many different perspectives.

Today, more than 100 speakers which consist of distinguished professors, lectures as well as students from the Asia and the Pacific region—Australia, Hongkong, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia—are attending a conferenceto share their research and ideas on the relevance of social and political sciences in this rapidly changing world. In particular, the seminar will discuss various political and social issues underthree disciplines:

In international studies, the form will discuss theoretical debates on international relations perspectives, Asian century and international order, development, gender and democracy, human rights and international justice, north-south debates, industrialization and environmental degradation, globalization and poverty, intra-state conflict and migration, regionalism and economic cooperation, human security and non-traditional threats, regionalism, and other themes or topics related to international studies

In governmental studies, the seminar will discuss democratic institutions and procedures, issues in contemporary theory, public administration and policy, reforming and consolidating institutions, social policy and social legislation, regional studies, religions and activism, governmental systems and practices, sustainability and resources

In communication studies, the seminar will discuss the media studies in the changing of technology, the studies of effect and reception of digital media, the implication of digital media and culture on communication strategies (public relations, advertising, health communication, political communication, marketing communication etc.), the issues of digital democracy (in the media context, communication model, public sphere etc.), the needs of digital literacy for civic participation, textual and media analysis in the context of digital culture.

The seminar's role is to provide the opportunity for stimulating these cross-disciplinary conversations.I look forward to the presentations and the debates.

Finally, I wish to thank to the Rector of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta for the generous financial support for organizing this conference. I wish also extend my gratitude to our important partners: Asia Pacific Society for Public Affairs, Universiti Utara Malaysia (Malaysia), Universitas Islam Indonesia, Universitas Indonesia, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (Malaysia), Universiti Sains Malaysia (Malaysia), Khon Kaen University (Thailand), Flinders Univer-

sity (Australia), De La Salle University (The Philippines), Korea University (South Korea), and Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland). I wish to thank to all the participants who coming from various part of Indonesia as well from foreign countries. And the last but not least, of course, I wish to thank to all of the committee who have work tirelessly to prepares the seminar.

On behalf of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, I declarethat **International Coneference on Social and Politics** 2016 is now open and sincerely wishes that this seminar be steered to a fruitful conclusion.

Wassalamu'alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh

Dr Ali Muhammad
Dean, the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogykarta

FOREWORD

Assalamualaikum WR WB,

In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds. May peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his family and companions.

Honourable guests, Rector of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Co-host University partners, Executive committees, all of the participants, ladies and gentlemen.

First of all, I would like to express gratitude to Allah for invaluable blessing us. Therefore, this event can be held at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY), Indonesia. I would like to express warm greetings and welcome to all of you who participate in "the 1st International Conference on Social Politics (ICSP 2016)".

Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta in collaboration with the Asia Pacific Society for Public Affairs, Universitas Indonesia, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Khon Kaen University, Maejo University, De La Salle University, Korea University, Universitas Islam Indonesia and Adam Mickiewicz University organize the International Conference on Social Politics under the topic of "the Challenges of Social Sciences in a Changing World". This conference aims to provide a platform for scholars, researchers and practitioners to share their insight, ideas and experiences.

Globalization and the increasing of interconnection among actors bring both opportunities and threats. Cross-cutting issues such as the development of technology, global economic crisis, global warming, forced migration, terrorism, democracy and contagious diseases have emerged and need to be responded properly. To benefit from the opportunities and to manage the threats, understanding and cooperation among actors whether on an international, national or local level are required to deal with those cross-cutting issues. Those several questions should be dealt whether in term of level of territories such as international, national and local; in term of a theoretical or practical level. Those ideas and arguments can be found in these proceedings.

For example, in the global level, some scholars suggest that the leaders and institutions must realize how the new rules of the game for global governance will affect their countries and institutions. They must build the social and political skills to involve in international arenas actively. At the same time, they can minimise the impact of global change on the economic and social futures of their countries and communities.

In the national and local level, the idea of decentralization of decision-making and democratisation creates more challenges. In times of transition, scholars and organisations must understand how to develop cooperation and collaborate with multiple layers of government and also networks of interested parties. At the same time, the leaders at local and regional levels should work beyond central governments properly to build relationships with global players, international civil society, and supra-national institutions.

With regards to above mentioned, this event is expected to contribute to solving the problems of dynamic global changing. I am really aware that together with all of you, we can find a new way to support our national interest and local communities dealing with the engagement of the global linked. Besides, this conference could develop a mutual understanding amongst scholars on social and politics.

I am also highly indebted to the Co-host partners, and to all of the staffs who help and support for the successfully of this event. I wish to all of you that this event will be sustainable and contribute the achievement of knowledge on public policy significantly. Once again, thanks to all of you and enjoy the conference.

Wassalamualaikum WR WB.

Yogyakarta, 3rd January 2016

Eko Priyo Purnomo, MRes., PhD

The Chair of ICSP 2016

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CHAPTER 1

A POSSIBILITY OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION IN EAST ASIA

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Abstract

Cooperation among countries in this world is the popular issues nowadays. Several countries cooperation frameworks are exist in this world. The one of cooperation framework is through regional organization. East Asia is the one region which does not have regional organization in this world. Even though, East Asia region is consisted by several big countries in this world. Become interesting question, when the big region as East Asia does not have regional organization which bound them to achieve their national interest. If we see from general perspective, the existence of big countries in East Asia region will give more benefit for East Asia region. The condition of East Asia which does not have regional organization is interested to be analyzed. This paper will focused to analyze the importance of establishment of East Asia regional organization in order to try solving the political problem which being the unharmonious relations among East Asia countries. Then the necessity of regional organization in East Asia also will be examine, with discussed the possibility and challenges for East Asia in order to establishing East Asia regional organization. Dynamics which happened in East Asia region that discussed in this paper will give us the understanding about the East Asia from the perspective of politic, economic, and security.

Keyword: East Asia, Regional Organization, Political Problem, Countries Cooperation.

INTRODUCTION

The development of cooperation among countries nowadays has been increase. Almost every country in this world has cooperation with the other countries. This phenomenon is being interested issue when nowadays country more open than before. In 21s century, countries in this world prefer to using peaceful way in order to get their national interest. Many cooperation framework in this world are exist in this world include through regional organization.

Regional organization is the organization which fulfilled by government as a members which has one aims in order to support cooperation in economic, political even in security which is this organization defined by geographically or area (Berman & Maze, 2012: 4). Regional Organization is used to increasing the development in one region through cooperation among them. Goal of regional organization is hopes all countries in defined area or region could develop together. Almost every region in this world has regional organization such as Europe with European Union or EU, Southeast Asia with ASEAN and so on. The most successful of regional organization is European Union; they have already made good integration from economic until politic.

Become interesting issue when we saw to the Eastern Asia, yes East Asia. The region with consisted by countries who has good economic development such as Japan, People Republic of China and South Korea, even nowadays People Republic of China is become the second countries who has strong economic in this world. But they do not have regional organization. It became interesting question why they are does not have regional organization?

Some political problems have been occurring among East Asia countries. Until nowadays some issues still continue, some East Asia countries do not have harmonious relation among them because some particular political problems. In this paper the author wants to analyze the possibilities of the establishment of East Asia regional organization. With the condition of East Asia who has some political problems, the author would be analysis the actions of

East Asia regional organization to solve the political problems through East Asia regional organization.

This paper will examine the possibilities of establishment of East Asia regional organization, with supported by facts, data and actions which doing by East Asia countries in term of creating East Asia regional organization. In this paper also would more emphasize in analyze of the role of regional organization in solving political problem among them.

NECESSITY OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION IN EAST ASIA

East Asia is the region is eastern Asia which covers the area about 12.000.000 km² with the total populations about 37% of Asia's populations and 22% of world populations (2014 World Population Data Sheet, 2014). The East Asia region which has large populations and has large area indeed they have a potential to creating or establishing East Asia regional organization such as the other region in this world that already have regional organization. Especially East Asia is supported by the good of economic condition; some countries have a good in economic development, such as China, Japan and South Korea.

Until nowadays East Asia region do not has a formal regional organization, which covered East Asia region (Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Japan, Mongolia and People's Republic of China). East Asia region is left behind from their neighbor South East Asia region; South East Asia already has regional organization which called ASEAN or Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN has significant role in order to develop the Southeast Asia region. And also ASEAN has been working properly until nowadays implementing their function as regional organization.

The implementing of European single market by European Union in 1992, viewed as a stepping stone or booster for other region in order to making economic integration (Prasetyo, 2011:258). The success of European single Market has been

makes the other region to implementing what European Union has been done include East Asia. Discussing about the necessity of East Asia regional organization actually implicitly East Asia has been started in term of market integration in East Asia region. Some FTA or RTA which East Asia countries has been done, such as ASEAN +3 (ASEAN Members plus PRC, Japan and South Korea), CAFTA (China ASEAN free trade area), and also APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) those are one of reasons for East Asia to creating the East Asia regional organization. Economic integration which already did by their self is in order to facing the challenges of globalization and those all in term of increasing competitiveness to facing market competition (Prasetyo, 2011:259).

Moreover, nowadays China is being new economic power in this world. With the emergence of China as a new power in economic is give influence in term of economic in East Asia, China has been control over half of market in East Asia (Soesastro, 2006:218). We could see the domination of China in market sectors, the China's product could found easier in many countries particular in countries, which have trade agreement with China. This condition is being the benefit for East Asia to establishing regional organization. With China's experience in economic will be created good cooperation among East Asia countries under East Asia regional organization. China could bring the other countries under East Asia region increase their economic income.

East Asia countries need East Asia regional organization also in order to solve the political problems that occur among East Asia countries. Some political conflict in East Asia such hard to solve. Those political conflicts are force East Asia to creating East Asia regional organization. The other regional organization also has been success to solve some political problems that occur among the member of regional organization such as what ASEAN did. The effort to solving the political problems will be difference sense if uses the mediator from the inside. Instance for solving the political problems among East

Asia countries would be more effective or more sense if mediated by East Asia regional organization, different if mediated by outside of East Asia.

With collective goals in the beginning of creating East Asia regional organization will makes East Asia regional organization running effectively. East Asia regional organization could run and very possible to solving political problems among East Asia countries. No countries that will oppose because all has agreed in beginning of created of East Asia regional organization. One vision, one aim among them would makes togetherness among them, emphasizes unity with upholding sense of friendship, such as what ASEAN did.

CHALLENGES ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION IS EAST ASIA

In order to creating or establishment of East Asia regional organization, certainly East Asia region facing some challenges or problems those being stumbling block in term of creating East Asia Regional organization. Some issues that facing by East Asia region certainly are not easier to solved. Some challenges which facing by East Asia countries are comes from internal East Asia countries itself.

The author identified that there are two main challenges that facing by East Asia region. Based the issues that facing by East Asia region in order to creating East Asia regional organization there are two main challenges in creating of East Asia regional organization. Those challenges have to be passed by East Asia region. Those are problems among East Asia countries and the domination of United States in Asia Pacific.

Problem among East Asia Countries

The first political problems among East Asia countries is the problems between Japan and People republic of China, until nowadays Japan and China has territorial disputes. Senkaku Islands is the recent issue which being concern for both countries. Basically, this issue has been appears since long time ago. The core of conflict is dispute eight uninhabited islands, which located in East China Sea. Both of them Japan and China claim area in Senkaku islands based on their interpretation.

Actually the Senkaku islands dispute which getting hot nowadays also influenced by the postponed discussed this islands when normalization of Japan – China relations in 1972. At the time Prime minister of Japan Kakuei Tanaka was went to Beijing to discuss normalization diplomatic relations between Japan and China, Tanaka met with Premier Zhou Enlai. In this meeting Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was uphold this issue to discussed at the time but Premier Zhou Enlai, was not respond Kakuei's request prefer to postponed to discussing about this issue (Drifte, 2014). However the rising of this issue nowadays making the relations between China and Japan is getting wide until to the top level. Even when in APEC 2014 Beijing Prime Minister Japan met President of People Republic of China Xi Jin Ping, they get handshake but the Xi Jin Ping face expression showing the flat expression (Kaiman, 2014). The condition is shows that both of those countries still in high tension although their leader met in one international forum. This is the serious challenge for East Asia region in order to establishing of East Asia regional organization. The tension that happens between People Republic of China and Japan would give impact to another aspect.

Indeed this issue not only disputing the area explicitly but this issue more complex when in this area there the big potency in oil resources which has high economic values for both of those countries. Some countries in this world also has similar problem which disputing the island or area which has potency in oil and give the high economic values, such as what happen between Indonesia and Malaysia in the past time, both of those countries disputing the Sipadan and Ligitan island then this case until bringing to international court of justice and ICJ decide that Sipadan and Ligitan are belong to Malaysia. What already happen between Indonesia and Malaysia also could be implementing to bringing this case through the international court of justice but both of countries have to agree before bringing it to

ICJ.

Second issue which being challenge in order to establishing East Asia regional organization is about the real China. In China we know that there two part which claimed them as state first is People's Republic of China and the second is Republic of China. People's Republic of China which today occupy the mainland of China then the Republic of China which exist in Taiwan Island, which sometime people called Republic of China as Chinese Taipei.

This problem occurs since Chinese civil war after the World War II, which is at the time Kuomintang party and Communist war each other. And Kuomintang Party was become the loser on this war. Actually before the civil war in China, there is only one government which called Republic of China that administrates China. Before People's Republic of China take over the mainland China, China was unite to war against Japan, Japan started the expansion into the Asia in 1939, responding this Japan expansion government of Republic of China declare the war against Japan, no P.R.C. at the time (Chiang, 2004:12). But because the Kuomintang Party which one power of government lose in Chinese civil war so that Republic of China move to Taiwan and People Republic of China establish People's Republic of China with supported by communist party, who Mao Zedong as the leader at the time, and also Mao become the first President of China.

Almost countries in this world recognize People's Republic of China as a sovereignty state not Republic of Taiwan, include United Nations also. Previously, before People's Republic of China accepted as a member of United Nations, United Nations recognize Republic of China as a member but within the Resolution 2758, Republic of China position replaced by People's Republic of China in 1971, automatically Republic of China has been lose their position in UN as a way to approach in International Level (Hsieh, 2009:59). United States and Japan also was changing their position toward Republic of China, particularly for Japan. After the normalization bilateral relation between Japan and China, Japan recognize people Republic of China as China which knowing before that Japan was recognize Republic of China as a China.

All of the East Asia countries today do not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. "China" problem become obstacle for creating the East Asia regional organization, People's Republic of China never recognized the Republic of China as a states, their told that Republic of China is our part, Taiwan is a province in People's Republic of China, but in the other hand is Republic of China declare that their independent state not as part of People's Republic of China. Within one China policy issued by P.R.C. which is only People Republic of China as the China include the Taiwan no other, it's such as makes difficulties to solving this complexity problem. Although China and Taiwan are have a problem in political relations, but in trade or economic they have good relations or no problem in term of trading. Perhaps this is could being the solutions for this problem, why not Republic of China (Taiwan), remove the word China and replace to Taiwan become Republic of Taiwan, and their separate from China and this is make easier for Taiwan to develop their country, they can open diplomatic relations freely, but again this way also not easy to separate part being an independent state especially for Taiwan case, have been started with the tension since civil war after world war II.

The third challenge is about the conflict between North Korea and South Korea. Korea divide into the two countries first is Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). the conflict in Korea also is the result of World War II, United States and USSR which become the main actor at the time successful divide Korea become two state, North with the communist ideology and the south Korea with the liberal with democracy. Actually if we see from the name North Korea also proclaims their self as democratic state but democratic in different way, they used democracy in communist way.

In 1950, North Korea Military was made invade toward the South Korea. Caused

of North Korea invasion, in the Korea was held Korean War which produce many victims. Actually, there is no official peace agreement between North Korea and South Korea in term of Korean War. The condition of South and North Korea which never have official peace agreement between both of them are makes as officially they still in the war condition until today. But when the era of President Kim Dae Jung have issued a policy. Which is the content of the policy is to maintain the relations between north and South Korea. The policy crated in order to increase interaction between North and South Korea. Before this policy totally success, the problem was coming toward *Shunsine* policy. United States in 2002 announced that North Korea has been started in develop weapon mass destruction. The issue of weapon mass destruction is very sensitive, as what happen when 2003 United States invade Iraq cause United States accuse Iraq has weapon mass destruction.

The effort of Kim Dae Jung to increase or trying build good relationship among North and South Korea have to canceled because this issue. Yes, as we know that until today the tension between North and Korea is not stable, sometimes they were in high tension but sometimes in low tension. This problem is one challenge for East Asia in order to creating East Asia regional organization. But the future of this conflict could be solved with the existence of East Asia regional organization. There is hope to solving this problem, different with the case of Taiwan and China. All has the possibilities, prospect to solved, only how we maintain those problems with peaceful way without bloodshed.

United States Pivot in Asia

After the end of World War II, United States of America reincarnate become the powerful country in this world. United States spread their influence to around the world, particular for their idea about the democracy. United States is very concern in order to develop their idea about democracy to around the world.

The rising up the other power in this world, People Republic of China has been making United States more concern to Asia Pacific. Some policy has been issued by Obama in term of increase influence or existence of United States in Asia Pacific, particular to rebalancing the other power of the world, China. In 2011 US President Barack Obama some policy with Asia-Pacific nations such as trade and military, United States would expand the cooperation in both sector (Talev, 2011). The rising up of China makes the US centric was decrease.

Actually, the East Asia countries which has close relations with United States such as Japan and South Korea, makes United States easier to coming to East Asia and made some influence in Asia Pacific particular in East Asia region. The existence some United States military bases also influence stability condition in Asia Pacific and strengthen the relation with U.S. allies. The policy that issued by United States has goal to take the benefit from United States toward Asia Pacific countries, include United States make cooperation with the other great power particularly in Asia Pacific such as China (Sutter, Brown, Adamson, Mochizuki, & Ollapally, 2013:1).

In term of unification body in East Asia actually this idea has been started since 1990s. When at the time Tun Dr Mahathir Muhammad Prime Minister of Malaysia deliver the idea East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) or East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) which has purpose make free trade agreement among East Asia and ASEAN countries at the time, but this idea not be realized because United States did not agree and some countries such as Japan and Korea looks like not interesting with this idea (Miura, 2011:8). Tadahiro Yoshida argues in his paper "Mahathir wanted to establish a new regional organization that would replace APEC" (Yoshida, 2004:4). This was such as extrem ambition, Mahathir want to erase the influence of United States in Asia Pacific. To erase the influence of United States in Asia Pacific is very impossible, and Japan not really interested with EASG or EAEC because United States out from the EAEC that Mahathir propose.

The domination of United States in East Asia such as when the case of East Asia Economic grouping has given role impact toward the East Asia countries. United States has close friends South Korea and Japan, which we could see from the EAEG cases both of them solid to avoid the idea of EAEG such as what United States did oppose that idea. The rising of China be expected could be muffle the domination of United States in East Asia and the other regions, even as we know that the cold war has ended but the spreading of ideology still continue until nowadays, most United States very spirit to spread democracy to around the world.

WAYS TO ACHIEVE EAST ASIA REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

East Asia regional organization, some people argue that such as impossible thing to creating East Asia regional organization. In the political life, nothing impossible to get deal in everything includes the East Asia regional organization. Unconsciously within the Joining some East Asia countries in some international forum have been makes East Asia in a way to East Asia regional organization. But in this paper we discuss two organizations which give more impact to East Asia region, those ASEAN and APEC.

ASEAN

ASEAN or Association Southeast Asian Nations is regional organization in Southeast Asia region which has experienced since 47 years ago, when five initiated countries met together and agree to create regional organization in Bangkok so that called as Bangkok Declaration. This regional organization has focus area in economic and political among Southeast Asia countries.

The existence of ASEAN and solidity of Southeast Asia countries making East Asia countries use ASEAN as a hub in order to creating some political framework. Certainly some political framework itself organized together within ASEAN. Influence of ASEAN in Asia region itself give some opportunity for East Asia country to produce ASEAN as a target market for East Asia country which some East Asia countries are Producer countries .

ASEAN +3 for instance, although ASEAN +3 has cooperation in political-security cooperation not only focusing in economic area particular in economic integration but however the priority thing for Japan, China and South Korea are in economic cooperation. Beside ASEAN +3 there is another political framework which organized together with ASEAN such as ASEAN Summit. Japan has important role in term of ASEAN +3 because ASEAN +3 was initiated by Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto did visit to some countries in ASEAN (Yoshida, 2004:7). ASEAN summit basically, the continuation of the idea by Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohammad about East Asia Economic Caucus because the idea in ASEAN Summit also similar with the Mahathir proposes in the past. In here is also talking about the economic cooperation within ASEAN countries and the other partner such as China, Japan and South Korea.

The main point ASEAN here is the ASEAN as hub for East Asia countries to cooperation and making interaction among them, and unconsciously it makes strengthen the communication among East Asia countries and direct East Asia in a way to create Regional organization. Japan and China could communicate here, as we know that Japan and China has a long historical background which makes the relations among them not going well before but after the normalization relations of China and Japan in 1972, they could running their relation as usual.

APEC

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation is the regional economic cooperation among Asia Pacific countries includes some countries outside Asia Pacific countries such as United States. APEC today such as popular attracts attention for the other countries in this world. In APEC there some nations that not recognize as state that could join in this organization and has same equal position with other, for instance Taiwan.

As we know after the Chinese civil war, Republic of China replaced by People's Republic of China as the winner of Chinese civil war from the communist party and PRC occupy the mainland of China the Republic of China move to Taiwan Island. Previously in United Nations officially Republic of China as

official member, but after People's Republic of China accepted in United Nations and officially Republic of China out from United Nations, and almost countries in this world only recognize People's Republic of China as China not Republic of China, include United States and Japan which previously recognize Republic of China.

Certainly, the existence of Taiwan in APEC gives some opportunities for Taiwan to develop and making cooperation with the other countries even they not recognize as a state. In APEC also we could see two parties China and Taiwan which does not have good relations sitting in one organization. Only APEC as international organization is allow Taiwan to become a member. Remember when APEC 2013 meeting in Bali Indonesia, President of PRC Xi Jinping met the Taiwan envoy former vice President of Taiwan Vincent Siew.

We could see that in APEC East Asia countries such as PRC and Taiwan could be make interaction and communication its support the East Asia in a way to regional organization. Yes we know that the existence of united States here, when the establishing of APEC, Japan is the country request to United States to participate in APEC (Yoshida, 2004:8).

EAST ASIA SHOULD BE LEARN FROM ASEAN

In order to solving some political problem facing by East Asia countries, they have to learn from the other regional organization such as ASEAN. How ASEAN could solve the political problem in South East Asia? In term of solving political problem in East Asia has some experience for instance in the case of South China Sea. Beside that ASEAN also is senior regional organization after European Union.

ASEAN has been success solve the problem in peaceful way, for instance in conflict of South China Sea who involved some ASEAN countries and China. It was started with held bilateral meeting with China, which previously never held the bilateral to discuss this issue. In this meeting also talking about the resolution would be taken to solve this conflict. So then has been agreed the resolution within the ratification of Declaration of Conduct (DOC) on the South China Sea. This is such kind of bright spot in order to solve the problem who involves ASEAN countries and China.

East Asia regional organization could copying the step or the way that ASEAN taken. In here ASEAN as the regional organization carry out their role as a real mediator. ASEAN stand in between two parties which involve in dispute. This is best formula to solving the political conflict.

CONCLUSION

East Asia regional organization could be realized by East Asia region. East Asia region has a prospect and possibility in order to establishing of regional organization. Some potential that East Asia has already has nowadays could be expanded to regional organization. Economic integration for some East Asia countries for instance those all is a way to achieve regional organization.

Within the involvement of some East Asia countries in some regional political and economic frameworks could be as a stepping stone for East Asia region to establishing East Asia regional organization. In some international cooperation East Asia should maximize the interaction between other East Asia counties. The spirit of unity also should be brought by East Asia countries in term to achieve the common goal for East Asia regional organization, and little bit to forgotten the thing that already happen in the past.

In final analysis, East Asia region has a prospect and possibility to create a regional organization but it also could not be realized in short time, still need more time for East Asia region. To creating East Asia regional organization also East Asia should get support from another part in this world, particularly to United States because as we know hegemony of United States in this world still exist until nowadays then United States alliance in East Asia should be ensure that United States interest in East Asia still safe within the existence of East Asia regional organization. Even in the past when would

be create of East Asia communities United States was not agree with that. To solving some political problems among East Asia countries, regional organization should be positioned as a mediator or third party. East Asia regional organization is a bridge to connecting among East Asia countries and East Asia regional organization is not allowed to interference in domestic problems of the members but East Asia regional organization still has responsibility to maintaining peace in East Asia region.

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IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND THE RISE OF ISIL: THE CHALLENGES TO THE UK NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract

The harrowing scene of million refugees who have fled Syria to come across Europe has become the world's attention since the longstanding war began in 2011. The need of sanctuary is critical given the chaotic situation within Syria itself. Syria has been running to the state failure, resulting from government's inability to provide fundamental rights to its citizen and the systemic political corruption as well as the authoritarian regimes. The United Kingdom, one of major countries delivering commitment to spend 0,7% of their GDP on aid, displays an attitude which probably gives hope to those forced to flee their home due to civil war. Since 2011, the United Kingdom has granted asylum to almost 5,500 Syrian nationals with the resettlement routes notably known as the programme which has resettled 6,000 people as of November 2014. However, the United Kingdom has been wary of the growing number of irregular migration from Syria coming to their homeland as the estimated 725,000 irregular migrants will present challenges to its national security. ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) has emerged as one of the most visible terrorism threats to the United Kingdom national security. As stated by David Cameron to the House, Britain needs to use their head and heart by pursuing an approach which tackles both of the problem as well as the consequences including stabilizing the countries where the refugees come from. Given the high number of ISIL attack to Britons in either the United Kingdom or abroad, thus it is crucial to develop a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy which aims to dismantle ISIL and protect national security. This paper will therefore seek to examine the extent to which the United Kingdom will expand their commitments to accept the irregular migrants despite the threat facing Britain from the rise of ISIL which has potential to destabilize their national security.

Keywords: Syria, state failure, the United Kingdom, irregular migration, ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), national security

INTRODUCTION

Irregular Migration and the Rise of ISIL : The Challenges to the UK National Security

Following the increase of intra-state wars in Middle East since 2000s, countries in Europe therefore have to deal with security challenges since they become the main destinations of those fleeing their countries to get a better security protection. The United Kingdom remains one of the main destinations where the migrants aim to reach. However, most of them are included the irregular migrants as they enter the UK without permission, evidence of lawful entry, and illegaly entering the breach of a deportation order (IOM cited in Cherti, 2013). British government have generally taken a hardline approach to confront the irregular migration by strengthening border controls, reducing irregular entry into the UK, and removing irregular migrants and failed asylum applicants where possible (Cherti, 2013). Given the growing number of irregular migrants fleeing their home countries approaching the breach of the United Kingdom, the challenges that the United Kingdom have to face are more likely to increase as the consequences. In addition to that, transnational terrorism such as Islamic State of Iraq and Its Levant (ISIL) which has escalated numerous attacks not only in Iraq and Syria but also accross the region possess a significant threat to flourish in Great Britain.

The paper will seek the extent to which Britain will stick with its commitment in providing assistance to the irregular migrants

from Middle East despite the increase of security challenges at home due to irregular migrant and ISIL which posses dire threats consequently. This situation will therefore provide a framework for thinking about the threats which irregular migrants and ISIL possess toward the UK national security by analysing on its root causes at first, which is the state failure. The article will be organized into three main sections. The first section discusses the relationship between the national security challenges derived from the state failure, providing a brief overview of political instability in the Middle East. The second section reviews the irregular migration phenomenon in the United Kingdom as one of government's main priorities to address. Last but not least, the third chapter will elaborate the trend of transnational terrorism and on how Britain deals will the threat. Analysis about irregular migrant and the rise of ISIL as the United Kingdom's security challenges bear on the future of peace and security in the United Kingdom and further in Europe as the most targeted continents by those fleeing Middle East due to the intensified state failure which has led to the intra-state wars.

State Failure Contributing to the UK National Security Challenges

State failure as the condition in where the government is unable to provide a basic rights for their citizens has led to the enormous security challenges worldwide. The complicated situation due to the fear of repercussion and other harrashment done by the authoritarian government has promulgated the massive displacements afterwards. The recent increase of foreign fighters at home in Syria confronting Assad's regime has led to the worsening situation. The nature of displacement in Syria entered a new critical phase following the intensification of conflict in early 2012 in where the Syrian regime's operation in Zabadani, Duma, and Damascus have done a brutal crackdown from targeted repression to the disproportionate use of military force againts civilian populations – resulted in the use of increasingly heavy artilery (Ferris, 2013). This complex situation

has, therefore, forced people to flee their homes due to the fear of conflict which sometimes transforms into a civil war. The escalating violence which happened in most of countries in the Middle East like Syria in around 2011has brought Syrian to cross the borders and seeking for a more secure place. Syrian refugee problem has been defined as the worst humanitarian disaster since the end of the Cold War given the high death tolls and over 200,000 casualties. It resulted to the Internally Displaced Persons who need a sanctuary, and also the resettlement places which have to be allocated in order to offer protection.

It is necessary to understand that the general impact of state failure have shaped the cross-border security threats. It has also shaped country like the United Kingdom to put more concern about its national security challenges. There has been identified two major factors contributing to the number of security challenges that Britain has to encounter given the state failure escalation; the irregular migration phenomenon and the rise of ISIL which possess a potential threat through its transnational terrorism networks. Most recently, Middle East countries have witnessed a wide array of intra state wars started from the failure of government to provide security and public order, legitimate representation, and welfare towards the citizen. Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have long been considered as ''failed states'' given its weak political governance, economic grievance, and unstable security.

Syria, has contributed to the most of migrants influx accross the Europe and therefore has raised a security dilemma to the recipient countries. Countries facing a dilemma whether or not they have to remain accepting the migrants from Middle East as their humanitarian obligation or reject them since there is no guarantee that all of those fleeing Syria are purely migrants. Syria has been a byword for the Middlea East chaos. The Middle East quagmire which spreads accross border has exacerbated the security situation in the neighboring regions such as Ankara, Beirut, Lesbos, and recently Paris.

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The main routes into Europe for refugees from Syria are by land via Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria and by sea to Greece and Italy (Orchard, 2014). In addition, international migrations flows is seen as overwhelming states' capacity to maintain sovereignty accross a number of areas thus jeopardizing the very basis of their security (Adamson, 2006).

This circumstance has led into global responsibility given the diverse impacts worldwide. There are different responses which countries have approached in order to deal with this challenge. Ostand (2015) argued that there are at least two level of supports needed by the Syrian refugee influx worldwide; the financial assistance and refugee resettlement which need to be undertaken by increasing the level of burden sharing by the international community as a whole and distributing the burden among industralized states in Europe, North America, and the Asia Pacific. However, I believe that financial assistance and refugee resettlement may not stop the Syrian refugee influx since the root cause lies at the state failure in the first place. Yet, humanitarian responses must be adhered as suggested by human security which draws into the more broadly conceptions in the current global discourse, such as 'responsibility to protect', 'effective multilateralism', and 'human development' therefore the aim is not just about political stability but encompassing a notion of justice and sustainability (Kaldor, 2007). However, the contribution that human security has brought is on how it challenges our approach to security in at least two ways; first, it shifts the focus toward the individual, and then it emphasizes security on the common values (Oberleitner, 2005).

The debate around human security concept has been viewed as the contrasting ideas on how humanitarian issues are entwined with state sovereignty as what happened where hundreds of thousands refugees enter the breach of the United Kingdom or many other countries ilegally. In fact, it will become the global responsbility on providing them assistance on the basis

of humanitarian action. However, the current debate has brought to the incendiary framework whether or not irregular migration has been providing channels for any potential terrorists to spread presence worldwide. It is seen by the Syrian passport found near the Paris attack location. Despite its uncertainty whether or not it is true, this news has almost scattered the world to directly blame migrants as the source of terror. The United Kingdom, however, as one of the countries who upholds humanitarian principle has committed themselves to remain accepting those migrants despite the potential security challenges to appear.

Irregular Migrants in the United Kingdom

Migration has long been considered as one of the remaining global challenges unsolved given the growing number of both regular and irregular migrant along the year. Given its strategic positions in the continent encompassing huge potentials, the United Kingdom becomes one of the most favorable destinations for the migrants worldwide. The push and pull factors remain vary from economic motivations to the fear of repression in migrants' home country. In response to the crisis, the UK through Department for International Development (DFID) has allocated over £1.1 billion since 2012 to over 30 implementing partners (including United Nations agencies, international non-governmental organisations and the Red Cross) to support local capacity and build longer term stability (DFID, 2015).

However, problem occurs when an irregular pattern of migration emerged. According to UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ''irregular migration'' tends to refer to the movement of international migrants who enter or stay in a country without having any correct authorization (Rights, 2014). In addition, the irregular migrants also have such common terms such as ''undocumented'', ''authorized'', ''unlawful'', and even ''illegal''. According to IOM (2012), irregular migrants are those entering the state's border illegally without permission or by deception, persons for whom there is no

evidence of lawful entry, and persons who enter in breach of deportation order. However, there is also series of practical problems since some irregular migrants can be recorded – such as asylum seekers whose applications are rejected, or those apprehended at borders without proper documentation (Koser, 2005). Furthermore, access to data also becomes a problem as in many states such data are collected by enfocement agencies and are not made publicly available.

One of the major tragedies happened recently was the result of political instability in the countries such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and also Afghanistan which is the spread of irregular migrants everywhere. There have been a growing number of people who fled their home countries in order to gain a much better protection from some European countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden. The UK has been mostly cited as one of the main destinations of irregular migrants given the variety of factors such as economic, political, and also social. The economic drivers would the increased poverty in their homes while there is a potential to enjoy a much higher wage in developed countries like the UK. Moreover, the political and social context are associated with the political instability resulted in the asylum seekers and refugee.

The high influx of the irregular migrants has raised an awareness of Europe nations as they become the most targeted destinations. Since 24 October 2012, the EU and its members states have provided approximately €230 million in humanitarian and other assistance to those affected by the Syrian crisis both inside and outside the country (Fargues, 2012). While the UK Government's policy though the Home Office up until 29 January 2014 was to be generous with humanitarian aid to Syria's neighbors rather than to accept recognized Syrian refugees for resettlement in the UK with the establishment of 'Vulnerable Persons Relocation Scheme' (VPRS) by taking the most vulnerable refugees directly from the region (Smith, 2015). Under the scheme, the UK is planning to resettle up to 20,000 refugees over the next five years. However, the recent Paris bombings may undoubtedly impact to the policy applied. Despite the commitments to be actively engaging in humanitarian aid in response to the migrant crisis, the United Kingdom has also witnessed a potential threat which may hamper the society due to the massive migrant phenomenon.

Nevertheless, we could still highlight the UK as the country who has taken a leading step within Europe on its commitment of humanitarian aid to the Syrian crisis and also has created a new resettlement programme for Syrians, the Vulnerable Persons Relocation (VPR) scheme, as well as introducing concessions for Syrians outside the immigration rules (Orchard, 2014). The UK government in fact welcomes legal migration where it is beneficial to the UK economy and society, but the government also aims to control the immigration system so that only those with the appropriate permission are entitled to enter and remain in the UK as set out in the following specific goals:

1.) The creation of a dedicated Border Police Force to enhance national security, improve immigration control, and target trafficking of people, weapons, and drugs,

2.) Supporting e-Borders and the re-introduction of exit checks, and

3.) Introducing new measures to minimize abuse of the immigration system (Toms, 2015).

In addition, there has been a transnational cooperation in reducing the irregular migration where cooperation with third countries are promoted such as the EU Readmission Agreements (EURA) strengthening on border security with 13 participated countries such as Pakistan, Serbia, Moldova, and Georgia. However, problem remains there since most of the migrants come from the failed states in the Middle East in where they are unwilling to return to their country of origin given the high level of vulnerability there. Most of them aim to achieve asylum in order to get a better livelihood. However, these individuals are understood are understood to have made a conscious choice to remain in the UK by

contravening immigration law, therefore many of them remain officially homeless and destitute in the UK (Innes, 2014).

In addition, UNHCR suggested that: "Providing solutions in the form of resettlement or relocation to safe third countries is a critical and often life-saving intervention for refugees having urgent protection needs and compelling v ulnerabilities...These interventions are also an expression of solidarity and burden sharing with countries in the region currently hosting more than two million Syrian refugees." (UNHCR, 2015)

Therefore, it recommends the solidarity action of world leaders in order to address the problems of refugees. The international refugee law framework applies to European countries to the extent that they are parties to the relevant international conventions and on issues of customary international law such as the non-refoulement (Orchard, 2014). Thus, all countries have to perform according to the humanitarian basis which is protecting the refugee. Nevertheless, it is mostly found that the pattern is irregular. Recently, one of the impacts of the attack in Paris is the social cohesion where most of people are now persistance to accept more migrants. Germany who has openly its border to accept the migrants have also raised a sensitivity to other European nations. Sometimes people are trapped into the belief that they have to fight against the irregular migrant as they are sources of threat into national security. In the UK where many Muslim reside, bring any possibility of disharmony since most of the attackers claim themselves as Muslim.

The policy of "regularisation" is introduced by many states worldwide such as those in Europe and the United States as the solution to offering the chance for some, or all, irregular migrants living in a country to apply for some kind of legal status in that country through a one-off measure (often called an amnesty) or a permanent feature of the immigration rules (MigrationWork, 2009). Nevertheless, it could not solve the problems as the high number of refugee remain in the

UK given the continuing instability which happen in the migrants' home countries.

However, not all dire threats are from the irregular migrants. There are also series of significant incidents and precedents of terrorism promulgated by native British who previously hold such trainings in Syria. In April 2008, Simon Keeler became the first British Caucasian Muslim convert to be convicted of Islamism-isnpired terrorism charges who was found guilty of inciting murder for terrorist purposes overseas and fundraising for terrorist purposes (Simcox, 2010). Thus, to call irregular migrants as "threat" may be sound too louded. However, it will be unrealistic if avoiding to admit the potential problems arrising due to their presence. Thus, identifying the source of irregular migrants would be more significant before aiming to tackle them.

ISIL: The Danger of Transnational Terrorism Movements

Post 9/11 has displayed a growing number of terrorism movement. The Global War on Terror proposed by George Bush after the 9/11 has led to the enormous terrorism activity through the transnational networks. Prior to 9/11, there was only limited numbers of terrorism activity worldwide, but we can now witness many forms of terrorism either politically or religiously motivated one. The similarly minded men mobilized the root of terrorism movements on behalf of ''same idea''. Dehumanizing society would be the goal of those terrorism movements. Several bombings which shocked Europe in Madrid on March 2004 and in London on July 2005 have raised a very deep concern in the link between migration and national security. They used to be resistant group but have developed recently to be transnational terrorism. Additionally, the dire threat of the returning foreign fighters who had spent years fighting Syria or other countries in Middle East is real. British security services fear that those foreign fighters who had fought in Syria and Iraq as Sunni idealists but will return as an-Western terrorists (Byman, 2014).

Most recently, Europe is facing a

tremendous attacks promulgated by ISIL who have claimed their responsibility in the recent attacks in Paris where at least 120 people were killed by the simultaneous suicide bombings and terrors. France is therefore escalating its border security by obtaining from the Schengen agreement for a while. It has also influenced Britain to pay a more attention into their borders given the potential threats of terrorism. The UK government has been compromising in irregular migrant problems. However, they offered no deal but fighting against ISIL. In addition, ISIL has become the major challenges not only facing the UK but also Europe in general since many attacks have been addressed to Europe countries like France recently. Following the Paris attack, the UK's Security Service has raised the current threat level for transnational terrorism to be severe or the attack is highly likely (M15, 2015). It is further strengthened that members of the public should always remain alert to the danger of terrorim and report any suspicious activity to the police or the anti-terrorist hotline.

In November 2014, the UK through its security agents M15, has been changing the level of threat in its national security towards severe or high likely. As of November 2015, the terror level has been in severe following the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015. It is also strengthened by Prime Minister David Cameron's commitment on countering the extremists as follows:

"Any strategy to defeat extremism must confront, head on, the extreme ideology that underpins it. Whether you are Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, Christian or Sikh, whether you were born here or born abroad, we can all feel part of this country – and we must now all come together and stand up for our values with confidence and pride." (Cameron, 2015).

Thus, it shows us that Britain has a strong commitment in respecting all people regardless their beliefs. It is important to differ those extremist Muslim and Muslim who ahve no intention to go for doing any violations. Even though sometimes ISIL who proclaims themselves as Muslim has made the situation becomes worse since there are many Muslim migrants in the UK. ISIL spread their ideology by the transnational networks accross Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, etc. Problems start between the radicalist (Sunni potentially) vs ISIL vs Assad's regime troops which results to the complicated security challenge dehumanizing Syria. Most recently, the new trend of cyber attack has been a prioritized security threats to address in Britain. Osborne, Prime Minister David Cameron's close ally said:

"ISIL are already using the Internet for hidesous propaganda purposes; for radicalisation, for operational planning too. They have not been able to use it to kill people yet by attacking our infrastructure through cyber attack. Therefore public spending on cyber security would be almost doubled to a total of 1.9 billion pounds over the period of 2020 as the Internet represents a critical axis of potential vulnerabilty." (Reuters, 2015)

ISIL is considered as the biggest and first extremist movements combining violent tendencies, ambitions, and also territorial control over the region since its inception in June 2014. It is suspected that around 500 British Muslims have travelled to Syria by most of them joining violent Islamist group. They will mostly come back home to the United Kingdom with some sort of experiences and training thereby engaging in more terrorism action will be the goal. Moreover, it is supported by the fact that Turkey, which has become one of the most promising destinations for irregular migrant has been widely criticized for its soft border policy in dealing with refugees from Syria. The reluctant former communications working for Islamic States told that he travelled in a convoy trucks as part of an ISIL unit from their stronghold in Raqqa across Turkish border easily as the Turkish military was accused of arming terrorist weapon in order for ISIL to initiate attacks against the Kurdish people in Rojava (Guiton, 2014). Network is therefore becoming critical as it becomes the bridge through which the Jihadist networks can spread their presence as well as ideology. The emergence of the non-state actors,

particularly in this case is terrorist networks, is widely seen as a threat of human security. In addition, police and military are not the only ones who can provide security to the states.

Counter-terrorism applied in the UK has been the major strategies to deal with the terrorism suspects. It involves many layers of the government with Home Office as the central point of its policy. It will cover four areas namely : (1) Pursue : to stop terrorist attacks, (2) prevent : to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, (3) protect : to strengthen our protection against terrorist atatck, and (4) prepare : to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack (Office, 2015). It will also be supported by the Britain national security strategy which identifies 15 priority risk types and the most pressing topics will be acts of terrorism, hostile attacks upon the UK cyber space, an international military crisis between states, and the major accident or natural hazard. It also argued that the existing policy option has the following goals: to prevent foreign travel, to protect againts attacks from returning fighters and sympathisers, to reintegrate returning fighters, and also to strengthen counter-radicalisation efforts by maximizing the M15 role. In addressing terrorism, however, it must be recognized that there is no single or universal solution to the problem of terrorism – be it either the domestic or international variant (Hoffman, 1999). Hoffman further argued that this fact only reinforces the need for multiple creative solutions, if not to resolve, then at least to control the growth of terrorism and contain its violent manifestations. Multiple creative solutions therefore will be useful in mitigating any potential threats of terrorism.

CONCLUSION

Despite the challenges of irregular migrants and ISIL towards the UK national security, the UK government stays on its commitment on providing a sanctuary to those fleeing their homes due to the fear of repercussion. Given the harrowing fact of state failure which has led to enormous exodus worldwide, the UK has been actively initiating many forms of international initiations under the idea of humanitarian mission. The UK is also one of the countries who has taken a leading step within Europe on its commitment of humanitarian aid to the Syrian crisis and also has created a new resettlement programme for Syrians, the Vulnerable Persons Relocation (VPR) scheme, as well as introducing concessions for Syrians outside the immigration rules. There has been identified two major factors contributing to the number of security challenges that Britain has to encounter given the state failure escalation; the irregular migration phenomenon and the rise of ISIL which possess a potential threat through its transnational terrorism networks. Nevertheless, the threat possessed by the rise of ISIL has also contributed to the significance of national security strategy by focusing on some goals: to prevent foreign travel, to protect againts attacks from returning fighters and sympathisers, to reintegrate returning fighters, and also to strengthen counter-radicalisation efforts.

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POLITICAL ECONOMY MATTER IN THE AID EFFECTIVENESS AGENDAS

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Abstract

The effort to improve the effectiveness of aid started since post-Cold War era. The shift of development cooperation from state-centred orientation to human security concern has made the issue of tackling poverty and creating good governance become the central target of the foreign aid agenda. In order to ensure the maximum achievement of the agenda, number of international aid effectiveness forums conducted. Interestingly, in these forums, the concept of South-South Cooperation (SSC) emerged as an alternative framework to challenge the traditional aid system. This paper argues political economy has continuously hidden as the central discussion to improve the effectiveness of aid. In fact the issue of power and politics between donor and aid recipient still became the major factor why aid has not being able to achieve its intended purposes. The same story also occurs in the implementation of SSC. Without addressing the issue of power relation obstacle it is difficult to increase the progress of the aid effectiveness commitments.

Key words: political economy, aid effectiveness, international forum, aid quality, effective development

INTRODUCTION

The central argument of this article is that the efforts to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid have not achieved their targets (Burnside & Dollar, 2004; Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009; Phillips, 2013). The reason is the political and economic motives still dominate donor and aid recipient relationships. In consequence, though commitments and mechanisms have already been produced in international forums, there is still a 'disconnection' between the policy 'consensus' and the practical level of implementation. Many aid projects undermine aid effectiveness principles in their implementation and are unwilling to engage with national systems. Meanwhile, for local actors aid is still portrayed as a source of power for achieving political interests. These situations make it difficult for actors involved in aid projects to hear the voices of poor people and entails failure to improve their condition.

Before critically discussing the above point, it is necessary to understand first the historical development of international cooperation which encourages the shift of mode aid delivery in developing countries (especially during the post-Cold War era).

CONTEMPORARY AID ISSUES

The concept of aid effectiveness has been negotiated and developed in the international forums since the 1990s. During this period, the international political atmosphere shifted to human security and human development concerns (Woods, 2005: p.394). The fall of the Soviet Union and the changes in aid policy have influenced on the change of pattern of civil wars. In Africa, the West humanitarian intervention has emerged new conflicts in the form of "new wars"[1] (Kaldor, 1999: p.204; Reno, 1997: p.497). Later on, these conflicts have become the source of poverty and food insecurity in the continent (Karanja, 2010: p.115; White, Killick, Kayizzi-Mugerwa, & Savane, 2001: p.120).

The crisis of development experienced by countries in Africa (which is also known as the tragedy of "the lost decade") after the implementation of the Structural Adjustments Programmes (SAPs) has also contributed to the collapse economic of the territory and increased poverty. This has made the idea of free market fundamentalism approach

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[1] These conflicts are described as internal war which includes ethnic mobilisation, resource extraction and state failure.

got its critics (Stiglitz, 2002). For Stiglitz, the project of structural adjustment has gone too far and has ended up counter-productive - it has increased social problems which led to conflicts (Stiglitz, 2002: p.30). While Fine and Escobar (and other advocates of the "post development" movement) argue that structural adjustment was part of the neoliberal project to roll back the post-colonial state in the Global South in the interest of global capital and at the expense of human development (Escobar, 2010: p.156: Fine, 1999: p.11-12).

In the meantime, new ideas emerged from Asia where countries like Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore were experiencing economic growth. This situation was contrast to what happen in Africa and indicated the challenge to the Washington Consensus.[2] A report entitled *The East Asian Miracle* (1993) produced by the World Bank explained it is the state intervention which made the countries developed. This report was significantly influenced by the Japanese government and while it led to a "turn to institutions" within the World Bank (Wade, 1997: p.354-355).

As solution to tackle the massive poverty, the neoliberalists in the World Bank and their critics agreed on the importance of the practice of good governance[3] to secure the effective development (World Bank, 1997, 2000). This new thinking emerges because the belief that the states have power to satisfy and control their populations and sustain the

circumstances. As markets also have positive contribution to the lives of poor people, it needs to place as the centre of poverty reduction agenda (World Bank, 2001). This effort, Stiglitz argues, has to be backed up by sound institutions (Stiglitz, 2002: p.188). In a report which was published in 1994, UNDP linked human development with security issue. This means any issue which relates to human being will have an impact to security (UNDP, 1994). Therefore human security needs to place as focus of attention because it affects development.

Since then good governance and human security became the newly development agendas and the focus of interventions in international cooperation. This approach has been widely adopted by many development agencies, both international (multilateral) and national (bilateral), into their 'reform' projects in developing countries. To put the approach into more specific policy in international arena a forum called the Millennium Summit was organized in 2000 and resulted a commitment known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MDGs consist of eight goals and a set of measurable time bound targets which aim to lift the world's most destitute people out of development challenges by 2015.

If it looks at the contemporary debate on foreign aid, the present of MDGs reflect the idea of the optimists which believe aid quality can be improved (Booth, 2012; Maathai, 2010; Sachs, 2005). One of the strategies is by having international forum which discuss commitments and mechanisms for the maximum impact of aid. This group is actually subdivided into neoliberals and neo-Weberians. Neo-liberals claim that development can only reached through freeing the market and limiting the intervention of the state. In contrast, neo-Weberians believe state-led development is the key to successful of industrialization and economic growth – it refers to the success development in East Asia (Booth, 2012; Maathai, 2010; Sachs, 2005).

Besides the optimists, there are two other camps on aid effectiveness debate. They are the sceptics and the radicals.

2 Washington Consensus was firstly introduced in 1989 and referred to ten specific economic policy prescriptions (including fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward Foreign Direct Investment/FDI, privatization, deregulation and property rights) which aim to assist countries in Latin America out from the economic and financial crisis 1980s (Williamson, 2009). John Williamson (an English economist and also a former World Bank manager) was the person who coined the name and formulated the approach through his work (Williamson, 1990, 1993, 1997). Since 1980, this idea was propagated by IMF and World Bank as the approach of neoliberal development to developing countries through SAPs. One of the policies includes imposing to get new loans with conditionality which makes developing countries adapt market oriented development.
3

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According to the sceptics, which includes such scholars as William Easterly and Dambisa Moyo aid has not worked (Easterly, 2006, 2013; Moyo, 2010). The solution put forward by Easterly and Moyo is for the world's poor to look private financial markets for development (Easterly, 2013: p.246-248; Moyo, 2010: p.145-148). For the radicals, aid is a practice of liberal governmentality – a technique for making countries in the south adopt the West's reform agenda as their own agenda (Anders, 2005: p.39; Duffield, 2007: p.224; Li, 2007: p.6; Mosse, 2005: p.13). Li argues, neoliberal aid agencies often do not consider the element of power in their practice (Li, 2007: p.188). In fact it is a very important matter and determines the success of aid projects.

Michael Foucault put forward the concept of governmentality as "the conduct of conduct" (Lemke, 2002: p.50). In this perspective the development agenda is seen as product of calculated and rational activity which is implemented using different techniques and many forms of knowledge. The purpose is to shape conduct so that it fits the desired outcomes (Dean, 2010: p.18). The foreign aid regime represents a technology to reshape relationships with aid recipient countries. Eventually actors in the local countries internalise the donors' agenda (Harrison, 2004: p.4; Hout & Robison, 2009: p.4). According to Li (2007: p.7), Boas and McNeill (2004: p.1) and Anders (2005: p.38) there are two steps of governmentality. The first is problematization which means donors try to constructed local problems that need to be addressed. The second is rendering technical. In this step, donors appointed trained experts which capable to frame, give diagnoses and prescriptions over the local issues according donors' interests. The implications are, when the project ends, development results will be based on the aspiration of donors rather than the locals.

Political economists, while also critiquing neoliberal practices of aid, take a different approach for understanding development.[4]

In its critical perspective, political economists use structuralist approach to development, which sees development policies as a product of competition amongst elite groups. These elites will use their power to secure their interests from other actors.[5] This means political economists differ in key ways from Foucauldian critics of neoliberal development. For structuralist political economists donors are not on powerful as Foucaultians suggest. Along with the aid distribution aid agencies will face local actors that are interested to influence new forms of governance. These local actors view aid as source of power and they seek control of it for securing their political agendas.

THE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE AID EFFECTIVENESS

Critics have repeatedly pointed out that aid projects are often wasteful and inefficient. The first evidence of this argument comes from a meta-analysis of 73 different studies on the impact of aid to development conducted by Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009). According to their investigation after 40 years of its present aid has only limited contribution in the improvement of living conditions in developing world. Burnside and Dollar also came out with the similar argument. Through a careful examination of the recent experiences on the aid implementation they concluded that there was just a small contribution aid to growth. Much lesson-learned shows growth only occurs if the aid recipient country has a good quality of state institutions and policies (Burnside & Dollar, 2004; Burnside & Dollar, 2000).

The above facts are indeed very sad news. However, the fact is not a surprise, aid was often helpful only during emergency

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4   Another political economists' perspective of development which has been widely used by the World

Bank and neoliberals sees development as natural phenomenon and the process is influenced by the rent-seeking activities of individuals. Under this assumption it argues economic policy reflects the interest of particular group which demands the market values and principles as the basis of economic, politic and social behaviour (see Hutchison, et all., 2014)

5   This perspective has been applied to understand development in Africa, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam (see Farah, 2009; Hope, 1996; Rodan, Hewison, & Robison, 1997).

rather than for the long-term. Much of the aid went back to the aid organizations rather than to local people. It is argued aid has even fostered corruption (Phillips, 2013), generated rent-seeking activities (Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2008), created dependency (Moss, Pettersson, & Van de Walle, 2006) and caused social unrest and even civil war (Moyo, 2010). Government officials think of aid as free cash. Therefore instead of using the money for people's welfare they divert it for their own personal benefit. Politicians might be used the aid money to pay the expense of their campaign and to influence the outcome elections. Some other elites view aid as a permanent and consistent source of income.[6] This makes them unwilling to create certain policies which encourage development using national revenues and keep relying on aid. In Africa, competition over the access of aid resources has prompted rebellion. Since then conflicts between the rebels and local military always occurred.

Aid in Africa is one of the most common topics of debate regarding the effectiveness of aid in recipient countries. In the last several decades, Africa has received more than US$1 trillion of foreign aid. But, in terms of the impact, experts have published different results. Levy (1988) and Gomanee et al. (2005) argue aid has contributed positive contribution to the development in Africa. However, there are too many studies evidence aid in Africa has just give small impact to the continent (Goldsmith, 2001) and in some cases it even made the situation got worse than before (poor people become poorer and development became slower) (Calderisi, 2006; Dunning, 2004; Lancaster, 1999; Moyo, 2010). This fact explained there is a problem on international aid system especially relates to the delivery phase.

In order to scale up the effectiveness of aid as well as to meet the challenge of the sceptics, Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as forum which comprises countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and concentrates

in international development decided to facilitate international meetings which meet donors and their partners. Arguably the forum is important since it addresses aid actors' differences and efforts and will produce specific policies for the full effectiveness of foreign aid in the future. Moreover, based on some evidences, development efforts were often not fully achieved because the donors tend to prioritize their geopolitical interests over development interests. This made aid often directed to countries whose policies were not focused on reducing poverty (World Bank, 2001). In other cases, there are some countries that were ever trapped in conflict because of the state failure to achieve economic development (Collier et al., 2003: p.53). Therefore, to prevent the conflict re-occurred, these countries are in need of foreign aid as an option to assist development.

DAC was established in 1960. The members are bilateral and multilateral actors and the works are largely dominated by the United States (US) and other Western Powers (including France, Britain, Germany, International Monetary Fund/IMF, World Bank etc). The US dominance in the organization has backed up the two Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) running the program of development which focuses on human security and good governance (Dreher & Sturm, 2012: p.367) – as well as increase the power of Washington Consensus and influence the ideas and the policies of the DAC (an attempt to reinforce neoliberal economic policies) (see Carbonnier, 2012: p.167; Gibbon, 1993). Therefore, although members in the DAC have their own aid programmes, "they would all look to the IMF and World Bank to ensure recipient compliance with that core set of policies" (Woods, 2008: p.1216). It then makes the both institutions become powerful in t*he United Nations system – even up to the moment.*

The first round of aid effectiveness forum was held on 21-22 March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico. The summit called as a Conference on Financing for Development and attended by more than 50 Heads of State and Government. The forum emerged

6   This phenomenon is called "rentier elites" (Yates, 1996: p.21)

as a response of the financial crisis in the world including in Latin America and Asia in the 1990s. Mosse (2005: p.4) called it as the decade of challenge to "neoliberal vision". Yet, the crisis also had slow down the sustainability of development programmes which impacted to the increase of poverty in the countries – situation that makes them difficult to achieve MDGs targets. As a result at the Monterrey conference donors committed to allocated 0.7 percent of their Gross National Income (GNI) to support poor countries to reduce poverty and achieve the targets of the MDGs.

In the forum, a new paradigm of aid as a partnership relation established. Aid is no longer about one-way relationship but rather two-way relationship between donor and development partner. This means to achieve the mission on reducing poverty, the both donor and aid partner agreed to share their responsibilities and commitments. In return, aid recipient has to commit themselves in improving governance, establishing development priorities and adopting sound policies for growth (Menocal & Mulley, 2006: p.2; Menocal & Rogerson, 2006: p.2). This is the meaning of equal partnership system which also a strategy to limit certain issue regarding aid implementation problems in the future.

To reaffirm the commitment on improving the aid effectiveness, a High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Rome 2003. It was attended by leaders from the major multilateral banks, bilateral and international organizations and donor and recipient country representatives. In the meeting, harmonizing aid policies, procedure and practises became the central topic of discussion. The result of the forum called Rome Declaration on Harmonization. The outline of the declaration provides concrete priority actions to ensure the adaptation of aid effectiveness agenda.

A year later, in February 2004, an International Roundtable on Managing Development Results was held in Marrakech, Morocco. The aim of this forum is "to forge a shared understanding of the principles of managing for development results and to discuss ways to build on the progress going forward" (Dabelstein & Patton, 2013: p.26). The meeting has resulted on the commitment of the heads of the multilateral development banks and the chairman of the OECD-DAC to foster the global partnership on managing for results which later known as the Marrakech Memorandum. The impact of this international agreement was the endorsement of the Paris Declaration.

The March 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness results important steps towards improving the quality of aid. The forum itself was attended by representatives of over 150 countries and organizations. It resulted on what so called Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which was signed by 35 donor countries, 26 multilateral donor organisations, 56 developing countries and 14 civil society observers. To improve the quality of aid, the forum has endorsed 5 main principles in the aid effectiveness efforts namely ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. In the forum, the word partnership became the major discourse within participants. The phrase inclusive partnership is now commonly used to reflex the participation of all stakeholders including parliamentarians, foundations, the private sector and civil society (Bissio, 2008: p.234.235). Yet, the term of donor countries and partner countries are also managed distinguished in the meeting.

The 3rd High Level Forum on aid effectiveness agenda was took place in Accra, Ghana in September 2008 and was attended by 1200 delegations from 100 countries and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). The focus of the meeting was to evaluate, strengthen and deepen the Paris Declaration principles and commitments. Strengthen the South-South Cooperation (SSC) in the development agenda became one of the most highlighted points at the forum. This idea emerged as the same month Global Financial Crisis was took place. Some are worry that this situation might drop the amount of Western aid to developing countries. Meanwhile, in the same time the world was in height of the commodity boom – huge increase in the power of China and massive competition for

primary commodities. The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) states: "The AAA recognises the value of co-operation that reaches beyond traditional aid arrangements, such among developing and middle income countries." This is an idea which revolutionises traditional thinking about aid, as flows from rich countries to poor countries. As the Agenda states, "the AAA redefines the relationship between donors, developing countries and their citizens" (Development Assistance Committee, 2008). It is an alternative form of development cooperation in the context of middle income country. In fact the idea is not new - it was firstly introduced through a meeting called Asian–African Conference which was held in Bandung 1955 (also known as Bandung Conference). Bandung conference met representatives from twenty-nine independent nations and resulted on the creation of Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). NAM aimed to against domination of the West (United States and its allies) and the East (Soviet Union and other communist states) and created South-South cooperation for better development in the Third World countries (Ciment, 2007: p.1118). It is important to note Indonesia played two major roles in the creation of NAM. First, the country had become the host of the meeting. Second, Sukarno, the first Indonesian president, was the one who became the precursor of the formation of NAM. Later, Sukarno also used the principle of NAM as one of its essential foreign policies. At Accra, the idea of SSC was harnessed to the goal of greater aid effectiveness.

Three years after Accra, in 2011, the 4rd High Level Forum entitled Partnership on Development Cooperation held in Busan. It was initiated by G7+, a group of twenty fragile and conflict-affected states, attempting to reshape the terms by which aid operators used. The result of the meeting called a New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (OECD, 2012: p.1). New Deals emphasized the new vision of partnership that evolved from North-South paradigm and recognised the fundamental contribution of developing nations and a number of emerging economies

in South-South development cooperation. This idea, then, has called back the topic of SSC into international development agenda discussion.

THE AID EFFECTIVENESS AGENDA EVALUATION

The previous section already provided information on the effort to improve the effectiveness of aid through international forums. As can been seen, the meetings have resulted number of commitments and mechanisms which aimed to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development in the recipient countries. Some questions came up. What is the progress so far? Does SSC is the solution for better development in developing countries? What truly factor that has to address in order to the improve quality of aid? These points will be discussed in this section.

According to United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), SSC "is a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains." The work involves two or more developing countries which their type of cooperation can be in the form of bilateral, regional, subregional or interregional basis. So far, the operationalisation of SCC has taken place largely in the form of "increased volume of South-South trade, South-South flows of foreign direct investment, movements towards regional integration, technology transfers, sharing of solutions and experts, and other forms of exchanges." These efforts have been played largely by governments and "with active participation from public- and private-sector institutions, non-governmental organizations and individuals" (United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), 2015).

The present of SSC have given an alternative option in international cooperation and can fulfil the needs of development by aid recipient countries. However the matter is not as simple as this. In the political economy terms, the idea of "South-South" is a rhetorical device that is designed to invoke the ideas of

equality and solidarity, arising from a common colonial experience. However, analysis of the relationship between the rising "BRICS" powers and the countries to whom they have given development assistance shows that the promise of equality is misleading. The example is the present of China in Zambia which believed has given more benefit to Chinese economy rather than local countries. Michael Sata, the 5th President of Zambia, said the present of aid and investment from China were just like Trojan horses. It has exploited the local resources without contribute significantly to development of African economies and society. He also gave an example: "You recruit Chinese doctors and they end up having Chinese restaurants in town. They are just flooding the country with human beings instead of investment and the government is jumping. China is sucking from us. We are becoming poorer because they are getting our wealth" (Brautigam, 2009: p.6). In other words, it is difficult to achieve the agenda of development within SSC since the relation of the countries is still about politics and interest, not about mutual trust.

Furthermore, analysis of SSC as an issue of bilateral relations between two countries does not take into account the different political interest of subnational groups. Elites in the recipient countries interested to the power which provides by aid resources. Therefore they ask greater control over the aid flow. This point is reflected in the paragraph 15 and 16 of Paris Declaration which says: "donors commit to support - country strategies, policy dialogues and development co-operation programmes - on partners' national development strategies and periodic reviews of progress in implementing these strategies" and "donors commit using a country's own institutions and systems, where these provide assurance that aid will be used for agreed purposes, increases aid effectiveness by strengthening the partner country's sustainable capacity to develop, implement and account for its policies to its citizens and parliament (Development Assistance Committee, 2008: p.3). Busan New Deal agreement also showed another

contest over the struggle for influence made by local actors upon direction of social, economic and political development in the aid recipient countries. It is reflected in the principle of ownership which means "partnerships for development can only succeed if they are led by developing countries, implementing approaches that are tailored to country-specific situations and needs" (OECD, 2011: p.3). It is expected, by using local actor priorities, the fully interest of many elites in the country can be easily achieved. For instance, the involvement of civil societies in development can ensure that SSC works in the interests of citizens. However, this task will not be easy to achieve since they have to face local politicians and elites which are powerful and interested to influence the policy over development (Beausang, 2012: p.99). Even, civil societies itself is a form of elite which has political purposes - mainly in the relation of securing their self-existence and image - and able to challenge the hegemonic power over development policies (Lewis & Kanji, 2009: p.180.181). In Bangladesh, for instance, the project of empowering women has given more benefit to NGO rather than the people. In the beginning, NGO formed some women groups which involved in silk production within a World-Bank-funded project. Later, he bought the silk products resulted at mutually favourable prices and then sell it at higher price in the market (Bebbington, Lewis, Batterbury, Olson, & Siddiqi, 2007). To this extend, it can be argue civil societies do not always become the extensions of the aid industry. They are form of elites that has their point a view of neoliberal development. Therefore, it is likely difficult for civil societies to attain the notion as always being positive in terms of delivering change to the lives and livelihoods of the beneficiaries.

The previous point indicates there is a contestation over power and politics between donors and recipient which influence by the aid flows (Mosse, 2005: p.10). On the donor side, aid is a tool of achieving their reform agenda. To ensure the maximum gain of this reform targets they will use any possible way including using their own aid system standard

and trespassing local institutions system (Hudson, 2015; Paul, 2013). Meanwhile from the recipients' perspective, aid inflow is politically profitable. Rather than to use the aid for the purpose of improving the living condition of the poor power-holders will be more interested to implement the aid effectively for their strategic interests (Dietrich, 2011: p.57). These asymmetric expectations were made the principles of the Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action, Doha and Busan's Global Partnership got a relatively low achievement on the agreed goals (Brown & Morton, 2008; Chandy, 2011; Chuhan & Bhargava, 2006; Dabelstein & Patton, 2013; Wallace, 2009). It is also expressed by Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary General by saying: "all too often, aid is driven more by politics than by need, undermining its effectiveness" (Herfkens & Bains, 2015: p.7). The evidence clearly suggests that although aid actors are relatively easy to produce agreement there is another factor that prevents them to follow the aspects of principles agreed in Paris namely political interests (Carothers & De Gramont, 2013).

Political economists see SSC as new signal of power relation between actors who identify as "South". For instance, despite China and Zambia are both "South", their relationship is characterised of power, not only between the two countries, but also between elites and non-elites within those countries. The "South-South" rhetoric disguises power differentials between and within countries of the Global South, and makes it more difficult for us to see which groups exactly are benefitting the most, and which least, from particular aid projects or development policies. In the context of China – Zambia aid relationship for instance, Michael Sata can say that Chinese investment has only given small contribution to the local development. But in reality the present of China in the country has provided higher economic benefit to some Zambian state elites, at the expense of the population which facilitates these practices. However, it is likely difficult to determine whether Chinese of Zambian states elites that get majority benefit from their relationships.

CONCLUSION

Aid is indeed politically profitable. Donor and recipient are interested to influence over the aid flow because they can use it for their commercial and developmental objectives. If all aid actors have really committed to improve the effective of aid they have to adopt the principles of mutual cooperation and emancipation through the aid efforts. The two principles are very important and become the main pillar of international development.

The new rhetoric of SSC is an example of how shifting economic power in the world around the time of the Global Financial Crisis, the rise of China and the commodities boom has produced a new ideal of aid partnerships that is equal and solidaristic. However, a political analysis reveals in the SSC there are various actors that pursued interests for the sake of their own benefit.

Distributions of power between subnational groups within countries are important as distributions of power between countries in determining whether aid achieves particular outcomes associated with human development.

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DEBATING "NATIONAL INTEREST" VIS-A-VIS REFUGEES: INDONESIA'S ROHINGYA CASE

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Abstract

The recent tragedy of the Aylan Kurdi, a refugee child who washed up on a Turkish beach, has put migration issue back on top of public discussion in Indonesia. European refugees problem within certain limits experienced by Indonesia in handling the Rohingya refugees. The uniqueness of Rohingya issue in Indonesia is the high Islamic sentiment of public so that they urged the government to accept the refugees unconditionally. At the same time, the government has to act in a realist perspective of the national interest and has to do maneuvers between domestic, regional, and international expectations. This paper will discuss the debate between the 'national interest' of Indonesian Foreign Policy vis a vis refugees by using empirical data from literatures and in-depth interviews with the foreign ministry staff and civil society organization that deal with the Rohingya case. The authors will argue that the identification of Indonesia national interest is closely related to pragmatism politics of the elite.

Keywords: foreign policy, national interest, refugees, Rohingya, Indonesia

INTRODUCTION

A heartbreaking picture of a lifeless body of Aylan Kurdi washed up in Turkey beach echoed around the world in early September. By September 17, 2015 (15 days since it was published for the first time), at least there were 170,000 tweets on Twitter mentioning the toddler's name. This disturbing image shocked the world and suddenly, many civil society organizations and grass root groups poured the refugees with food and refuge. "The image has started a movement of civil society, of private individuals, and even of the tabloid press, to say: Government we need to do more," said Melissa Fleming, spokeswomen of UNHCR.[1]

Some government of Europeans states, such as French, Britain, and Germany gave fast response to the public histeria by announcing that they will accept tens of thousands refugees. But in the end of the day, they have to face the reality that the burden of accepting the refugees is beyond their capability. The term of 'national interest' is used by the Europe politician in debating the issue. And then, for the first time in twenty years, Austria, Denmark, and Germany close the borders for their inability to cope with huge flow of refugees.

The tragedy of Aylan Kurdi has put migration issue back on top of public discussion in Indonesia, especially in social media. European refugees' problem within certain limits experienced by Indonesia in handling the Rohingya refugees. The uniqueness of Rohingya issue in Indonesia is the high Islamic sentiment of public so that they urged the government to accept the refugees unconditionally. At the same time, the government should act under a framework of 'national interest'. For a developing country with income per capita USD 4,700 per year and 40% of its population must live with less than 2 USD a day, giving refuge to strangers is not an easy job.

This paper will discuss the debate between the 'national interests' of Indonesian Foreign Policy vis a vis refugees by using empirical data from literatures and in-depth interviews

[1]   http://bigstory.ap.org/article/80e8a986e36b4b9 0bafca7be3d2298df/photo-turning-point-all-depends-europes-leaders

with the foreign ministry staff and civil society organization that deal with the Rohingya case. The authors will argue that the identification of Indonesia national interest is closely related to pragmatism politics of the elite.

THE DEBATE OF NATIONAL INTEREST

The origin of 'national interest' term cannot be separated from how a government denominate its policy and assured the public that it is beneficial to them. As explained by Burchill (2005, p. 9), the word 'interest' itself has two senses, objective (a general or natural concern, having an objective right, claim, or stake in something) and subjective (a general curiosity or having the power to attract curiosity or attention).

Beard (cited by Burchill, 2005) stated that before the late of 15th century, theology was the core affair of intellectual elite. After that, secularism and political economy displaced it and then "interest shrank to an economic conception in writings and negotiations involving policy, statecraft, and social affairs generally."

That is why, according to Beard, "in policy discussion where the national interest is central to decision making, it is the owners of property who are actually being considered. There is no such thing as an objective reality called national interest."

Beard's view was challenged by Rousseau (cited by Burchill, 2005) who claims "societies have common interest which should form the basis of decision making and policy." These common interests are the binding forces which keep society stick together.

The concept of national interest is also related with concept of *raison d'etat* of Machiavelli. According to the doctrine of *raison d'etat*, the state should do whatever it takes to preserve its power, even if the state's action might against the religious or ethical standards (Burchill, 2015, p. 18)

In the discourse of international relations, Rousseau's view and doctrine of *raison d'etat* lead to a realist perspective that sees state is the main actor and survival of the state must be the ultimate objective of every political action. As Waltz (2000) stated, "states performs essential political, social,

and economic functions ... They foster the institutions that make internal peace and prosperity possible" (quoted by Burchill, 2005, p.18).

Clinton (1994) classified skepticism over the term of national interest in 4 types, as well as providing its response.

1. *The Undemocratic National Interest*

Some viewed national interest as convincing cover or rasionalization of some subnational groups self-interests. But, as Clinton said (p. 72-73), any term may be used wrongly, so is the national interest term. If national interest term is rejected totally, political discourse will have no language at all. The community needs this term because it protects something that holds them together. As Colm wrote (cited by Clinton), "..without this overarching community and its larger good, what ground does one have for resisting the pressures of special interests and opposing actions by some member of community that may threaten the rights of other members?"

2. *The Irrational National Interest*

Some viewed that no politician have capability to choose the most rational choice; all subnational groups, like politician, elected officials, or civil society groups would identify their aims with the national interest. The term rational choice is related to economic efficiency and the fair competition. According to Clinton (p. 75), this view denied the possibility of pressure groups and bureaucratic politics' ability to result in policy that approximates the common good.

"Political decentralization and economic free competition may well be very good things, but without attempting to grasp the common interest that they further we have no way of deciding whether they are good or not," (p. 75)

3. *The Obsolescent National Interest*

Responding some thinkers that said 'national interest is obsolete term',

Clinton quoted Morgenthau, "While the realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the nations state is a product of history, and is therefore bound to disappear in the course of history."

What Morgenthau said more than 35 years ago seems close to reality in the era of globalization today when boundaries between nations diminished and free trade regimes became stronger. In many cases, interest of a state is replaced by the interest of a multinational institution. But, the state is still the prominent actor in international scene and it seems never lose its dominance toward the society.

4. *The Exclusivist National Interest*

Some thinker viewed national interest term fails "to take into account either the interests of others outside the nation or the trancendent rules of ethical conduct" (p. 79).

Clinton argued, ethical conduct and national good are not necessarily in conflict, since "States have supplied the order that has allowed for the development of justice; national communities, when they live up to what is best within them, form cooperative endeavours to advance toward the principles of justice on which they are founded." (p. 80)

While realists extract national interest into three big ends: sovereignty, security, and prosperity, Nye (1999) stressed that values and morality should be part of national interest.

In a democracy, the national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world. It is broader than strategic interests, though they are part of it. It can include values such as human rights and democracy, if the public feels that those values are so important to its identity that it is willing to pay a price to promote them.... A democratic

definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction between a morality-based and an interest-based foreign policy. Moral values are simply intangible interests. Leaders and experts may point out the costs of indulging these values. But if an informed public disagrees, experts cannot deny the legitimacy of public opinion.

From here, the questions arise, which value is considered to be part of the national interests of a country? If public opinion is split in perception an issue, which value should be considered of the national interest? If these values (or intangible interest) contrary to tangible interest (security, economy), will the government take pragmatic action, or stick to the value? These questions will be discussed in the next sections by examining Indonesia's foreign policy toward Myanmar.

RELATIONS OF INDONESIA AND MYANMAR

Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Myanmar began in 1949. Indonesia declared independence in 1945 after colonized more than 3 centuries by the Dutch and 3 years by Japanese; while Myanmar's independence declaration was in 1948 after being a British colony over a century. From the start, Myanmar besieges by ethnic strife because ethnic Burman, which formed around two-thirds of its population, dominates the more than 100 remainder ethnics, such as Shan, Karen, Rakhine, Rohingya, and Mon.

In the period 1948-1962, Burma (the country's name before 1989) adopted parliamentary democratic system. In 1962, General U Ne Win staged a coup and established a militaristic government, which was very abusive toward human rights, according to Amnesty International. Ne Win was retired in 1988, but the successor still military and continued to violate the human rights. Following the junta's suppression of protests and detention of political prisoners in 1988, The United States imposed economic sanction.

Despite international criticism toward the junta's attitude, ASEAN welcomed Myanmar as its member in 1997. The sanction was

lifted in 2011 when Myanmar entered a period of reform. This period began with election in 2010 that gave presidential post to Than Sein who then led a series of reforms, such as releasing political prisoners, establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, and efforts toward peace with ethnic rebel groups.

Indonesia had a significant role in democratization process in Myanmar, especially during the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014). It is interesting to note that in 2005 Indonesia's GDP per capita was 1273.47 USD and 1865.85 USD in 2014. There is a quite big gap compare to Myanmar's GDP per capita that was 216.4 in 2005 and 1203.8 in 2014.[2] Trade value between two nations is relatively small compare to the value of trade between Indonesia and other ASEAN countries. Trade value Indonesia-Myanmar in 2008 was 264 million USD and 465 million dollar in 2012, while trade value Indonesia-Thailand in 2011 was 17 billion USD.

From economic point of view, Myanmar is not yet an important business partner for Indonesia. From geopolitics view, Myanmar is far less important for Indonesia, compare to Myanmar's strategic position toward China and India since Myanmar is often perceived to be a buffer state between the two Asian giants of India and China. So, what is the main reason for Yudhoyono's administration to give special attention to Myanmar?

At least there were two reasons. First, Indonesia always identifies itself as a regional leader and has traditional responsibility to maintain the regional security. Second, after *reformasi* (the periode after the fall of Suharto regime), Indonesia is considered as a country that succeeded in transformation process and promote the value of democracy and pluralism by the international community. It brings a kind of self-image for Indonesia's statesmen that Indonesia has responsibility to promote democracy internationally (Poole, 2013). The second reason also related with the flamboyant figure of Yudhoyono who sought a higher international profile for Indonesia. It

was revealed from the speech of the president in front of Indonesian community in Myanmar (2013).

> *"I still remember, as soon as I took over the presidency at the end of 2004, for a few months I maintained my communication with Myanmar's leaders at the time, Gen. Than Shwe. At that time, Myanmar was sanctioned by Western countries; it was isolated by many countries in the world. I took the risks, I took that step [communicate with Myanmar's leader] with good intentions and goals."*

> *"I still remember, my action was not fully understood, let alone approved, by the Western countries ... I said to them, sanctions and embargo will not solve the problem."*

Yudhoyono recalled that he and the leader of Myanmar exchanged several letters and on that letters he encouraged Myanmar to implement the seven steps to democracy. He provided terms for the diplomacy he has done to Myanmar namely "constructive engagement".

> *"And the peak of this process was two years ago [2011] ago at the meeting of ASEAN and East Asia Summit in Bali. At that time, as the chairman I had to decide, whether Myanmar could be approved to become the chair of ASEAN in 2014 or not. Many countries, especially Western countries, said, no, not yet. But with good calculation, with good research, and by looking at developments in Myanmar, with my determination as the chairman, finally ASEAN countries agreed to have Myanmar as chairman in 2014."*

According to Yudhoyono, it was the trust from its ASEAN fellows that encouraged Myanmar to improve its democracy.

> *"Finally the world also recognizes [this improvement], Europe Union yesterday has lifted its embargo. So once again, soft power approach, constructive engagement, is much better than just giving sanction and embargo."*

Indonesian role in democratizing Myanmar has been applauded on the international stage. One of the compliments came from Australian ex-Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd, "I congratulate Indonesia through

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2 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD

ASEAN for its fine diplomacy on Burma. This has been good work by our friends in ASEAN, and good work, in particular, by Foreign Minister Natalegawa."[3]

After being disengaged from international community for nearly five decades, Myanmar opened itself up to foreign investments. It happened especially after the US lifted its sanctions in 2011. The growth of foreign direct investments in Myanmar is arising each year. While Myanmar benefited from Indonesia's effort to convince the world to stop isolating Myanmar, it is ironic that Indonesia has not yet got its share. According to Myanmar Investment Commission, Indonesia is ranked 21 out of 30 countries that invest in Myanmar.[4]

This deficit of Indonesia's economic diplomacy was recognized by Indonesia's then President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In the speech he gave in front of Indonesia community in Myanmar in 2013, he said,

"Myanmar will continue to improve its democracy and advance its economy. Indonesia has a clear position, even before it transforms into this condition. Not many countries are willing to take risks to make friends with an isolated and sanctioned country. But we have good intentions, a good purpose; we have a clear mind. Therefore, since we already have a very good friendship, let us boost our economic cooperation."

Yudhoyono also regretted that Indonesia's businessmen less quickly than other countries in exploiting economic opportunities in Myanmar. He also recalled how Indonesia had important role in solving conflict of Cambodia and Bosnia, but the economic benefit was taken by other countries. This statement shows that Indonesia has not yet reached its 'tangible national interest'. Furthermore, the 'intangible interest' had not yet been reached when associated with the issue of Rohingya refugees.

THE ROHINGYA REFUGEES

Rohingya is a minority ethnic in Myanmar, and according to Amnesty International, it is one of the most persecuted minorities in the world. Its population is estimated 1.3 million and most of them live in the state of Rakhine, western Myanmar. The majority of Rakhine State population is Buddhist and there were some deadly clashes between the two groups, Buddhist and Muslim. The most brutal sectarian violence took place in June and October 2012 that left more than 300 dead. The Buddhist also burnt the Rohingyas houses that forced hundreds of thousands of them to live in temporary refugee camps without proper condition. Thousands of them tried to get away from this dire situation and made dangerous journey into neighboring countries by boat. For many reasons, countries in the region unwilling to let them land and it makes the problem of the Rohingyas became the regional problem.

The root of this problem is the refusal of Myanmar government to give the Rohingyas citizenship and the fundamental civic rights that go with it. In the view of the government, the Rohingyas are illegal migrants from Bangladesh even though most of them have lived in Myanmar for generations. In international stage, Myanmar always deny 'Rohingya' term and insists on using 'Bengali' instead.[5]

Rohingya problem is a stumbling block in the Indonesia-Myanmar relations and even ASEAN-Myanmar in general. It is difficult to say that Indonesia succeed in its effort of democratizing Myanmar when there is still ethnic's discrimination in the country. Myanmar's stubborn stance on denying the existence of Rohingya complicate the negotiations on this issue. In 2009, the Myanmar delegation even refused to discuss the issue of Rohingya in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Thailand, which took place shortly after the case of 190 Rohingya boat people that expelled from the coast of Thailand and

3 http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/01/12/let-asean-way-take-reins-region-s-democratization.html
4 http://www.hktdc.com/resources/fair/1415/worldsmeexpo/s//4979/1418200669336_C5.pdf

5 http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21654124-myanmars-muslim-minority-have-been-attacked-impunity-stripped-vote-and-driven

returned to international waters.

Interestingly, when talking about Rohingya, Yudhoyono did not use term "democracy", but he used "Islam" instead. This was revealed in a statement during his visit to Myanmar on 23-24 April 2013, "Indonesia has commitment to help solve those problems. I said to the President Thien Sein, since Indonesia is the largest Muslim population in the world, of course, we are concerned with what happened in Rakhine State. "

Prior to the President's visit, on 7-8 January 2013, Indonesia's then Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa came to Myanmar and visited four villages in Rakhine State. During the visit, Natalegawa offered his proposal to solve the sectarian conflict, such as "the creation of mutual trust between the communities involved in the sectarian conflict" and "boosting the economy of the state so there can be more jobs and people can enjoy a better quality of life in the future." He also pledged 1 million dollars in humanitarian assistance to the Rohingyas and this promise has already met with the construction of 4 schools in Rakhine in 2014.

It seems that Yudhoyono's active foreign policy toward Myanmar is not followed by the new Indonesian President, Joko "Jokowi" Widodo. In general, during the first year of his reign, in conntrast to Yudhoyono, Jokowi seemed reluctant to attend a number of high-profile international events. In his speech in ASEAN Summit 2014 in Myanmar, Jokowi did not mention any word of Rohingya eventhough the Summit took place 6 months after the arrival of boat people to the waters of Indonesia, which led to uproar in the mass media and social media in Indonesia.

On May 15, 2015, a boat carrying 600 Bangladeshis and Rohingya refugees from Myanmar Langsa landed on the coast, the eastern part of Aceh province. The ship had previously been denied by Thai and Malaysian military. Some Indonesia fishermen then helped the boat people to land in the coast of Aceh (western Indonesia). International Organization for Migration (IOM) believed that as many as 8,000 Rohingya "boat people" were stranded at sea at that time. At first,

Indonesian military's stance was not different with its counterpart in Thailand and Malaysia. Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) chief Gen. Moeldoko said, the Indonesian government will not allow the boat of Rohingya refugees to enter Indonesia's water.

"For ethnic Rohingya, when they crossed the Strait of Malacca and found difficulties in the sea, we will help them. We will give water or food, because it is related to humanity. But if they enter our territory, then the task of the military is to safeguard the sovereignty of our country, " said Moeldoko at the Presidential Palace on May 15th, 2015. He even stated, "We have already had big burden to take care of our own people, do not add [the burden] with this [refugees] problem."

This statement provoked international dan domestic criticism. In domestic sphere, Islamic sentiment is very strong on this issue. "The Buddhists slaughtered our Muslim brother in Rohingya" was the main narration that easily provokes sympathy. Many civil society organizations used this kind of narration to collect donation from the people to help the refugees. But, in the same time, the hatred was on the air. In contrast to the case of boat people in 2012, the arrival of the Rohingya in May 2015 was actively used by the grass-root opposition camp (ordinary people that were supporter of Prabowo Subianto, Jokowi's rival in the 2014 election) to undermine the government. They used social media and websites to spread opinion that Jokowi's administration has ignored the Rohingya refugees' fate and that the Buddhist was Muslim's enemy.

Some Islamic organizations, such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama also formally asked the government to provide maximum assistance to the Rohingya refugees. Politician from Democrat Party, Imelda Sari, even compared Jokowi's stance with the e-President. Imelda said, when serving as President, Yudhoyono was very actively communicating with the Government of Myanmar and the countries involved in the issue of Rohingya refugees. "However, we do not see it in the President Joko Widodo,"

said Imelda in a press conference about the Rohingya refugees, in Jakarta May, 18th 2015.[6]

Responding to criticism from the public, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, stressed that the government has done a lot of deed to immigrant from Bangladesh and Rohingya who entered Indonesian territory. "Since Indonesia is not a country participants of The *1951* United Nations *Convention* Relating to the Status of *Refugees*, what we have done is extramile (exceeded the Indonesia's responsibility)," said Marsudi in the Presidential Palace, May 19th, 2015. Marsudi also cited the UN appreciation for the great efforts done by Indonesia in taking care of the refugees.[7]

In fact, Jokowi has delegated the task of diplomacy to his Foreign Minister. Immediately after the entry of refugees into the waters of Aceh, Marsudi met with her counterpart from Malaysia and Thailand in Putrajaya, Malaysia. In May 20, 2015, both Indonesia and Malaysia declared their readiness to provide shelter for a year to the boat people of Myanmar and Bangladesh, while Thailand refused to help. Marsudi also managed to get a pledge funding from Middle East countries, including Qatar which pledged 50 million USD.[8]

Finally, the president himself came to the public and give statement related financial burden. "Helping the refugees is a humanitarian activity. ...We are counting and calculating the costs involved. However we do need international support," said Jokowi in May 24, 2015.[9]

For the Indonesian government, morality and kindness is not as easy as saying. Currently, Indonesia has a big enough burden since the total number of refugees in Indonesia is reached 13,000 people. Most of them did not make Indonesia as the country of destination. They wanted to go to prosperous countries such as Australia and Malaysia but they encountered obstacles in the way and stranded in Indonesia. Indonesia did have a firsthand experience in how hard the return process of the refugees. For two decades (1975 - September 1996) Indonesia providing temporary shelter to the Indochinese boat people in Galang Island. The Indonesian government should conduct long time diplomacy to convince the Vietnam government that the refugees was their citizen (Ismawati, 2013, p.186).

The ironic part is, while Indonesian government dealing with domestic and international pressure to take care the refugees, Myanmar government stubbornly denies the existence of the Rohingyas.

"It's very clear that Myanmar is not the source of problems related to boat people in the Andaman Sea, but rather a partner for solutions," said Zaw Htay, deputy director of the office of President Thein Sein. "The international community must understand that pressuring and blaming Myanmar is not the way to save lives at sea."

That statement was Myanmar's respond to invitation from Thailand's Prime Minister, Prayuth Chan-ocha for a regional meeting on the issue. Following this rejection, on May 21, Malaysia and Indonesia's Foreign Ministers came to Naypyidaw to urge their Burmese counterparts to join the meeting. At the same day, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken also came to Myanmar and met President Thein Sein and Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, commander in chief of the armed forces. After this meeting, Burma announced its readiness to come to the meeting "as long as other countries agree to use the term "illegal migrant" instead of "Rohingya."

"They can't pressure us," Zaw Htay said. "We won't accept any pressure."[10]

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6   http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/05/18/19462801/Soal.Rohingya.Jokowi.Diminta.Ikuti.Jejak.SBY

7   http://news.okezone.com/read/2015/05/19/18/1151965/menlu-retno-indonesia-berbuat-banyak-untuk-rohingya

8   Interview with Director of Human Rights and Multilateral Cooperation of Foreign Ministry, June 23, 2015

9   http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2015/05/150524_indonesia_presiden_rohingya

10   http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/28/in-burma-migrant-crisis-inspires-little-grief-but-plenty-of-denial-rohingya-myanmar/

WHICH NATIONAL INTERESTS?

So what is the real Indonesia's national interest in dealing with Rohingya refugees?

Foreign Ministry staff who dealt with the problem of Rohingya refugees in Indonesia replied this question by quoting the Preamble of the Constitution, "We have an obligation to participate in implementing world order based on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice." [11]

Furthermore, he rejected the notion that the Islamic factor is the main reason for Indonesia to help the Rohingya refugees.

> "The case of the migrants from Bangladesh and Rohingya has multidimensional nature. Religion is only one of the dimensions, there are other dimensions, economic, political pressure, transnational crime, and human rights. Some people see religion as the main factor simply because they look at this problem from the aspect of solidarity, but focusing on religion alone is not enough. But I understand if there are a number of civil society organizations looking at this case in terms of religion alone, and it did attracted a lot of public attention. But it is not enough. We should see it in a comprehensive manner. "

One of Indonesian CSOs that provides humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya, MER-C (Medical Emergency Rescue Committee), considers that taking part in resolving of Rakhine State's conflict is a part of Indonesia's national interest. The reason is humanitarian solidarity and long time friendship between Indonesia and Myanmar.

> "Indonesia is considered as "older brother" who was respected by the Myanmar people."
> "We must look at this issue from a humanitarian perspective. The root of the problem is not religion, but 'human freedom'. Their biggest problem is their stateless status, this must be resolved. Most politicians in Myanmar had wrapped this problem with religious issues for the sake of their political interests." [12]

With this perspective, MER-C do what

they call a "humanitarian politics". They provide medical assistance to both parties in Rakhine State (Muslim and Buddhist), while educate the public about the reality to avoid further violence between them. MER-C also tried to explain the real situation to Indonesian people to defuse tension and hatred on religious grounds.

> "In general, religious life in Myanmar is fine. In Rangoon there are various houses of worship, including mosques, and even mosques are free to do 'azan' (call to prayer) with the speakers. So the situation is not as portrayed by many hardline Islamic media in Indonesia."

But the voice of the other CSOs and grass root people quite different. Indonesian public response over the sectarian conflict in Rakhine State sounds loud. The protests, criticisms, and objections from Indonesia Muslim society towards the Myanmar government is quite strong. Even there was a bombing attempt of the Myanmar embassy by radical groups in 2013. Islamic sentiment of Indonesian people simply cannot be ignored. This is why Presiden Yudhoyono stressed that "I said to the President Thien Sein, since Indonesia is the largest Muslim population in the world, of course, we are concerned with what happened in Rakhine State."

According to Rizal Sukma (2003, p.140), throughout the history of Indonesia, the Islamic factor has always been a consideration in the country's foreign policy. The relationship between Islam and the foreign policy indicates pressure on the policy "by the primary consideration of domestic priorities and the interests of the regime."

During the Suharto period, Indonesia's foreign policy towards the Arab-Islamic world or international issues that has Islamic dimension was used for domestic purposes. According to Sukma, Indonesia's foreign policy character is not Islamic, but it avoid conflict with the "Islamic interest". This approach is used for the sake of political stability, economic development, and the regime's security. A similar approach is followed by Indonesian president after Suharto.

In the case of boat people of Rohingya, eventhough President Jokowi is never

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11 The interview with Director of Human Rights and Multilateral Cooperation of Foreign Ministry, June 23, 2015

12 Interview with founder and activist of MER-C (Medical Emergency Rescue Committee), November 2015.

mention the term "Islam" in his statement, the Minister of Social Affairs, Khofifah Indar Parawangsa, provided the color of Islam in Indonesia's measures dealing with the Rohingya. Khofifah, who is activist of the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), urged the "Muslimat NU" (women activist of NU) to donate Al Quran for the refugees and she visited many Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) to ask their willingness to accommodate the Rohingya orphans.

After all, as stated by Rousseau, "societies have common interest which should form the basis of decision making and policy". *Indonesia* has the world's *largest Muslim population* so it is not odd if "Islam" becomes the common interest and the government will avoid of having "un-Islamic" image in its foreign policy. But still, as stated by Sukma (p. 143), "there is a limit within which the influence of the Islamic factor in foreign policy can be expressed."

CONCLUSION

Indonesia still does not have a clear definition of its 'national interests'. The only reference is the "national goal" set forth in the Preamble of National Constitution1945, which are "to protect the people and the homeland of Indonesia, to improve the intellectual life of the nation; to promote the general welfare, and to participate in implementing world order based on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice."

Each government sets its foreign policy based on their perceptions of national goals. In the Strategic Plan 2015-2019 of Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the term 'national interest' is used many times without any explanation of what is the meaning or the definition of the term. In this strategic plan, ASEAN has a special position for Indonesia and it is considered in line with the country national interest.

"ASEAN is one of the pillar and the closest concentric circles of Indonesia foreign policy. Indonesia is one of the initiators and founders of ASEAN countries, so the stability and prosperity of the region would be in line with Indonesia's national interests, both political, security, economic and socio-cultural." (p.15)

It explains why Indonesia foreign policy towards the Rohingyas is still far from the expectations of (some of) the Muslim community of the country. They demand Indonesian government to take firm steps to stop the violence against ethnic Rohingya, such as severance of diplomatic relations with Myanmar.[13] But the government ignored the demands for the sake of stability and unity of ASEAN that perceived as important national interest of Indonesia.

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REFARMING INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLITIC ON THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER: THE CASE OF INDONESIA-CHINA RELATIONS ON ASIAN CENTURY

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Abstract

Indonesian foreign politic has always changed along with the changing of international world order. In the past, Indonesian foreign politic focused on building good relationship with Western countries like the United States and the European countries because at that time, the international order has dominated by Western powers. However, nowadays the emergence of China as the strongest economic power in Asia has changed the foreign politic courses of many countries including Indonesia. Moreover, China with its world economic giant power indirectly built the new international world order in various means, by making Asia as center of the new world order and economic power at once. Some liberalists argued that China's economic power has balanced hegemonic power to the United States and the European countries. Therefore, many countries eagerly engaged to build partnership with China. In addition, the dynamics of political relations in Asia region is becoming more cooperative with the presence of economic cooperation which give mutual benefits. On the other hand, Indonesia foreign politic of the Jokowi's Era focuses on building strategic cooperation with China. There have been existing many Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in which China and Indonesia have signed. These MoU led to many cooperative relations between Indonesia-China in all aspects. Through liberal interdependence approach, this paper will deeply explores and proves that Indonesian foreign politic has changed towards The New International World Order in which Indonesia has more cooperative relations with China compare with the others. Furthermore, this paper will also explain how China shapes The New International Order using its economic power and how Indonesia renewed its foreign politic relations to achieve mutual benefits in the Asia Region.

Keywords: *China's economic power, cooperative relations, Indonesian foreign politic, liberal interdependence, The New International Order.*

INTRODUCTION

Indonesian foreign politic has changed time by time along with the changes of the world order constellation. In the period of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Indonesian foreign politic has established cooperation with all countries especially in the field of economic cooperation. He refined Indonesian foreign politic on the international system as a countries with "a thousand friends and zero enemies" and an "all directions foreign policy" (Connelly, 2015). Under his leadership, Indonesia's foreign diplomacies are done by opening foreign investment by countries in Asia such as Japan, China, and India (Kemendagri, 2014). He sought to improve ties with both the United States and China (Connelly, 2015; Novotny, 2010). In 2008, he built bilateral relations with the United States to enhance comprehensive cooperation in various fields. Indonesian foreign policies during his era are closer to the United States. It was proven by the commitment of President Obama and President Yudhoyono to boost bilateral relations by intensifying consultations and developing cooperation (US Embassy, 2012). On the other hand, long-standing economic

powerhouses of United States, European Union, and Japan suffer economic downturn due to the global financial crisis and European fiscal crisis also affected the economic positions of many countries (Hadi, 2012). Moreover, the impact of the global economic crisis is also felt by Indonesia including (1) declining performance of balance payment, (2) the pressure on the exchange rate, and (3) boost the inflation rate (Setneg, 2009). However, Indonesian economy has persisted because of the support from the Chinese and Indian economies. On the other hand, the emergence of China as a world economic power has indirectly change the world order, especially the world economic order (Sihono, 2008). China with its strong economic power lead into a new force in changing the world economic arena which is increasingly shifting toward Asia. Therefore, many countries around the world began a strategic partnership with China because the future of the world economy has shifted to the era of Asia along with the advantage promising more cooperation in the region. Indonesian foreign policy under President Joko Widodo in The New World Order is very interesting to be studied more in depth, especially the Indonesian foreign policy towards China in view of China as the new raising star country with rapid economic growth in the world. Indonesia's efforts to engaged a strategic partnership with China is also backed Indonesia's desire to be able to obtain profits while following in the footsteps of China's economic growth.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To analyze Indonesian foreign politic towards China in the New International Order, the authors use interdependence liberalism approach in economic relations that exists between Indonesia and China. The key assumption of liberal theory looks interdependence and international system as the configuration of interdependent state preferences which determines states behavior (Moravscik, 1997). For liberals, state behavior reflects varying patterns of states preferences and it drives foreign policy

of state itself. Indonesian foreign politic also driven by their preferences when engaging relations with other countries. To some extent, interdependence liberalism argues that interdependencies which occur between countries lead to a peaceful and cooperative relations so that the interdependence was also able to prevent conflicts or wars (Rosenau, 1969, p.365). Moreover, interdependence liberalism stated that cooperative relations among countries are able to resolve conflicts and problems by using a peaceful way through negotiation, cooperation and compromise.

Interdependence liberalism assess that modernization increase the level and scope of interdependence relations between countries-not only in economics but also in other areas such as politics, security, technology, education, and tourism-which leads to a cooperative relations (Jackson and Sorensen, 2006, p.104). The authors believe that interdependence in the economic relation between Indonesia and China makes their relationship becoming more cooperative. The interdependence relation in the economy triggered a sustainable interdependence relation at political and regional security (Moran, 2001). Interdependence liberalism looks that cooperative relations which resulted mutual benefit does have risks and expenses that may be detrimental to either party (Yarger, 2006). Nonetheless, risks and expenses can be minimized or even eliminated through cooperation relation among the parties that are arranged in a mutual agreement. To some extent, interdependence liberalism also argue that the partnerships aim to maximize social welfare, and the role of government be further increased to arrange a mutually beneficial trade (Mansbach and Rafferty, 2008, p.28). This fits the context of interdependence relations between Indonesia and China where the two countries increased the government's role in regulating secure trade by increasing economic cooperation. Indeed, interactions that occur in interdependence liberalism relations promote economic cooperation, but this would cause increasing interdependence community relations between countries. Moreover, in the complex interdependence,

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this minimizes the possibility of conflict and war and strengthens relations between countries because it involves the community and society (Keohane and Nye, 2001, p.21).

Interdependence liberalism states that in the industrialized countries, economic development and foreign trade are the tools to achieve excellence and prosperity with less cost (Jackson and Sorensen, 2005, p.148). This also applies in the China-Indonesia relation which is more focused on improving the well-being for both societies. Increased prosperity as a result of cooperation both countries generate economic interdependence which triggered the establishment of peace and political cooperation between Indonesia and China.

In addition to critical view on political perspective that according to Keohane and Nye that rhetorician of interdependence often claim that since the survival of the human race is threatened by environmental as well as military dangers, conflicts of interest among states and peoples no longer exist. This conclusion would only follow if three conditions were met: an international economic system on which everyone depended on our basic life-supporting ecological system were in danger; all countries were significantly vulnerable to such a catastrophe; and there were only one solution to the problem (leaving no room for conflict about how to solve it and who should bear the costs). Obviously these conditions are rarely all present.

CHINA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER: COOPERATIVE RELATIONS AND HARMONY IN ASIA REGION

The emergence of China means a lot to balance the current "hegemonic power of the United States" in the new Asian era. Some liberalists argued that China's reliance on global economic and financial system as a complex position which indirectly challenges the United States (Jones et.al., 2014). On the other hand, United States of America as said by President Barack Obama rejected proposition that the rise of new power is a threat to United States security or International Order. Rather, while acknowledging that the

International Order has already been changed for "a new century" by the rise of China, India, and Brazil (Jones et.al., 2014, p.4). It seems that China does not really intent to counter the power of United States, but the reality it did. However, the authors believe that what China's have done on promoting "the New International Order" is a logic consequences of interdependence relations in economic sector. China's economic relation with countries in Asia region as one of the causes why the 'New International Order' is shifting from the West to the East. Indeed, after suffering from economic crisis, the economic power of the United States and European countries are still recovering so that China's rising power is leading on the world. Hence, China's interdependence relation with the Asian countries especially with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a major cause of the emergence term of "The New International Order".

Furthermore, the authors believe that cooperative relations and harmony in the ASEAN with China on China-ASEAN framework agreement as a proof that China's indirectly "make a New International Order" which shifted to Asian Era. Since the signing of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between China and ASEAN in November 2002, economic and trade relations between the two sides are progressing rapidly, the value of trade increased from about 60 billion US dollars in 2002 to 231 billion dollars in 2008 (China Consulate, 2012). Stronger interdependence between the two sides (ASEAN and China) in the economy has strengthened the relationship between the political and security relationship with one another.

China and ASEAN also make a Trade in Goods Agreement, the Settlement Agreement, and Agreement on Trade in Services and Investment Agreement. These agreements have had a legal framework which is evidenced by the Schedule of Specific Commitments. Each member country of the ASEAN together with China have a Schedule of Specific Commitments are used as a guide

so that the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) cooperation have a guarantee of security cooperation system. The system of cooperation in the CAFTA regulated the things about how to facilitate trade, and how to better facilitate investment between the two sides (ASEAN and China).

The cooperation between China and ASEAN in CAFTA has a purpose, namely (Ditjen Kerjasama Internasional, 2010): (1) Strengthen and enhance economic, trade and investment between ASEAN member countries and China. (2) Progressively liberalize and promote trade in goods and services as well as creating a system that is transparent and facilitate investment. (3) Excavate areas of new cooperation and develop appropriate policy within the framework of economic cooperation between member countries. (4) Facilitate more effective economic integration of the new ASEAN members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) as well as bridging the gap between the economic developments of member countries.

The cooperation between China and ASEAN can be divided into five pillars (China Consulate, 2012). The first pillar is the cooperation of CAFTA itself, which is a pillar of the economy. While the second pillar is the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia as a political pillar that is strengthened by the commitment of both sides to resolve the problem in peaceful ways. The third pillar is in the field of security that is marked by the Declaration of Conduct of Parties to the South China Sea–ASEAN (DoC). It is characterized by the commitment of both parties to resolve the South China Sea issue in a manner that is more peaceful using diplomacy or negotiations. The fourth pillar is the exchange in social and cultural fields. The fifth pillar is China supportthe dominant role of ASEAN in East Asian economic cooperation.

The development of strategic partnership between China and ASEAN oriented to peace and prosperity has been started since 2002. This signifies that ASEAN is a regional organization first established a strategic partnership with China. With the launch of CAFTA in 2010 marked the development of strategic partnership between China-ASEAN into a more serious direction. This kind of partnership will encourage the advancement of regional cooperation in East Asia. Since the financial crisis of 1997-1998, ASEAN has encouraged development of ten plus three cooperation framework with China, Japan and South Korea. Under that framework, there are three cooperation ten plus one, which is the embryo and East Asian economic cooperation mechanism in the future (Aseansec, 2012). CAFTA can be seen as one mechanism for such cooperation. In line with the shift of the economic center of the world economy that leads to the east, where CAFTA will provide important implications for the constellation of regional and world economies. At the instigation of CAFTA, economic cooperation throughout the region and even the whole Asia is also being developed.

CAFTA also gives a positive signal for the international community, in which ASEAN and China are work together to drive the wheels of the world economy, especially in the midst of the global financial crisis which is still felt its effects. Moreover, CAFTA could also be a counter balance to the influence of big countries like the US, Japan, South Korea, and India. The rapid development of cooperation CAFTA has the potential to encourage these countries to apply various forms of sustainable economic cooperation that can provide mutual benefits.

THE CONTESTANTS IN THE REGION: CHINA'S NEW WAY OF PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT

The Great Britain's decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) formed by China gives an indication of important changes in the global geopolitical impacts. Indeed, this significant impact will likely ending the world single owned political mechanism whose important alliance is in controlling the world after World War II. The other hand, presence of the Great Britain in addition to continuing its traditional efforts as a nation-state with a strong banking tradition, gives an indication of

the importance of maritime axis as a new interactions that connect various important areas in Asia, Africa, and Europe. This side also shows that maritime infrastructure will be a major pioneer in sustaining economic growth and trade that seek new modalities for cooperation. This phenomenon seems to give new confidence about the emergence of China as a new hegemonic force from the Asian continent. Many experts predict that the rise of Asia on the world hegemony has been started from the rise of China economic and political power.

However, Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia, Liu Jianchao, is giving another discourse on the question of hegemony in which currently China as the second greatest economic power in the world. China is demanded to continue to expand its influence of economic and political but this expansion is truly intended as concept of the 'peaceful development', and not to create a new hegemonic power. Hegemony is not profitable for China because it will not change the position of being a 'guardian of world peace'. According to Ambassador Liu, the reason China still rests on the development policy of peace is because he believes every country has the right to expand, prosper and survive in an international environment of peace. Thus, the goal of China is developing in a harmonious and peaceful environment. Without it, China will not achieve development. That's what China is doing in the last 30 years. No major conflict since China's opening up and implementing reforms.

In a research report to the United States Congress in August 2008, Congressional Research Service (CRS) described in detail about position and role of the two countries: United State of America and People's Republic of China (PRC) in the constellation of world influence (Congressional Research Service Report,2008). China and the United States use tools of soft power in different ways and with varying effects. Since the mid-1990s, the PRC has adopted an increasingly active and pragmatic diplomatic approach around the world that emphasizes complementary economic interests. China's influence and image have been bolstered through its increasingly open and sophisticated diplomatic corps as well as through prominent PRC-funded infrastructure, public works, and economic investment projects in many developing countries. Meanwhile, some surveys have indicated marked declines in the U.S. international public image since 2002. Some foreign observers have criticized U.S. state diplomacy as being neglectful of smaller countries or of countries and regional issues that are not related to the global war on terrorism. According to some experts, U.S. diplomatic and foreign aid efforts have been hampered by organizational restructuring, inadequate staffing levels, and foreign policies that remain unpopular abroad. Despite China's growing influence, the United States retains significant strengths, including latent reserves of soft power, much of which lie beyond the scope of government. Furthermore, by some indicators, China's soft power has experienced some recent setbacks, while the U.S. image abroad has shown signs of a possible renewal. The United States exceeds the People's Republic of China (PRC) in global trade, although the PRC is catching up, and far surpasses China in GDP and foreign direct investment. This debate produces two important strategies, namely: 1) Engagement, this strategy more emphasis on soft power action. Through China's participation in the globalization of economic and political liberalization will generate its openness towards Western politics and culture. 2) Containment, which put more emphasis on the use of the traditional power of the military strategy and diplomacy allies to thwart the rise of a great power of China. This strategy is taken from the anti-Soviet strategies of the cold war with the formation of a strong coalition of countries that share a common interest in controlling the increasing strength of China especially with tightened U.S. Security relationship with Japan while investing in an alliance with the Mission of anti Chinese blatantly.

REFRAMING INDONESIA FOREIGN POLITIC ON PRESIDENT JOKOWI'S ERA: THE FUTURE OF CHINA-INDONESIA RELATIONS

In the current era where globalization impact on the increasing interdependence between state and non-state actors on a global scale so that social relations in a community significantly shaped and influenced by the dimensions of the wider social relations on a worldwide scale (Scholte, 2000). Globalization also encourages good economic cooperation like what is happening now between China and Indonesia. The direction of Indonesian foreign politic and economic towards China since under President Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono has implemented a strategic cooperation to achieve mutual benefit. It also seems to remain consistent under current Indonesian President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Indonesian political and economic policy direction toward China continues to conduct strategic cooperation with efforts to increase volume of the cooperation between the two countries. It can also be seen from the foreign policy model of President Jokowi that emphasis on four main priorities (Rahmawaty, 2014): (1) Using maritime identity in international cooperation and diplomacy. (2) Increase global role through a middle-power diplomacy. (3) Strengthen public diplomacy. (4) Expand its involvement in the Indo-Pacific region.

President Jokowi's vision is to make Indonesia as the World Maritime Axis (WMA) has a bit more influences for Indonesia-China relations and cooperation. This is an evident from the results of the President Jokowi's visit to boost some agreements to strengthen economic cooperation with China, particularly on trade sector, infrastructure, finance, industry, tourism, as well as relations between the two communities. Moreover, the mutual relationship beneficial through interdependence between Indonesian-China is through approval of China on WMA idea and initiative of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Indonesia interdependency relationship with China over the approval of WMA has on implications and strategic

cooperation for maritime connectivity in order to realize the economic interests of both parties. The realization of the Maritime shaft can enhance the strategic cooperation through the development of infrastructure that will facilitate economic trade between Indonesia and China.

Indonesian government strategic cooperation with China is outlined in the Joint Statement of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of People's Republic of China. In order to increase the volume of cooperation between both countries, the two governments signed several cooperation documents (MoU) covering cooperation in several fields such as (Duta, 2015; Oxford Analytica Ltd., 2015): (1) Economic cooperation between Indonesia and the Minister for Economic Affairs of the National Development and Reform Commission of China; (2) Industrial and Infrastructure Development cooperation between the National Development and Reform Commission of China by the Minister of State Enterprises; (3) the Ministry of SOEs with the National Development and Reform Commission of China to speed Rail Construction Project Jakarta-Bandung; (4) the National SAR Agency (BASARNAS RI) with the Minister of Transport of China; (5) the prevention of double taxations; (6) the National Space Development Agency (LAPAN) with the China National Space Agency; (7) the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) with China Development Bank Corporation (CDBC); (8) Projects Assistant to Prevent and Cure Bird Flu; (9) Specific Comprehensive Economic Cooperation; (10) the Establishment of a Joint Investment Promotion committee; (11) the China-Indonesia Economic and Trade Cooperation Website; (12) Exchange of Letter for Training Course and Management of Economic and Trade Cooperation.

Furthermore, there are at least 20 Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) which were also agreed upon by Indonesia-China private sector in an effort to increase economic cooperation that is mutually beneficial for both parties. During Jokowi's

visit this year 2015, Chinese firms inked at least 30 deals whose worth around 63.4 billion US dollars with Indonesian business partners; of this 24.9 billion US dollars will be channeled to infrastructure (Oxford Analytica Ltd., 2015).The twelve MoU mentioned above can be seen that the relationship between Indonesia and China is a relationship of mutual dependence in accordance with the cooperation projects in the field of economics (Amrullah, 2015). Indonesia bilateral relations with China always prioritize the principle of mutual respect, appreciation and both countries play a role in maintaining regional peace and stability so that the comprehensive strategic partnership formed to enhance the mutual benefit and achieve social welfare (Utami, 2015). In relation with Indonesia's foreign policy toward China, the current economic cooperation is indeed a boon for both sides, especially in the realization of the idea of WMA where Chinese government as the main partner will share in the profit of the Indonesian maritime shaft. This year, even both countries have established more comprehensive strategic partnership. According to former Indonesian Economic Coordinating Minister Sofyan Djalil, initial trade relations between the two nations are developing well (BBC, 2015). He hopes that cooperation can be enhanced in the future. The leader of the Chinese delegation from China State Council, Yang Jiechi, also stated that an agreement between the two countries to improve economic relations has accomplished during President Jokowi's visit to China to meet President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in 2014 (BBC, 2015).

The Indonesian cooperative relations with China under President Jokowi are highly increasing after he returned from China for the Boao Forum. In late April, Jokowi held his third meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Jokowi foreign politic style towards China seeks to boost competitiveness via bilateral agreements especially in infrastructure and manufacturing rather than through regional integration. Jokowi has explicitly stated that he wants Chinese investment to focus on infrastructure and manufacturing. Currently, much of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Indonesia is in the resource sector or geared to producing goods for Indonesia›s market. However, Indonesian officials want the country to be more than a market. Jokowi has also tasked the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing to help generating 80 billion US dollars of Chinese investment by 2020. To some extent, Jokowi agenda to build maritime infrastructure in Indonesia also engaged with China to do Jokowi›s WMA strategy by complimenting China's aim of creating a 'Maritime Silk Road'. One key pillar of Jokowi›s strategy is to build maritime infrastructure including 24 ports, deep-water harbors and fishing industries. China has pledged to support these initiatives through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (of which Indonesia is a founding member) and China›s Silk Road Fund. Moreover, China has also pledged investment beyond the maritime domain: The two sides have signed Memoranda of Understanding to cooperate on a high-speed rail linking Jakarta and Bandung, and on energy and toll road projects. The two sides have also announced a maritime forum to enhance cooperation between their coast guards, and a plan for baseline security agreement for search and rescue operations as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Furthermore, in term of strengthening economic cooperation with China on trade sector, Indonesia establishes policy framework which can be divided into five parts (AseanCN, 2015): (1) Improving market access to China›s exports to the level of a lower rate for national products; (2) Improving cooperation between businessmen in both countries through establishment Strategic Alliance; (3) Improving access services in the Chinese market for service providers nationwide. (4) Increasing the flow of foreign investment from China to Indonesia; (5) Opening technology transfer between businesses in both countries.

Increasing market access to China›s exports to the level of a lower rate for national

products is the first step of the foreign policy of Indonesia to build a strategic partnership with China. China and Indonesia have signed an agreement to carry out a gradual reduction in tariffs. From 2004 to 2007, it has taken place opening access Indonesia›s exports to China gradually as a result of the provisions that have been set in the framework as follows: The opening of market access of agricultural products of Indonesia to China in 2004. It was followed by the opening of market access to Indonesia›s exports to China in 2005 who earn an additional 40% of the Normal Track (± 1880 tariff lines), which lowered the level of the tariff be 0-5%. Then in 2007 get an extra 20% of the Normal Track (± 940 tariff lines), which lowered the level of tariffs to 0-5%. Whereas in 2010, Indonesia gained additional market access for exports to China as a result of the elimination of all tariff lines in the Normal Track China. On the other hand, Indonesia eliminate 93.39% of tariff lines (tariff heading 6683 of the total 7156 tariff lines are in the Normal Track) in 2010, and 100% in 2012. Nowadays, China-Indonesia two-way trade volume surged to 16.8bn US dollars in 2005 with an average growth of 20 per cent to 30 per cent in recent years (Oxford Analytica Ltd., 2015).

With opening access to Indonesia›s exports, China has continued to gradually increase the volume of Indonesian exports which makes the country as an export destination-5 after the European Union, Japan, the US and Singapore. Flagship product of Indonesian exports to China are farm products (oil palm, rubber, coffee), minerals (coal, aluminum, iron, nickel) and some manufactured goods (sports shoes, digital cameras, laser disc players), etc. Indonesia-China trade value grew by an average of 17% (Oratmangun, 2011). Indonesia›s export growth to China was 14.15% while the growth of imports by 21.1%. After the implementation of the early harvest program in 2004, the total value of trade between Indonesia and China grew by 30.1%. The value of exports grew into 24.9% and the value of imports became 35.1%. The contribution of exports to China to Indonesia›s export value reached 9.8% while

the contribution of Indonesia›s imports from China mencapai14,4%.

In more detail, the value of Indonesia›s exports to China are (Purna et.al., 2010):

a. Primary commodity sector plantation sector, the largest contribution rubber contributed US $ 6.152 billion, US $ 1.269 billion cocoa, coffee US $ 991 million, and coconut US $ 901 million.

b. Processed plantation sector, the largest contribution of palm oil (US $ 14.11 billion) and rubber (US $ 1.485 billion).

c. Food crops, wheat contributed the largest contribution (US $ 252 million) and cassava (US $ 36 million).

d. Horticulture contributed fruits, nuts, and vegetable preserves (US $ 170 million).

e. Livestock subsector contributed milk (US $ 187 million) and fats (US $ 377 million).

While the value of Indonesia›s imports from China as follows (Purna et.al., 2010):

a. The import occurs in horticulture, such as fresh garlic, apples, pears, as well as Mandarin kwini fresh, fruit and other commodities amounted to US $ 434.4 million.

b. Food subsector in the form of wheat and other seeds, raw sugar, peanut peeled, and other food commodities amounted to US $ 109.53 million.

c. The livestock subsector is generally in the form of live animals imported US $ 17.947 million.

From the above details, it is clear that Indonesia's foreign policy towards China has managed to build strategic partnerships that produce cooperative interdependence relations. Numerous gains that are derived by both countries (China-Indonesia) have increased for the level of welfare of both parties. Economic interdependence also trigger by collaborative efforts on an ongoing basis as happened in 2010 when the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) has increased trade between Guangzhou (China) and Indonesia with more than 10 percent in 2010 from US $ 1.45 billion in 2009 (AseanCN, 2015).

This is due to the success of Indonesia's diplomacy in building a strategic partnership with China. In addition, Indonesia's exports to Guangzhou have increased by 206.8 per cent to $ 586 million from the same period in 2010. Imports Indonesia from Guangzhou increased by 140.5 percent to $ 233 million. In general, Indonesia exports more products, such as machinery, textiles, furniture and pharmaceuticals to Guangzhou. Of economic interaction can be seen that both parties benefit and prove the success of strategic partnerships built by Indonesia.

In terms of Foreign Direct Investment or FDI also increased which benefits both parties. FDI from China to Indonesia increased by 1369.34%. Indonesia FDI to China also increased, amounting to 92.73% (China Consulate, 2012). The number of Chinese companies that invest in Indonesia recorded more than 700 companies, which are mostly engaged in the fields of energy, telecommunications, electricity, mining, finance and insurance. In addition, China also held the ASEAN China Investment Cooperation Fund of 10 billion US dollars to support the development of regional infrastructure that can provide convenience to trade. While the tourism sector, Indonesia benefited with increased tourist arrivals from China to Indonesia amounted to 700% (Metronews, 2009). To improve profitability, Indonesia should encourage sectors and competitive potential and provide significant support for sectors that are vulnerable and have low competitiveness. Indonesia must learn to open ourselves to make improvements in various fields so that prosperity can be enjoyed by all the people of Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

Indonesian foreign policy towards China is a form of strategic partnership which produces interdependence relations especially in the economic field. Economic interdependence relationship that exists between China-Indonesia has been providing mutual benefits as evidenced by the increase in the volume of cooperation between Indonesia and China. Under the leadership of President Jokowi, Indonesia-China strategic relations is increasing rapidly. It can be concluded that the Indonesian foreign policy towards China is a relationship of mutual dependence and mutual benefit both for the economy of Indonesia as well as for the China's economy.

Hegemony, as certain types of International Order, is constructing the interests and values of the dominant power and its vision of the world.

The problems of collective action was minimal because the dominant power took over in providing economic security and the common good. The success of hegemony of promoting stability, cooperation, and development of international institutions under the leadership of the dominant power depends on two sets of factors; First, the hegemon must have superior resources and is willing to lead. Leadership power in translation depends not only on political executive of the dominant country but also in its domestic political and public support, particularly an open society. Second, the leadership of dominant State must be accepted by a weaker country. Provisions of public policy may direct to the countries that receive the State's dominant or from its Alliance, and follow its leadership. Indeed, in addition to China's 'reluctance' diplomacy to be able to emerge as the new power in the world as describe in this paper. In fact, since 1990, the United States is also indirectly suppressing the emergence of China as a potential country to become a great power.

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THE ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA CULTURAL DIPLOMACY THROUGH SAMAN GAYO DANCE IN STRENGTHENING NATIONAL IDENTITY

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Abstract

Indonesia is a multicultural country. The diversity of the culture must be maintained by preserving and protecting it from the claim of others country. The existence of traditional culture is very important, because it has a very big role in shaping the national identity and also the regeneration process of the nation. This paper is attempted to explain how the cultural diplomacy process of Indonesia through Saman Gayo Dance to UNESCO and holding Saman Summit as process of Strengthening National Identity. The researcher took the specific interest on soft power concept to analyze the phenomena. Furthermore, this paper is using descriptive method with qualitative approach. The data collection technique is literature study consisting of books, journals, and including data from the website reliable and supporting the explanation of this paper. The result of this paper explain that Indonesia is doing diplomacy by proposing Saman dance as intangible cultural heritage original from Indonesia to UNESCO, holding Saman Summit, and shows that the globalization by using media became the existential threat of Saman Gayo Dance in Indonesia. The UNESCO recognition and implementation of the Summit Saman is done in order to preserve Saman dance from extinction and functioned as affirmation of the national identity of Indonesia in domestic or even international areas.

Keywords: Globalization, Soft Power, Saman Gayo Dance, National Identity

INTRODUCTION

In the period of 2007-2012, Malaysia has claimed seven of Indonesian cultural heritage and recognizes it as theirs. The first claim that declared by Malaysia toward indigenous culture of Indonesia on November 2007 was claiming toward Reog Ponorogo. Furthermore, the claim was continued in December 2008 toward the song Rasa Sayange from the Maluku Islands (Alunaza, 2015: 88). Next is the culture of batik, then Pendet also claimed by one private party ads that appear on tourism promotion in television on the Discovery Channel program titled enigmatic Malaysia in August 2009. Besides those all, Angklung musical instruments and ensembles in March 2010 and the Tor-Tor dance and Gondang Part which is the original art of North Sumatra.

Come with a variety of different cultures and its own identity, it will not close any kind of possibility to be disrupted due to the advent of globalization. Globalization and westernization in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, making people do not care and less preserve their culture so that its culture becomes neglected. This is an opportunity for neighboring countries to seize it, because now is not only the physical area which is containing a high commercial value but also cultural richness. For the examples of the ownership disrupted are batik heritage, Galigo performance, Angklung bamboo, Kolintang, Dayak arts and many others cultural heritage. (Riski Adi, 2011: 1)

On the other hand, cultural diversity which is possessed by Indonesia has many positive sides. One of them is Indonesia could be known in the international community through its richness and diverse cultures.

This culture can be used as a lure or decoy to attract foreign tourists to come into Indonesia. However, lack of attention to the preservation of local culture, whether from the government and from the public, resulted in the cultures which are threatened to disappear from Indonesian sovereignty in the midst of globalization. Since many cultures that claimed by Malaysia, Indonesia became more aware in preserving culture.

Challenge towards the national spirit born with the rapid advancement of life, where the distance is no longer an obstacle. Globalization has became a spear and erode the spirit of patriotism. Globalization has posed a problem for the existence of the state and nation. Globalization became disintegration threat (Hendrastomo, 2007). Slowly, globalization also becomes the cause of national identity scraper (Perwita, 2011: 136).

The influence of globalization in Indonesia causes the young generation forgetting their own identity. One example that can be seen is that, they are more attracted to the lifestyle of other countries. Globalization makes a lot of people have a loyalty that can override national feeling of solidarity that had previously been validly (Rudy, 2003: 40).

Local culture is an asset that needs to be addressed and taken seriously. The existence of local culture is important because the culture contributes greatly to the formation of national identity, also for the regeneration of the nation. Therefore, Indonesia must take into account all aspects of the diversity of the nation's development efforts in accordance to the conditions of the times. Furthermore, the presence of Indonesian culture must be taken seriously because it is able to provide its own meaning to the image of Indonesia in the eyes of the world (Manuaba, 1999).

All parties should participate to protect the culture and all the rights in Indonesia, whether by the government, society, and private companies, as well as institutions and non-governmental organization. In case of copyright culture, art and others, can be done by government through art copyright regulatory simplification both individuals and institutions, and accelerating the setting of various Indonesian cultural rights that can only be made and owned by the government.

The entry of globalization in the Republic of Indonesia can lead to the extinction of traditional cultures and will be replaced by the growing modern culture. One of it is Saman dance. Saman dance comes from Gayo highlands of Aceh. This dance is one of the media for achieving the propaganda message that reflects the value of education, religion, manners, heroism, teamwork and togetherness (www.indonesia.travelnews).

With the uniqueness and charm which full of Indonesian cultural values, saman dance deserves the title as the world cultural heritage. Through a variety of appearances and promotions, saman dance is not only popular in Indonesia but also to the international community. This is because the saman dance is very strong with cultural content and artistic Indonesian archipelago. Of the many art and culture belong to Indonesia, of course, it could be a bridge of peace of the world, in which every element of Indonesia must participate to preserve the art and culture of the national identity (Muhammad Ramdan, 2013).

This paper is divided into three important points in explaining and analyzing Saman Gayo dance as cultural diplomacy of Indonesia to the UNESCO for the inauguration of their national identity. First, Indonesian diplomatic process to obtain the recognition Saman Gayo dance from UNESCO, the second is the implementation efforts of Saman Summit as a form of preservation Saman Gayo dance. Also, the existence of a threat Saman Gayo dance be the final part of this paper.

SOFT POWER CONCEPT

Power is the ability of an actor either individual or group of nation-states to influence the mind and behavior of other actors that want to do something that was not to his liking (Mochtar Mas'oed, 1990: 98). In a simple word, power is the ability to control or master something. The establishment of a country's own goal is to prioritize the achievement of its power to other countries. Soft power emphasis on mastery of the forms of national

power of a country that does not look like the ideology, cultural and moral values (intangible resources).

Soft power is defined as the ability to get the results you want by attracting the attention of others, rather than playing them with encouragement material. This ability is tends to persuade than force. Soft power is the ability to attract and influence other actors to get what we want, but not through the imposition of a violent nature. This ability can be created in three ways: attract, entice, and owning (Liriyanti, 2011: 18).

Joseph Nye describes that there are three sources of soft power; culture, political ideology and foreign policy (David, 2008:14) .

"Soft power of a country "rests primarily on three resources: its culture (inplaces where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority").

Soft power can be actualized as a national strength of a country, which is based on values, the ideology and cultural characteristics that concretely can be demonstrated through policies and behavior of the state or the products produced by countries such as lifestyle, music, movies, and foods that are widely consumed.

There are a wide variety of resources to be converted into soft power through the appropriate conversion strategies. These resources include the culture, the values, the right policies, good domestic models, etc. Also related to the discussion of the author, that if the ability, potential or cultural capital owned by Indonesia can be well developed and optimized through positive steps such as cultural diplomacy, the potential will be able to be a soft power that has a positive impact on Indonesia itself (Prima, 2012: 18).

Cultural diplomacy activities created by Indonesian through the Saman dance has been able to create a positive appeal to the international community. So with the appeal of the UNESCO considers that Saman dance is worthy recognized as one of the Indonesia intangible cultural art belong to Indonesia.

Through cultural diplomacy undertaken by Indonesia, Saman Dance is known and is able to compete as one of the indigenous cultures of Indonesia in the eyes of the International.

In terms of developing its soft power, Indonesia prioritizes culture and foreign policy as a major power in attracting the sympathy and trust of the international community. Culture can be defined as an interpretation unit, memories and meanings that exist within humankind and not just in words (Liliweri, 2002: 15). Culture affects the values of human beings, even the attitudes and behavior. Actor of the culture itself is a human being, because every acts that committed by men are always within the scope of culture. The ability of culture that can influence the attitudes and behavior of the individual/society does not rule out the possibility of culture which can also influence the attitudes and behavior of a country.

Development of cultural diplomacy through Saman dance is reflecting Indonesian way to embrace the world. Saman dance is a way of cross-country cultural diplomacy which is very effective for Indonesia to be able to get its national identity. Strategic use of mass media in the field of communication provides many advantages for the development of soft power which is launched by the Indonesian Government through the Saman dance performances abroad.

This paper is a descriptive research with a qualitative approach, which the authors attempted to provide a picture or describe the state of the object as well as the existing problems. Therefore, the descriptive method here is expected to achieve the purpose of research, which illustrates clearly the facts and characteristics of the object under study accurately. Data collection techniques in this research is by study literature, review the journals, books, and online news websites and other reliable sources that support the completeness of the data in this paper.

UNESCO RECOGNITION TOWARDS SAMAN GAYO DANCE

According Convention 2003 UNESCO, in Article 2, Paragraph 1 states that cultural

heritage objects include all the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills and tools, objects, artifacts and spaces of culture associated with them are recognized by communities, groups and in the case of certain individuals as part of their cultural heritage. Intangible cultural heritage is known as living heritage. The comparison is a natural site and cultural sites, known as heritage objects.

UNESCO has adopted the Convention on the Protection of Non-objects Cultural Heritage in the Session of 32nd General Conference held in Paris, 17 October 2003. The Convention in 2003 started operating since April 2006, aimed to increase the visibility or public awareness, encourage mutual respect and protection of diverse cultural non-objects heritage or living cultures through cooperation between the government and communities at the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

The concept of cultural heritage of UNESCO in widely apply the definition of cultural anthropology, which has played a central role in making people more aware of the importance of the cultural heritage that until today still underappreciated. At the core of this concept, which underpins the mission of UNESCO is the understanding about the essence of cultural that adopted by people as a symbolic expression of cultural activities and embraced by the people. In addition, the concept of cultural heritage by UNESCO made clear assumption that cultural heritage objects owned not only by the state but by individuals, groups, and communities related to the object that was described (www.unesco.org, 2014).

Indonesia has submitted Saman Gayo Dance to UNESCO as one of the intangible cultural heritage since March 2010 that was accompanied by proposals academic paper. Saman Gayo has met the four criteria set by UNESCO. These include the four criteria of authenticity or originality, uniqueness, a philosophy that is universal, and has infectiousness against Indonesia widespread public life

Related to the criteria set by UNESCO,

Saman Gayo Dance has completed the criteria bellows:

U.1 Elements of is a world's cultural heritage which is original and be inherited from generation to generation, have a philosophy as a fitting kinship, created by communities and groups to show the identity of the community. In it there is the values of divinity, patriotism, power, and the continuity of The Gayo Lues history.

U.2 This element requires urgent protection because of its risk towards the viability, despite the efforts of the community, group, individual, or the country concerned. In this matter, countries must be able to demonstrate and explain specifically that the elements listed really needs protection and that is registered element also has a unique criteria.

U.3 Protection measures those described may enable communities, groups or individuals concerned to continue the practice and transmission elements. The countries concerned should be able to elaborate on a coherent security strategy and systematic, with the budget and schedule accordingly. These measures should also be able to increase capacity and provide knowledge to the community.

U.4 Elements that nominated followed by the widest possible participation of communities, groups, communities, or individuals concerned and with their free approval, prior and informed. Participation and community involvement is the base for all the criteria, primarily in the planning and implementation of measures compiled (UNESCO, 2011).

Saman of Gayo derived from Aceh Gayo Lues Regional ratified as a world cultural heritage under UNESCO meeting on 24 November 2011 in Bali International Convention Center. Saman Dance nomination file accurately compiled and submitted to UNESCO in March 2010 by the Government

of Indonesia. The file submission after getting full supports from the Central Government, Provincial Government of Aceh, of Gayo Lues Regents, and community of Gayo. After the files is checked by the Secretary of UNESCO and the International Expert, furthermore filed in the trial in Bali.

THE EFFORTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA TO PRESERVE SAMAN DANCE THROUGH SAMAN SUMMIT 2012

Saman Summit is a place for keeping various cultural diversity that exists in Indonesia and ensure that Saman Gayo dance is still maintained its authenticity because of dealing with the essence of culture that notice that the change is a necessity. Besides, the Banyuwangi culture appears which received and active on taking elements of other cultures without feeling disturbed in its purity. Rudat art from Lombok also demonstrates the flexibility of attitude in line with its growth by taking various elements from anywhere that matches, including from the Dutch cultural treasures. Saman Summit also highlighted a number of other traditional art related to the customs and the religion of Islam that developed throughout Indonesia. Thus, it can be said that the implementation of Saman Summit is an opportunity to move a lot of parties in order to notice what are the culture of Indonesia as well as the way to maintain and preserve and develop it (http://samansummit.lpsn).

Saman Summit based on dance and music in the tradition Saman Gayo society that is not just art that appear on stage, but also a culture that has deep structure through a long historical process of the social structure of life. Post declaration of UNESCO and recognition of the Saman Dance as a world cultural intangible heritage authentically from Indonesia, Saman Summit comes as a blessing proud because it could be seen as a mandate globally to co-own, pay attention, and be responsible for maintaining and developing the Saman Dance as a cultural icon of Indonesia worldwide in a global platform as the dance that get the public appreciation (Salam, 2012).

Saman Summit is one of the Indonesian Government's efforts in preserving the Saman dance. Once recognized by UNESCO and included in the list of world cultural heritage intangible authentically from Indonesia, Directorate General of Culture Ministry of Education and Culture through the Directorate of Film and Art held The Saman Summit on 14 to 16 December 2012. The event took place on the field Museum Fatahillah Jakarta where that was the first agenda that organized and referred to as a tribute to Saman Gayo Dance which on November 24, 2011 has entered into the list of intangible world cultural heritage by UNESCO (http://kulturmajalah.com).

Saman Summit 2012 activities were divided into three forms, ranging from seminars, exhibitions and performances. The seminar consisted of two keynote speakers, Syafii Maarif and Goenawan Mohammad and four panel discussions on the issue of art, ranging from Saman Gayo dance to other arts that also featured in the Summit Saman activities (http://www.kemdiknas.go.id).

Saman Summit also intended to protect and preserve the culture of Indonesia, consider that Indonesia often at odds with neighboring countries related to similarities in terms of culture. Saman Summit activities also planned to be carried out annually to maintain while preserving Saman dance notably Saman dance from Aceh Gayo Lues (http://regionalkompasiana.com).

Saman has become one of the Indonesian cultural icons that indicates the identity of the nation not only in Indonesia, but the world also have known Saman dance. By Saman Summit, Indonesian people are expected to love Saman more as part of national culture. In the agenda, Wamendikbud Wiendhu Nuryati said that all elements of the nation should cooperate to protect Saman and all the Indonesia culture. It means that the Indonesian people must protect the characteristics and principles of Saman Dance and develop it in society. Implementation of the Saman Summit is expected by Gayo Lues community to the Central Government for preserving Saman Gayo dance (http://m.jpnn.com).

THE THRAET ON SAMAN GAYO DANCE EXISTANCE

Registering Tari Saman cultural heritage intangible native to Indonesia is not only because they want the recognition from UNESCO itself. As the researchers described earlier, the threat makes Saman dance become extinct. In this paper the author will mention and explain the threat that makes Saman dancewill be extinct, and is accordance to the results of field observations conducted by a team of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Indonesia on February 2009 through community interviews and questionnaires. Here are the threats that make Saman dance to be extinct, namely:

Globalizations and Modernization

Foreign cultures that increasingly plagued make the erosion of local culture which is loaded with meaning. The emergence of foreign culture as a product of globalization shows that globalization becomes a threat to the integrity of one of the nation's culture. The younger generation now prefers foreign culture which is competitive for the defense of regional culture (Muhyidin, 2014). The younger generation considers that foreign culture is more advanced culture so that makes them forget and ignore their local value. Globalization of popular culture managed to affect the lives of the world community. It is seen from the results that adorn sphere cultural products internationally, one of them is Indonesia. Indonesia's young generation more interested in western culture, since the notion that western culture is an advanced culture and the local culture is a culture that outdated (Riza Ulfani, 2014).

Gayo Lues and Serbejadi (Lukup) are remotes and isolated for centuries, and thus Tari Saman unchanged. Before restructuring and the accelerated development of the district, the orientation of the majority of the local community is Gayo Lues. After that, especially after the Gayo Lues became the District in 2002 and accelerated development of the region, interaction with the other districts and with the outside world becomes more open.

Thus, the orientation of the public, especially the younger generation began to shift, and the visibility of Saman dance culture began to decline, compared to the previously. If previously many young people in Gayo Lues were still very enthusiastic about the Saman dance, since the advent of globalization and modernization, that enthusiastic about the Saman Dance is reduced and young people become more enthusiastic about the new things that come into Gayo Lues. In addition to globalization and modernization that became a threat to the existence of Saman Gayo dance, there are several supporting instruments towards the extinction of Saman Gayo dance, they are:

Television

According to the results of field observations conducted by a team of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, many respondents mentioned TV as a threat to the survival of Saman culture. TV satellite dish antenna installed atop seen many good homes in towns and villages in the district of Gayo Lues. With these antennas, many national and foreign broadcasts can be received. VCDs and DVDs are also sold everywhere. As a result, watching TV is entertainment options for all age groups, replacing the traditional art Saman dance. This clearly threatens the future of Saman dance, and the transmission to the younger generation. Saman dance coaches and players prefer to sit in their own home and watch television or video compared with rehearse or perform the Saman Dance. There is a local TV station in Blangkejeren (LTV), but rarely broadcast on Saman dance. The influence of television media presence is greatly affect the existence Saman Gayo dance.

Lack of Funds

Many respondents stated that lack of funds as a threat to protect the Saman dance culture. Saman dance costumes are not cheap. To create a set of hand-embroidered costumes Saman dance consisting of 18 sets of costumes, two long cloth, shirts, traditional sarongs, trousers and a cloth to the wrists

which takes about two months manufacture. Similarly, Saman dance performances, especially on a large scales or involving transport to distant places, requires funding. To invite another village as a guest for Saman dance competition for two days and two nights require a considerable cost by the inviting and invited party (Document of the list of Ingitable Cultural Heritage of Unesco).

The Gayo Lues District Government admitted until February 2013 has not received funding to develop the Saman dance from Aceh province, the Ministry of Tourism, the Creative Economy. Either of the Central Government up to UNESCO itself has not provided funds for the development of Saman, when Saman dance has been recognized by UNESCO as world cultural heritage.

The Lack Knowledge of Saman Dance

From interviews conducted by a team of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, although many respondents able to perform Saman dance, but only a few (5%) could name nine parts of Saman dance performance, 5% could mention the 7-9 parts, 27% could name 4 -6 parts, 32% 1-3 parts, and 32% do not know one part of Saman dance performance, as the interviews of 79 respondents. These figures show that knowledge of the Saman dance is reduced, and security measures required to preserve it. According to the respondents, decreasing knowledge of Saman Dance is because of many young people focus on their formal education and have been reduced curiosity to learn Saman dance. Then the willing to learn Saman dance also reduced due to the absence of government policy to integrate lessons to learn Saman dance become special lessons in school.

Besides, the number of young people who move to another city, moving to the new region and the province to continue their education. So fewer young people who want to learn the Gayo Lues Saman dance and prefer to continue their formal education without also studying dance which has become a tradition Saman Gayo Lues community long ago.

Respondents reported that many teachers / coaches that have knowledge of Saman dance are elderly without a successor to pass on their knowledge. It is highly feared by artists Saman dance, they argue Saman dance is a traditional art that they had and able to continue to be taught and communicated to the younger generation.

However, because some of the things which the researchers already mentioned, and supplemented by a factor of coaches who are elderly, the opinion of the respondents increasingly strong that Saman dance endangered, due to the factor of the coaches who are elderly and younger generations Gayo Lues which little is keen to Saman dance learning, so that the need for assistance to help protect the Saman dance from extinction. Because of the need for efforts to inventory and prepare teaching materials Saman dance then help is urgently needed.

The Emergence of New Version for Saman Dance

Today, Saman Dance in the Republic of Indonesia has many versions. This happens, the original Saman Dance of Gayo Lues was developed by Shaykh-sheikh which move to another city or region so that it appears many Saman dance new version. The emergence of this new version of the Saman dance emerged slowly, from the changes in movement, singing, costumes and the number of dancers.

Saman dance is actually only played by men, but over time, the Saman dance is played by women also, with the different songs and different costumes. This occurs because the Saman dance has been developed and has been disseminated through the events of religious or event that is not a religious holiday.

According to respondents, Saman Dance is growing and attract attention from the people nowadays and considered by the people of the Republic of Indonesia. So Saman Gayo Lues dance originally covered with this new version. Many people of The Republic of Indonesia is more interested in Saman dance new version compared to the original.

Peoples Republic of Indonesia also

know that the origin of Saman dance is new version. So Saman Gayo Lues dance original from these became extinct with the advent Saman dances to this new version. Therefore, the respondents felt the need for an effort to make the protection of this Saman dance.

This paper just want to emphasize that cultural diplomacy Indonesia through Saman Gayo dance is a form of soft power used the Indonesian government to be able to establish their national identity. Results explanation of the practices and obstacles in the process of Indonesia's diplomacy in this article may experience a difference if written by other researchers which notice from a different perspective.

CONCLUSION

Diplomacy undertaken by Indonesia to gain recognition Saman Gayo dance from the UNESCO is a way to protect the existence of Saman Gayo dance from the extinction and the spirit in fostering a sense of patriotism as well as the strengthening of the identity of the Indonesian people that is culturally rich order to be able to maintain good relations with the other countries and avoid the claims from the neighboring countries.

Getting recognition of Saman Gayo dance as an intangible cultural heritage from the UNESCO to strengthen national identity is a form of soft power of the Republic of Indonesia in approaching other nations, because of the importance of maintaining and protecting the cultures of Indonesia, which has a lot of cultural diversity. By utilizing the cultural dimension, Indonesian diplomacy to show soft power as well as a process in showing their national identity.

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INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY: COMPREHENSION AND COMPARISON ON GLOBAL MARITIME AXIS

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Abstract

As Joko Widodo (popularly known as 'Jokowi') is officially inaugurated as the 7th President of Republic of Indonesia in the late of 2014, a new set of foreign policy design is then publicly introduced. The idea of establishing the notion of Indonesia as Global Maritime Axis is set out in order to achieve several important goals in which one of them is to intensify economic diplomacy. This idea is commonly shaped by the fact that Indonesia is one of the largest archipelagic states in the region. Therefore, it is geographically plausible for Indonesia to conduct this particular foreign policy. Scrolling back to the era of old civilization, the idea of maritime state was earlier recognized as the concept of Thalassocracy. Although the concept is mainly emphasizing about the power of the state that is measured by its navy, it somehow gives an overview for the contemporary state that water (which refers to the sea) is one of the countable platform that may let the state to gain more possession over something. By reflecting to the prevailing actor on maritime power such as India, the authors intend to compare some major factors within the structure of Indian maritime power to the on-going establishment process of Indonesia maritime axis. The authors, by conducting this study, also aim to give some useful outcomes towards the formulation of newly Indonesian foreign policy.

Keywords: Indonesia, global maritime axis, thalassocracy, India maritime strategy, economic diplomacyy.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of maritime power is not a new thing. It is used to be known as *Thalassocracy*, a term which explains how the sea is ruled by those who have control over it, back in the era of ancient Greek history. In retrospect, this particular concept emphasizes the idea of a state who uses naval power as a way to gather its possessions which are separated by the existence of sea(Ross, 2003). Unlike the concept of *Thalassocracy* wherein the whole aspects of a state are necessarily depended on the capability of its navy to control over its power (Ross, 2003), the modern practice of maritime concept has been somehow developed to avoid the fragility of power relations as what was exemplified by the concept of *Thalassocracy*. In the other hand, Alfred Thayer Mahan defined maritime power as the result several key factors such as trading, the existence of overseas bases, and merchant and naval shipping(Holmes & Yoshihara, 2011). These characteristics are followed by the fact that there some prominent names of maritime powers exist in the contemporary geopolitics namely the United States and China whose power can simply be measured by looking up towards those key factors.

In the other hand, Indonesia, a state that has 54, 716 km of total coastline(Encyclopediia)is recognized as one of the biggest archipelagic country in the world. Given that fact, It certainly appears as a very ambitious move when Indonesian newly installed President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo took the office and establishes the notion of 'Maritime Axis' as a new set of foreign policy that is projected to be achieved within 4 years of the administration. Not only that this policy will need to face certain pressures coming from the surrounding geopolitical environment(Nelson & Sulaiman,

2015), it needs to also struggle with the fact that there are plenty of fundamental things that Indonesia needs to accomplish, such as building up many supporting infrastructures, before finally being able to pursue the identity as a new emerging maritime power.

It is better to first know that Indonesian maritime axis is a notion that has been promoted and glorified by Jokowi and allies ever since the era of presidential election in the 2014. It is mentioned in the point number sixth of Jokowi's action program that was released for public in May 2014 saying that Jokowi, through the action plans, wants to create Indonesia to be an independent, advance, and strong maritime state that is based on the Indonesia's national interest(Widodo & Kalla, 2014) .

In November 2014, the time he already entered the office, Jokowi further intensified his assertion on the idea of creating Indonesia as a new maritime axis as he spoke in a capacity as the President of Republic of Indonesia in the Ninth East Asian Summit, Myanmar(Neary, 2014). Through five pillars of maritime axis doctrine that he introduced during his speech, Jokowi was finally able to diminish the abstraction of maritime axis policy and set it into a more practical realm which could explain how the policy would possibly be achieved.

Given that circumstance, further description about the plan on achieving maritime has validated that Indonesia possesses an optimism to take a step further into this particular policy. The geographical advantage owns by Indonesia has made it plausible for Jokowi to aim the Indo-Pacific region not only by positioning Indonesia in the center of triangular of the two oceans as what former foreign Minister Natalegawa previously presented in 2013, but by integrating the world maritime with Indo-Pacific system(Shekhar & Liow, 2014).

Around two decades earlier before Jokowi came up with the idea of maritime axis, India started an attempt to expand its influence throughout Asia under the policy called 'look east' initiated by NarasimhaRao's administration to look for another economic opportunities in the middle of economic recession which was brought by the Gulf War crisis in 1991(Rajendram, India's new Asia-Pacific strategy: Modi acts East, 2014). The result was satisfying. India was success to make the cooperation on various fronts leveraged. India was also success to gain attention from the United States, Japan and particularly ASEAN countries who wanted to balance the influence of China as India eventually became a nuclear power in 1998(Strachan, Kang, & Sinha, 2009).

The continuation on 'look east' policy happened at the time when new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. 'Act East' policy is introduced as the 'upgraded' version of the previous foreign policy. Sharing, more or less, the same philosophy as 'Look East' policy, Modi tries to post the idea to play more active role in East and Southeast Asia by enhancing its defense diplomacy with the counterparts within the scope of interest. Not to mention, India's intensive approach to Asia and the appearance of growing competition with China have somehow created another interpretation that India wants to gain a greater role in global politics(Rajendram, India's new Asia-Pacific strategy: Modi acts East, 2014).

In the next part of the paper the authors would attempt to, first, measure the current capacity of Indonesia in achieving 'maritime axis' policy by comparing it towards several key aspects of India's 'Act East' policy. We use India as a comparative subject due to several assessments. First of all, there is a convergence in terms of how Indonesia and India ranging the scope of interests. 'Maritime Axis' policy is set up based on the awareness on geopolitical shift that goes to the Asia Pacific(Sambhi, 2015). In the case of India, it is pretty much clear that 'Act East' policy intensifies and shares the same goal and focus of the previous policy which is to engage states in Asia Pacific in order to construct a greater role on geopolitical realm. Second of all, the authors see that India has more profound experience in maintaining cooperation strategy towards Asia-Pacific. It is proven by numbers of cooperation

achievements that have been obtained by India with the focus of framework in Asia-Pacific region. Second, the authors would attempt to draw some outcomes that might be achieved under the implementation of Indonesia's 'Maritime Axis' policy.

Comprehension on Indonesia Global Maritime Axis Strategy

The idea to have Indonesia as the maritime country has introduced long time ago by the previous presidents before JokoWidodo. Since Indonesia, geographically, is the archipelago country with the large of total coastline for 54 km. Then, Indonesia is in the route of international sea trade, such as Malacca strait that connected to two oceans, Hindia and Pacific. This means that the position of Indonesia is strategically important to connect the economic waterways to India, China, and so forth.

As the elected president, Joko Widodo introduced the new foreign policy to support Indonesia as global maritime axis. This goal was being emphasized on the East Asia Summit in Naypitaw, Myanmar where the framework has five points of goals:

1) Rebuild Indonesia's maritime culture. As a country that is made up of 17,000 islands, the nation must realize that its future is largely determined by how it manages the oceans 2) Maintain and manage sea resources with a focus on establishing sovereignty over sea-based food products. 3) The country will prioritize infrastructure and maritime connectivity development by building sea tolls and deep sea ports while also improving the shipping industry, logistics and maritime tourism. 4) Through maritime diplomacy, Indonesia must end the sources of conflict at sea, such as fish thefts, violation of sovereignty, territorial disputes, piracy and pollution. 5) As a country that is the bridge between two oceans, Indonesia is obligated to build its maritime defense power.(Witular, The Jakarta Post, 2014)

However, the enhancement of the maritime sector has been proposed by the previous president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, while it argues that the implementation of the previous maritime strategy have not achieved yet, portraying from the lack of resources management. Seeing from the large water area, Indonesia's economy should been help by the water resources and industry. People in Indonesia's coastal area are also living in the poverty level. It is a proof of lack in managing the resources. Thus, in the notion of Indonesia's Global Maritime Axis, President JokoWidodo would like to develop the infrastructure and facilities in order to enhance the maritime-based economic development.

Then, measuring from the security of Indonesia's maritime condition, there are several problems such as illegal fishing. As stated by The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of Indonesia estimates that illegal fishing costs the country 30 trillion rupiah (about 3.11 billion dollars) annually.(Badan Informasi Geospasial, 2015)As one of the largest archipelago countries, Indonesia also has several conflicted point in coastal borders. However, as stated in the State Defense Policy 2014, maritime issue is becoming one of main concern to be developed.

The enforcement of maritime sector as expected by JokoWidodo is established by the maritime diplomacy. Maritime diplomacy would like to invite partnership from other states to enhance the security of maritime sector. The maritime diplomacy is expected to diminish the sea conflict such as the illegal fishing, water pollution, and border disputes. The stronger cooperation between countries sees as the concrete ways to strengthen the condition of the maritime strategy.

The goals of this policy are to implement the maritime culture of Indonesia's society, where the people can recognize the identity of Indonesia as an archipelago country. In the end the realization of this identity hopefully can lead Indonesia to have the welfare of maritime orientation and develop the maritime resources.

India – Indonesia Maritime Cooperation

One of the concrete step to promote Indonesia as global maritime axis is by establishing the maritime diplomacy towards other states. One of the partnership and cooperation done by the government of

Indonesia is with India.(Agastia & Perwita, 2015) India sees as the right partner since India is intensifying the same goals of maritime with Indonesia.

Indonesia and India share the Indian Ocean, as Indian Ocean seems like the backyard of India where the Indian Ocean becomes the vital area for the security and economic interest.(Das, 2011) While Indian Ocean in Indonesia's important naval checkpoint in Malacca strait and Indonesia put a special concern to tackle the issue of piracy in the Strait. Thus, both countries share geopolitical interest in the security and maritime strategic.(Brewster, 2011)

Both countries have started the cooperation in the 2013 where both countries agrees to enhance the bilateral defense agreement where one of the main concern is the maritime strategy. Going on to the next years, where both countries are having annual joint naval patrol to strengthen the strategic partnership.

Comparing from budget allocation, Indonesian defense spending as a percentage of GDP was the lowest in ASEAN at 0.8 percent in 2014, well below the regional average of 2.2 percent.(Parameswaran, 2015) However, India will have the increasing of budget allocation of 11.5 per cent from the growth rate of GDP. From the aspects of defense, navy will get the share of 16% with the acquisition budget in the following table. (Behera, 2015)

Table I. Share of Defense Services in Defense Budget 2015-16

Note: DRDO = Defense Research and Development Organization; OFS = Ordnance Factories

Source: India's Defense Budget 2015-2016 (retrieved from: http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/IndiasDefenceBudget2015-16_lkbehera_020315)

Table II. India Navy's Acquisition Budget

	2014-15 (BE) (Rs in Cr)	2014-15 (RE) (Rs in Cr)	2015-16 (BE) (Rs in Cr)	% Increase in 2015-16 (BE) over 2014-15 (BE)
Aircraft & Aero-Engine	3330.7	3310.7	3466.1	4.1
H&MV	34.3	8.0	11.0	-67.9
Other Equipment	4358.1	3696.9	2558.6	-41.3
Joint Staff	1028.9	714.8	922.3	-10.4
Naval Fleet	12576.1	9398.3	16049.9	27.6
Naval Dockyard	1612.9	661.3	1275.3	-20.9
Total Acquisition Budget	22940.9	17790.1	24283.2	5.9

Note:BE: Budget Estimate; RE: Revised Estimate
Source: Fourteenth Finance Commission (retrieved from: http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/IndiasDefenceBudget2015-16_lkbehera_020315)

The biggest percentage acquisition of the defense budget shares of India goes to the Army. However, the concern on developing the maritime sector of India is shown by the previous table. Although the increasing of budget is not implemented for all technologies but there is the additional on the total allocation for the year of 2015-2016.

Table III. Comparison on India – Indonesia Naval Power

	India	Indonesia
Total Naval Strength	202	171
Aircraft Carriers	2	0
Frigates	15	6
Destroyers	9	0
Corvettes	25	26
Submarines	15	2
Coastal Defense Craft	46	21
Mine Warfare	7	12

Source: Global Fire Power(retrieved

Maritime defense technology is important, measuring from its utility to help the manpower in order to secure the area. Comparing from the data above, Indonesia is still left behind from India. As one of large sea power, India keeps allocating their defense budget to upgrade the technology. Even, India is developing the buy-make approach in order to self-reliance on the defense technology. Thus, India invests on the manufacturing sector of the arm and weaponry.(Behera, 2015)

Later, ports are also fundamental aspects towards the development of maritime sector. Furthermore, India has 13 major ports as the help the growing of trade and economics. Indonesia, with the geographically archipelago countries, in the budget allocation has far measure from India. Even Indonesia has the lowest allocation among ASEAN countries. Moreover, most of the Indonesian technologies are former technology owned by other countries.

However, with the establishment of the partnership with India, is one of the effort to enhance the maritime diplomacy towards the strategy to create Indonesia as the global maritime axis. In the end, Indonesia is still lack on the ownership of arm and weaponry, development of technology and in the allocating of defense budget, and need more efforts to catch up in order to achieve the goal of maritime axis.

Economic Diplomacy as an Output

Thismaritime doctrine is set to become the defining feature of his five-year presidency. In the document outlining his foreign policy platform, he promised to focus upon maritime security, diplomacy and naval development. One of the goals of the proposed notion is to achieve and strengthen the economic diplomacy. The overreaching goal of the doctrine is to give the country the means to further its economic development and to push it towards achieving upper-middle income status.

The British economist and diplomat, Nicholas Bayne, defined economic diplomacy as the "*method by which states conduct their external economic relations. It embraces how they make decisions domestically, how they negotiate internationally and how the two processes interact*"(Bayne, Financial Diplomacy and the Credit Crunch: The Rise of Central Banks, 2008). By transforming Indonesia into a Global Maritime Axis, Indonesia could use this opportunity to boost its economic. Not only taking the advantages through the maritime resources but also from maritime dynamics and interaction in Asia Pacific region.

Indonesia needs to direct its target of diplomacy to support the achievement as maritime country and maritime axis. Related with this, strengthening the maritime economic diplomacy is an important step for Indonesia. It shows that every single country in the world tends to put the priorities in economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy is also expected to prop up the government's efforts to create the national economy to be more independent and competitive. To reach the goal, the target of diplomacy should be directed to encourage the strengthening of international cooperation that could utilize all of Indonesia's potential as an archipelagic country. In this context, Indonesia needs to put the existence of the sea as comparative and competitive advantages in the relationship with the other nations in the world (Muhamad, 2014).

Economic Maritime Diplomacy towards Domestic and International Politics

Economic diplomacy is important as an advantage for Indonesia's future prosperity. By optimizing Indonesia's maritime power through economic diplomacy, Indonesia can strengthen its domestic power as well as international cooperation, whether at the bilateral, regional or multilateral level. At domestic level, with the goal to expand the Indonesian economy, the doctrine of Global

Maritime Axis would improve maritime connectivity and infrastructure by starting to build "sea highways", constructing deep seaports and logistical networks, as well as developing maritime tourism, fishing and shipping industries. It also seeks to maintain and manage marine resources to secure the country's "food sovereignty" (Witular, The Jakarta Post , 2014). The other impact of economic diplomacy to Indonesian politic domestic could bring Indonesia's marine and coastal vegetation to be significant contributors to global oxygen supply and its marine resources could also provide important seafood products.

Besides, the rise of economic diplomacy in domestic politics could also affect the players of the politics in Indonesia. Before government underline the economic diplomacy as the goal, the cast of players of politics could only be politicians and limited governmental entities, however, after the economic diplomacy growing to be one of the goal of Indonesian Maritime Axis and it is expectedly achieved, the business groups, NGOs, as well as interest and advocacy groups somehow could also take important roles in domestic politics. Basically, the following goal of economic diplomats is to competently determine multilateral economic policy by coordinating specialized ministries, by shaping the negotiation process at economic standard setting organizations, and by constructively including non-state actors when useful and appropriate(Saner & Yiu, 2003). Ultimately, the role of government in economic diplomacy is to give strategic direction, while coordinating and mediating pressures and reconciling different types of tension (Bayne & Woolcock, The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations, 2011), simultaneously, the participation of non-state actors in domestic and international relations is a phenomenon that recently has been growing in developing country such as Indonesia.

At International level, the impact of economic diplomacy could lead Indonesia to be recognized as a reliable and stable country.

Therefore, as Indonesia success to strengthen its economic diplomacy, it is also led Indonesia to attracts foreign investment. President JokoWidodo has stated that Indonesia should focus on bringing more foreign investment into Indonesia(Purnamasari, 2014). Jokowi seems to have already put in motion his plan of attracting foreign investment in the development of the country's maritime infrastructure and defense industry. During his visit to Japan in August 2014, he was able to secure a commitment from the Japanese government to assist Indonesia in building its maritime infrastructure (Purnamasari, 2014). He has also indicated that development of maritime infrastructure would be a top priority for his government and for that reason he is going to work towards extracting similar commitments from other major powers that would further strengthen Indonesia's defense cooperation with key supplier countries, such as the United States, China, South Korea and Russia.

Maritime economic diplomacy is expected to encourage the foreign investment that could support the development in the marine field and increasing the carrying capacity of the sea infrastructure to exploit marine resources.Attracting foreign investment in transport, ports, communications, mining and alternatives energy development in the marine sector should be one of the main targets of economic diplomacy in Jokowi era (Muhamad, 2014). Besides attracting foreign investment, Jokowi also has laid his plan to raise the defense budget to 1.5 percent of GDP in five years (Song, 2015). Jokowi hoped that the allocation of 1.5 percent of GDP to the defense budget would contribute the much-needed revenue for defense modernization and revival of an indigenous defense industry.

From an ASEAN regional economic integration perspective, the development of Indonesia's maritime infrastructure will enlarge connectivity between Indonesia and the ASEAN market. Indonesia will focus its cooperation with other member states not only in land but also in sea and telecommunications sector. Because the majority of ASEAN member states lives in mainland, it shows that

there is only 8% of ASEAN trade between the archipelagic countries, which are Indonesia-Philippines-Brunei. Indonesian economic diplomacy should therefore focus on speeding up ASEAN considerations over maritime connectivity in such a way that the ports of Indonesian major cities are well connected to main ASEAN cities. Furthermore, the increasing capacity of Indonesia's ports will encourage the flow of goods and people around Indonesia. It also will strengthen the intensity of Indonesia's economic connection to ASEAN and Asia(Djumala, 2015).

The Enhancement of Maritime Sector

In effort to achieve the economic diplomacy through Indonesian Maritime Axis, however, there are still many sectors that should be improved by Indonesia, for instance the maritime sector. Jokowi has stated that maritime sector is one of the sectors that has been forgotten and marginalized in the national development agenda (Djumala, 2015) while the other sectors such as agricultural and mining are sectors that get more attention in Indonesia. Domestically, economic diplomacy should thus focus on maritime infrastructure, navigation, shipyard building and fisheries. Jokowi aims to revitalize trade between inter-connecting islands connectivity, protecting and modernizing the fisheries industry, and develop shipbuilding industry.(Piesse, 2015).

First, sea is undoubtedly the lifeline of Indonesia. However, poor port infrastructure has made shipping goods between the thousands of islands in Indonesia is extremely expensive. The government is planning to offer incentives to shipping operators, including fuel subsidies. This incentive is being made to encourage business to utilize sea-based routes rather than roads and also help encourage the wider use of sea-based transportation (Piesse, 2015). Jokowi stated this incentive will further be implemented by constructing the sea-highways along the shores in Indonesia. Modernizing ports to bring them into line with international standards could also increase access to Indonesian harbors with benefits for international shipping. The government

has also proposed the importation of up to 2,500 boats, followed with some plans such as importing 500 boats from China, not only to connect the major islands, but also reduce the costs of transportation and increase the flow of goods throughout the country. Starting to focus upon port infrastructures could help Indonesia to improve efficiency and promote a greater level of connectivity between islands, which has long been seen as a major obstacle to the economic development of the country (Piesse, 2015).

Second, Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a major regional problem that has significant domestic consequences for Indonesia. In response to this problem, the Jokowi Administration has adopted the hard-line measure of destroying foreign fishing vessels that have entered Indonesian territory (Piesse, 2015). By protecting and modernizing fisheries industry, the maritime sector could get advantage to utilize its fisheries resources.

Third, Indonesia should focus on developing the shipbuilding industry. Shipbuilding industry has good prospects along with the increasing demand for mass transportation and logistics in the midst of rapid economic growth in Indonesia. In a bid to assist the development of a domestic shipbuilding industry, the Jokowi Administration is considering the abolition of import duties and the value-added tax (PPN) on foreign ship components that are still required by local shipbuilders (Piesse, 2015). Therefore, maritime sector is one of the sectors that most benefited from economic diplomacy in order to achieve Indonesian Maritime Axis goal because the shortage of this sector is ultimately being improved by government.

Through the establishment of Indonesian Maritime Axis, economic diplomacy should be translated into tangible step which consolidate all international cooperation that may push the utilization of all potentials and wealth of Indonesian sea. Given that the fisheries sector is one of the pillars of the national economy, then the economic diplomacy should be emphasized in an effort to increase the value-added in Indonesian fisheries sector, such as formulate a specific strategy for penetrating

the international market for Indonesian fisheries export (Muhamad, 2014). Overall, economic diplomacy is applicable to be said as output of the proposed Indonesian Maritime Axis notion.

CONCLUSION

All in all, the foreign policy perspective of Indonesia as the Global Maritime Axis, that being proposed by President JokoWidodo after being inaugurated, is a policy to support the water and sea resources where Indonesia is geographically have the capability to enhance the maritime perspective. However, the perspective to strengthen the maritime aspects has been introduced long before the notion of nations-state is arrived. The development of maritime was exemplified from the idea of Thalassocrassy. Then, one of the successful key of the maritime policy is by conducting the maritime diplomacy. In this case, Indonesia is currently building the relationship with India. However, comparing to the maritime resources from infrastructure and maritime security technology, Indonesia is still left behind from India

The other maritime aspects tries to intensify by Indonesia is the economic sector. As one of important international trade routes, Indonesia believes that developing the infrastructurewill bring the benefit to its economy sector. By developing the economic, Indonesia is also maximizing on the development of sea-infrastructure, secure the sea resources by strengthening the law of illegal fishing, and enhancing the ship-building industry. In the end, the efforts of government are *on its way* to create Indonesia as a Global Maritime Axis. However, to see the level of success it needs further continuation and also evaluation.

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CHAPTER 2

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION: DOES POLLUTION HAVEN EXIST IN INDONESIA?

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Abstract

Developed and developing countries have different environmental standards. Broadly speaking, the environmental standards of developing countries are laxer than those in the developed ones. Stricter environmental standards in developed countries then would cause additional cost of production. As a result, this condition attracts pollution-intensive industries to move their production from the developed countries to the developing ones in order to reduce their production cost. This thought is commonly known as a pollution haven hypothesis. Indonesia as a developing country has laxer environmental standards than developed countries. Consequently, Indonesia might become pollution havens. This research is important to be conducted since becoming pollution haven will harm Indonesia in the future. In the present, Indonesia will benefit the foreign direct investment (FDI), but environmental degradation will be a serious handicap for Indonesia to develop further. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) has to realize this threat. This study is aimed at investigating the evidence of pollution havens in Indonesia. A preliminary investigation shows that trend of FDI inflows to Indonesia increases continuously from year to year, yet the amount of pollution also increases significantly from year to year. The fact explains that Indonesia is facing serious problem related to environmental degradation caused by pollution-intensive industries that move into this country, yet the GOI still does less measures related to this problem. Indonesia has a chance to prevent its country as a "pollution haven". The GOI has to realize the threat of environmental degradation caused by pollution-intensive industries and to protect the environment by establishing some policies to prevent environmental degradation getting worse.

Keywords: pollution haven, foreign direct investment, environmental degradation

INTRODUCTION

There are several push and pull factors that influence foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to developing countries. Corporations sometimes desire to move production offshore because of increased cost of and labor in the home country. Those factors are some example of push-factors. On the other hand, the desire to move production offshore is influenced by pull factors such as to seek cheaper cost of raw materials, cheaper labor, or economic stability.

Nowadays, environmental issues can be the rationale to move production offshore. In the beginning of world development after World War Two, environmental issue was not an important issue for transnational corporation and they could dispose of production waste easily. However, people awareness of environmental degradation issue has increased since then. Therefore, many governments in the world make a number of policies to prevent corporations disposing their production waste carelessly. However, the environmental regulation standard varies between countries.

Broadly speaking, the environmental regulation standards in developing countries are laxer than developed ones. Developing countries still need more investment to support their national development and to enhance their economic growth as well. Therefore, environmental degradation issues that might be caused by foreign direct investment are often ignored as long as they can attract the foreign investor to their country. If developing countries raised the environment standards, there is a possibility that they may lose FDI in their country.

Indonesia seems facing this dilemma. As a developing country, Indonesia still needs sufficient FDI to support its national

development and to reduce unemployment rate. Nonetheless, FDI can have several negative effects such as environmental degradation. The latest environmental problem that harms Indonesian people is smoke pollution in Sumatera. Smoke from land and forest fires blanket almost all region of Sumatera including South Sumatra, Jambi, West Sumatra, Riau, Medan and Aceh (The Jakarta Post, 2015). That smoke is caused by the widespread burning of tropical rainforests and peatlands to develop pulpwood and palm oil plantations. Palm oil giants are accused for this disaster (Allen, 2015). Data from Profundo revealed that 25 palm oil giants dominate palm oil industries in Indonesia and seven palm oil giants origin from outside Indonesia (Winarni & Gelder, 2015).

That fact above explains that the pollution havens might exist in Indonesia. Pollution havens hypothesis basically states that companies will move their operations to less developed countries in order to take advantage of less stringent environmental regulations (Mabey & McNally, 1999, p. 3). However, palm oil corporations is just one of the examples. There are still many FDI inflow from foreign corporations that establish its production activity in Indonesia in several sectors such as mining and manufacturing. This research is important to be conducted since excessive pollution will harm Indonesia in the future. In the present, Indonesia benefits the FDI, but environmental degradation will be a serious handicap for Indonesia to develop further. Soon, The Government of Indonesia (GOI) has to realize this threat. This research is based on a main research question, to what extent does pollution haven exist in Indonesia?

POLLUTION HAVENS HYPOTHESIS

A short explanation of pollution havens hypothesis can be found in Esekeland and Harrison article. The pollution havens hypothesis states that strict environmental regulations will move polluting activities for tradeable products to poorer countries (Eskeland & Harrison, 2002, p. 4). Smarzynska and a Wei researching the pollution-intensive

production of MNCs relocate their production to developing countries which have looser environmental standard (Smarzynska & Wei, 2001, p. 1). Eskeland and Harrison then, define:

> *The pollution haven as a corollary to the theory of comparative advantage: as pollution control costs begin to matter for some industries in some countries, other countries should gain comparative advantage in those industries, if pollution control costs are lower there (for whatever reason (Eskeland & Harrison, 2002, p. 4).*

Another scholar, Neumayer, explains:.
A country provides a pollution haven if it sets its environmental standards below the socially efficient level or fails to enforce its standards in order to attract foreign investment from countries with higher standards or countries that better enforce their standards (Neumayer, 2001, p. 148).

Pollution haven definition by Neumayer explained the dilemma faced by developing countries whether to set inefficiently low environmental standards or to set efficient standards but fail to enforce them to attract foreign capital (Neumayer, 2001, p. 147).

This situation occurs, accordingly to Wu, because developing countries gave more attention to economic growth rather than environmental protection (Wu, 2001, p. 1). If that was true, then the relation between foreign direct investment and environmental standards became clearer that developing countries desired to attract foreign capital and to ignore environmental protection.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The existence of Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH) has always been an interesting debate. Some scholars question this hypothesis since the evidence of PHH is still weak, and the others believe the existence of PHH and keep investigating the evidence of PHH because they realize the risk of serious pollution caused by pollution-intensive industries that move to low-environmental standard countries.

Eric Neumayer was one of scholars

that discussed about the evidence of PHH. Neumayer found that the evidence of PHH was relatively weak at best and inconclusive or even negative at worst (Neumayer, 2001, p. 161). Even though there was only weak statistical evidence, he stated that the analysis should not stop here and needed further analysis. Moreover, pollution havens might very well exist so that evaluating policy options for tackling (potential) pollution haven problems is important thing to do (Neumayer, 2001, p. 164).

Pollution havens might exist and could harm developing countries who have laxer environmental standard, yet there are only few amount of research about pollution haven. Eskeland and Harrison were the others scholars who had a concern about pollution havens issue. They argued that environmental regulations could influence an increase or a decline of investment in the home country and in the country which has laxer environmental standards (Eskeland & Harrison, 2002, p. 3). Mexico, Venezuela, Morocco and Cote d'Ivoire, were chosen as study cases in order to get the evidence, unfortunately they found no evidence about the relation between foreign investment in those four developing countries to abatement costs in industrialised countries. Surprisingly they found that foreign firms are less polluting than their peers in developing countries. However, they found some evidence that foreign investors were concentrated in sectors with high levels of air pollution, even though evidence was weak at best (Eskeland & Harrison, 2002, p. 27).

Eskeland and Harrison as well as Neumayer have similar thought about pollution havens. Although the evidence of pollution havens is still weak, it does not mean that pollution havens cannot exist. Both of those research suggest the policy makers to concern about pollution control policy.

An investigation about PHH also conducted by Dean, Lovely and Wang which evaluated the evidence from China. Their research discussed whether foreign investors attracted to weak environmental regulations. The main results did not differ much from previous scholars above. They found difficulties to find the evidence of PHH in China. In process of investigating the evidence, they considered the origins of the FDI and categorized them into non-ethnically Chinese (non-ECE) source and ethnically Chinese source (ECE). The FDI from ECE source such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau is significantly deterred from provinces with relatively stringent pollution regulation. In contrast, non-ECE source such as US, EU, and Japan were not deterred since FDI from these rich countries used environment-friendly technology (Dean, Lovely, & Wang, 2009, p. 11).

Another scholar who researched the same issue was Anggito Abimanyu. He researched about the impact of free trade on industrial pollution and also questioned about pollution havens. His research focused on four ASEAN member states. Those were Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia. Abimanyu faced the same problem with prior studies above. The problem was the lack of convincing evidence on the impact of the countries' environmental policy to LDC's product imports. The main finding of him was that the differences in environmental standards between the developed countries and less developed countries were not a significant variable influencing the decision to locate dirty-product imports. In the near future the difference in standards can become a significant factor (Abimanyu, 1996, p. 50).

Those four articles above have similar problem that is the lack of evidence to prove the existence of the PHH. Even though it is difficult to find the evidence, it does not mean that we may stop here and forget this issue. More work on finding the evidence of pollution haven is clearly needed since it may harm the environment of developing countries. So that, this research aims to find the evidence of PHH through deep investigation in Indonesia.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN INDONESIA

Most of Foreign Direct Investment inflows to Indonesia are from developed

countries. Table 1. shows top ten developed countries investing in Indonesia in 2014. Those countries are Japan, Netherland, United States, United Kingdom, China, Australia, France, Canada, Luxembourg, and Italy.

Table 1. Statistic of Foreign Direct Investment Realization Based On Capital Investment Activity by Country 2014

Country	Total of Project	Value of Investment (million US$)
Japan	1,010	2,705.1
Netherland	181	1,726.3
United States	179	1,299.5
United Kingdom	182	1,588
China	501	800
Australia	226	647.3
France	115	200.2
Canada	34	164.2
Luxembourg	23	85.8
Italy	51	63.0

Source: (Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, 2015)

In fact, those ten countries have high level amount of pollution compared with pollution in Indonesia. Table 2 shows the amount of CO2 emissions in those ten countries.

Table 2. CO2 Emissions 2011 (metric tons per capita)

Country	CO2 Emissions
Japan	9.3
Netherland	10.1
United States	17.0
United Kingdom	7.1
China	6.7
Australia	16.5
France	5.2
Canada	14.1
Luxembourg	20.9
Italy	6.7

Source: (The World Bank, 2015)

The high level amount of pollution is caused by high productivity of developed countries. When some production activities are relocated offshore to developing country, there is a possibility that developed countries will "export" their pollution to developing countries.

Indonesia as a developing country faces that threat. Chart 1. below shows FDI inflows from 1991 to 2010. Trend of FDI inflows increased despite declined during economic crises in 1998/1999 and 2008.

Chart 1. Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, in million US$)

Source: (The World Bank, 2015)

The increasing trend of FDI was followed by the increasing amount of CO2 emissions (see chart 2.). The amount of CO2 emissions in Indonesia is not as high as the developed countries. The highest amount of CO2 emissions in Indonesia was 2.3 metric tons per capita in 2011 (The World Bank, 2015), but the trend was also increasing. GOI should pay attention to this possible threat.

Chart 2. CO2 Emissions in Indonesia (metric tons per capita)

Source: (The World Bank, 2015)

Both of charts above have similar trend. When FDI inflows increased, pollution increased as well. Interestingly, when FDI inflows declined during crises, pollution declined as well (see also table 3.). It might be coincidental, but it might be related to each others too. This possibilities cannot be ignored.

Table 3. CO2 (kt) Emissions in Indonesia

Year	CO2 Emissions (kt)	Trend
1991	179,731	-
1992	202,576	increasing
1993	218,601	increasing
1994	221,413	increasing
1995	224,941	increasing
1996	253,291	increasing
1997	278,659	increasing
1998	210,211	declining
1999	241,983	increasing
2000	263,419	increasing
2001	294,907	increasing
2003	306,737	increasing
2003	316,792	increasing
2004	337,635	increasing
2005	341,992	increasing
2006	345,120	increasing
2007	375,545	increasing
2008	412,387	increasing
2009	453,106	increasing
2010	436,106	declining

source: (The World Bank, 2015)

It might be too early to conclude that FDI from developed countries cause serious environmental degradation in Indonesia. It needs further research to consider others variables that cause environmental degradation such as pollution contribution by domestic direct investment (DDI) and FDI from non developed countries. Besides that, environmental degradation should measure other indicators such as deforestation, water pollution, and land pollution (destruction of earth's surface).

Figure 1. Distribution of Critical Watershed Areas in 1984

Figure 2.30 Distribution of critical watershed areas in 1984 with 22 critical watershed areas
Gambar 2.30 Sebaran DAS Kritis pada Tahun 1984 sebanyak 22 DAS Kritis

Figure 2. Distribution of Critical Watershed Areas in 2005

Figure 2.30 Distribution of critical watershed areas in 2005 with 62 critical watershed areas
Gambar 2.30 Sebaran DAS Kritis pada Tahun 2005 sebanyak 62 DAS Kritis

Source: DG of Water Resources, Ministry of Public Works (Ministry of Environment, 2013, p. 48)

Two figures above have shown the degradation of watershed from 1984 to 2005. There were 22 critical watershed areas in 1984 and the number increased to 62 watershed areas in 2005. From the map in 2005, almost every area in Indonesia had critical watershed problems.

Figure 3. Decrease of Forest Area from 2000-2011

source: Ministry of Forestry (Ministry of Environment, 2013, p. 53)

Deforestation in Indonesia experienced similar thing with degradation of watershed. Forest area decreased by time to time from

2000 to 2011. Reforestation program by GOI did not contribute much since deforestation happened faster than reforestation. Moreover, the budget of GOI for environmental improvement is minimal. It was about 0,8% from total budget.

Figure 4. Indonesia's Government Budget in 2015

Source: (Ministry of Finance, 2014)

The data of air pollution, critical watershed, and deforestation are enough to describe environmental degradation in Indonesia. However, further research is needed to find further link between FDI and environmental degradation, since the cause of environmental degradation in Indonesia is not only from FDI.

INVESTIGATING THE EVIDENCE OF POLLUTION HAVEN IN INDONESIA

As discussed above in the literature review, many scholars had a problem in finding the evidence of pollution haven. To prove that MNCs seek other places that have laxer environmental standard was difficult since the evidence was weak at best.

In efforts to find the evidence of pollution haven in Indonesia, the author also finds difficulties in obtaining data. The data of environmental degradation in Indonesia is scattered and incomplete, even Ministry of

Environment and Forestry does not provide complete data which is accessible for the public. For the example, when trying to access environmental degradation data through data lingkungan hidup nasional. menlh.go.id, we should have a username and password. Field research is needed to get more detail about environmental degradation data caused by FDI.

It is also difficult to find FDI inflows data by sector before 2010 since Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (IICB) does not provide the data before 2010 through its website. The data got from The World Bank is not comprehensive. It is only provide general information about the total amount of FDI inflows, not provide FDI inflows by sectors.

POLICY CONTRADICTIONS IN INDONESIA

Nowadays, new policy made by the GOI eases the foreign investor to invest in Indonesia. IICB can finish investment procedures needed within three hours including a land-booking letter (Kompas, 2015). it is part of the government's second economic policy package that allows prospective investors with a minimum investment of Rp 100 billion and/or a plan to employ more than 1,000 workers to get that privilege (The Jakarta Post, 2015).

That policy has positive and negative effects. On the one hand, Indonesia becomes more attractive for foreign investors and it means more FDI inflows to Indonesia. On the other hand, pollution intensive industries could relocate its production to Indonesia easier and it means a serious threat for Indonesia's environment.

Moreover, Permen No. 97/2014 (Ministerial Regulation) made by The Ministry of Environment and Forestry makes the condition worse. Authority to give a permission or not related to environment and forestry condition has been delegated to IICB in order to support one-stop integrated service policy. Investment will get better with increasingly damaged environment as its consequence (Manurung, 2015, p. 6). This policy gets many protests from environmental activists.

GOI's policies seem ignoring environmental aspects in order to get as much investment. Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI), as NGO based in Indonesia, also has the same anxiety about economic policy package of GOI to improve the ease of investment. WALHI states that GOI's policies in manage its natural resources are just the same with colonial regime that facilitates investor to deprive natural resources in order to get foreign investment (WALHI, 2015, p. 4).

The evidence of pollution haven in Indonesia might be weak at best, yet a serious threat of environmental degradation is threatening Indonesia. Physical indicators of environment in Indonesia have never experienced an improvement (Kompas, 2015, p. 14). Several data above can describe that environmental degradation is increasing by time to time. Pollution haven hypothesis, although not yet proven, can be a hypothesis that warns developing countries including Indonesia about a serious threat of environmental degradation caused by pollution-intensive industries through FDI. Government has the most important role in managing natural resources utilization, even can influence the relation among countries through diplomacy (WALHI, 2015, p. 23). GOI has to prepare prevention actions, so that Indonesia will not become a pollution haven.

CONCLUSION

Pollution haven may exist when countries have different standard of environment regulations. When a country has laxer environmental standard, it may become a pollution haven. Indonesia as developing country has laxer environmental standard compared to developed countries. Indonesia, just like other developing countries, need more foreign investment to support national economic growth and often ignore the effect of FDI to its environmental conditions.

This research is still inconclusive. It is just a preliminary and further research is planned. To conclude that pollution haven exist or not in Indonesia is too early since the evidence of pollution haven happened Indonesia is still weak.

Further research has to explain that to what extent FDI influences environmental degradation in Indonesia. A clear link should be established there. Besides that, research has to establish a clear comparison of GOI's policies and developed countries' policies related to environmental issue to support the argument that FDI from developed countries relocates its production to a country with laxer environmental standards.

While this research does not provide some clear evidence of pollution haven in Indonesia, a message from this research is clear that we do not need more evidence to protect our environment from external threat. Maybe when the evidence has finally been found, it will be too late to prevent worse environmental degradation happened in Indonesia. The threat of environmental degradation caused by FDI is serious and GOI has to be aware with that, even though the evidence has not been found yet. Some policies reform related to environmental and investment regulations are needed to make some preventive measures.

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ADAPTIVE PUBLIC LEADERSHIP ON FACING CHALLENGES OF ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC)

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Abstract

Entering the free market era for ASEAN countries or known as "ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 2015" which is high competitive and a lot of challenges from the changing environment, the existence of an ideal leader is urgent to promote and realize the vision and mission of Indonesia that has been disclosed in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution and translated based on the needs of national, regional territorial provincial and district/city. The leader's ability to adapt new circumstances and understand how to develop subordinates to be able to better handle complex situations, is a great thing that should be a concern for leaders in changes. Adapting means to understand the meaning of a new state, and have the initiative in the ability to adapt and change with a complete practice in a personality shared values, governance, systems, procedures. Then, find the most effective way yet easy to use, for the development and sustainability of the core activities of the organization. The above facts explain that the leadership values determine the success of development in order to optimize and utilize AEC programs especially in free trade, where the market mechanism determines a process of goods and services which also influence human resources that managed by the certain leadership style, especially in the businesses mechanism that have fairness principle. Using the methods of literature study and interviews, this study aims to analyze how the adaptive leadership in the public sector faces the challenges of the AEC. Given that if it is associated with the challenges of the future, a good leader at least has the ability to be adaptive to the uncertainty of the future, the ability to work cross-country and cross-cultural as well as the ability to create an innovative environment.

Keywords: Adaptive Leadership, ASEAN Economic Community, Environment Changes

INTRODUCTION

In the era of free markets is "ASEAN Economic Community 2015" or the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) full of competitiveness and the challenges of environmental change, so the ideal leader should be an urgent need to promote and realize the vision and mission of the State that has been disclosed in the preamble of the Constitution 1945 and translated based on the needs of national, regional territorial provincial and district / city.

When talking to the free market, it is definitely related to the term let market works without distortion. This resulted in the belief that private companies should be free from government intervention, whatever the social consequences resulting thus opening the free flow of trade in goods and services become the main indicator, even the labor market professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, accountants, consultants and others. In addition, competition products of entrepreneurs in the districts / cities will compete fairly in a free market or will completely accept the product other States, as well as with professional workforce who are educated from the district / city can be received in neighboring countries or not , It is a very serious challenge, but that does not mean it cannot.

The tough challenges must be addressed in the election process with the regime of Law No. 1 of 2015 in which the local elections that will be realized simultaneously. The local elections are at stake for the provincial, district / city to come, to be able to utilize the AEC or AEC to be used by pressing and minimize the consequences of poverty are real, not just economic growth statistics

alone.

See the future perspective especially AEC, the next course takes leaders who have an understanding of thought to prevent the negative impacts and create strategies to take advantage of the AEC for the benefit of society, especially to improve the welfare and people's purchasing power. ASEAN markets into one unified single market Southeast Asia. AEC existence will make the flow of goods, services, investment and free capital in the region of Southeast Asia with all its consequences. AEC will keep running no matter what. Therefore urgently needed a leader who is sensitive and have a clear concept in strengthening the regional economy in supporting the national economy.

The government has no strategy and plan that is appropriate to protect the interests of farmers, fishermen, laborers and traders in the traditional AEC 2015[1] potentially face a loss of people's access to natural resources and high rates of poverty in rural areas. The above facts explain that the leadership values determine the success of development in order to optimize and utilize AEC especially in free trade, where the flow of goods and the flow of people continues to move without hindrance, whether as a product, workers, tourists, trade and others through a mechanism market as a process that determines, of market mechanisms to humans, entrepreneurs, goods and services that are managed by the management leadership, especially in the enterprise and business mechanisms that have fairness and justice.

Global Leaders Forecast survey results in 2014-2015 showed that the Indonesian leader's ability to work in cross-cultural and cross still low[2]. Global Leaders Forecast survey results in 2014-2015 showed that the Indonesian leader's ability to work in cross-cultural and cross still low. Whereas, this ability should be had by a leader in Indonesia

in order to face AEC. Leadership adaptive to change and uncertainty of future will come, the ability to work cross-border and cross-cultural as well as the ability to create an innovative environment is something that should be possessed by a leader in Indonesia in the face of the AEC. Business leaders in Indonesia showed that the ability to work cross-country and a new culture held at the level of 32% (world 34%), while the ability to be adaptive to the dynamic conditions are still at the level of 52% (world 58%)[3]. When compared with the scope of the world, business leaders in Indonesia have a very good chance to be the face of AEC as long as they realize that they have to change the focus of their organization ability critical of our future.

Similarly, the leadership in the government sector is also required to be able to have three (3) such capabilities. If it can be narrowed again, the leader of the government sector should be the leader adaptive atmospheres. Leaders who are not able to read the situation to be expected in the future strategic policy that is not right. The poor ability of government leader posed an absolute public dissatisfaction caused by non-fulfillment capability that is able to read the future situation[4]. So the question that arises is how the adaptive leadership in the public sector facing the challenges of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)? This paper tries to describe the adaptive leadership from the standpoint of theoretical and empirical, and can ultimately provide recommendations related to aspects of national and local leadership facing the AEC.

ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is a realization of the ultimate goal of economic integration adopted in Vision 2020, which is based on the convergence of the interests of the member countries of ASEAN to

1   This statement is explained by IGJ Riza Damanik, Executive Director of Indonesia for Global Justice (IGJ). Accessed in Tuesday, 2 June 2015 through: http://www.kerincitime.co.id
2   Quoted by mpi-update.com from Global readers Accessed in Tuesday, 2 June 2015 through: http://mpi-update.com

3   Richard S. Wellins, Senior Vice President from Development Dimensions International (DDI) in discussion "Mengupas Kriteria Pemimpin Bangsa saat ini dan masa depan (ditengah turbulensi Ekonomi Politik) on 20 May 2015. Survey is followed by 780 bussiness leader in Indonesia. *Ibid*
4   Hendri Satrio, Indonesia Political observer University of Paramadina and Keynote of Kelompok Diskusi dan Kajian Opini Publik Indonesia (Kedai KOPI). *Ibid*.

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on Social Politics

deepen and broaden economic integration through existing and new initiatives with a clear time limit. in establishing the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), ASEAN must act in accordance with the principles of an open, outward-looking, inclusive and market-oriented economy consistent with multilateral rules and compliance with the system for compliance and effective implementation of the commitment to a rules-based economy.

ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) will establish ASEAN as a single market and production base to make ASEAN a more dynamic and competitive with the mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of existing and new economic initiatives; accelerate regional integration in the priority sectors; facilitating the movement of business, skilled labor and talents; and strengthening institutional mechanisms of ASEAN. As a first step to realize the ASEAN Economic Community at the same time, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) will address the development gap and accelerate the integration of the countries of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam through the Initiative for ASEAN Integration and other regional initiatives. The cooperation forms are:

1. Human resource development and capacity building;
2. Recognition of professional qualifica-tions;
3. Closer consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies;
4. Steps trade finance;
5. Improving infrastructure
6. Development of electronic transactions through e-ASEAN;
7. Integrating the industry throughout the region to promote regional sources
8. Increase the involvement of the private sector to establish the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).

Importance to ASEAN's external trade and the need for ASEAN Community as a whole to keep looking forward,

The main characteristics of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC):

1. The single market and production base,
2. Competitive economic region,
3. The region of equitable economic development
4. The area is fully integrated in the global economy.

These characteristics are closely interwoven. By Incorporating elements required of each characteristic and should ensure consistency and coherence of the elements as well as the implementation of appropriate and mutually coordinating among relevant stakeholders[5].

There are four things that will be the focus of the AEC in 2015 that can be used as a good momentum for Indonesia[6]. First, countries in Southeast Asia will be used as a region unified market and production base. With the creation of the unity of the market and production base will make the flow of goods, services, investment, large amounts of capital, and skilled labor becomes no barrier from one country to other countries in Southeast Asia. Second, the AEC will be formed as an economic region with a high level of competition, which requires a policy that includes competition policy, consumer protection, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), taxation, and E-Commerce. Thus, it can create a climate of fair competition; there is protection in the form of a network system of consumer protection agencies; prevent copyright infringement; creating a transport network that is efficient, safe, and integrated; eliminating the Double Taxation system, and; increase trade with online-based electronic media.

Third, He also will serve as the region has equitable economic development, with priority on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Competitiveness and dynamism of SMEs will be enhanced by facilitating their access to the latest information, market conditions, also

5   Arya Baskoro, Peluang, Tantangan dan Risiko bagi Indonesia dengan adanya Masyarakat Ekonomi ASEAN: Peluang, Tantangan dan Risiko bagi Indonesia dengan adanya Masyarakat Ekonomi ASEAN. Accessed in Tuesday, 2 June 2015 through: http://crmsindonesia.org/node/624.
6   Arya Baskoro, *Ibid*

development of human resources in terms of capacity building, finance, and technology. Fourth, the AEC will be fully integrated to the global economy by building a system to improve coordination of the member states. In addition, there will be increased participation of countries in Southeast Asia in the global supply chain through development package of technical assistance to countries less developed ASEAN Member. This is done to improve the ability of industry and productivity so that not only increase their participation in a regional scale, but also led the initiative to be globally integrated.

THEORY
Leadership and Adaptive Leadership

Debating the study of leadership since the days of empire into an interesting discussion considering the various dimensions can be present on the implementation of a leadership activity from a leader like the king, the prime minister or a president. Various styles of leadership of the dictator until the discussion of democratic leadership, transformation and in various studies referred to by the leadership of the collaboration. The debate this theory can never give satisfaction and straightforward explanation, both among thinkers, researchers and academics, especially for affected groups of the results of a leadership. Both practical and theory no one dared mention the theory of leadership is really valid and leadership styles are most effective in every condition and every organization. This led to various speculations and ushered in the egocentric leadership experts who said that their theory is the most up to date and adaptive to various problems encountered in the organization, both in the organization of political, economic and non-economic, and even tried to bring the leadership that makes the characteristics of public organizations.

Leadership related to the handling of the change, set the direction to formulate a vision of the future then unite, communicate and inspire people in the organization to achieve the goal. This is consistent with the Nawawi said that leadership is the ability or intelligence that drives some people (two or more) in order to cooperate in carrying out activities directed toward a common goal[7]. The ability to direct others to achieve the set objectives cannot be done easily, if a person does not have a born talent, expertise and references of action in the past in the field of leadership. Influence is a function of leadership aims to direct the behavior and attitudes of others in the context of the organization regardless of its intended purpose or actual beneficiaries[8].

Furthermore, the characteristic feature of leadership skills which are expected to have three, namely[9]: (1) technical skills (technical skills), is the knowledge and skill of a person in the process of administrative policy and / or techniques; (2) human skills (human skills), ability to work effectively with people and fostering teamwork; (3) conceptual skills (conceptual skill), the ability to think in terms of models, frameworks, extensive relationships and long-term plans (visionary). In addition, the ability to be possessed by a leader is technical knowledge; product knowledge; skills to analyze and solve problems; professional skills; innovation; initiative; use of information and communication technology effectively[10]. It also expressed by other experts who say that the leadership of the public sector should at least have[11]: 1) have the ability as a leader as well as the official leader; (2) has the ability to authorize; (3) have a high attention to lower employment; (4) can create atmosphere job satisfaction. The definition implies is a leader should be acceptable to all members of the group and as an official leader, the leader should be fatherly[12].

If related to the challenges of the future, a good leader at least has the ability to be adaptive to the uncertainty of the

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7   Nawawi's statement is quoted by Harbani Pasolong, Kepemimpinan Birokrasi, Alfabeta, Bandung, 2010. pg. 4.
8   Gary Yukl. 2010. Kepemimpinan Dalam Organisasi. PT Indeks. Jakarta. pg. 6-7.
9   Robert L. Katz, 1955, dalam jurnalnya Skills of an Effective Administrator.
10   John H. Zenger dan Joseph Folkman, The Handbook for Leaders, Buana Ilmu Populer, Jakarta, 2004. pg. 21.
11   Gupta L. D, 1983, Educational Administration at College Level, New Delhi: Mohan. pg. 92.
12   *Fatherly* dapat dikatakan sebagai sikap kebapakan.

future, the ability to work cross-country and cross-cultural as well as the ability to create an innovative environment[13]. The future of course is something that inevitably will be found and challenges and dynamics faced by an organization not least by a State. Visionary leader and adaptive leader is an absolute requirement needed to face the challenges in the future.

Adaptive means intelligently adjust to the changes. Adaptive leadership means leadership that easily to adapt itself to the changes and new circumstances. Change is always forming new views, and a new outlook will influence the ongoing events. If the leader does not prepare her personality to respond to the new view, then he will find it difficult to face the change. The ability to organize the personality of a leader in a change will assist the evolution of the organization to handle varying complexity.

The leader of an organization representing a number of organs in the diversity of functions and roles of the traffic work processes and services. The leader's ability to adapt to new circumstances, and understand how to develop subordinates to be able to better handle complex situations, is a great thing that should be a concern for leaders in change. Adapting means to understand the meaning of a new state, and have the initiative in the ability to adapt and change with a complete practice in a personality shared values, governance, systems, procedures. Then, find the most effective way, yet easy to use, make progress and sustainability of the core activities of the organization.

Intelligence leadership must be shown in the form of effective leadership especially in terms of decision-making firm and clear, and the ability to adapt through the learning experience from every point of the journey to change. Leaders must remain with the firm leadership style and influence. Therefore, leaders must find its own concepts and principles of adaptation of lessons were

shared intuition leadership, to create a new governance effective and productive. Change requires leaders to listen carefully, to make action through the ability to adapt to reality, and do not get used to obviate the fact that must be faced.

Changes have properties to give a limited time and limited information. Therefore, leaders should not hesitate and be no action, the leader must move quickly to make a decision within the time limited, and finalize an action plan by gathering as much information, to address the risk of unwanted process changes. When leaders are not able to understand the limitations of time and information in the event of a change, then the leaders will postpone action on the decision to change, and in the end he would fail to meet that change. When leaders forgot the changes, then he will be private perfect for waiting for permission from reality, but he will never be able to adapt to reality, because he was waiting for permission from reality, and reality is always waiting for a change of personality and governance that is able to embrace reality, to generate effectiveness in each process of the organization.

Adaptive leadership means leadership that is capable and intelligent face various situations in a variety of events. And, they are not silent with much to think about, but it moves fast with a wide range of actions, to solve the challenges with changes as needed. Adaptive leadership is always able to organize and improve the quality of mental personality, to be involved in the process of change, and always produces a higher degree of certainty, and has enthusiasm to learn better from every point of change towards a desired reality.

Visionary leader is someone who has a vision for the future that by Thom can create a vision that is done by:

1. Creative approach with proper vision in the future by step:
   a. Breaking away from the ideal concept of reality
   b. Change their perception of the world
   c. Thinking about themselves apart from the object and the situation in

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13   Rainer Turangan, Direktur Daya Dimensi Indonesia (DDI) as quoted by mpi-update.com. Accessed on 4 June 2015.

the neighborhood
   d. Shift their thinking from the beginning to the third person
   e. Creating what is important to them is not what other people expect
   f. Visionary thinking
2. Approach Vision-Training Targeted by step:
   a. Mapping, is the identified every aspect of the project that we can think.
   b. Generating assumptions in the series "would not it be nice if ..."
   c. Write the script

The definition above implies that the vision must be consistent with individual needs and values within the organization. In addition, future challenges as mentioned in desperate need of adaptive leadership. Adaptive leadership is emerging in modern leadership theory expressed by Bambale. It is said that adaptive leadership is leadership that involves leaders develop a vision for the future and inspire others to accept change and be a participant on the way forward with the characteristics: competent in his field; decisions and objective in dealing with the problem; reflective in looking at their own attitudes and behavior; trustworthy in dealing with other interests; innovative in pursuit of better performance; activities are efficient[14]; open-minded in considering relevant information and perspectives.

Some of the concepts of leadership above can be used in order to run an organization depends on the characteristics of the organization. Adaptive action and visionary leadership are certainly linked to changes in the vagueness of the future situation. Such actions can be done by[15]:

1. *Create a Felt Need for Change*
2. *Introduce the Change*
3. *Revise and Finalize the Change Plan*
4. *Stabilize and Sustain the Change*

Source: Daya Dimensi Indonesia (DDI)

Adaptive and visionary leadership as well as leadership and change action is the action that will be discussed in this paper in order to address the real challenges of the future of Indonesia, especially in order to face AEC 2015.

METHOD

This research is basic research (fundamental research) with type research literature that examined various theories associated with adaptive leadership in order to face ASEAN Economic Community. Data retrieval technique uses data sourced from variety of secondary sources, such as books, journals, newspapers and rules related to legislation.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Adaptive leadership in the ASEAN Economic Community in Indonesia

Being the leader of the government in a country both nationally, regionally and locally is not easy. Further challenges will be faced by the leadership in Indonesia. Adaptive and visionary leadership in the face of AEC performed leaders through:

Create a Felt Need for Change

A leader acts to anticipate changes (adaptive) should be able to create a feeling of a need for change. It means that the creation of awareness of the changes to members

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14   Bambale, Abdu Ja'afaru, et.all, 2011. Stimulating Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCBs) Reseach for Theory Development: Exploration of Leadership Paradigms. *International Journal of Academic Business and Social Sciences August* (2011), Volume 1, Special Issue
15   Subject is explained by Dr. Ir. Rozan Anwar, MBA, M.Sn. Founder dan CEO Daya Dimensi Indonesia (DDI) in lecturing class Strategic Leadership and Change. Master of Administration and Public Policy

within an organization is absolute is the duty of the leader. To the leaders who will shape the feeling aware of the changes to its members, should be able to identify (identify) what is needed to change (what needs to change), why an organization led to be changed (why it must change) and the consequences of what happened to organization if the organization does not respond to these changes is a challenge (the consequences for the organization of not responding to the challenge) and the leader should get the attention of its members by giving reason to move from a state of comfortable (get their attention - give people a reason to move out of comfort and complacency).

The context of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in terms of an adaptive leader can implement some of these questions. What is needed to change in order to face the AEC? Obviously the first thing to do is to prepare oneself and take advantage of opportunities in the AEC 2015 and should improve the capability to be able to compete with other ASEAN member states that fear will compete in their own country will not happen. So far, the government leader both the national and local levels have provided socialization associated with AEC though still partial. However, with it expected that all stakeholders have the awareness to improve themselves in order to face the AEC. Since 2011, the government has issued Presidential Instruction No. 11 of 2011 concerning the implementation of the AEC Blueprint commitments in an effort to prepare for the ASEAN free market. The blueprint contains 12 priority sectors that will be integrated by the government which consists of 7 (seven) goods sectors, namely industry agro, automotive, electronics, fisheries, industry rubber-based, industry-based wood and textiles then 5 (five) came from the services sector, namely air transportation, health, tourism, logistics and technology[16].

When a leader to get the question, why the organization should be changed? In the context of dealing with the AEC of course the organization of the State as well as at the local level at least more flexible, repair service bureaucracy, deregulation and the rule of law (law enforcement). AEC will indirectly affect the mindset of a leader, as a leader especially the head of state must have noticed its citizens. AEC is not only open up trade flows of goods and services but also the labor market professionals such as doctors, lawyers and others that open up opportunities for foreign workers to fill position and profession in Indonesia were closed or minimal foreign labor[17]. Additionally related consequences will be experienced by Indonesia if only the organization does not respond to these changes is that Indonesia will become slaves in their own homes as said by President Sukarno in his trial before the Dutch courts. If not anticipated, then will be happened the swelling intellectual unemployment which currently number about 600,000 late without any improvement of the quality of labor[18].

Adaptive leaders will lead the organization towards a dynamic organization that can make changes in building area. Repair an area into a region that has its own bargaining position would be easier to compete in the AEC. Regent Tarakan, Surabaya Mayor and Jembrana are some areas approaching governance dynamic (dynamic governance) with the organization's ability to think about the future (thinking ahead), think of the effectiveness of the program being run at this time (thinking again) as well as learning from other organizations (thinking across), which managed to bring the region out of nothing towards something[19].

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16   Those sectors in AEC era will be implemented in free trade, investment and labor. But now, those programs is changed by other programs. Accessed on: http://id.stie-stmy.ac.id

17   Formal statement from Technical Staff of Labor and Transmigration Minister, Dita Indah Sari on BBC. Accessed through http://www.bbc.co.uk

18   Edy Suandi Hamid, Economist of Indonesia Islam University in his interview with Metro TV. Accessed through http://ekonomi.metrotvnews.com at Friday, 5 June 2015.

19   Azhar Kasim, Martani Husaeni, Rozan Anwar dan Neo Boon Siong. Merekonstruksi Indonesia sebuah Perjalanan Menuju Dynamic Governance. PT. Kompas Media Nusantara. Jakarta. pg. 90.

Introduce the Change

Introducing the company to its members is the job of a leader, as a visionary leader would become a mentor as well as a coach for its members. The process of introducing change by leaders can be done by providing or requesting members of the organization to resolve the issue (ask the people to solve the "problem"), provide solutions and strategies (offer solutions and strategies), listen to the goals, interests and fears members (listen to people's Objections, concerns and fears), know and acknowledge the fear members (acknowledge Reviews their fears) and invites and asks its members to contribute ideas (invite people to offer ideas).

The relation with aspects of introducing the changes, of course, the root causes are identified in advance what issues that become an obstacle in the face of the AEC. Related to this, the legal issue is the fundamental problem that must be corrected. There are two (2) issues of the leaders in Indonesia to be resolved. First, law implementation which in dispute. The initial problems will be great when the leader must has law which will be used in the event of a dispute between the ASEAN countries to establish economic research agreement. Second, the differences between the legal order ASEAN countries and the absence of standardization of the level of compliance with the law among ASEAN countries. Problems bureaucrats as government administrators also become an obstacle to the development of an economy. It should be recognized that the reform of the Indonesian bureaucracy especially mental problems unresolved enforced, so it is still possible for some unscrupulous rogue State administrators to misuse the authority to make a profit for itself. The above problems are two (2) aspects of the problem of the many aspects that can hamper the existence of Indonesia in the AEC when local leaders and / or regions are not adaptive. For example, the city of Surabaya for more than 1 (one) decade (2002-2014) that in general there are some policies or programs implemented by the Surabaya city government under the leadership according to the authors adaptive is[20]:

1. Reforming the bureaucracy
2. Improving public services
3. Structuring the city and waste reduction through Surabaya Green and Clean program
4. Clear the jam flooding
5. Optimizing information and communication technology.

Policies mayor of Surabaya is a process of introducing change through the provision of opportunities for staff to resolve problems, provide solutions and strategies as has been stated by Power Dimensions Indonesia through its representative Rainer Turangan.

Until now, the improvement of bureaucracy through bureaucratic reform program and program acceleration mental revolution produced by the President of Indonesia today aims to improve the ethical behavior of bureaucrats by changing patterns of thought[21]. Mental revolution carried out by entering values into the curriculum Trisakti and Nawacita learning that exist in every organization of education and training candidates for government officials.

Revise and Finalize the Change Plan

Donations idea, either from within the organization or outside the organization by leaders at least revised and resolved to support the process of change. Assist members of the organization in identifying hidden opportunities, defining the shape of future changes based on the requirements / standpoint of its members as well as creating a creative and innovative solutions are some things that must be done by adaptive leaders. Outside of helping members of the organization, encourage members to find creative answers to answer questions about the changes that will be experienced and adjust to changes in vision, strategy and planning is the main task of the adaptive leader in revising and completing the planning process changes.

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20   Azhar Kasim et.al, *op.cit*. pg. 95-152.
21   Statement of the president of Indonesia, Joko Widodo in direct interview with Najwa Shihab in Mata Najwa that republished by Kompas, 17 October 2014

Relation to meet the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), a national leader and leadership in each region determines the AEC region can compete in the future. Of course a change that will be experienced by the government with the ASEAN free market is the increasing number of people who inhabit Indonesia, the number of educated workforce and local professionals will compete with workers from outside Indonesia. Aspect of human resources in the integration of the ASEAN community is language. Although there is still debate about the use of language that ASEAN will be used, but some heads of regions have imposed a mandatory program of English as an international language like Karanganyar, Banyuwangi, Denpasar and Surabaya. On the other hand, the ASEAN countries namely Thailand looks ready to send its workforce in Indonesia to implement curriculum Indonesian[22].

Urgency adaptive leadership in revising and adjusting the planning of change can also been seen in the aspect of national development direction. Indonesia national development on the former regime has established a comprehensive program in the face of the AEC. The program is known as in terms MP3EI (Master Plan for the Acceleration of Indonesian Economic Development). But the current leadership has evaluated and revised development programs towards the development of the program term "Nawacita". The new leadership program is one of them covers economic development. Another example in the sphere of local government, the government of Madison County, known as the granary of East Java and has a local production of seed SMEs like Brem and Sambal Pecel has cooperated with the National Standards Body (BSN) to improve the quality and value of the production area in accordance with the quality standards international[23].

Aspect of the initiation of the adaptive leadership plays an important role in improving the competitiveness of local, regional and national levels. When planning has been established, the next step should be done by a leader is planning to record in the form of planning documents which can become a benchmark of development and then set the standard value and quality of the program that will be implemented.

Stabilize and Sustain the Change

When organizational change has taken place and is considered to adjust to the situation and the situation of environmental uncertainty, further adaptive leader role is to stabilize and maintain the sustainability of the changes in accordance with the times. Develop action steps to make changes, develop performance measures to evaluate these changes, making adjustments to changes in vision and strategy to reflect / kind of thinking and new insights as well as challenge the organization's members to be open to new challenges to be faced. The fourth step in maintaining the stability and sustainability of a very important change made by the leader of the organization.

CLOSING

Environmental organizations have become different and can be felt by the leaders adaptive. Modern era characterized by knowledge-based organization, globalization and the loss of organizational boundaries has encouraged environmental organizations become more complex and more diverse culture. This fact requires leaders to make adjustments and changes in attitude means ready to learn continuously. In the face of AEC that will start December 2015, adaptive leadership skills in the discipline for personal growth and keep learning as a step toward self-mastery that will facilitate their leadership and achieving the results they want.

Leaders know that the value or foundation in the face of competition AEC is human resources. So the leadership role becomes very important when in the position of leader of policymakers. Policies generated by the leader of the learners will be able to bring into the organization's learning culture.

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22   Tetty Tanoyo, Sudah Siapkan kita Menghadapi Masyarakat Ekonomi ASEAN 2015?, 09 September 2014. Accessed through http://www.tettytanoyo.com
23   Suprapto in Conference, Peran Standardisasi dan Pelayanan Publik dalam memasuki ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Jumat, 14.31 WIB.

At the very least, capable and adaptive leadership knows something important inside the organization and then turn it into something worth bargaining. It is focusing not only on output but also on the impact and benefit. It was possible for members of the organization to face the reality that will increase the opportunity for the organization to achieve the desired results.

Of course in the face of AEC this context, the role of leader cannot walk alone either local leader, regional and national. Administrative reforms in all important aspects such as a clear law enforcement, deregulation and de-bureaucratization in the public sector leadership to the effectiveness and efficiency of public services, the delegation of the middle-manager associated with the strategic policy (leader only is mentoring and coaching). Technical context for example, injection of English and the local language into the national curriculum will increase the capacity of human resources without eroding values of local wisdom.

In general, effective measures and adaptive in responding to changing conditions must involve the leadership that has the ability to sense making of the condition of the environment that he knows early potential threats and opportunities (read: Karl Weick "Sense Making in Organizations." This ability can be used to utilize information system for the development of knowledge and policy of decision making, managerial or operational within government organizations.

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NEW INSECURITY: ASSESSING THE U.S. INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND LIBYA

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Abstract

9/11 was an unforgettable event to the United States'people and the rest of the world. It shifted and changed the U.S. foreign policy in global politics since president Bush declared the war on the global terrorism. After years of so much assertive unilateral military means to pursue the targeted terrorist and to alter with human rights, democracy, and so on, the consequences are unexpected. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the U.S. military intervention was effective just in a short term and for the specific military reason, however, generated the more complicated violent conflicts harmful and detrimental to such liberal values. The series unilateral intervention has been triggering a new kind of threat to the global security and bring the world security for the uncertain future.

Keywords: insecurity, global politics, war on terror, global terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

When the world was approaching the end of the 20th century, the U.S. just declared itself to be the only superpower in the world after the fall of the main rival, the Soviet Union. But soon after celebrating the victory, a series of terror attacked the U.S. in September 11, 2001 which consequently shift the direction of the U.S. foreign policy significantly and started a great change of global politics on the eve of the 21st century. It is the tragic moment happened in the United States' soil, killed thousands of American people, destructed and destroyed several symbolic American superiority (WTC towers and the Pentagon building), it's done using American civilian passenger aircrafts as weapons, and it suddenly happened without any prior warning and out of anticipation or quick response from the American defense force. Therefore, it's understandable when the sudden reaction from the U.S. government and the people is a mixed feeling of disbelief, terrible sadness, hatred, and flare up anger.

The U.S. response is the "global war on terror" policy. Since 2001, the U.S. and its western allies have deployed military forces to several countries in the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa. Its main purposes are to fight for defending human rights, promoting democracy, expanding free market, and maintaining security, against what so called terrorist groups, especially al-Qaeda and the "rogue regimes" which are indicated support, protect or at least sympathize toward the terrorist groups. The U.S. and its allies' military deployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya reflected representation of those three regions, where they involved in violent conflicts against the defendants of the rogue regimes.

However, because of the presence of the American troops in those countries had been prolonged for over a decade, and the fact that occur in these countries has not been as expected, even in some ways get worse, it is interested to ask about the results of these military games, whether they have been conducive or detrimental to liberal values such as human rights, democracy, development, and global security.

To answer the question I want to divide this paper into four parts. First, the theoretical framework to explain the recent insecurity in terms of increasing terrorism, failed states as results of the Western interventionism.

The next three parts are about insecurity in practice, explaining the cases in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. By assessing such evidence, this paper concludes that it helped a few in a short term and hindered a most part of the world in the middle and long term in terms of improving human security and global order. In my opinion, we need another approach which is more just, fair, peaceful and comprehensive to understanding, and intervening in, the world.

EXPLAINING NEW INSECURITY

History tells that one reason on which the United States of America was founded is for the sake of freedom from imperialism. The historic American leaders like George Washington and John Quincy Adams had wisely warned American to not be tempted to be "another Imperium." It is true as far as the characteristics of the classic imperium like the Ottoman, British, and Soviet. Now the U.S. holds different practices, but the same spirit of imperialism. It is a different "imperium" like what Michael Ignatieff says that the American empire is, "a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known." (Ignatieff 2003). And it looks like American destiny to hold the legacies of the old imperial power of the Ottoman, the British, as well as the Soviet Union. Even after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990s, the U.S. stands alone, not just for its fortune, but also for its burdens.

And in the last decade after 9/11, practically, the U.S. brings the burden alone to make a better world based on its own vision, namely, liberal democracy and free market capitalism. Furthermore, the situation in the Middle East is more complex, a mixed of terrorism, failed states, and anti-America rogue regime abusing human rights. So, the military supremacy may just defeat the terrorist groups and topple down the rogue regime, however, The U.S., as Mallaby argues, "… cannot rebuild each failed state or appease each anti-American hatred, and the more they try, the more they expose themselves to the overreach that eventually undermined the classical empires of old." (Mallaby 2002). The fierce struggle among authoritarian regime, Islamist theocratic tyranny, and democratic-nationalists, makes the burden harder severalfold to resolve. The evidence shows that the more the American empire penetrated militarily to resolve the conflict in the Middle East, the more the terrorism and failed states occur. And the U.S. has been being trapped in this enigma which precisely harm to American principle itself.

The phenomenon of failed states invites the consciousness of the responsibility to protect (R2P) for the sake of humanitarian reasons. And it is very important to address because the violation of human rights remain occurs, especially in the failed states, as Gareth Evans stated,

> "And let us get to the point that – when the lives of thousands or more of men, women and children are again at risk because a country has shown that it is unable or unwilling to end a man-made humanitarian crisis within its borders – the reflex response around the world is not to say, as countries have been saying for centuries, that 'it's none of our business', but rather to accept immediately that it is the business of all of us, and have the debate only about who should do what, when and how." (Evans 2009).

And institutionally, the obligation to save failed states should be in the hand of the United Nations along its bodies. Helman and Ratner, in *Saving Failed States* insist,

> "The long-term acceptance of limitations on absolute sovereignty, the emerging views expressed by the world community regarding the propriety and legality of humanitarian assistance to countries in distress, and member states' increased willingness to entrust more authority to the U.N. all point to new alternatives for responding to the phenomenon of failed states." (Helman and Ratner 1992).

And the new alternatives is the U.S unilateral intervention, regardless its liberal agenda behind the policy, could be effectively accomplished such situations in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Rwanda.

After the shocking 9/11, however, the U.S. has been going far further in the more complex situations of the failed states, rogue regimes, terrorism, civil war, corruption, and the abuse of human rights combined. And it made the emphasize of the military approach itself was not sufficient, even worsening. The failure of the U.S. incomprehensible and ironic intervention, instead, sparks anti-American movement which harms both civilians, nationalists, and the U.S. interest itself and led them into the insecurity situation. The ultimate insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa now characterized by the emerging radical Sunni Islamist as the proliferation of which called by Patrick Cockburn as the "al-Qaida-type terrorism" (Cockburn 2014) like Boko Haram in Nigeria as well as Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and especially the phenomenal Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Syria). The danger of its intolerant principles to human rights, among others, is depicted by Cockburn, "As with Boko Haram in Nigeria, militants in Iraq and Syria see no religious prohibition in enslaving women as spoils of war." (Cockburn 2014). As the news reporting, their conduct of war is indiscriminate and totally out of any law of war, as they, "… shoots children in the face for minor blasphemy and sends pictures of decapitated soldiers to the parents of their victims." (Cockburn 2014).

On one hand, the U.S. along with its liberal economic interest, military supremacy, and support for democracy and human rights generated its responsibility to protect (R2P) and saved people in failed states. On the other hand, the UN awkwardness to response such situation encourages the U.S. imperial desire to intervene unilaterally, though it consequently led the U.S. to expense a lot of its resources, both capital and human, so that Barry Posen propose warns to the U.S. to pull back its active foreign policy, "It is time to abandon the United States' hegemonic strategy and replace it with one of restraint." (Posen 2013). It is because the U.S. must be conscious that the U.S. intervention resulting no more than an anti-American reaction and that the allies has been using its security

shelter to save their own interest.

Responding to what Posen proposed, Brooks argues, "The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know." (Brooks 2013) It means that the U.S. engagement to fight against rogue states with a tough policy to neutralize rough countries through preventive, even preemptive, wars is still needed to make the world be a better place for liberal democracy and the market economy. Nevertheless, the U.S. ironic unilateral military actions produce unexpected results: it is costly too much, generating more failed states, and increasing terrorism, which all of them led the U.S. to more insecurity, both economically and politically.

To assess in more detail, the next parts describe the cases of the economic, political and military strategies of the US and its allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya consecutively.

AFGHANISTAN: AS BUSINESS AS USUAL

The 9/11 tragedy triggered the U.S. and NATO to launch the 'global war on terror,' and it was addressed to the Taliban in Afghanistan who protected al-Qaeda, the terrorist group who was accused as the actor behind 9/11 attack. "In the wake of 9/11, the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invaded Afghanistan under the rubric of the 'global war on terror'" (Klassen 2013) The military campaign succeeded to wipe out the Taliban from power and the U.S. proceed to recover post-war Afghanistan with state building and economic reconstruction as the implementation of Bonn Process. Afghanistan was promised "a future of democracy, development, peace, and security." (Klassen 2013). To achieve those promises, the U.S set up to build a new state under Hamid Karzai, his cabinet, and an elected parliament in making a stable government, employ the IMF and many NGOs to to rebuild Afghanistan's economy and along with NATO forces remain conduct a low-intensity war to sweep the rest of 'anti-government forces.'

However, the glorious promise of the US to the Afghan people had never become

reality because there was a bias in the implementation of the policy of the war against terrorism. Anand Gopal in his article *How an American Fantasy Conflict Created Disaster in Afghanistan* (Gopal 2015), noted that Afghan top figures initially welcomed the American promises as what Hajji Burghet Khan of Ishaqzai tribe, a former Taliban supporter and a hero of Afghan war, said, "Now he was extolling the virtues of the coming American order. There would be jobs, he said, and there would be development. And, most important, farmers would be left alone to do the work they'd always done." (Gopal 2015). Also in what other Afghan leader, Hajji Bashar of Noorzai tribe, a former financier of the Taliban said, "… that with American wealth and power on their side, the future had never looked brighter." (Gopal 2015).

Unfortunately, the elected Karzai government was too dependent to the U.S. support for financial and military protection. The dependency made the government could not prevent the corruption in many aspects of public administration. Aid and development programs have been scaled back, production and distribution of opium emerged as a multi-billion-dollar industry. But the most dangerous bias lied on the overemphasis on counterinsurgency. Many of low-intensity war operations to neutralize the remaining Taliban forces went wrong. The pragmatic interests of some U.S. collaborators, on behalf of their own fortune, distorted information to the U.S. authority in repacking their rival tribesmen as the targeted Taliban. Furthermore, the way how the U.S. military attacked and ambushed the targeted people was full of wrongdoing and how they detained and treated the captured "Taliban" was full of humiliation which never happened even in the Soviet era. This caused the rest of Afghan tribal leaders and ex-Taliban fighters realized that they had no choice but to fight back. That explains why they fled across the border to Pakistan to join with the Taliban's safe-havens in the northwest Pakistan. Conclusively, the glorious purposes to create democracy, development, peace, and security in the post-Taliban Afghanistan is destroyed by the pragmatic greed for the sake of business as usual.

IRAQ: THE MORE THREATS TO THE U.S. AND ISRAEL

Soon after a quick assessment of what happened in September 11 debacle, president Bush announced the "global war on terror" on his address to Congress on the night of the same day:

> *"The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." (Bush 2001, 58).*

However, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was questionable regarding its correlation with the 9/11 terror, since there is no hard evidence whether or not Iraq under Saddam Hussein acted a terrorism against the U.S. or harbored a terrorist group, especially al-Qaeda. Furthermore, George Parker declares that "it still is not possible to be sure, and this remains the most remarkable thing about the Iraq." (Mearsheimer and Walt 2009). And in *Understanding the Bush Doctrine,* Robert Jervis argues, "That the doctrine could guide behavior, even if it were originally a rationalization." (Jervis 2003). It means that beyond its importance, the U.S invasion is an implementation of the Bush doctrine which use the 9/11 as rationalization to the doctrine and the invasion as its realization, even though it led the U.S. to perform the characteristic that so much like an empire. To put a light on the enigma, some propositions focus on the main purposes of the U.S.: establishing more security for Israel and alternating the U.S. military base out of Saudi Arabia.

Prior to the 9/11, a series of demand to president Bush to go to war against Iraq with the priority to topple down Saddam Hussein from power. In *Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,* Mearsheimer and Walt argue that "the war was motivated at least in good part by a desire to make Israel more secure." (Mearsheimer and Walt 2009). The evidence supported the statement, since a part of the

initiative came from neoconservative groups around the president, and the more significant proposal has come from the Israel lobby, which were done by many Israel officials and lobbyists, based on an assumption that obviously Saddam Hussein was the most dangerous enemy to Israel. So, the 9/11 is a trigger, a *casus belli,* with which the proposal quickly support by American public and politicians, and also American allies all over the world.

But the aftermath of the Iraq war told a contrary. Mearsheimer and Walt says, "The war in Iraq has not been good for Israel either, especially since it has strengthened Iran's hand in the region." (Mearsheimer and Walt 2009). And no less than Amatzia Baram, an Israeli expert on Iraq who support for Saddams ouster, now admits, "the invasion produced much, much more [terrorism] that I expected." (Mearsheimer and Walt 2009). Through its military supremacy over the toothless Iraqi forces, the U.S. was relatively easy to gain victory and overthrown Saddam Hussein. Nevertheless, the unexpected consequences occurred since the recent situation in Iraq has exactly put Israel in a more dangerous threat of terrorism.

The other rationales behind the prolonged U.S. war in Iraq are argued by Doug Stokes, "… the three salient US interests in Iraq; the desire to install a pro-US state; acquire permanent military bases and to transnationalize the Iraqi economy." (Stokes 2009). But after prolonged over a decade, and succeeded to toppled down Saddam Hussein, the American military presence in Iraq has not met to conforms general political and strategic patterns of American statecraft in the Middle East. Instead of alternative military based out of Saudi Arabia, Iraq now is the most dangerous place to install the U.S. military based since its political instability and civil-war-like violent conflicts among sectarian groups. And the situation obviously hampers any effort to transnationalize the Iraqi economy.

LIBYA: DIFFERENT STYLE, SAME DEBACLE

Compared to Afghanistan and Iraq, the military campaign led by the U.S. to invade Libya in 2011 used a different style in which no direct deployment of the U.S. army in the battle ground. Shortly after the death of Muammar al-Qaddafi, president Obama said, "Without putting a single U.S. service member on the ground, we achieved our objectives." (Kuperman 2015). Apparently, the Obama administration has learned from its involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which thousands of American soldiers lost their lives. In Libya, instead, the U.S. and its western allies just supported the opposition to balance against al-Qaddafi forces through enforcing no-fly zone, bombarding Libyan military bases, and apparently also supported the opposition and rebel groups with arms and ammunitions.

It was true, for the short term, as Kuperman added, "the United States seemed to have scored a hat trick: nurturing the Arab Spring, averting a Rwanda-like genocide, and eliminating Libya as a potential source of terrorism." (Kuperman 2015) However, in the long term, the result is in contrary to all such three well-meaning goals: the fragile infant democratic process turned into deadly violent conflicts among factions, just multiply the massive violence, including indiscriminate civilian casualties, and changing Libya into a safe-haven to radical Islamist groups.

As a matter of fact, the aftermath of the intervention led by the U.S. over Libya results a debacle in which much unreliable information was exaggerated in the journey to decide to deploy military intervention in Libya. The lack of prudent consideration to what games played in the Libyan field made a military campaign on behalf humanitarian aid produced nothing but helping the militants. As Kuperman says,

> *"The rebel groups sometimes exaggerate not only the state's violence, but their own popular support, too. Even where a regime is highly flawed, as Qaddafi's was, chances are that intervention will only fuel civil war-destabilizing the country, endangering*

civilians, and paving the way for extremists."
(Kuperman 2015)

Nevertheless, there are two critics responded to Kuperman's conclusion that as the observer, indeed, a person like Kuperman could just state that president Obama's decision to invade Libya is a debacle. However, as a decision maker, Obama was in constraint and under pressure when the decision might be made and the action was based on considerations that could not be proved at the time. (Chollet and Fishman May-June 2015) But Kuperman replied that whatever the reasons underlying the decision, the evidence shows that Libya is getting worse, not better. And Kuperman warns that the subsequent events would be more insecure to the U.S. and its Western allies' interests, contrary to the glorious goals of security, democracy, and prosperity. (Kuperman May-June 2015)

CONCLUSION

The bitter terrorist attack on September 11th 2001 in the United States of America's soil shifted the direction of the U.S. foreign policy significantly and started a great change of global politics on the eve of the 21st century. The U.S under the Bush administration declared the "war on terror" to the terrorists and the rogue states given asylum to the terrorist groups. Instead of taking the weary UN procedures in resolving the problem, the U.S. tends to do a much assertive unilateral military means to pursue the targeted terrorist and to spread the solution in the form of imposing liberal values such as human rights, democracy, development, and global security. However, after years of military deployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the consequences are unexpected. Instead of keeping the anti-imperial nationalist spirit to the assorted national interests, the U.S. was tempted to be imperial-alike obsession to rule the world and hold the burden alone.

In Afghanistan, the success story in defeating the radical Islamist Taliban in order to terminate al-Qaeda's den, was biased by a prolonged abuse and corruption for the sake of financial profit, causing wrongdoing military operations and the humiliation to the civilian radicalized them to be part of reemerging Taliban.

In Iraq, the consideration to invade Iraq and toppled down Saddam Hussein was come from the U.S. neoconservative groups and strengthened by Israel lobby in order to establish U.S. hegemony after the Middle East and to provide more security to Israel from its most dangerous enemy, Saddam Hussein, but resulted to more insecurity to both countries, because Iraq now stumbles into political and security chaos and the fallen Saddam Hussein gives more chance to Iran-backed up Shiah majority to rule in Baghdad and therefore sparks Sunni-based resistance.

While in Libya, even though the U.S. and its allies did not deploy military troop on the ground, but the same debacle occurred, since the rush and the incomprehensible settlement process was covered by a desire to retaliate against Muammar Qaddafi.

Conclusively, the military intervention could show that the specific missions were accomplished: wiped out Taliban in Afghanistan, toppled down Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and overthrown Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. Therefore, it is effective in a short term and for the specific military reason.

However, the incomprehensible approach hindered a most part of the world in the middle and long term. A new approach which is more just, fair, peaceful and comprehensive is needed for understanding, and intervening in, the world.

In general, the paradoxical conduct of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya is detrimental to liberal values such as human rights, democracy, development, and global security.

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EMBRACING PEACE THROUH THE MEMORY OF WAR: GERNIKA AS A CASE STUDY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

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Abstract:

The commemoration of the bombing in Gernika that happened in April 27, 1937 is actually the leading activity for Gernika to pursue peace. Continued by the peace museum, peace research center and the legendary painting by Pablo Picasso, the people of Gernika are trying to pursue peace through the memory of war. The paper argues that the method of people of Gernika in pursuing peace is through the memory of war. Through the memory of war, which is embedded in the four elements, they created an identity of Gernika to be the symbol of peace and the symbol of anti-war.

Keywords: identity, memory of war, peace, identity-based conflict, Gernika-Spain

INTRODUCTION

Basque is one of the provinces in Spain which is very important in the Spanish history, especially during the civil war in 1934-1939. As Basque is an ethnic with the different race, culture and language among the Spanish majority, it was united and had the same say over few things such as the stand on the side of government instead of the opposition. Therefore, Basque province was targeted by Franco military troops along with the help from Italian and Germans government.

A small town named Gernika in Basque language or Guernica in Spanish was bombarded by joint forces (Spanish-Italian-Germans) under the command of Francisco Franco (later became the dictator of Spain) in order to weaken the support over the government from Basque supporters. However, what made the bombardment over Gernika was different than any other places in Spain by Franco in his pursuit over the power was because Gernika was the sacred place for all Basque in general. Gernika is a home of oak tree where taking oath as the officers was taking place; it was a venue of the house representative; it was the place where the *fueros*[1] was born for the first time and finally the agreement between Basque and Queen Isabella with King Ferdinand was also done in Gernika (Graham, 2000).

When the nationalist group won the war and Franco became the head of Spanish state, Gernika and many other towns in Basque received many pressures from the central government and many policies were made to limit their movement and freedom. Language and culture were absolutely forbidden during Franco era; someone can be ended up in jail if got caught using Euskera (Basque language). Franco ensured the infrastructure was built referred to Spanish (Madrid) style where *'puerta del sol' must*[2] be built in every town. The policy of this infrastructure uniform called reconstruction-deconstruction. It was reconstructing new building with the new style and deconstructing the old building with the old (Basque) style at the same time (Viejo-Rose, 2011).

During Franco era, people of Basque was resisting in at least two forms: using the political way and using the extreme one. When the pressure towards them was strong, it strengthens their identity even stronger as well; the sense of belonging on their identity as Basque was even tightly gripped. The normal resistance was done by politician and activist through a formal protest and legal political procedures while the extreme one was done

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[1] *Fueros* was the law of the kingdom, and later became the autonomous right document of being special region within Spain.

[2] Gate of the sun (personal translation)

by the organization or so called 'separatist movement' named *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA) which tends to use violence in their struggle to get recognition of Basque identity and to get independent as a Basque state.

Since Franco died in 1975, Basque returned to show its identity, especially after Juan Carlos I, the successor of Spain after Franco opened up the flow democracy towards his country. The death of Franco was not only good news for Basque, but actually it was the same thing to some regions which shared common situation like Cataluña[3] and some activists who had been always critical towards Franco's policies. Local languages were spoken again freely and being taught to their new generations, including *Euskera* (Basque language). Not only those mentioned above who were happy with the death of Franco, but also ETA was one of them, too. ETA's struggle did not end there even though the emergence of this organization was because of the dictatorship of Franco. ETA was no longer Franco's problem but it became government and most people of Spain as its target was not only Franco Administration people or new administration people, but also civilians. After Franco was gone, then ETA came.

On the other hand, Gernika started to show its important town again after years Franco made it silence. Gernika was conducting what opposites from ETA, it is nurturing peace. Gernika was trying to tell people that not everybody supports terrorism done by ETA, not every Basque is in favor with ETA, and so the image of Basque should not be associated as terrorist or ETA. Started from the commemoration of the bombing, Gernika asked everybody in Gernika to prevent what had happened to their town no to happen again in the future. So the commemoration was kind of reminder for Basque to keep peace in the region. Not only the commemoration, the pursuit of peace was also done by Gernika through three other elements, they are: Peace of Museum of Gernika, Peace Research Center and the legendary painting by Pablo Picasso.

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3   Consists of following provinces, they are: Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona.

COMMEMORATION

The bombing that happened in April 27, 1937 in the town of Gernika is commemorated annually by the people of Gernika, and the first commemoration was held in 1987 after the re-emergence of Basque identity which was buried for forty years. The commemoration was not obviously held during the Franco era since he repressed the people of Gernika and he did not admit the action done by him, he even blamed the people of Gernika did it by themselves instead. The commemoration was not even held right after Franco died since the people of Gernika needed sometimes to have the same shared memory and later it is called collective memory. The commemoration is held every year since then.

The commemoration has been promoted reconciliation and peace until it obtained few good results such as an official apology from the Petra K Kelly, the parliament member from the green party of the Germany to the people of Gernika during one of the commemoration events. Later, the apology was also made by the President of the Germany, Roman Herzog who asked forgiveness in 1998 to the survivors and to the people of Gernika for the role of Germany during the Spanish civil war and to be specific, for the bombing of Gernika 78 years ago.

The commemoration is developed from time to time. Such as four minutes remembrance of the bombing with the siren was developed few years ago and it made the commemoration was even more sorrow. Another important sub-program during the commemoration is the academic activities such as seminar and workshop. For example in 2014 the academic program brought the big theme: *"Universo de la memoria y memoria universal. Palabra, vacío y silencio"[4].* In 2013, the academic program brought the big theme: *"Poder y Paz. Economía de Paz. El Poder de la Paz"[5].* In this academic program, usually students from the major of peace or related

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4   Universe of the memory and the universal memory. Word, emptiness and silence (personal translation).
5   Power and peace. Economy and Peace. The power of peace (personal translation)

major from many different universities across Spain and Europe are invited to the program to have these scientific activities. In addition, the students could apply what they have learned in the class to the context of Gernika.

The commemoration is going into a deep interaction with the people of Basque through emotional program such as musical drama. The musical drama narrated the story of the moment where the town of Gernika was bombed by the Condor Legion of the Germany and *Legendaria* of Italy. Casted by many street actors and the performance moved around the city with the sorrow songs sung by several people acting as the victims. The performance was amazing, strong and impressed many people including local or international tourist.

The commemoration is done annually and involves the whole town with many organizations such as *Gernika Gogoratuz* Foundation, *Zine Klub Elkartea*[6], *Gernika-Lumoko udala*[7], *Gernikazarra Elkartea*, Ayuntamiento de Gernika-Lumo, Gernika Batzordea[8] y Kultura Batzordea, Gernikarra Historia Taldea[9], and BASKale Elkartea[10].

To complete the programs in the commemoration of the bombing, some museums were open for free in only one day, in which the day where the bombing commemorated, April 26; the museums are peace museum has the complete collection of the bombing of Gernika and few collection of other human tragedy in the world; museum of *Euskal Herria* which has the complete collection of the people of Basque includes history and cultures; and finally *La Casa de Juntas*[11] which has the sacred oak tree of Gernika and the old Basque House of Representative.

The commemoration actually brings the simple message, Gernika has experienced the dark history which became collective memory of the people of Gernika, and they voiced to the world that they suffered from it,

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6   Elkartea means association
7   Udala means city
8   Batzordea means committee
9   Taldea means team
10   Socio-cultural Basque-German Association
11   Old house of representative building

and they do not want that happens anywhere, either in Gernika or anywhere else in the world.

The commemoration is also a way for Gernika to connect with the other victims of the bombing in other parts of the world such as Dresden in Germany and Hiroshima in Japan. Dresden started to invite the representative of Gernika to commemorate the bombing in Dresden on February 13, 2003; while Hiroshima, represented by the mayor of the town and the president of Mayors for Peace, joined the commemoration of Gernika in 2007 for the first time. Afterwards, the commemoration is attended by the representative annually as a solidarity act by the victims for the similar tragedy. Both have the collective memory on the same feelings but in different events, bombing on the defenseless civilians.

PEACE MUSEUM

"A museum is a non-profit making permanent institution in the service of society and of its development, and open to the public, which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits, for purposes of study, education and enjoyment, material evidence of people and their environment." (Icommuseum, 2014)

The name of the 'peace museum' in fact evolved from the first time established until it is used in many countries nowadays. The name which was called 'anti-war museum' changed to memorial museum and finally became 'peace museum' which is quite common up until now.

In the beginning, the 'anti-war' was a concept by a polish named Jean de Bloch (1836-1902) for the exhibition which later he wanted to make it as museum. The man who was awarded A Nobel Peace Prize in 1902 realized his intention to participate the exhibition of 'anti-war' in Paris in 1900. Unfortunately, although the exhibition was successfully done, Jean never had a chance to see his dream museum opened its door until he passed away in 1902 (Young, 2010: 85).

Few years later after Jean died, still in the same year, the museum of 'anti-war' for

the first time was established in Lucerne, Switzerland. The museum which was named 'war and peace museum' could attract twice of the population number of the residents of Lucerne annually. Due to its fame and the existence of the museum, Lucerne became the venue of the fourteenth of the International Congress of Peace in 1905 which previously was held in Boston, United States of America (Young, 2010: 85).

The third museum was established in 1925 in Berlin, Germany which was called 'Anti-*Kriegs*[12] Museum'. This museum was founded by Ernst Friedrich (1894-1967), a pacifist anarchist. As time went by, this museum experienced up and down, especially during the era of Nazi. The museum was broken into in 1933 and Ernst was imprisoned. He did not give up that easy, the museum was reopened up again in Belgium to avoid Nazi, but he was followed and the museum had to be shut down again. The museum finally reopened up again back in Germany by his grandson in 1981 up until now (Young, 2010: 85).

After the end of the Second World War, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum began the new form of museum by the new name, memorial museum which obviously focused on the memory. The museum has the spirit to deny forgetting, these two museums are projected to ensure human not to forget to the tragic events that happened in the past, in this case the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (Young, 2010: 84). The museums have warned the people on the terrible effect of the atomic bombing which is still impacting even until now. Those victims have been suffering not only those direct ones, but their generations have inherited the illness from their parents through their grandparents, their grandparents of their grandparents.

Even now, after over half a century later, many aftereffects remain: leukemia, A-bomb cataracts, and cancers of thyroid, breast, lungs, salivary glands, birth defects, including mental retardation and fears of birth defects in their children, plus, of course, the disfiguring

keloid scars (atomicbombsmuseum, 2014).

Apart from the name of 'peace museum' that has evolved, the concept of the museum has also been evolving from time to time in accordance with the phenomenon that happened on the way. In the early of its establishment, museum had displayed arms and its effect toward human or victims which were documented by pictures and videos. Later, the peace museum emerged is not only displaying the terrible things happened in the past, but now the museum is more than only an exhibition. Museum attempts to reclaim and retold the old stories of the peace makers, peacemaking, and equips the new generation to build peace in their own time and live. Furthermore, the peace museum is part of the important thing in the culture of peace in the continuity of working toward peaceful world (Young, 2010: 85).

Gernika Peace Museum was the first peace museum, not only in Gernika but also the whole Spain. Embarked from the human tragedy of the Gernika Bombing in 1937, the peace museum was established in 1998 by the unanimous decision of the town hall of Gernika-Lumo. In its early existence, the museum was named by the history museum of Gernika which guides people to the history of Gernika, especially the civil war of Spain in which Gernika as a focus. However, in 1999 until 2002, the museum was renovated and adjusted with the assistance of the ministry of culture of Spain. The museum which is located in *Plaza de los Fueros* number one, finally changed its name became the peace museum of Gernika.

Previously, the name of the museum was 'Museum of Gernika History', and then it was changed into 'Gernika Peace Museum'. As the name changed, it also changed its mission from only providing information to become active missionary for achieving peace. In detail, the museum has the mission to preserve, visualize, publicize and to conduct research while also to educate visitors to understand the basic ideas about culture of peace, the past, the present through the history of Gernika-Lumo.

Furthermore, the museum became

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12   Kriegs means 'war' in Germans

active members of the international network in the museum community of the world in order to keep it updated and informed and to gain more coverage of this museum in reaching the world such as International Network of Museums for Peace (ICOM), ICOM: International Council of Museums, IC-MEMO (The International Committee of Memorial Museums in Remembrance of the Victims of Public Crimes), AIPAZ (Spanish Association of Research for Peace), International Coalition of Sites of Conscience Forum of Peace and Human Rights Associations.

The museum also provides collection of the reading materials in the documentation center like a library, I includes: The bombing of Gernika, the Spanish Civil War, The exile, and History of Gernika-Lumo and many others.

As the museum is categorized as modern museum, Gernika peace museum allows the visitor experience the moments before and during the bombing of Gernika on April 26, 1937 through the audiovisual room. The narration is read in four options of languages, they are Euskera, Spanish, French and English. The audiovisual room is able to make the feel like a real moment as if a real condition because they made the room looks like as it was and the audio sounds like real such as when kids were playing, the noise of the Monday market[13], and all of them make the visitor could really feel how the feeling at that time was. Finally, the audiovisual room experience is ended by the view of the wreckage of the house that was built exactly on the place where peace museum is currently located. The wreckage is shown suddenly after the light shoots the space behind the glass of the glass of mirror.

Apart from the permanent spaces of the museum that visitors can see, they also have temporary space which is dynamically changing from time to time. In 2014 this temporary space has an exhibition called 'Transit Gernika'. This exhibition brought the concept of time travel from the old time of Gernika until the recent situation of Gernika. Some pictures are shown in this exhibition but

in two types of pictures: the old town and the new town, the old generation picture and the young generation of Gernika, the old street and the new street of Gernika and many aspects that can be compared between the past and the present. The most interesting part on this section is actually the Photoshop Photos where they combine two different pictures of old and new pictures together but only different color; for example they showed soldiers (in black and white) standing on the street with another photo with the current condition with kids playing on the same street (in color).

This museum is a witness of the collective memory of the people of Gernika through its complete collection. This museum tries to bring the people of Gernika and other visitors to heading the destination of peace. The museum as if strengthens the collective memory of the people of Gernika and to be a bridge between the past and the present with the goal of the future. The past represents the history of the people Gernika in museum's collections, the present represents the identity of the people of Gernika where the past influenced it much and finally the future is the goal to achieve peace as the destination of the people of Gernika and all people of the world.

PEACE RESEARCH CENTER

The name of this peace research center is Gernika Gogoratuz in Euskera and has a meaning 'Gernika is remembering'. The peace research center that has the same name as its foundation is dedicated for the human tragedy that happened in Gernika in 1937 or during the Spanish civil war. The center was established in 1987 coincided with the 50th anniversary of the Gernika bombing through the unanimous decision of Basque parliament. The establishment of the center was also in the same time as the first apology from the Germany, represented by the parliament member of the green party Petra K Kelly which later the apology was also made by the Germany President, Roman Herzog in 1998.

The center has a goal to perpetuate the symbol of peace and to remember the

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13   The bombing was happening during the Monday market on April 26, 1937

historical fact of the town of Gernika. Through the framework of memory and culture of peace, the center brings Gernika as an object of the scientific research for the peaceful world, particularly in Basque country. This mission is done through having researches and other relevant activities such as training and community work under the big theme of Peace Symbology and Everyday Life & Peace.

In the topic of peace symbology, this research aims to get some achievements in three categories. First, this research is projected to create some spaces for the meeting and the reflections such programs that have been conducted, they are: international conventions, summer programs and days of anti-military dedication. The second target is to strengthen the researches and innovations with the academic collaboration; it could be with the individuals, universities and some institutions in the scheme of peace. Finally, the center has targeted to participate actively in the international networks to strengthen the researches, especially in the scoop of Europe and Latin America.

Meanwhile, in the topic of everyday life & peace, the center has at least three targets to be achieved. First, the center is projected to have an intervention community-based towards everyday's conflict and to help the process of transformation through looking at the historical and social sides. The second is to recover the group as the reflection forum to encourage the transformation process. Finally, the center on the everyday life & peace is projected to strengthen the social fabric and to recover the capacity of the new institution in the society.

The centre has also the special libraries, such as newspaper library and the archives of the documentary films of about 8.807. In addition, the library also has 4.077 of scientific researches, 208 units of the educative resources and 336 of the audiovisual teaching references. In addition, the research center also has editorials named Red Gernika which has been published in 13 editions and 17 drafts of the editions that are edited which published afterwards. In different edition and other framework, the research has resulted 25 of monographic works and audiovisual materials.

This research is there for strengthening the collective memory that has been in the people of Gernika about Gernika through the scientific approach. After the commemoration of the bombing that help to make the same perception of the collective memory and the transfer of collective memory from the old generation to the young generation, peace museum came for the authentic data of the bombing through its authentic collection, and now the peace research center is coming not only with the emotional and memory, but with the scientific methodology. The center is coming with the logic calculation of struggle for peace. The centre is to complete the commemoration and the peace museum for peace.

LEGENDARY PAINTING BY PABLO PICASSO

The world had changed a great deal since Picasso painted that first political masterpiece, but it had not necessarily grown easier. We are near the end of a tumultuous century that has witnessed both the best and worst of human Endeavour. Peace spreads in one region as genocidal fury rages in another. Unprecedented wealth coexists with terrible deprivation, as a quarter of the world's people remain mired in poverty. Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations (Hensbergen, 2005: 1).

As we have mentioned earlier in the introduction, Guernica is different than Gernika apart from the spelling difference; Gernika is the spelling of Euskera and Guernica is the spelling of Spanish. Gernika refers to the town of Gernika, while Guernica refers to the painting by Pablo Picasso. Therefore, in this section, the reader should be ensured to understand in the first place between Gernika and Guernica.

His name is Pablo Ruiz Picasso. Was born in Malaga – Spain in 1881, this son of an artist father named José Ruiz y Blasco would be one of the most Spanish influential artists whose masterpiece holds the significant

relation with the Spanish soil. Knowing that his son with his wife named María Picasso had the interest and talent in art-especially drawing, he introduced objects of life to him to draw in the early of his age. The father who was also the professor of the fine art in the school, encouraged him to learn more in the field of art, until one day he said something meaningful to Picasso, "a drawing should be an exact representation of the model: red fabric should look like red fabric, sadness should look like sadness" (Serres and Price, 2010: 7).

Artist expresses their feeling and mood through what they are good at. A writer would write pages and pages of sorrow to express their sadness; the music instrumentalist would play their instruments with the bitter sound and finally painter like Picasso would express his sadness and sorrow through painting. Picasso painted Guernica with all his heart in every scratch to the big canvas of 3, 5 m x 7, 8 m. What he saw on May 1, 1937 on the French national newspaper of Ce Soir, he poured all of them into the painting of Guernica (Serres and Price, 2010: 20).

Picasso was commissioned by the republican government of Spain to paint something about the situation in Spain, to tell the world how the civil war suffered many people in Spain. The painting was projected to fill the pavilion of the international routine agenda called, 'The World Fair' in Paris which was held in Brussels before in 1935. The world fair which was participated by many countries in the world entitled by, The Exposition *Internationale des Arts et Techniques dans la Vie Moderne* and opened on May 25 - November 25, 1937. However, even one month before the world agenda opened, Picasso had not had any inspiration to paint his first political painting in his life for that event. It is political because he wanted to end the civil war in Spain as he always loved his own country and he was pacifist.

One morning in Paris, April 27, 1937 there was a big demonstration wave in the city centre. They have got news from the people in the border (with Spain in the south) through the radio broadcasting by the president of the Basque country, José Antonio Aguirre in Bilbao about the bombing in Gernika. They were protesting about the human tragedy which was against the values of humanity. Three days later, the bombing of Gernika done by the German and Italian air forces on the service of Francisco Franco was strengthened by the London Times journalist, George Steer reported from the field; and later the news was reprinted to many medias in the world, including *Ce Soir* in Paris. Soon after Picasso knew the news, he was so sad and continued to paint his sketch. But not the painting he had started, painting that had just came to his mind with anger. He painted Guernica.

Guernica looks like only painted in black and white, but it actually has blue color in the little part of the painting; and Picasso intended to use these three limited colors for Guernica and painted with oil (Pablopicasso, 2014). The blue color showed the sadness as it is line with the English idiom, 'Feeling Blue' which has the meaning sad or depression; in the same time, blue has the meaning of hope or peace which would be the output of the painting as anti-war symbol. Meanwhile, the black and white were simple combination to represent the sorrow as people go the funeral with the black clothes. The three colors were sufficiently representing the sadness and the hope rather than many colors which often symbolize the happiness and cheers. Picasso was taught by his father to present the exact sadness for the sadness and exact happiness for the happiness; and the color is one important aspect to make Guernica alive for Picasso and for many people who see it.

Behind the chaos and extreme sadness that is described in Guernica about Gernika, Picasso intended to put hope in it by coloring it little in blue (as United Nations uses it for the color of peace keeping force) and three symbols at least in the painting. The hope of Picasso is deposited in these three symbols, they are: first is the dove that is painted behind in between bull and the horse. The second is the candle or little lamp held by a hand which was believed by Spanish people as a hope. Finally the symbol of hope is deposited by

Picasso on the grown flower on the piece of the broken sword held by the dead soldier (Guernicapicasso, 2014). Therefore, the painting of Guernica is not only about the documentation of the tragedy or perpetual reminder of the tragedy, but Guernica is also the symbol of anti-war and an embodiment of peace.

> *'If peace wins in the world, the war I have painted will be a thing of the past ... The only blood that flows will be before a fine drawing, a beautiful picture. People will get too close to it, and when they scratch it a drop of blood will form, showing that the work is truly alive.' Pablo Picasso (Gijs, 2004: 53).*

The words above were said after Picasso had finished the painting and would be ready to hang it in the Spanish pavilion of the world routine agenda named 'The World Fair' in Paris along with other Spanish colleagues. As he did not come alone to the pavilion, Paul Eluard came with his poem about Spain, Joan Miro came with the painting of 'uplifted hands with a clenched fist', Alexander Calder came with his fountain of 'mercury' and mobile, Luis Buñuel came with his documentary film of España 1936, and another documentary film entitled Spanish Earth by Joris Ivens and Ernest Hemingway (pbspressroom, 2014). On that event, Guernica was introduced to the world for the first time. On the event, the political painting was trying to gather the supports from the international world to the Spanish civil war that was going on and made the people of Spain suffered a lot.

Even though Guernica had been traveled in many countries in the world, but Guernica never had been allowed by Picasso to visit Spain. Picasso made a promise not to let Guernica came home before the democracy was applied and Franco stepped down from the power. One day, Franco made a campaign to repatriate the Guernica in 1968 and assured Picasso that the government did not subject to the controversial matter, but Picasso turned the offer down through his lawyer without hesitation. It means that Picasso was not only painting it for the republican government at that time, but

he dedicated himself as idealist artist and pacifist, and he kept that consistency until he died in 1973 (pbspress, 2014). Picasso had never seen Guernica came home in 1981 at the *Casón del Buen Retiro* until finally resided in the current permanent place in Reina Museum, Madrid in 1992.

The existence of this painting strengthened the collective memory of the people of Gernika after they have the commemoration, peace museum of Gernika and peace research center of Gernika Gogoratuz. As if the collective memory of the people of Gernika is also validated by the international community through the painting of Guernica. In addition, the painting of Guernica is also a transfer media of the collective memory from generation to generation through the extraordinary painting that has the power of art. Earlier we have the commemoration which functioned to transfer the collective memory through the narration of the survivors and the exact timing of the bombing, the peace museum transfers the collective memory through the objects from the bombing that were collected as a silent witness, peace research center of Gernika Gogoratuz is transferring the collective memory through the education and scientific approach and finally the painting of Guernica is presented to transfer the collective memory through the power of the art and the international recognition. However, the whole elements were predominantly taking the sorrow as medias to keep peace.

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THE ROAD TO 'NICHE DIPLOMACY': COMPARING INDONESIA'S MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY UNDER SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO AND JOKO WIDODO

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Abstract

Middle power diplomacy is often associated with foreign policy activism in international environment. Due to their limited resources, middle powers implement niche diplomacy by focusing on a single issue area. Yet, contemporary Indonesia's foreign policy demonstrates a rather different conception on what middle power diplomacy really is. This paper seeks to compare Indonesia's middle power diplomacy under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo. This paper argues that Indonesia has no clear definition about middle power diplomacy because of the elitist character of its foreign policy. During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency Indonesia embraced internationalism to serve its ambition to be a global player. While his successor Joko Widodo seems to turn Indonesia's foreign policy back to domestic interests. This paper suggests a 'middle way' approach that the government should maintain internationalism but focus only on a single issue area in which Indonesia is capable of. In doing so, Indonesia should maintain its role identity that appropriate with it. This niche diplomacy can bring Indonesia a legitimate power in the face of international community which in turn increasing its leverage on the global stage.

Keywords: Indonesia's foreign policy, middle power diplomacy, niche diplomacy, role identity

INTRODUCTION

Concentrating on one single issue area in international environment is one of main characteristics of the secondary states foreign policy. Canada and South Korea, for example, assert themselves as international actors that promote soft power to influence international community.[1] Canada has long been recognized as a frontliner in the effort to create world peace through the elimination of landmines that led to the international Anti-Landmine Treaty in 1997 which became known as the 'Ottawa Treaty'.[2] South Korea is more focused on economic-development issues such as its involvement in the G20 forum.[3] During Seoul G20 Summit in 2010,

South Korea had succeded to incorporate economic development into G20 agenda that had been dominated with monetary issue and crisis management. Like Canada, other countries such as Australia and Finland also concern with international peace issues. As most Indonesian know, Finland was playing a crucial role behind the Aceh Peace Process in 2004. In short, these countries are influential because they are focusing on one area where they are very competent in that field.

Unlike those traditional middle powers, Indonesia has its own foreign policy behavior. Even if Indonesia claims to be the middle power country, there is no agreed conception of middle power diplomacy among decision makers. Marty Natalegawa, former Indonesian foreign minister, had repeatedly stated that Indonesia is a regional power with global interests.[4] Likewise, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) also stated during 2014 presidential campaign that "Indonesia as a regional power

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1 A. Cooper, *Recalibrating Middle Power Diplomacy: The Changing 'Soft Power' Brands of Republic of Korea and Canada in Comparative Perspective*, East Asia Institute Working Paper, February 2015.
2 N. Hynek, 'Canada as a middle power: conceptual limits and promises,' *The Central European Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2004, pp. 33-43.
3 See G.J. Ikenberry and M. Jongryn, *The Rise of Korean Leadership: Emerging Powers and Liberal International Order*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,

2013.
4 A. Acharya, *Indonesia Matters: Asia's Emerging Democratic Power*, Singapore: World Scientific, 2014, p. 2.

with selective global engagement",[5] which though somewhat different in terms of global engagement from the previous government, but equally view that Indonesia is a regional power. Nevertheless, both Yudhoyono and Jokowi have no consensus on what kind of diplomatic activity that Indonesia can play significantly on the global stage.

As exemplified by fellow middle power countries above, Indonesia should be able to focus on the most appropriate diplomatic area. Foreign policy specialization is certainly not easy considering the character of Indonesian political system that is strongly influenced by domestic politics, let alone many internal problems that must be resolved in the short run. In this context, Rizal Sukma was true when he argued that Indonesia's ability to increase its international leverage is still constrained by domestic problems such as economic vulnerability, security, law enforcement, democratic consolidation and rampant corruption.[6] In addition, the 'free and active' foreign policy principle which tends to make Indonesia do many things in global arena for the sake of national interest complicate the specialization step.

This paper is a comparative study of Indonesia's foreign policy under Yudhoyono and Jokowi. Specifically, this paper focuses on the concept and practice of middle power diplomacy during those periods. This paper argues that the conception of Indonesia's middle power diplomacy is very dependent on the elite paradigm of looking at the reality of global politics. During Yudhoyono's presidency, middle power diplomacy was interpreted as internationalism, an outward-looking foreign policy. Excessive internationalism cause Indonesia loses its focus of attention resulting in the lack of state's influence at the global level. In contrast, when Jokowi came to power, middle power diplomacy was interpreted as a reinforcement of Indonesia's identity as

regional power although it has not ruled out international involvement. In addition, the tendency of Jokowi to prioritize on domestic issues also made it difficult to find the most appropriate international role for Indonesia.

This paper will be divided into three parts. The first part discusses middle power diplomacy as an analytical framework. In general, the categorization of middle power can be viewed from three perspectives: realism that defines middle power from the possession of material resources, liberalism that looks at the behavior of country, and constructivism that takes identity seriously, specifically role identity. Middle power foreign policy that play a specific role identity in international relations then often associated with 'niche diplomacy'. Due to its relevance for the subject matter of this paper, I will focus on the third perspective. The second part will examine the conception and practice of middle power diplomacy during Yudhoyono leadership. This section highlights internationalism as the main character of Yudhoyono's foreign policy formulated in a number of national roles played by Indonesia at the global level. The third section highlights Jokowi's foreign policy that reinforces the idea of Indonesia as a regional power. This section also discusses the continuity and change of Indonesia's national role conception that becomes a guiding principle in conducting foreign policy. The fourth part contains conclusions and policy recommendations.

UNDERSTANDING MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY

In international politics there are three categories of state's status: major, middle, and small power. Traditional requirements for determining state's status is material factors such as geography, demography, natural resources, economy, military, and so on. All of these factors shape state's national power. The greater material factors they have, the greater the influence they would generate. From this approach, a middle power can be recognized from the national power they have and their influence in international

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5   J. Widodo and J. Kalla, *Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia yang Berdaulat, Mandiri, dan Berkepribadian,* Jakarta: Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2014, p. 13.
6   R. Sukma, 'Domestic politics and international posture: constraints and possibilities,' in Anthony Reid (ed.), *Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia's Third Giant*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2012, p. 90.

environment.[7] However, the material factor of national power is weak in some respects. First, there is no definite formula to measure the size of a state's national power. A considerable Gross Domestic Product, militaryexpenditure, population, or geography had only been agreed as indicator of national strength but not a fixed variable. Second, national power is not necessarily correlated with state's influence in international environment. Existing literature on diplomacy recognized two types of power; potential and actual power.[8] The material factors mentioned above are categorized as potential power, while the actual power is the ability of a state to transform the potential power into diplomatic conduct. For example, although Saudi Arabia and Singapore are very strong countries in terms of potential power – mainly from their economic giant and military muscle – the influence of both countries are relatively less significant in global politics.

The advanced definition of middle power employs non-material factor, i.e. foreign policy behavior. According to this approach, middle power marked by "[...] the tendency [of the states] to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide diplomacy."[9] Three key words – multilateralism, compromise, and a good international citizenship – are general tendencies of traditional middle powers such as Canada, Australia and the Scandinavian countries. Meanwhile, middle powers from the developing countries are also commonly meet those requirements except the third one – being a good international citizen – which seems not (or not yet) become a foreign policy

guideline for most middle powers from the developing countries. This is understandable since many developing countries have to prioritize their 'basic needs' – social welfare – before carrying the idealistic vision that still out of reach.

Broadly speaking, there are four characteristics of middle power diplomacy.[10] First, middle power foreign policy is not intended to alter the structure of balance of power, but rather to maintain or strengthen it. Middle powers do not presume to challenge the status quo, but rather seek a compromise with major powers. They neither choose balancing nor bandwagoning strategy. Middle powers arrange a good relationship with major powers in order to keep the international system from collapsing that would jeopardize their positions. Moreover, balancing against major powers is also avoided because it will only trigger retaliation that counterproductive for their national interests. However, there have been tendencies of middle powers from developing countries to reform the global order.[11] Some countries such as Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa conduct 'soft balancing' to form a political alliance to reduce the dominance of the West. BRICS represents middle power strategy to counter Western hegemony through their vision of 'post-Western world'. In 2014, China formed the Asian Insfrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) which attracts many countries. The United States perceives AIIB competitor to existing global governance such as the IMF, World Bank and ADB. Interestingly, a number of traditional middle power countries such as Australia, Norway, Canada, and Nordic countries joined the AIIB regardless of the United States opposition.

Second, middle powers conduct political activism to play the role of mediator, catalyst, and conciliator in the international

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7   C. Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, London: Macmillan, 1984, p. 74.
8   D. Baldwin, 'Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,' *World Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2, January 1979, pp. 161-194.
9   A. Cooper, R. Higgot, and K. Nossal, 'Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Orders,' cited in D. Flemes, 'Emerging Middle Powers' Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum,' *GIGA Working Papers*, No. 57, August 2007, p. 19.

10   C.P. David and S. Roussel, ''Middle Power Blues': Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War,' *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1998, pp. 135-136.
11   E. Jordaan, 'The Concept of Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers,' *Politikon*, Vol. 30, No. 2, November 2003, p. 176.

system. In order to address global challenges middle power countries tend to be a problem-solver, especially in international conflict. This 'national role conception'[12] refers to the duties and responsibilities of a state in the international system. The term 'middle' also means that middle powers are aware of their position when dealing with disputes among states. As a mediator, a middle power country will try to bring the warring parties to achieve peace. This kind of role was well accomplished by Finland inpromoting peace agreement between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement in 2005 known as 'Helsinki Agreement'. As a catalyst, a middle power country uses multilateral forums to propose an idea regarding certain issues. In 2012, Indonesia initiated a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea conflict containing elements of conflict prevention and management. As a conciliator, a middle power country tends to create multilateral cooperations in order to gain collective benefits. This role was exemplified by South Korea when it initiated an informal forum MIKTA in 2013 wherein Indonesia is a member.

One characteristic of middle power diplomacy referred to as 'middlepowermanship', i.e. diplomatic strategy to play a maximum role in the global scope through institutions or international regimes.[13] The most prominent characteristic of middle powers is the leadership role through coalition-building, multilateral cooperation, and international organizations. If the country's leadership is largely determined by hard power then the nature of its leadership is very hegemonic and unilateral. Conversely, the leadership role played by middle power countries is determined predominantly by its soft power through persuasion, negotiation skills, agenda setting, and skills other than non-coercive approaches.[14]

This makes sense since middle power countries have no sufficient material resources to impose power over others.

This sort of global leadership is exemplified by, for example, Canada and South Korea. Canadian foreign policy adopts what Andrew Cooper called as the role of the 'activist insider', which sparked the initiating, planning and organizing high-level meetings, set priorities and proposed, as well as the busy shuttle diplomacy using formal and informal channels.[15] A concrete example was practiced by Paul Martin, then prime minister, who were an architect behind the transformation of the G20 forum from the ministerial meeting into heads of state meeting or 'Leaders-20' (L-20). Martin believed that this transformation would bring G20 more effective forum as the highest decision was in the hand of heads of state, not ministers of finance.[16] Like Canada, South Korea also played global leadership role that is quite successful. At the G20 summit in Seoul in 2010 South Korea successfully proposed that development cooperation should be incorporated into the G20 agenda. This simple idea was a remarkable breakthrough since G20 has long been focusing on monetary stability and handling of the economic crisis. In additon, South Korea also played active role in many major issues such as the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, as well as International Conference on Cyberspace in 2013.[17]

Their active role raises crucial question of why they are able to do that. The answer is so simple. Effective global leadership requires strong domestic capabilities. This is understandable that both countries

12   K.J. Holsti, 'National Role Conception in the Study of Foreign Policy,' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3, September 1970, pp. 233-309.
13   R. Cox, 'Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future of World Order,' *International Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 4, Autumn 1989, pp. 823-862.
14   M. Yamasaki, *A Study of Middle Power Diplomacy as a Strategy of Leadership and Influence,*

M.A thesis, University of Waterloo, 2009.
15   A. Cooper, 'The Evolution of Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: The Re-Orientation of Canadian Strategy in the Economic and Security Arenas,' *Latin American Program Working Paper*, No. 244, March 2000.
16   P. Martin, 'Global Answer to Global Problems,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 3, May-June 2005, pp. 2-6.
17   K. Sung-han, 'Global Governance and Middle Powers: South Korea's Role in the G20,' <http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/global-governance-middle-powers-south-koreas-role-g20/p30062>, accessed on 14 January 2015.

played global leadership based on their status as developed countries. Canada and South Korea are members of the OECD, an international donors forum. In terms of population, economy and military capability, Canada is an influential global player.[18] South Korea's leadership in the G20 forum is favored by its status as a world economic power, particularly in the fields of high technology and industrial culture.[19]

So, what about middle powers that are still in the category of developing country? Do they need to be developed country first to be able to play effective global role? Unfortunately, the answer to that question is no. Status as a developed country is a necessary but not sufficient condition to being able to play an active role in international relations. Middle powers from developing country could still play a global leadership role without being a developed country in advance. See, for example India, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, and Mexico. Economically, according to World Bank data in 2013, they are all classified as middle-income countries. But these countries are quite active and play respective roles on the global stage. Their secret strategy in an effort to increase their influence in international environment is coalition-building. Those countries are actively building international networks as a means to increase diplomatic posture.[20] Besides, some of those countries are members of the informal club IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), BRICS (along with China and Russia), and BASIC (along with China).[21] While Mexico and Turkey are members of MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia).[22] In

short, coalition-building is a strategy of middle power countries despite unfavorable domestic conditions to perform global leadership role.

Third, middle powers tend to work through multilateral forums in order to carry out political activism. Through multilateral forums, either formal and informal, their leverage will be significantly better than working individually considering the limited resources they have. In addition, a multilateral forum serves much like a 'Paliament of Man' that accommodates aspirations and solves problems of the vast majority of the people, creating new norms, and negotiation table on various kinds of agreements between countries.[23] Multilateralism, especially in informal way, has become a tendency of middle power countries to show its existence in international politics.

Fourth, middle powers focus on sectors that become their competences considering the limited resources they have. In the diplomatic world, this concept is known as 'niche diplomacy'.[24] Gareth Evans defined the term as "concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field."[25] In this way they are able to mobilize all available resources to become an influential global player. Canada (again) and Norway are two middle power countries that has long been implementing 'niche diplomacy' in the effort to maintain world peace. Canada initiated the norm against landmines known as the 'Ottawa Process', while Norway is active in peace efforts in the Middle East known as the 'Oslo Process'.[26]

In dictionaries, the term 'niche' refers

18   L. Baxter and J.A. Bishop, 'Uncharted Ground: Canada, Middle Power Leadership, and Public Diplomacy,'*Journal of Public and International Affairs*, Vol. 9, Spring 1998, p. 85.
19   G.J.Ikenberry and M. Jongryn, *op.cit.*,p. 7.
20   A. Cooper and D. Flemes, 'Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World: An Introductory Review,' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 6, 2013, pp. 943-962.
21   See D. Flemes, 'Network Powers: Strategies of Change in the Multipolar World,' paper presented at the *22nd IPSA World Congress*, 8-12 July, Madrid, Spain.
22   See M. Jongryn, *MIKTA, Middle Powers, and New Dynamic of Global Governance*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

23   K. Mahbubani, 'Multilateral Diplomacy,' in A. Cooper, J.Heine, and R. Thakur (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 249-250.
24   A. Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997.
25   G. Evans, 'Middle Power Diplomacy,'<http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech441.html>, accessed on 6 November 2014.
26   A. Henrikson, 'Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: the Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway,' in J.Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 68.

to 'specialization'. Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines the term 'niche' as "a place, employment, status, or activity for the which a person or thing is best fitted". The Oxford Dictionary defines the term as "A comfortable or suitable position in life or employment". While the Cambridge Dictionary defines, "a job or position that is very suitable for someone, especially one that they like." Thus, it can be concluded that 'niche diplomacy' can be simply defined as a foreign policy effort to specialize in a particular issue. Specialization yields competence, which in turn engender professionalism in certain fields. Just like a professional worker, specialization would make them recognizable as people who are experts in their respective fields. So when problem arises they will be able to resolve it more effectively than those who do not hold any expertise. Indeed, there are those who have multiple talents, but experience proves that people focusing on specific areas tend to be more successful than those who do not.

Practically, niche diplomacy is closely related to 'middlepowermanship' or a leadership role in international issues. States focusing on one particular issue will more likely play as a global leader. This is because they bear global responsibilities, or at least believe that they will be able to play that role. Either at the multilateral or unilateral levels, global leadership role represents state's competency. Once again, Canada is the most excellent example of this. Canada has deep-rooted national identity as a peacekeeper, even celebrated nationally and it defines who the Canadian people is.[27] The most significant contribution of Canada aside of initiating the G20 heads of state meeting is institutionalizing the notion of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P was originally inspired by Kofi Annan responding genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica where there were gross human rights abuse committed by the government. Canada formed International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in September 2000 that gave birth to the

concept of R2P. This norm serves as the justification to military intervention in a country where massive human rights violation occurs. Canada's commitment on peace issues reflects 'norm-entrepreneur' that can not be separated from the state's competence on that field.

'PUNCHING ABOVE ITS WEIGHT': MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY UNDER YUDHOYONO

Yudhoyono's foreign policy embraced internationalism in the sense that Indonesia was very active on the global stage. Indonesia was very high profile in almost all international issues ranging from peace and security, economic and trade, democracy and human rights, gender equality, to climate change. Not surprisingly, the former Indonesian Ambassador to the United States Dino Patti Djalal said Yudhoyono is a 'foreign policy president'; a leader who strongly concerns with foreign affairs.[28] During Yudhoyono's era, Indonesia's foreign policy was certainly different from previous governments that tended to focus on domestic issues. This makes sense because those governments were prioritizing domestic recovery after the 1998 economic crisis rather than global involvement. Only after Yudhoyono came to power in 2004 replacing Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia's foreign policy began to perform a high degree of international activism. Prior to that, when Abdurrahman Wahid became a president he visited 26 countries to revive Indonesia's international image as well as to show that he was an international statesman.[29] Furthermore, Wahid's international tour also aimed to look for international supports to recover economic downturn, post-conflict management, and preserving national integrity.[30] Yet, there had

27   A.W. Dorn, 'Canadian peacekeeping: proud tradition, strong future?,' *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 2, Fall 2005, p. 7.

28   D.P. Djalal, 'Pemimpin yang Nasionalis dan Internasionalis [The nationalist and internationalist leader],' <http://dinopattidjalal.com/en/article/22/pemimpin-yang-nasionalis-dan-internasionalis.html>, accessed on 19 April 2013.
29   A. Smith, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo?,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 22, No. 3, December 2000, p. 505.
30   D. Mashad, 'Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Era

been no high profile foreign policy activities as Yudhoyono did.

As a middle power, Indonesia still commitsto 'free and active' foreign policy; a diplomatic principle that posits Indonesia between great and small powers. However, Indonesia does not want to position itself just in the middle. From the perspective of Yudhoyono, middle power diplomacy means that Indonesia will not only maintaining its status as a regional power, but also taking part in various international issues. Borrowing the words of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia is "a regional power with global interests." In his annual speech in 2014, Marty stated that "As a regional power with global interests, Indonesia will continue to speak forcefully in favor of diplomatic means in addressing disputes or various conflict situations."[31] Likewise, former Yudhoyono's adviser Santo Darmosusanto also said that the status as a middle power means the ability of a country to become a leader in the region or sub-region as well as "... to show expertise and push forward particular issues that are of interest to the international community."[32] Thus, Yudhoyono's conception of middle power diplomacy rests on regional leadership and active international participation.

Although status as regional power demands Indonesia a greater role in Southeast Asia, the 21st century world politics demands Indonesia to do more. In an era where the world has developed very rapidly, foreign policy should be directed to respond to these dynamics. In a speech before the House of Representatives commemorating

the 65 years of Indonesia's independence, Yudhoyono said,

> We realize, in the 21st century, free and active foreign policy alone is not enough. We must carry out free, active, and transformative foreign policy. We must improve the performance of the free and active diplomacy to be more oriented on creating opportunities, because in the era of the G20, in the era of globalization, it is time for Indonesia to be globalized. This is the time of Indonesian achievements, products, culture, and ideas are increasingly becoming part of the dynamics at the global level.[33]

As mentioned before, Indonesia will not discard the 'free and active' principle. Indonesia wants to be a global player to participate more actively in many international issues. Become a global player by no means rule out of being free and active. However, the 'free and active' had been considered insufficient principle to support Indonesia's foreign policy in the 21st century. Therefore, Dino Patti Djalal proposed 'free, active, and creative' foreign policy. According to Dino, creative foreign policy is needed due to the complex situations of international relations. In order to seize great opportunities, Indonesia needs to constantly adjust between theory and practice.[34] For Yudhoyono, the 21st century is the century of globalism in which the progress shall be achieved by removing dogmatism. All international actors need to open up their minds as well as being pragmatic, adaptive and innovative in order to face global challenges.[35]

Yudhoyono's desire to make Indonesia a global player – not global power – was

Reformasi [Indonesia's foreign policy in the reform era],' in G. Wuryandari (ed.), *Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia di Tengah Pusaran Politik Domestik* [Indonesia's foreign policy in the midst of domestic pressure], Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar & LIPI, 2008, p. 179.

31   M. Natalegawa, 'Annual press statement Minister for Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia,' <http://www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/PPTM%202014/Annual%20Press%20Statement%20Minister%20for%20Foreign%20Affairs.pdf>,accessed on 20 October 2015.

32   S. Darmosusanto, 'Indonesia: a new 'middle power',' <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/30/indonesia-a-new-middle-power039.html>,accessed on 20 October 2015.

33   S.B. Yudhoyono, 'Pidato kenegaraan Presiden RI dalam rangka HUT ke-65 proklamasi kemerdekaan RI [State union address of the President of the Republic of Indonesia commemorating 65th national independence],' <http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2010/08/16/1457.html>,accessed on 25 May 2015.

34   D.P. Djalal, 'An Independent, Active, and Creative Foreign Policy for Indonesia,' *Strategic Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January-March 2012.

35   S.B. Yudhoyono, 'The big shift and the imperative of 21st century globalism,' <http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2011/01/27/1572.html>,accessed on 16 April 2013.

proven by many national roles played by Indonesia. In a widely cited speech at the Wilton Park in 2012, Yudhoyono mentioned five Indonesian national roles: norms-setter, consensus-builder, peacekeeper, bridge-builder, and voice of developing countries.[36] As a norms-setter, Indonesia offers ideas about the standards of behavior in international relations that lead to stability and world peace. For example, Indonesia initiated the Bali Democracy Forum as a venue for disseminating and strengthening the idea of democracy as an ideal political system for all countries. This particular stance was seemingly extracted from the Democratic Peace Theory in which democratic values and norms are considered to be the factors able to bring peace between countries. Yudhoyono confirmed this by saying, "... democracy also should bring about peace. We are all aware of the theory of 'democratic peace', based on the assumption that democracies do not wage war against one another."[37] As a consensus-builder, Indonesia plays a key role in reaching agreement between nations. Particularly in ASEAN, where consensus decision-making becomes the norm and not the voting, Indonesia seeks to unify the different views and interests of member states. On the South China Sea issue, for instance, Indonesia conducted a shuttle diplomacy to convince claimant states to agree on a Code of Conduct that in turn led to peaceful settlement. As a peacekeeper, Indonesia's role was evident in the UN peacekeeping operation by deploying Garuda troops to a number of territories shattered by conflicts. As a bridge-builder Indonesia simply wants to bridge the differences between nations to create mutual trust so that the conflict can be reduced. Lastly, the role as the voice of developing world drives Indonesia to promote the interests of fellow developing countries in

international forums. This role is deep-rooted in Indonesian history of the Asian-African Conference 1955 or the Bandung Conference in which Indonesia was one of the initiators of the Third World revivalism.

None of these roles are pragmatic; all roles are idealistic in the sense that Indonesia is positioning itself as a 'normative actor'[38], carrying moral vision in its foreign policy. This seems to be in line with the idea of 'good international citizenship' proposed by Gareth Evans that later on became one of the characteristics of middle power diplomacy. Although the concept is not very popular to the public and diplomats, Indonesia – whether realized or not – has been implementing the idea in many various global issues. Indonesia's tendency to solve global problems reflects 'good international citizenship' idea and it is closely related to national roles described before. Yudhoyono conveyed an idea regarding what he termed 'constructive approach' in foreign policy, namely "... an ability to turn adversary into friend, and to turn friend into a partner. It means having the diplomatic, intellectual and emotional capacity, to respond to complex foreign policy issues. It also means putting to rest a siege mentality, wild conspiracy theories, excessive suspicion, an overly defensive attitude, or the fear the world is out to get us."[39] Based on a positive view, Yudhoyono had implicitly stated that Indonesia is a 'problem-solver'. This suggests that Indonesia will be committed to creating a harmonious international relations, full-fledged cooperation, and peace. By promoting universal values such as peace,

36   S.B. Yudhoyono, 'Indonesia's role as regional and global actor,' <https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/president-yudhoyonos-speech-at-our-annual-address/>, accessed on 19 April 2013.
37   S.B. Yudhoyono, 'Opening statement at the Bali Democracy Forum IV,' <http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2011/12/08/1762.html>,accessed on 16 April 2013.

38   'Normative power' concept has often been employed to explain European Union foreign policy. From the European perspective, normative power refers to power 'to construct public opinion', 'ideological power', or 'symbolic power' in order to show actor's identities in the eyes of international community. Simply put, normative power is identical with 'soft power' concept proposed by Joseph Nye of Harvard University. See I. Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU,' <http://aei.pitt.edu/7263/1/002188_1.PDF>,accessed on 20 October 2015.
39   S.B. Yudhoyono, 'Speech by President of the Republic of Indonesia before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA),' <http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/05/19/332.html>,accessed on 19 April 2013.

human rights, democracy, justice, equality, tolerance, and so forth, Indonesia can be considered as a 'good international citizen'. Internationalist foreign policy is directed as much as possible to represent and achieve universal values.

To bring those moral visions above into reality, Indonesia uses multilateralism approach. G20 is undoubtedly one of the most important multilateral forums of this century. This informal network is not only useful as an instrument to advance national interests for its members but also to voice their ideal perspectives at the global level. G20 may function as a 'network power' providing middle power countries with 'window of opportunities' to champion their aspirations. In the G20 forum, Indonesia plays roles as a 'bridge-builder' and the 'voice of developing countries'.[40] Aside from the G20, Indonesia also promoted idealistic visions in the United Nations. For example, as a 'norms setter', Indonesia proposed the norm prohibiting religious defamation in the UN General Assembly meeting held on September 25, 2012. This global norm would guarantee freedom of expression and is expected to be a means to maintain the good relations between religions as well as between nations.[41] In the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Indonesia and Britain initiated the interfaith dialogue that "... seeks to foster mutual understanding and mutual respect among all faiths and religions particularly in Asia and Europe and to propose a set of recommendations to actualize interfaith harmony within the international community."[42]At the Summit on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Indonesia has also been persistently   pushing the developed countries to participate and support the REDD Plus scheme to reduce carbon emissions. At the Asian-African Conference which was hosted by Indonesia, the government also consistently supported Palestinian independence through NAASP (New Asian-African Strategic Partnership) program. This indicates that ethics has also became a central issue in Indonesia's middle power diplomacy.

With regard to the remarkable contribution of Indonesia at the international level, it is easy to conclude that Indonesia's foreign policy during Yudhoyono leadership was very ambitious. The desire to become a global player requires high international involvement. Indonesia's role as the normative power has shifted Indonesia's identity where the country is no longer considered as a middle power in the traditional sense, but rather as a rising middle powers. The ambitious foreign policy seems like the phrase 'punching above its weight'; competing outside the capacity and capability. Although recognized as the 'Third Asian Giant'[43] and a 'pivotal state',[44] Indonesia in fact still faces many complex domestic issues that hinder Indonesia to become an influential power. Analysts from the domestic-centric perspective argue that limited domestic resources is the biggest obstacle for Indonesia to become a global player.[45] Therefore, this paper argues that given the limited resources available for Indonesia, the government should choose one particular area and consistently focus on

40   M. Rosyidin, 'Masihkah Indonesia Perlu G20? *Network Power*, Status, dan Strategi Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia Abad-21 [Is Indonesia still need G20? Network Power, Status, and Indonesia's Foreign Policy Strategy in the 21st Century],' *Analisis CSIS*, Vol. 43, No. 4, December 2014, pp. 386-407.

41   Lisbet, 'Inisiatif Indonesia dalam instrumen Anti Penistaan Agama [Indonesia's initiative in the anti-religious defamation instrument],' *Info Singkat Hubungan Internasional*, Vol. 4, No. 19, October 2012, pp. 5-8.

42   '1st ASEM Interfaith Dialogue,' <http://www.aseminfoboard.org/events/1st-asem-interfaith-dialogue>,accessed on 20 October 2015.

43   A. Reid (ed.), *Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia's Third Giant*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2012.

44   J. Bresnan, 'Indonesia,' in R. Chase, E. Hill, and P. Kennedy (eds.), *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for US Policy in the Developing World*, New York: Norton, 1999.

45   See for example D. McRae, *Membaca Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia* [Understanding Indonesia's foreign policy], Kompas, 5 March 2014, p. 7; D. McRae, "More Talk Than Walk: Indonesia As A Foreign Policy Actor," *Lowy Institute For International Policy*, February 2014; R. Sukma, 'Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and Possibilities,' in Anthony Reid (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 77-92 and D.F. Anwar, 'Indonesia's Wary Thinking on Foreign Policy,'<http://europesworld.org/2013/06/01/indonesias-wary-thinking-on-foreign-policy/>,accessed on 27 March 2014.

that. This argument does not mean to say that internationalism is not a priority – as alleged by adherents of domestic-centric perspective – but rather advocating internationalism in a more specific manner. The next section will look into the Jokowi's paradigm of middle power diplomacy in response to this issue.

INSIDE LOOKING OUT: MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY UNDER JOKOWI

It has been over a year since Jokowi's administration took over power from Yudhoyono. It is still difficult to see change and continuity of Indonesia's foreign policy during this narrow period of time. In addition, comparing Jokowi to Yudhoyono whom serving the country for a decade is absolutely disproportionate. Nevertheless, the general tendencies of Jokowi's foreign policy orientation are of identifiable subjects. For example, it can be seen from the foreign policy doctrine stated during Jokowi's 2014 campaign. A number of foreign policy approaches conducted by Jokowi's administration within the past year can also be the subject of study to look at the dynamics of contemporary Indonesia's foreign policy.

In general, Jokowi's foreign policy orientation can be observed from his tendency to focus on domestic issues rather than the international ones. In contrast to Yudhoyono who had high profile in the international stage, Jokowi seems not to be – borrowing Dino's phrase – an 'foreign policy president'. While Yudhoyono had a lot of international experiences, Jokowi spent his career as a businessman before holding public offices as Mayor of Solo in Central Java as well as Governor of the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta. Additionally, Jokowi has been widely known as someone who likes to go to the field to look at the real condition of society directly, popularly known as '*blusukan*'. This paradigm greatly affects how he runs the Indonesia's foreign policy.

The most prominent indicators of Jokowi's 'inward-looking' foreign policy is the 'Marsudi Doctrine'; an idea proposed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Lestari Priansari Marsudi as 'pro-people diplomacy'.

This idea emphasizes that Indonesia's foreign policy "... should be grounded, should not be at a distance of the interests of the people."[46] Three of four priorities of Indonesia's foreign policy under Jokowi give special attention to domestic interests i.e. protecting state sovereignty, enhancing economic diplomacy to support state autonomy, and protecting Indonesian citizens and legal entities abroad while another one is to improve Indonesia's role both regionally and internationally. Those priorities are elements that distinguish Indonesia's foreign policy between Yudhoyono and Jokowi.

On the issue of state sovereignty, the previous government was failing to protect the most vital national interests. Strong criticism comes up from the military. Former Army Chief of Staff Tyasno Sudarto said Yudhoyono failed to protect Indonesia's sovereignty and territorial integrity due to the lack of firmness in dealing with the loss of tens of thousands of kilometers of Indonesia's territory from Malaysia.[47] The 'soft diplomacy' approach used by Yudhoyono in dealing with Malaysia's violation in the Bintan waters in 2010, for example, was rated "... imprecise and tends to have a negative impact on the prestige and dignity of the nation."[48] In the issue of the protection of Indonesian citizens abroad, the previous government was also considered to having been failed. According to Migrant Care, until October 2013 there were 265 Indonesian

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46   'Menlu: politik luar negeri harus membumi dan kedepankan kepentingan rakyat [Minister of Foreign Affairs: foreign policy should down to earth and prioritizing the interests of the people],' <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/29/16390021/Menlu.Politik.Luar.Negeri.Harus.Membumi.dan.Kedepankan.Kepentingan.Rakyat>,accessed on 22 October 2015.

47   'Tyasno: pemerintahan SBY gagal jaga kedaulatan negara [Tyasno: SBY administration has failed to protect state sovereignty],' <http://news.liputan6.com/read/358019/tyasno-pemerintahan-sby-gagal-jaga-kedaulatan-negara>,accessed on 22 October 2015.

48   M. Rosyidin, '*Soft Diplomacy* SBY dalam Konflik Indonesia-Malaysia: Studi Kebijakan SBY terhadap Pelanggaran Kedaulatan oleh Malaysia di Perairan Bintan tahun 2010 [SBY's soft diplomacy in the Indonesia-Malaysian conflict: Case study of SBY's foreign policy towards sovereignty violation committed by Malaysia in Bintan waters in 2010],' *JurnalKajian Wilayah*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2014, p. 4-5.

migrant workers facing death penalty abroad. The highest numbers were in Malaysia (213), Saudi Arabia (33), China (18), and Iran (1).[49] The bad reputation of previous government on the issue of sovereignty and protection of migrant workers becomes a precondition for Jokowi's administration committing to fix these problems.

With regard to Indonesia's role in the international society, the fourth priority which will enhance the role of Indonesia both in regional and international scope can still be considered in line with the previous administration. Both Yudhoyono and Jokowi equally depart from the conception that Indonesia is a middle power country. However, Jokowi does not mean that as a middle power Indonesia is required to be involved (too) actively in the international sphere. As mentioned before, this is understandable because Jokowi wants to focus more on domestic reforms rather than global activism. Too much global activism will spend domestic resources, not to mention it is not in line with the doctrine of 'pro-people diplomacy'.

Jokowi's conception of middle power diplomacy can be discerned from the text of the vision and mission during the presidential election campaign in 2014 ago. In a very systematic, in-depth, and comprehensive manuscript, Jokowi-JK stated that middle power diplomacy means Indonesia is a regional power "... with selective global engagement."[50] This statement implies Indonesia's activism is limited merely to issues considered directly impacting the interests of the people. This statement at once confirms the dividing line between Jokowi and Yudhoyono in looking at the concept of middle power diplomacy. While Yudhoyono considered Indonesia is a regional power with global interests, Jokowi reverses Indonesia as a regional power with domestic interests.

As a middle power, Jokowi wants to strengthen the status of Indonesia so far as a regional power. Despite narrowing concentric circles – from global to regional – Jokowi does not limit the role and national interests of Indonesia in Southeast Asia. According to Rizal Sukma, Jokowi's foreign policy adviser, ASEAN should no longer be the 'cornerstone' of Indonesia's foreign policy; Indonesia requires 'a post-ASEAN foreign policy'.[51] Expanding Indonesia's concentric circles materialize in the program expansion "... mandala regional involvement in the Indo-Pacific region."[52] Indo-Pacific region is a vast area that consists mostly of the oceans cover two largest oceans in the world; the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It is obviously compatible with the doctrine of 'Global Maritime Fulcrum'. One of the comprehensive partnerships that Indonesia has been a member of is the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Indonesia's interest in IORA forum is primarily about the issue of maritime security and fisheries management where those two things are on the priority agenda of the Jokowi's 'Global Maritime Fulcrum'.[53] Indonesia will be the Chairman of IORA in 2015-2017 and will be used the opportunity to "... mainstreaming the concept of blue economy, encourage maritime cooperation, trade and investment facilitation, and cooperation of tourism and science."[54]

Another conception of Jokowi's middle power diplomacy is concerned with the Indonesian identity and how identity affects the implementation of foreign policy. During Yudhoyono era, Indonesia's foreign policy was influenced by the national role conception or role identity.[55] As noted earlier,

49   'Hukuman mati mengancam 265 TKI, ke manapemerintah? [Death penalty threatens 265 Indonesian migrant workers, where is the government?],' <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/10/16/1218450/Hukuman.Mati.Mengancam.265.TKI.ke.Mana.Pemerintah>, accessed on 6 November 2014.
50   J. Widodo and J. Kalla, *op.cit.*,

51   R.Sukma, 'Indonesia needs a post-ASEAN foreign policy,' <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/06/30/indonesia-needs-a-postasean-foreign-policy.html>,accessed on 22 October 2015.
52   See Visi-Misi, *op.cit.*,
53   R. Roza, '*Indian Ocean Rim Association* (IORA) dan Kepentingan Indonesia di SamuderaHindia [IORA and Indonesia's interests in the Indian Ocean],' *Info SingkatHubunganInternasional*, Vol. 7, No. 6, March 2015, p. 7.
54   R. Marsudi, 'Diplomasi Indonesia akan terkoneksi dengan kepentingan rakyat [Indonesia's diplomacy will be connected to the interests of the people],' *Tabloid Diplomasi*, No. 85, Year 8, 2015, p. 6.
55   Role identity refers to responsibilities of a state

Yudhoyono mentioned five Indonesian national roles i.e.norms-setter, consensus-builder, peace-keeper, bridge-builder, and voice of developing countries. In the era of Jokowi, these national roles seem to have been ruled out although not completely, especially on the role of peacekeeper. It would be interesting to see later how Jokowi would execute this particular role. Instead of continuing the Yudhoyono's national role conception, Jokowi highlights Indonesia's national identity as a 'maritime country' and 'archipelagic state'. In a constructivist perspective, this identity is categorized as a 'corporate identity' which takes into account material basis that distinguishes between one actor and another.[56] As stated in the vision and mission of Jokowi-JK, "We will be committed to promoting the identity of Indonesia as an archipelagic state in the conduct of diplomacy and build international cooperation."[57] When giving a speech before members of the parliament and Regional Representative Council or DPD, August 14, 2015, Jokowi said, "We must be able to demonstrate to the world that Indonesia is a maritime country that maintain and utilize marine earnestly."[58] Instead of furthering the agenda of the previous government who wanted to make Indonesia as a global player through the actualization of social identity – the role identity – Jokowi stressed the material identity about the geographical characteristics of Indonesia.

Based on corporate identity as a maritime country and an archipelagic state, Indonesia under Jokowi seems to want to build a solid domestic foundation before doing business in the global arena. This approach differs from the previous administration who assumed that global engagement – or internationalism in

general term – is very important for Indonesia to achieve status as a great power. Inside-out approach applied by Jokowi seems to replicate foreign policy approach during New Order in which Indonesia could only play a maximum role in the global stage only if it is supported by a robust national power. In other words, Jokowi's foreign policy adopts the 'international goals and domestic strategies' approach.[59] Thus, it is reasonable if Jokowi's foreign policy platform focuses on domestic matters.

Although limiting global involvement, it does not mean that Indonesia wanting to leave altogether the principle of 'active' in the long-devoted concept of 'free-active' foreign policy guidelines. Not only Jokowi, all governments that had ruled Indonesia has always been consistent in implementing political activism abroad in accordance with the constitutional mandate of 1945. It is commonly accepted that the constitutional basis for the implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy is expressed in the 1945 Constitution, Paragraph 4, which reads: " ... participate in the establishment of world order based on freedom, lasting peace and social justice." One manifestation of Indonesia's commitments to the world peace is playing role as a peacemaker. Among the national role conception proposed by Yudhoyono, Indonesia's role as peacemaker is a role that is relatively stable in the sense that every government in power feels this role is already integrated in the principle of Indonesia's foreign policy. Role as a peacemaker as well shows that Indonesia is consistently implementing middle power diplomacy which refers to the attempt to be a 'good international citizen'.

Role as peacemaker is arguably very much consistent with the concept of 'niche diplomacy'. By focusing on this role, Indonesia would most likely gain international recognition. This argument is based on the empirical evidence of the Indonesia's high commitment in the effort to create world peace through dispatching peacekeepers. When hosting

in international environment.

56   For more detail argument see A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 224-225.

57   See Visi-Misi, *op.cit*.,p. 12.

58   'Jokowi ingin buktikan Indonesia sebagai negara maritim yang tangguh [Jokowi would like to prove Indonesia as a tough maritime country],' <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/08/14/11233711/Jokowi.Ingin.Buktikan.Indonesia.sebagai.Negara.Maritim.yang.Tangguh>,accessed on 22 October 2015.

59   M. Mastanduno, D. Lake, and G.J. Ikenberry, 'Toward A Realist Theory of State Action,' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, 1989, pp. 457-474.

the Asia Pacific Meeting on Peacekeeping on 27-28 July 2015, Retno Marsudi stated that, "Indonesia is an example of a visionary and very committed 'net contributor' to international peace and security through UN peacekeeping operations."[60] Indonesia ranks at 11th in the world for countries contributing to peacekeeping forces. Indonesia even plans to increase the number of peacekeepers to 4,000 personnel in 2019 later. Although the presence of a peacekeeping force is needed, Indonesia sees that the best way of creating peace is to prevent it. "High commitment to PKO [Peace Keeping Operation]," said Retno, "also must be balanced with high commitment to prevent conflict and continue to bring peace."[61] Likewise, Vice President Jusuf Kalla also said that instead of sending peacekeepers, the world should working hard to prevent conflicts between states.[62]

Maintaining role as a peacekeeper is also supported by the Indonesian experience in resolving conflicts both between countries in the region and within the country. In Southeast Asia Indonesia has quite prominent role in mediating conflicts among ASEAN members. While within the country, the Indonesian government has repeatedly managed to dampen sectarian conflicts and separatism. All of these experiences support the foundational claim of Indonesia as a 'peacemaker' for the creation of world peace and security.

CONCLUSION

This paper reinforces the opinion of some observers that Indonesia's foreign policy remains strongly influenced by the elites who still very much determine the style of Indonesia's foreign policy. No exception when one takes a look at the concept of

middle power diplomacy; both Yudhoyono and Jokowi have their own understanding of how Indonesia should behave as a middle power in the international arena. Yudhoyono saw the necessity of internationalism as a manifestation of foreign policy of the 21st century. While Indonesia still has status as a regional power, the involvement of Indonesia must transcend regional boundaries. In other words, Indonesia must become a global player. Consequently, Yudhoyono's foreign policy demonstrated outward-looking approach. Unlike its predecessor, Jokowi sees that Indonesia's excessive global engagement is not commensurate with the results achieved, so Indonesia should limit its global activism and focus on the domestic issues. As a result, middle power diplomacy, according to Jokowi, is reinforcing its status as a regional power, not in Southeast Asia, but in the Indo-Pacific.

The second difference is how to increase the influence of Indonesia in the international sphere. Yudhoyono claimed that Indonesia's leverage is significant because Indonesia has idealistic roles able to contribute to the creation of an orderly, safe, peaceful, and full of cooperation world politics. These roles are actualized through multilateral forums to show the world that Indonesia, a developing country, has a big share in international issues. In contrast to it, Jokowi would rather go back to the past to strengthen the influence of Indonesia. Jokowi's historical romanticism finds its relevance when proposing Indonesia's identity as a 'maritime country' and 'archipelagic state'. This idea arises from 'Global Maritime Fulcrum' doctrine that became a backbone of Jokowi's foreign policy. To highlight the corporate identity, Indonesia is expected to become a respected global power. So there are shades of difference between Yudhoyono and Jokowi in terms of a strategy to strengthen Indonesia's leverage abroad; Yudhoyono rests on the role identity while Jokowi on the corporate identity.

If linked to the concept of 'niche diplomacy', then Jokowi's foreign policy is more closely related to the concept than those of Yudhoyono's. Maritime issues posed

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60   R. Marsudi, 'Strengthening support for UN peacekeeping,' <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/04/strengthening-support-un-peacekeeping.html>,accessed on 22 October 2015.
61   R. Marsudi, 'Indonesia dan PBB,' *Kompas*, 7 October 2015, p. 7.
62   R. Witular, 'Indonesia pledges 4,000 peacekeepers by 2019,' http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/30/indonesia-pledges-4000-peacekeepers-2019.htmldiaksespada 22 Oktober 2015.

by Jokowi may be an area of specialization which refers to the Indonesia's identity as a maritime country. However, this maritime issue is still in the making that cannot be used as a platform of Indonesia's foreign policy in the long run. That is, the maritime issues could be valid only during the reign of Jokowi and might not necessarily be accepted by the next administration. Based on the results of the study above, it can be concluded that the most enduring issue of 'niche diplomacy' in Indonesia's foreign policy debate is peace issue. Moreover, the role of the peacemaker is the traditional role of Indonesia. Indonesia has long been committed to the effort of creating world peace in accordance with the mandate of the preamble of the Constitution of 1945. Yudhoyono and Jokowi alike agree that Indonesia should play an active role in maintaining world peace, particularly through peacekeeping force. Therefore, this paper urges the government to immediately institutionalize identity as a peacemaker in the foreign policy white paper. It is considered important and urgent for two reasons: first, to prevent the syndrome of 'punching above its weight' which depletes domestic resources; and secondly, to reinforce the image of Indonesia as a middle power that specializes in the field of international peace.

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ISLAM AND CULTURES: JAVA-ACCULTURATED ISLAM IN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

In the 13th century, Islam began to approach Aceh in the north west of Sumatra brought by traders from Arab, Persia and Gujarat. At that time, the kingdoms of Indonesia mostly were Hindus and Buddhist, even some still believed in animism-dynamism. Slowly, the Islam traders began to spread Islam and Islamic ideology throughout Indonesia through trading and marriage. Until the 16th century, Islam first entered to java which was a Hindu and Buddhist center in the archipelago. A transformation of animism-dynamism to hindu-buddhism made their culture influenced by those beliefs. This transformation should make the Moslem traders easy to spread Islam and to complete the Javanese belief. Nonetheless, the Moslem traders had to face the new problems. They had to ensure the king and people among the Hindu and Buddhist activists. And finally, in the end of 16th century the one of Local Islam activist so called Walisongo (nine representations), Sunan Kalijaga, had an initiative to solve the problem by mixing the local culture that was wayang (puppet) to spread Islam. This method was successfully spreading Islam until rural society. But the influences of Hinduism and Buddhism still exist up to now. The moslems living year to year is under Islam rules among hindu-buddhism Javanese culture and becomes a new culture from this acculturation. This transformation makes Javanese Islam unique. Up to now, we can find many moslems doing the hindu-buddhism Javanese culture. People see it as a beautiful and unique culture. They make it as their strategy to attract people to come to their country to get profit but some still use it only for their belief. Islam tries to always keep their rules and genuineness. We can see the Quran. We see that there is no change in Quran from when it came to Prophet Mohammad 1400 years ago up to present. The Islam rules and culture was made to control human not only for Arabian but also for all mankind in all over the world. Then what about new Islam culture made by human? Therefore, in this paper I would like to discuss 1) How java-acculturated Islam appeared 2) How the characretistic of Javanese and its culture 3) How Javanese Islam culture (Islam acculturated culture) in the perspective of Islam is.

Keywords: Islam, local culture, acculturated Islam, Islam perspective

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is a country that has a lot of diversity in it. One of those is the diversity in the religion. Islam is not the only religion in Indonesia. Although nearly 85 percent of Indonesia's population adheres to Islam, but historically, Islam is not the oldest religion in this country. Islam came after some religions thrived in Indonesian society.

The arrival of Islam in Indonesia in the 13th century was not something new for the Indonesian society at the time. Indonesian society had undergone many transformations of various cultures that came approaching them and diffused into their culture.

The first comers coming to Indonesia were the first wave migration of Yunnan people in the southern China to Indonesia 3000 years BC. Then they transformed again after the second big migration that was the entry of Indo-Malay in 1400 BC. The arrival of the Indo-Malay brought people in Indonesia at that time to trust beliefs such as animism and dynamism. Then at the beginning of the 4th century traders from India came into Indonesia along with the Hindu and Buddhist

beliefs.

Historically, the beliefs that existed in the society blended with one another and created a new culture such as a Shiva-Buddhist belief, which is a mixture between the Hindu and Buddhist beliefs. This belief was mostly applied by the past empires such as Majapahit. Those beliefs and the cultures that had been living among the society could not be separated anymore and had been integrated into the Indonesian society culture. Then in the 13th century, the entry of Islam influenced into archipelago is a new culture that would eventually mingle with other cultures that have been living in the community which would create a new culture that is the result of a mix between various culture that had existed in the society.

Java is the center of civilization in Indonesia at that time. Many victorious kingdoms appeared and had been the center of any civilization such as Majapahit, old Mataram, Mataram Islam, Demak, Pajang, Sanjaya, Tarumanegara, Kediri, and others. The existence of Java as the center of human civilization made Java have more cultural diversity than the other regions in Indonesia. Even, many cultures converged or even appeared in Java as a form of acculturation and assimilation from various cultures. One of them is Islam culture that has acculturated with Javanese culture and then created the new culture called *Islam Kejawen*.

Islam Kejawen is not something odd for the Java society. In fact, there are many people who follow this kind of belief especially the people who are living in Central Java and East Java where this region was the center of Javanese culture hundred years ago.

Generally, *Islam Kejawen* is still a part of Islam. But in their practice, a lot of activities are contradict with what has been taught in Islam that commonly called Islamic Shari'a. Moreover, some Islamic parties and figures claim that *Islam Kejawen* is not purely part of Islam because it does not reflect Islam that has been described in the Qur'an as the holy scripture of Islam.

Even HM Rasjidi (1967), in his book "Islam and mysticism", tells that many traditions created by *Islam Kejawen* are not Islamic-based traditions but they are emerged from Javanese tradition that have been living before Islam came to Indonesia.

Therefore, in this paper we will discuss how Islam that has been acculturated with Javanese culture called *Islam Kejawen* is growing in society and how Islam views itself against the new culture that appears as a result of acculturation.

THE BEGINNING OF ISLAM EXISTENCE IN JAVA

Historically, Islam that was brought by traders from Persia and Gujarat was Islam which had a mystique element and had been mixed with either Persian or Gujarat culture. So when Islam was brought by those traders into Java, and at that time Javanese people had a belief in the mystical things so that it made them easier to accept Islam because of the similar culture of the Javanese with Islam myth that was brought by traders from the Persian and Gujarat.

Sociologically, the character of Javanese culture has similarities with Sufism Islamic culture that was brought by traders from Gujarat and Persia. Suyanto explaines (1990: 144) Javanese culture has some characteristics such as religious, non-doctrinaire, tolerant, accommodating and optimistic. Furthermore, those characters bring the style, character and special tendencies typical for the Javanese, such as a) believe in Almighty God as well as *Sangkan Paraning dumadi,* with all properties of his greatness; b) being idealistic, believing in something immaterial and supernatural things and inclined toward mysticism; c) prioritize nature than the formal aspects and rituals; d) put love as the basic foundation of human relationships; e) believe in destiny and tend to be submissive; f) being convergent and universal; g) tend to symbolism; h) tend to mutual cooperation, harmony and peace; i) being less competitive and less emphasis on material.

Meanwhile, based on its history, Simuh (1996: 110) classifies Javanese culture into:

1. Pre Hindu and Buddhism Culture

Indonesian culture, especially Java before the arrival of the Hindu-Buddhist influence was very hard to be identified definitely. As a simple society, it is proper that animism and dynamism is the main culture that evolved in their whole activity. The original religion which is often referred by the West as a magical religion is a cultural value that was most implied in Indonesian society, especially Java.

2. Hindu and Buddhism Culture

Javanese culture that received influences and absorbed elements of Hindu-Budda is not just a process of acculturation, but it is the rising of Javanese culture by utilizing the elements of the religion and culture of India. The most striking feature in Javanese culture is very theocratic. The influence of Hindu-Buddhist-animist beliefs enrich more dynamism which has long been living

3. Islam empires Culture

This culture was began by the end of the Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms that turned into Javanese Islam in Demak, north Java. This culture could not be separated from the influence and role of the Ulama (a Moslem that has a lot of knowledge about Islam and followed by people (theologian)) of Sufi saints who were the wali of java. The development of Islam in Java was not as easy as it existed outside Java which were simply dealing with local culture that was still sketchy (animism dynamism) and was not so much permeated by elements of Hindu Buddhist thoughts such as in Java.

Long time before the entry of religions such as Hindu, Buddhist, Islam, Catholic, Christian, etc., the Javanese society already knew the existence of God and believed in him. Thus, all religions that approached them were well-received by the Javanese society. They are not accustomed to polarize religion and belief because of their character that are universal and accommodating. They assumed that all religions are good with their expression: *Sedaya agami niku sae*. This phrase is what ultimately brings consequences emergence of syncretism in Javanese society.

In the way of approaching, the *Ulama* of Islam did it by two kinds of approaching, non-conformism and compromise approach. Non-conformism approach is an approach that maintains the identities of religion and would not accept the foreign culture except the culture has the same purpose with Islamic thoughts, while the compromise approach (accommodating) is an approach that seeks to create atmosphere in a peaceful, tolerant, willing to coexist with religious followers and other different traditions of religions without compromising their religion that so-called cultural approach.

Uka Tjandrasasmita explains there are 6 ways how Islam spread in Indonesia (Badri Yatim, 2010). Those ways are through:

a. Traders

In the 7th century Islam began entering Indoensia precisely in Pasai through traders from the Persian, Arab and Gujarat. Then in the early 13th century, Islam began entering the north coast of Java. Uka Tjandrasasmita explains that many Muslim traders settled on the coast of Java island whose inhabitants most of them were still infidel. They established mosques and began to expand its Islamic influences.

b. Marriage

From the economic view point, Muslim traders had a better social status than most natives. So that the indigenous people, especially the princesses, were interested in becoming their wife. Before getting married, they were islamized, after they had children, their environment became increasingly widespread and would likely build emerging-

affluent areas, villages and Muslim kingdoms. It happened in Sunan Gunungjati that was married to Princess Kawunganten.

c. Tassawuf

The tachers taught theosofi Sufi mysticism or mixed with the doctrines that have been widely recognized by society. They were adept at doing magical and healing powers. Sufism, the form of Islam that was brought to the natives had the similar characteristic with the doctrine which they got before that is Hindhu's thoughts, so the new religion that is Islam was easily understood and accepted.

d. Education

In this case, the education is exactly by establishing schools and cottage organized by religious teachers, *kiai* and *Ulama*. This has been done by the *Ulama* who gave effect to the society as well as Raden Rahmat did in Ampel Surabaya.

e. Art

The most famous islamization through art is the art of puppet show. This method was used by Sunan Kalijaga in spreading Islam. He did not ask for wages from the audience, but he told the audience to follow him to recite the shahada (a sentence marks the entry of a person into Islam; a sign that someone is a moslem). Other arts are also used for the dissemination of the Islamic religion as literature (tale, chronicle, etc), building art and sculpture.

f. Politics

Most people converted to Islam by following their king. The approach of the *Ulama* by marrying the royal family is one of the measures to spread Islam. By marrying the ingdom family, the position of king or prince will be held by the Muslims and then it was used to influence people to convert to Islam.

ISLAM TRANSFORMATION ON JAVANESE CULTURE

Islam is the concept of a humanist doctrine, which is a religion that focuses human as the central objective, based on the concept of humanism teosentric. It means that Islam is the principle of humanism teosentric and then it gets transformed as value that would be internalized and implemented in the society. This system appears symbols that are formed that is caused by dialectic process between religion values and the values of culture (Kuntowijiyo, 1996).

Islam is universal as well as the characteristics of the Javanese society that tends accommodative so that Islam is more easily fit into the Java society. Despite that customary law which is so thick and binding for a long time in the Java community to make Islam must accommodate and gets involved with the existing culture that eventually lead to a syncretism.

Sociologically, Islam is present and corresponds dialectically with the local culture. It shows that Islam is a local product which is universalized to become universal and flexible religion (Bizawie, 2003). In this case, Islam as a local product is a product that was appeared in Arabic, in Arabic situation and addressed to problems occurring and growing there. And most importantly, Islam is a revelation from God that is universal in which the adherents deemed in accordance with experience, problems, culture system and all diverse forms. In other words, the actualization of Islam cannot be separated from the locality aspects ranging from Arab, Persia, India to Southeast Asia such as Indonesia and Java in particular in accordance with each cultural characteristics (Abadi and Susanto, 2012).

Therefore, the development of Islam will never be the same from one place to another and from one time to another. Islam and its views will change with its flexibility in accordance with the changing times and finally make new cultures in society. The cultural tradition which will grow along with the increasing of its broad scope. Thus, this perspective is identified as the accommodationist perspective (Abdi and

Susanto, 2012).

Accommodationist perspective brings the view that the relevance between Islam and local culture lasted constructive-accommodating-affirmative that makes Islam getting more diverse. Historically, the relationship in this view is various that it can be said that there is no single Islam culture (Andik Wahyun, 2013). No single Islam culture means that Islamic culture in one place to other places has different characteristics because it has undergone acculturation with the local culture.

As well as Islam in Java. In the process of spreading, the *Walisongo* attempted to compromise with the approach by considering the local culture characteristics. In addition, the puppet was previously a part of the ritual and ceremonial Hindus that was converted by walisongo as a tool for spreading Islam. This is a new of highly sophisticated and brave innovation in the way of communication. Because spreading through this art makes local people feel safe because Islam exists without threatening the traditions, culture and their position (Mun'im DZ, 2008).

Islam finally comes and grows in a static and conservative Java society that causes a syncretism that is syncretic Islam. Syncretic is the process or result of pooling, combining, and system alignment of two or more different or opposing principles, thus they form a new system of principles that is different from the previous system principles (Heddy, 1995). While in his book, Simuh (1995) explains that the syncretic is:

> *An attitude or outlook that does not question whether it is an original religion or not. For people who stand for syncretic, they assume that all religion are good. Saxon syncretisms are likely to combine elements of religion, which is essentially different or even opposite.*

Historically, Islam which was brought by traders from Persia and Gujarat is basically condensed with mystical things that are more oriented to the esoteric dimensions compared with the dimensions of the exoteric (Zaini, 1988). Islam is more easily accepted by the Java community at that time because it had

similarities to the traditions of their native religion (animism dynamism) and Hindu Buddhist. Unlike the case with Islam which came in the second wave brought by pilgrims (those who worship in Mecca accordance with certain procedures) returning from Mecca. Islam reformist movement of Wahhabi Islam which is very popular in Arabic and very opposed beliefs that are considered superstitious, kurafat or heresy.

If we look back to thousands years ago, the original belief embraced by the Javanese is animism dynamism belief that by JMW this Bakker (1976) referred to the original religion or otokton. Where the original religion thinks it still can exist either in the form of syncretism, forgery or supranational religion.

Then, after the emergence of the Hindu and Buddhist, religions emerged into a new syncretism called Hindu-Shiva. It similarly happens when Islam entered into Java. Finally the third hierarchy of this belief brings out a new syncretism that is often called as *Kejawen*. An example is the kingdom of Mataram hundreds years ago. Although the Mataram kingdom is a kingdom of Islam, but they are the inheritors and guardians of Hindu Buddhist tradition as a form of reincarnation of the Majapahit empire that have been a pride of Javanese society from the past until now.

The big difference in the development of Islam in the Java community is there arose the term coastal civilization and inland civilization (Sedya Sentosa). Coastal civilization is a civilization of conservative Islam which eventually is usually called *Santri*. While the inland civilization is a process of Islamization as a form of syncretism on Islam and Javanese cultures derived in static and conservative Javanese society.

And then, based on Geertz's research (Robertson, 1986) he classified the Java community into 3 parts, those are *Priyai*, *Abangan* and *Santri*.

The *Priyai* is same as the *Santri* where they learn and do something based on the Islam thoughts and try to leave cultures that are contrary to Islam. While *Abangan* or commonly called *Kejawen* those who claim to be Muslims but do not run the Shari'a

which has been carried out and more likely to do things that have been taken down and the customs of the java habit in the past. According to the history, the *Santri* and the *Priyai* usually live in parts of the north coast of Java, especially in Central Java and East Java. But it does not mean that it is just concentrated there but because Islam has spread so the *Santri* began to spread to all parts of Java.

Basically, *Abangan* just like other Muslims who acknowledge God as their god, but on the other hand they also believe the existence of creature or things that did not look like a god, or mythical creatures. They believe that these creatures have the same powers as those of Java used to do before the advent of Islam.

Islam Kejawen in variants of Islam is the result of the dialogue between the cultural values of Islam with Javanese local culture has combined with Hindu culture which did not agree with the ultimate law of Islam (Marzuki, 2006). Meanwhile Koentjaraningrat (1984) explained that *Islam Kejawen* is a complex of beliefs and concepts of Hindu Buddhist who tend towards mystical mixed into one and recognized as the religion of Islam.

Javanese society who embrace Islam syncretic *Kejawen* is still widely found mainly in Yogyakarta and Surakarta, but it also can be found in several other areas because of the influence Mataram Java at that very broad. They will continue to recognize Islam as a religion, when faced with the identity of their identity. Formally they will continue to recognize Islam as a religion, but practically, they do not run the teachings of Islam which is subject, as *shalat*, fasting Ramadan and Hajj (Koentjaraningrat, 1994).

Although this *Kejawen* the proper worship of Muslims and recognizes Islam as a religion, but their daily lives cannot be separated from the traditions of Java in the past. Some examples of these traditions is like

Slametan

Slametan is a tradition that has been long performed by the Javanese before Islam entered. This tradition is a form of ritual that is practiced by adherents of the Hindu who still have confidence in the ortokton or native religions (animism dynamism). As Simuh (2003) that all rites (religious traditions) and religious meditation dynamism animism is intended to relate to and affect the spirit and magical powers. But after the entry of Islam, they began to change the objectives and procedures of this tradition. Slametan is the most important ceremony of all the rites existing in the system of religious people in general and *Kejawen* in particular.

In general, this ritual is divided into two types (Koentjaraningrat, 1984). The first is *slametan* that is not associated and dealing with religion and the second one is *slametan* dealing with religion. Rituals that are not related to the religion does not cause an effect on the emotions and beliefs and is usually held only as a form of solidarity or for ordinary people party celebration. Moderate form of the second that is related to the religions it is more sacred. Rituals which have religious ties can be seen in the rituals of salvation after a miraculous day people died, on the seventh day, a day to forty, one hundredth and thousandth. Indeed, this ritual actually coined various types, but by and large can be categorized as described above.

Syncretizing against Islam in this ritual is in its process, with the aim to seek safety, property or the serenity with various intermediaries, and they do it by reciting any kinds of prayer recites and dhikr in it.

Tirakat

Tirakat is another Javanese tradition that is experiencing syncretizing. *Tirakat* is a ritual in which a person is required to fast for several days with the means and conditions in order to get the durability and strength of faith. This philosophy on this ritual aims to enable those who run them can experience difficulty in living up to this tradition do they hoped to have the mental strength and a strong faith and get a reward from Almighty God.

Actually this kind of ritual is also done by Javanese predecessors before the advent of Islam. With a certain regulatory requirements, they expected to get the magical power of

the spirits or gods they believed. However, because of the similarity of method of fasting is to refrain from eating and anger makes the followers of Islam and Javanese consider that this penance as well as fasting in general.

Tirakat has various types such as *mutih, nglowong, ngepel, ngebleng and patigeni. Mutih* means a person does not eat any kind of food except white rice on Mondays and Thursdays. *Nglowong* means fasting for a few days before the major holidays of Islam. *Ngepel* means used to eat in small portions, that is no more than a handful hands for a day or two days. *Ngebleng* means fasting and solitude in a particular room by not eating or drinking for a certain period of time such as 40 days. *Patigeni* means fast in a dark room concentrated of impenetrable light (Koentjaraningrat, 1984).

Seeing from the procedure, this tradition is similar to meditation tradition performed by Hindus, which is way of concentration to achieve unification. In essence, this ritual is a form of ritual to undergo the hardships of life that aims to get closer to God (Sedya Sentosa, 2008).

Nyadran

Nyadran is a ritual exalt, honor, and celebrate ancestral spirits conducted in Ruwah (the 7th month of Islamic calendar) or after the 15th of Sha'ban before Ramadan.

According to Karkono Kamajaya (1995), the same kind of ritual that aimed to give the respect to the ancestor had also existed before Islam entered to Indonesia. Not only in Java, this kind of tradition is also practiced by tribes outside of Java. The *Kejawen* perform this ritual on the pretext of respecting diversity. This tradition has also been embedded in the book of Negara Kertagama written by Mpu Prapanca.In this book, it is written 'sradda ceremony' that is a celebration to commemorate Tribuwana or Rajapatni led by Buddhist monks (Kamajaya, 1995). Practically, this tradition consists of *Slameten* and visiting the grave of their ancestors.

There are many other traditions performed by the *Kejawen* society which

mixes local cultures with their daily lives in the running as a Muslim worship.

Greetz's research on the characteristics of the Java society that produced three types of Javanese Muslim society in particular shows the diversity of the Javanese characteristic, especially the Moslem. But with the changing times and started a lot of people who study religion thoughts, they began to leave the syncretism tradition.

ISLAM VIEW ON JAVA-ACCULTURATED ISLAM *KEJAWEN / ABANGANGAN*

Reviewing how the dynamic and flexible Islam is, it can acommodate against local culture wherever and whenever. Although Islam has a culture of openness to the outside does not mean that Islam can always get along with all cultures. Seeing from its consistency, even though Islam tried to blend in with the local culture does not mean that Islam fully follows all existing ritual traditions. Islam itself has concrete guidelines in the form of al-Quran and hadith which are the rule to keep purify of Islam.

Whereas if we look at how Islam accommodates them against the culture would be a lot of us find Islam with its own characteristics. Such Islamic tradition in India will have differences with the tradition of Islam in Java such *Kejawen*. After we discuss how the the characteristics and history of the *Kejawen.* There is a question for it*, how Islam views itself against syncretism that occurred that eventually gave rise to a new tradition called *Kejawen*?

The flexibility of Islam can be seen from the Islam thoughts that manage human life. For instance, the interaction of Islam divides people into two parts, the relationship between man and his god and man's relationship with another man.

In principle, Javanese people are religious people that believe in god. Similarly, they believe in the existence of Allah as their god just like how other Muslims in the world believe in Allah as their god. But the difference here is that most of the Java community is still conservative and tend to be static that can not depart from tradition and beliefs of

his ancestors although they believe that the almighty God is one, but they also believe in the existence of gods and objects that have magical powers. In contradict with *Santri* that have left the tradition that contradicts with Islam culture even that is their local culture.

Thus the things that need to be examined from *Kejawen* Islamic society is their ritual traditions. Traditions like going to the tomb of certain persons with the aim to seek blessings and wish what they ask may be granted as well as other traditions is a tradition that has become a core in their daily lives. Although these rituals aims to ask to their god that is Allah, but the way they are doing is contrary to Islamic Shari'a. They ask for something to god not directly but through intermediaries such as offerings or heirlooms others. Indirectly they deify these objects and assume they will have the ability to will.

In Islam itself, there is a principle that their god is only one that is Allah. They prohibits the existence of an associating that with deciding person or something as God beside Allah. As for those who believe in someone or something other than Allah is considered as an act of '*syirik*' which is the biggest kind of crime in Islam. Iin the Quran, it has described how to both ordinances bowing and praying to God. As for the things that are contrary to what has been described in the Quran which was then clarified in a hadith is considered as an innovation that are prohibited.

Thus, what has been done by the Java community *Kejawen* or *Abangan* have been out of the teachings of Islam. And deserves to be underlined that these activities should be abandoned or at least changing procedures that should be straightened out so it wil not conflict with what has been taught in Islam.

However, despite much debate emerged on the existence of Javanese Islam, but the Javanese community itself never debates the issue of their divinity faith. They never consider which one is the truesrt or the most wrong belief. So from their inner attitude such this can lead to tolerance that we see today, where there is no conflict between Islamic conservatives such as *Santri* with Islam *Kejawen* who still believe in the culture of their ancestors.

CONCLUSION

Islam is a religion that is open, dynamic and flexible, so that Islam can be readily accepted by all cultures. Because it is dynamic, Islam accommodate themselves with other cultures, giving rise to a new form of culture that shape the characteristics of Islam in the region have differences with Islam in other regions.

Islam which deals with culture and static and conservative society ultimately lead to a syncretism, that is a result from a combination of two systems principle yielding new system principles.

This is what happens in Java. static and conservative society and the influence from previous syncretic culture makes Islam in Java have have two characteristics that are Islamic conservatives who fully embrace the system of the teachings of Islam and Synncretic Islam which is usually called Islam *Kejawen* who tries to combine between ancient Javanese culture and Islam culture.

However, in practice, this syncretism Islam *Kejawen* which raises cultures are very much incompatible with the rules in Islam, causing much polemic in a conservative Islamic society.

However, under the pretext of preserving the local culture, *Kejawen* society still run the activities of the ritual. But the Javanese people who never question the belief at least minimize the problem of conflict in the Java community in general. Thus arises the tolerance between the Java community that still put forward the principle of mutual cooperation.

There is no compulsion for the Java community *Abangan* to leave their culture but it would be better if they were a little straighten their ordinances perform these traditions that do not contradict with Islamic Shari'a. It is an obligation for the all Moslems to remind each other so that together they can carry out the purpose of life properly and realize a life of value

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DYNAMICS OF SOUTH ASIAN INTEGRATION RELATED TO INDIA'S MEMBERSHIP ON SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC)

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Abstract

The integration of South Asian has not been easy to be maintained. It has been challenged by the membership of India on South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In one side, the economic integration of South Asian, as one of the SAARC features, could be enhanced by the economic power of India. The deepening of trade relation among SAARC members is relatively slow. But, India has an ability to boost it up considering that the India's economic growth is categorized as the high one, even predicted by Asian Development Outlook may overtake the China's economic growth in 2016. With its high economic growth, India could be triggered to spur its intensive trade relation with the other members of SAARC, which would generate a domino effect to the economic integration of South Asian. But in other side, the internal conflict between India and the other member of SAARC (e.g. Pakistan) is the biggest obstacle for integration of South Asian. Such conflict harms not only the relation between these two members of SAARC, but also the regional integration upheld by SAARC as a whole. The given conditions above reflected that the integration of South Asian is highly influenced by the membership of India on SAARC. This paper attempts to explain how the dynamic of South Asian integration influenced by the India's membership on SAARC will be.

Keywords: Integration, South Asian, India, SAARC, Conflicts.

A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERA- TION (SAARC)

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an organization of South Asian nations, established on December 8, 1985. It is headquartered in Kathmandu, Nepal. The very first proposal for establishing a framework for regional integration in South Asia was made by the late president of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, on May 2, 1980. Prior to this, the idea of South Asian integration was discussed in at least three conferences: the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in April 1947, the Baguio Conference in the Philippines in May 1950, and the Colombo Powers Conference in April 1954 (S. Rehman, 1999).

The governments of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka formally adopted its charter providing for the promotion of social, economic and cultural development within the South Asian region and also for friendship and cooperation with other developing countries. Its seven founding members were Bhutan, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh while Afghanistan joined the organization in 2007. Observer states include USA, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, Myanmar, Mauritius, Iran, and European Union. Meetings of heads of state are usually held on annual basis and meetings of foreign secretaries twice a year.

Since the formation of SAARC in 1985, the level of cooperation among the member countries have increased substantially. SAARC was established with the objective of improving the living standards of the people, cultural and regional economic growth and increasing cooperation with other regions of the world (S. Kripa, 2008). During the recent years, realizing the importance of regional cooperation and development, SAARC mem-

bers have now created a sense of acceler- ating regional economic development and they advocate revival of the organization by moving from just the issuance of declarations to practical implementation of the plans and policies to turn this weak region into a poten- tially developed one. This recognition has led towards increasing the pace of cooperation among the member countries.

For the success of SAARC, economic and trade cooperation is very much important and become the first thing to be focused on for the development of South Asia (Irum Sha- heen, 2013). Many years of discussions have at least established the bases of coopera- tion in this particular area. During the 1990s, SAARC discussed the Preferential Trading Area (SAPTA) among the member countries which was materialized in the shape of Free Trade Agreement which is now known as South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). Ac- cording to this agreement, the tariff reduction plan was chalked out and since 2006, this re- duction had been carried out in two phases i.e Pakistan and India pledged to put tariffs on all the goods down to twenty percent with- in two years and all other countries to thirty percent within three years (M. Hussain, et. al. 1999). While in the second phase, Pakistan and India decided to put the tariffs on goods down to 0-5 percent within five years and oth- er members of the organization within seven years. Though the initiatives taken to trade freely in the region has encountered a lot of problem but still we can not ignore that the member countries are proceeding ahead with their plans to improve the regional growth and cooperation (President Pervez Musharraf's Statement Reported by M. Aftab, 2004).

B. INDIA AND THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF SOUTH ASIA

South Asia is at a turning point. Powered by the dynamic growth of the India's economy, it is the fastest-growing region in the world. South Asia can be propelled faster to find its rightful place in the world if its member states develop as an integrated economy. This would make South Asia the second-largest economy in the world after the People's Republic of China (PRC), leaving behind even the United States (Akmal Hussain, 2006). The stakes for regional economic integration are clearly high, and its prospects are bright.

South Asia is home to about one and half billion people or 23% of the world population. Its share in world gross domestic product (GDP) remains at barely 2,3%. The eight countries in the region, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, have diverse economic features with India and Pakistan being the two largest economies in terms of the regional GDP and population. But India's dominance in nearly all respects is a central and special feature of the region that can be seen as both a positive and negative feature in the context of promoting greater economic cooperation (Rajiv Kumar, 2009).

India is both literally and otherwise central to South Asia. India's size and central location in South Asia makes the region quite unique and complicates the case for regional integration. It is the only country in South Asia that has common borders with all others (except Afghanistan). In terms of its geographical size, its demographic and economic potential, and its political weight, the country towers above the other countries in the region (Tomislav Delinic, 2011). For instance, in 2006 India accounted for 78% of the regional GDP by value. Pakistan, the next largest economy after India, accounted for 11% of the regional GDP, followed by Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Similarly, India accounts for 74% of the regional population, Pakistan for 13%, Bangladesh for 10%, Nepal for 2% and Sri Lanka for 1%.

Figure 1. SAARC Countries Shares of Gross Domestic Product, 2006

Source: World Bank, 2008

On closer inspection, India's position of prominence is shown to be one of the many hurdles standing in the way of South Asian integration. Its neighbors often view India as both a savior and as part of the problem. The smaller South Asian countries are far less diversified and have a relatively underdeveloped industrial structure. This makes them reluctant to push forward with regional liberalization due to fear of being swamped by Indian businesses, resulting in a possible deindustrialization of their economies (Tomislav Delinic, 2011).

On the other hand, South Asia is power driven by the vibrant economic growth of India (Bishnu Pant, 2014). South Asian countries have been engaging in uneven bilateral agreement from political fear with the powerful growing India's economy against the welfare of their economies. However, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka has expanded their manufacturing aptitude, trade and economic growth, and foreign direct investment (FDI) due to free trade agreements with India. This tendency needs to be further strengthened and can emerge as the major driver for regional cooperation in South Asia.

SAFTA will be trade-creating within SAARC, with India serving as the growth pole for the region, and ensure that all the participating countries will gain. Given its dominant size, human resources, and aspirations for a global role, India will have to take on a disproportionately larger responsibility for promoting regional cooperation in South Asia. Batra (2004), using an augmented gravity model, estimated the trade potential for India with its trading partners in the world and specifically within regional groupings like the SAARC. Though the estimates indicated positive trade potential for the SAARC region as a whole, the positive trade potential was mainly on account of potential trade between India and Pakistan, which was estimated at $6,5 billion more than the actual trade between these economies. On the basis of the trend and structure of trade between India and Bangladesh, Rahman (2005) believes that bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh was not as high as it should be. And there was scope for mutual trade expansion. If Bangladesh's exports were increased, this would induce higher imports of raw materials and intermediate goods from India. The demand for the Indian consumer goods exports would also increase in Bangladesh due to higher income from increased exports.

India naturally dominates the region's trade as it has common borders with all the countries of South Asia. Table 1 reveals that India's trade with all countries increased from 1995 to 2006, with a large proportion of total exports to the region going to India. There have also been changes in the direction of the region's trade. In 1995, 61,5% of India's exports to the region went to Bangladesh, but this decreased to 30,7% in 2006. On the other hand, Bangladesh's export share to India increased from 42,3% in 1995 to 63,5 % in 2006.

India-Sri Lanka trade too has increased tremendously and India has become the most important trading partner for Sri Lanka in the region. Some 86% of Sri Lanka's exports to the region go to India and 35,5% of India's exports to the region go to Sri Lanka. This could be due to the FTA between the two countries which became operational in 2000. There has also been an increase in India's trade with Nepal and Pakistan in recent years, despite the trade with the latter being conducted still on the basis of a positive list and India not having been granted MFN status by Pakistan, in violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) norms and practices.

Table 1. Direction of Intra-Regional Trade (% of Total Exports of a Country in the Region)

	India		Bangladesh		Pakistan		Nepal		Sri Lanka
	2001-03	2006-07	1995-96	2005-06	2001-05	2006-08	Up to2006	2006-07	2005
India			0.62	0.54	0.00	0.00	40.71	46.60	6.20
Bangladesh	...	...			0.05	0.10	0.75	...	0.18*
Pakistan	...	...	1.40	1.87			0.47	...	0.60*
Nepal	...	...	...	...	...	...		...	...
Sri Lanka	0.01	0.01	0.23	0.41	...	...	0.13	...	
Bhutan	...	...	0.01	...	...	...	0.01	...	...
Maldives	0.01	0.01	0.00	...	...	...	0.00	...	n.a.
Share of South Asia	0.02	0.02	2.25	2.82	0.06	0.10	41.80	46.60	7.00

Source: Estimated from Direction of Trade Statistics Data.

Meanwhile, table 2 presents the India's role as the predominant source of FDI within

the region. Intra-regional flow of FDI is a great potential for South Asia, because it is needed to develop South Asia's infrastructure. South Asia countries will benefit from development of a cross border highway network, which is used to facilitate movement of goods and personnel all across the region. The benefits of greater transport, communication, and energy connectivity cannot be captured in any quantitative exercise but are estimated to be very significant to the economic growth of each country in South Asia. The sources for infrastructure development in South Asia are less. Regional cooperation can offer multilateral agencies in developing the physical infrastructure in the region (Rajiv Kumar and Manjeeta Singh, 2009).

Table 2. Intra-Regional Flow of FDI in South Asia (% of Country Total)

Table 4: Direction of Intra-regional Trade (% of Total Exports of a Country in the Region)

1995 From/to	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Maldives	Bhutan
Afghanistan	...	3.4	32.2	0.0	64.4	0.0	n.a	n.a
Bangladesh	0.6	...	42.3	11.8	31.4	13.6	0.0	0.3
India	0.9	61.5	...	6.9	4.5	24.6	0.8	0.8
Nepal	0.0	11.9	83.6	...	1.5	3.0	0.0	n.a
Pakistan	7.3	56.3	14.2	1.1	...	20.2	0.5	0.4
Sri Lanka	1.0	11.8	31.4	0.0	42.2	...	13.7	n.a
Maldives	n.a	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	99.0		n.a

2006 From/to	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Maldives	Bhutan
Afghanistan	...	2.2	50.0	0.0	47.7	0.1	n.a	n.a
Bangladesh	0.5	...	63.5	1.9	27.8	4.7	0.0	1.8
India	2.7	30.7	...	15.8	12.2	35.5	1.2	1.8
Nepal	0.0	0.8	98.3	...	0.9	0.0	0.0	n.a
Pakistan	60.0	12.0	19.0	0.2	...	8.7	0.2	0.0
Sri Lanka	0.3	2.2	86.6	0.1	6.7	...	4.2	n.a
Maldives	n.a	0.0	5.9	0.0	0.0	94.1	...	n.a

Source: Aggarwal, 2008.

C. INDIA AND THE POLITICS OF SOUTH ASIA

Although economic and trade cooperation is very much important as explained above, there is something beyond that SAARC members should be more focused on. In fact, the political factor is the main reason for regionalism in South Asia not to be built well. Bimal Prasad stated that the basic reason behind the slow growth of regional cooperation in South Asia is not economic, but political (Bimal Prasad in Puran Ghale, 2015). If members of SAARC could set aside the political differences then the region constitutes an ideal grouping for economic integration (Muchkund Dubey in Puran Ghale, 2015). Political factors that make regionalism

in South Asia not to run well are mainly due to the security issues faced by SAARC member countries.

From political issues, the regional integration in South Asia is unsuccessful because others member of SAARC reluctant to recognize the leadership of India in the South Asian region (Kishore C. Dash in Puran Ghale, 2015). According to Kishore C. Dash, regional relationship could be improved by the presence of hegemon that can provide institution's rules and policies (Dash in Puran Ghale, 2015). Hegemon absence may cause coordination dilemma and raise issues related to coordination (Dash in Puran Ghale, 2015). The reluctance of SAARC members happens because of the asymmetry power balance between India and others member of SAARC as explain below.

C.1. Asymmetry Power Balance in SAARC

India has significant role in the economy and global politics (Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen in Puran Ghale, 2015). As a country, India has successfully attracted global attention because of advantages it has. India has managed to become the country with remarkable economic growth and makes the country rank seventh highest GDP in the world (IBEF, 2015). Moreover, India is also the second fastest growing country in the world after East Asia (Puran Ghale, 2015). As the largest democracy country in the world and the country with tenth largest economy in the world, India is becoming a global concern with its emergence as a new economic power.

The role of India in economy and global politics brings global aspirations to India for having significant role in integration of South Asia. As Rafiq Dossani et al. points out that, "In most of the successful examples of regionalism, a major regional anchor played an important role in bringing countries together, at least in integration's early days" (Sood et al in Puran Ghale). The region's geo-politics strongly suggest that India is the best candidate for the job (Puran Ghale, 2015).

Not only based on role in the economy and global politics, another indicators for

making India has a great potential to lead South Asia is Indo-centric. Indo-centric refers to India as a center for South Asia both in terms of geographic, demographic, economic, and military power (Puran Ghale, 2015). In other words, India has superiority in terms of geographic, demographic, economic, and military power. Geographically, India has the largest area in South Asia. The extent of the territory of India makes the country surrounded by land and maritime borders with all SAARC member countries, except Afghanistan (Puran Ghale, 2015).

From the economic standpoint, India is the country with the highest GDP in South Asia. It can be seen from the average GDP of India in 2007 until 2011, which was around 1147.74 billion dollars per year. India's GDP on average accounts for about 81.71% of the total GDP of SAARC countries. The country with the second highest average GDP is Pakistan with a value of 129.38 billion dollars per year. The country with the third largest GDP is Bangladesh with an average GDP of 73.78 billion dollars. Of the average GDP produced per year, it can be seen that average GDP gap between India with Pakistan and Bangladesh are big enough. This suggests the existence of an asymmetric force between India and other SAARC countries in the economic field. The following table illustrates the GDP of SAARC member countries from 2007 to 2011.

Table 3. GDP of SAARC Member Countries 2007 – 2011(in constant price)

Countries	Average
SAARC	1404.7
Afganishtan	9.6
Bangladesh	73.78
Bhutan	1.12
Maldives	1.4
Nepal	9.74
India	1147.74
Pakistan	129.38
Sri Lanka	31.5

Source: SAARC, 2015

In addition to the economic side, the asymmetric force between India and other SAARC countries is also visible from the demographic composition. If the average population of SAARC from 2008 to 2012 in the South Asian countries is 1.6 billion, the average population of India 1.2 billion represents 75% of the average total population of SAARC per year. The second and third largest average population is held by Pakistan and Bangladesh with an average population of 173 million and 151 million people per year. Considerable difference in the average population between India and Pakistan and Bangladesh show that asymmetric also occurs in South Asia in terms of demographics. The following table shows the structure of the population of SAARC member countries from 2008 to 2012.

Table 4. Population Structure of SAARC Member Countries 2008 – 2012 (in thousand)

Countries	Average
SAARC	1607078
Afganishtan	28413.6
Bangladesh	151231
Bhutan	717
Maldives	326
Nepal	26854
India	1205653.6
Pakistan	173095.4
Sri Lanka	20767.4

Source: SAARC, 2015

In addition to the geographic, demographic, and economic, asymmetrical is also visible from the military side. India has the largest military expenditure compared with other SAARC member countries. In terms of percentage of GDP, the average allocation of funds for military expenditure in 2007 until 2011, the largest is by Pakistan with a percentage of 3.4%. Although Pakistan has the biggest GDP, the average number of Pakistan military expenditure from 2007 through 2012 is the second largest, amounting to 4.4 billion dollars. The average allocation of military funds from 2007 to 2011 by India is the largest with a value of 35.81 billion dollars and accounted for 3.12% in terms of GDP.

This shows that India also has the superiority of the military because the fund used by the Indian military is much more when compared with other SAARC member countries. In more detail, it can be seen in the table below:

Table 5. Military Expenditures[1] of SAARC Member Countries 2007-2011

Country	Average Annual Income 2007-2011 (% GDP)	Average Annual Expenditure 2007-2011 (in million dollar)
Afganistan	2.06	197.76
Bangladesh	1.12	826.36
Bhutan	-	-
Maldives	-	-
India	3.12	35810
Nepal	1.84	179.21
Pakistan	3.4	4400
Sri Lanka	3.34	1050

Source: World Bank, 2015.

The existence of asymmetric force between India and other SAARC member countries make security as an important issue. It is as expressed by Feroz Khan stating that in an asymmetric environment, the issue of security is a major obstacle for regional integration (Puran Ghale, 2015). Smaller countries that are members of SAARC such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives are suspicious and distrustful of India with its motive to become hegemon (Puran Ghale, 2015). Because of suspicion and distrust, then these countries allow for external forces to hinder the realization of India's desire to become a hegemon. This can be seen in the increasingly good relationship established between Nepal and China, Sri Lanka and China and some Western countries, and Pakistan with China (Prasad in Puran Ghale, 2015).

Not only gives impacts to the external relation, the suspicion and distrust between members also gives impacts to the dynamics on establishment of SAARC and internal relation between members of SAARC below.

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1   Military expenditures are all expenses incurred by a country to finance its army. This includes the financing of the peacekeeping forces, the Ministry of Defense, military and other government organizations related to defense affairs.

C.2. Dynamics on Establishment of SAARC

The first concrete proposal to establish a framework of regional cooperation in South Asia was posed by President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh in Bangladesh Working Paper (BWS) on November 25, 1980 (Chaudhury in Puran Ghale, 2015). When viewed in detail, the purpose of the establishment of SAARC in the beginning was not to realize the need of cooperation among member countries but asymmetric power balance in South Asia. In an asymmetric environment, it becomes inherently difficult for a small state to deal with its bigger neighbor on an equal footing, thus reducing the former's bargaining power in inter-state relationships (Puran Ghale, 2015). This is what happened with Bangladesh. To reduce the losses caused by the bilateral relationship with India, Bangladesh uses a strategy formation of regional organizations to resist the power of India (Shukdev Shah in Puran Ghale, 2015). The design of the establishment of regional organizations in South Asia was supported by other smaller countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Those smaller states feel threatened by the dominance of India in the political and economic system. Establishment a good relationship to counter the dominance of India in political and economic system through setting up multilateral forum is needed (Puran Ghale, 2015). Based on that explanation, SAARC is a unique regional organization in terms of establishment objectives. If other regional organizations are generally established with a goal against external threats, SAARC is an initiative of Bangladesh supported by small countries to fight the growing power and influence of India (Chaundury in Puran Ghale, 2015).

In addition to the purpose of establishment, the uniqueness of SAARC is also visible from the adoption of a proposed establishment of a regional organization by India and Pakistan. Pakistan and India at first were suspicious and skeptical about the establishment of SAARC. For both countries, SAARC is considered a nuisance to the realization of their national interests

(Chaundury in Puran Ghale, 2015). At least, three reasons make India suspicious and skeptical about the establishment of SAARC. First, India suspects the influence of western countries in the establishment of a regional organization in the proposal submitted by Bangladesh (Chaundury in Puran Ghale, 2015). Second, India is afraid that the South Asian regional organizations are anti-Soviet Union that may disrupt the good relationship between India and the Soviet Union as reflected in the signatories to the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1971 (Chaundury in Puran Ghale, 2015). Third, India fears that the proposals submitted by the President Ziaur Rahman can provide an opportunity for other South Asian countries to regionalize bilateral issues and join forces to fight India (Haider Khan and Zulfikar Larik, 2007). Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, submitted these reasons at the Meeting of the South Asian Foreign Ministers on August 1, 1983 (Chaundury in Puran Ghale, 2015).

Although initially suspicious and hesitant India, India finally approved the establishment of a regional organization in South Asia for two reasons. First, the regional organization is the concept of strong neighborhood that hard to be rejected by India. In fact, the presence of South Asian regional organization can be used to influence regional politics in the interests of India (Puran Ghale, 2015). Second, based on consideration that rejection the idea of establishment regional organization would make India being isolated that could disrupt India's national interests (S. D. Muni in Puran Ghale, 2015).

On the other hand, Pakistan assumed that the framework of regional cooperation is a strategy by India to organize the South Asian countries in the fight against Pakistan and ensures the regional market for Indian products to reinforce the dominance of India in South Asia (S. D. Muni in Puran Ghale, 2015). In addition, the presence of South Asian regional organization is feared to even strengthen India's position in the region by providing a better forum for India to speak out and to force the strategic strength to the smaller countries (Chaundury in Puran Ghale,

2015). Pakistan eventually became a member of SAARC of the same reason—not wanting to be isolated by the countries in South Asia (Puran Ghale, 2015). India and Pakistan became a member of SAARC with the terms accepted by all members of SAARC, which did not include security issues in the agenda of SAARC (Ppriyanka Kher, 2012).

As political issues are not addressed, SAARC does not have a common approach to resolve disputes between member countries, particularly related to regional conflicts (Uttara Sahasrabuddhe, *n.d.*). Because it does not have the approach to the conflict, SAARC avoid involvement in various levels to resolve regional disputes. This can be seen from SAARC Summit or SAARC Ministerial Meeting which do not negotiate disputes between member countries both formally and informally. In other words, there is no security nor political issues that have a significant effect to the SAARC member countries because almost no issues of high politics are included in the agenda of SAARC (Uttara Sahasrabuddhe, *n.d.*). This makes SAARC ineffective as a regional organization because it does not have the capability to resolve regional political issues.

C.3. The Relational Dynamics on Members of SAARC

SAARC member states seek to protect the interests of the political elite in each region with a focus on external threats compared to internal threats such as poverty, uneven growth, and government corruption (Uttara Sahasrabuddhe, *n.d.*). External threats in security issues can be seen in the perception held by the SAARC member countries on regional threat. For small countries, a regional threat comes from India that seeks to become hegemon. Ananya Mukherjee identified that India's desire to dominate the smaller countries in South Asia even become a major barrier to the realization of regional cooperation (Uttara Sahasrabuddhe, *n.d.*). India perceives itself as hegemon, and India precisely fears of regional threats in the form of intervention from outside of South Asia (Uttara Sahasrabuddhe, *n.d.*). As for

Pakistan, the security cannot be achieved as long as India has not handed over Kashmir to Pakistan. Below is the detail explanation about the relation between members of SAARC.

C.3.1. India-Pakistan

Most serious conflictual relationship in South Asia is between India and Pakistan (Puran Ghale, 2015). Observers argue that the dynamics of the relationship is such hostages that make prosperity and regional harmony in South Asia cannot be realized (Puran Ghale, 2015). Disputes between India and Pakistan are due to fears over the hegemony of India both politically and economically (Alyson J. K. Bailes, John Gooneratne, Mavara Inayat, Jamshed Ayaz Khan and Swaran Singh, 2007). An example of Pakistan and India dispute on politics could be seen in the struggle for Kashmir region since 1965. In the case of Kashmir, Pakistan wants freedom for Kashmir people. On the other hand, India wants Kashmir to be part of India with the consideration that the freedom given to Kashmir could trigger the emergence of other similar movements and carried out by other ethnic groups in India (Alyson *et al*, 2007)

From the economic side, Pakistan is afraid that they fail to compete with India because India's market is getting bigger and stronger economy. This concern due to de-industrialization as Pakistan's domestic industry fails to compete with Indian products. An example could be seen in the textile industry as a key driver for economic growth and contribute to Pakistan's exports with a share of more than 65%. Pakistan textile industry is threatened by the presence of the Indian textile industry that is more diversified (Rajiv Khumar, 2009).

C.3.2. India-Sri Lanka

The relationship between India and Sri Lanka is not too good. This is due to the dispute between the two countries. India, especially Tamil Nadu people, intervenes in ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. This conflict occurred since the British domination ended

until the end of the civil war in 1983 involving ethnic minorities, namely the Sinhalese and Tamil (M. Manir Hossain and Ronald C. Duncan, 1998). This conflict originated from ethnic discrimination by Sinhalese as the majority against Tamil ethnic as ethnic minority. There are at least three reasons that make India intervene the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. First, the Tamil Nadu in India has a close relationship in terms of ethnicity, culture, and religion of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka (P.A. Gosh, 1999). Tamil Nadu people cannot let "their brothers" to get abomination of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The assistance provided by India in the form of both material and moral support.

Secondly, along with the continuing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi issued Indira Doctrine. This is a strategy used to unify South Asia under the leadership of India (P.A. Gosh, 1999). Indira Doctrine is a security doctrine which states that India does not have any purpose in intervening in internal conflicts in South Asia. Through this Doctrine, indirectly India wants to convey that the external forces in the dispute in South Asia will not be tolerated (P.A. Gosh, 1999). Thirdly, the support provided by India to the Tamil is one form of pressure to force the United States trying to shift the power of the Tamils in Sri Lanka (P.A. Gosh, 1999). Factors behind the Indian intervention in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka showed that India seeks to become the sole hegemon in South Asia by way to minimize the entry of external forces outside South Asia.

C.3.3. India-Nepal

India and Nepal started the bad relationship because of the dispute in borderline. This dispute started in 1981. The contested borderline is Kalapani and Susta as Nepal's border region in the west and east (Stephen Groves, 2014). Kalapani is an area between Nepal, India, and China. This region has a strategic military position and was once used by Indian troops in a war against China in 1962 (Stephen Groves, 2014).

Mahakali River flows through the Kalapani border area. For Nepal, Mahakali River source comes from Limpiyadhura. As for India, the source of Mahakali is Lipu Lekh (International Boundaries Consultant, 1998). The difference makes Nepal and India have a conflict in Kalapani region(International Boundaries Consultant, 1998). In addition to difference in the spring of the River, the dispute also occurs as a result of gaps in managing the River by using modern technology (International Boundaries Consultant, 1998). India use modern technology called hydroelectric and can make the water flowing in the border region of Nepal becomes dry. However, the water is also required by Nepal to run the irrigation project (Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit, 1999). Similar as in Kalapani, Susta border region also has a river named Narayani, a border region between Nepal and India. Because of the great flood occurred for several times, the border region of India extends for 14,500 hectares of the original. It is a threat to the sovereignty of Nepal (Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit, 1999). On the other hand, Nepal is the focus of security for India. Nepal is not a stable country regarded as a security risk to the region (Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit, 1999). From the explanation, it can be said that both Nepal and India both see the other as a threat to the sovereignty of each country.

C.3.4. India-Bangladesh

The dynamics of the relationship between India and Bangladesh have gone ups and downs. India's role in helping the liberalization of Bangladesh on the western part of Pakistan in 1971 was the beginning of good bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh. The strong bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh started under the leadership of President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. After the assassination of President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975, the bilateral relations of Bangladesh with India started to be worse. Bangladesh started to develop its relations with other countries like the United States, China, and Pakistan. Although aware of the centrality of India and its role in helping the liberalization of Bangladesh, Bangladesh is increasingly suspicious and fears of India's domination in the future. Disputes between Bangladesh and India arise in the distribution of natural resources such as water and border region (M. Manir Hossain and Ronald C. Duncan, 1998). An example is India seeks to build a seven-route transit in the northeast part of India, which is the border region between India and Bangladesh. The development of transit route may interfere with security interests of Bangladesh, as it considers (M. Manir Hossain and Ronald C. Duncan, 1998). Instead, India is sure that Bangladesh provides a place for military training for rebels from northeast India. Feroz Khan said that India has accused Bangladesh of conspiring with Pakistan to destabilize India's northeast (in Puran Ghale, 2015). On the other hand, Bangladesh sees the charges given by India only to make Bangladesh as a target

C.3.5. India-Bhutan

In 1949, India and Bhutan signed the Friendship Treaty. With the signing of the Friendship Treaty, Bhutan shall conduct foreign relations by considering the position of India. Therefore, since the signing of the Friendship Treaty between India and Bhutan, India was often willing to regulate foreign affairs of Bhutan (India-Bhutan Relation, 2014). In 2007, a decision on India to regulate foreign relations of Bhutan was removed so that the right to conduct foreign relations in accordance with its wishes (India-Bhutan Relation, 2014). Diplomatic relationship between India and Bhutan was formally established in 1968 with the appointment of a representative of India in Thimphu (India-Bhutan Relation, 2014). The relationship has long been the basis of trust and mutual understanding. India is the greatest trading partner of Bhutan as well as a leader in the trade (India-Bhutan Relation, 2014). Economic development, especially hydropower, is a major cooperation between India and Bhutan. In addition to economic development, India's cooperation with Bhutan could be seen from the provision of scholarships by the government of India to the people of Bhutan.

C.3.6. India-Maldives

India is the first country to recognize the independence of the Maldives in 1965 and put its representatives in the Maldives. India and the Maldives have a good relationship because of shared ethnicity, language, culture, religion, and trade networks (India-Maldives Relation, 2014). The strong relationship that exists between India and the Maldives cannot be separated from their regular contacts on government level. In addition, India also provides assistance to the Maldives, such as in the construction of hospitals, investments, credit facilities, and tsunami relief in 2004 (India-Maldives Relation, 2014). In terms of demographics, India has the second largest number of expatriates in the Maldives with the livelihood are doctors, teachers, nurses, etc.

C.3.7. India-Afganistan

India and Afghanistan have a good bilateral relationship. This is especially due to the similarity in opponents, namely Pakistan. Afghanistan rejects the inclusion of Pakistan as a UN member due to the disputes about the border region (Kamanye Thadani, 2014). Meanwhile, India also has a dispute with Pakistan on Kashmir region. The existence of antipathy towards Pakistan made Afghanistan and India signed a Friendship Treaty in 1950 (Kamanye Thadani, 2014). Afghanistan and India has a symbiotic mutualism relationship. This can be seen in Afghanistan getting 1.2 trillion dollars since 2001. The assistance provided makes India as the largest donor country for Afghanistan to build the country after the US invasion in Afghanistan to fight against the Taliban (Kamanye Thadani, 2014).

On the other hand, Afghanistan provides assistance for India in efforts to maintain regional stability and to counter the influence of Pakistan in Kabul. In addition, the assistance provided to Afghanistan has successfully made India have access to energy in Central Asia through partnerships with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (Kamanye Thadani, 2014). Afghanistan's relationship with India is increasingly better and Pakistan sees this as a threat to its interests in the South Asian region (Jayshree Bajoria, 2009).

One visible importance is competition in the consumer market in Afghanistan. From the explanation, it can be said that although the relationship of Afghanistan and India is better compared to the relationship of India and Pakistan, it does not rule out the possibility that Afghanistan has the potential to become the area of cold war between India and Pakistan.

D. INDIA IN THE INTEGRATION OF SOUTH ASIA: A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS

Although India has considered as the fastest-growing region in the world and naturally dominates the region's trade as it has common borders with all the countries of South Asia, this does not automatically bring success to the economic integration of South Asia. Moreover the smaller South Asian countries are far less diversified and have a relatively underdeveloped industrial structure. This makes them reluctant to push forward with regional liberalization due to fear of being swamped by Indian businesses, resulting in a possible deindustrialization of their economies.

Being threatened by Indian businesses in economic integration is not the main reason behind the slow growth of regional cooperation in South Asia. The basic reason for making regionalism in South Asia not to run well is political. From political issue, the regional integration in South Asia is unsuccessful because others member of SAARC reluctant to recognize the leadership of India in the South Asian region. The reluctant of SAARC members happens because of the asymmetry power balance between India and others member of SAARC. This asymmetry is the result of India's superiority in terms of geographic, demographic, economic, and military power which called Indo-centric in South Asia.

The existence of asymmetric force between India and other SAARC member countries has made members of SAARC suspicious and distrustful of India with its motive to become hegemon. Those suspicion and distrust between members of SAARC give

impacts to the dynamics on establishment of SAARC. SAARC was established by smaller countries initiated by Bangladesh supported by other smaller countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka to counter the dominance of India in political and economic system through multilateral forum. India and Pakistan became member of SAARC because did not want to be isolated by the countries in South Asia. Both countries became a member of SAARC with the terms accepted by all members of SAARC, which did not include security issues in the agenda of SAARC.

The suspicion and distrust between members of SAARC also give impacts to small countries by defining a regional threat. India was defined by smaller countries as regional threat that seeks to become hegemon. India has conflicts almost with all members of SAARC such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh. As political issues are not addressed in the agenda of SAARC, there is no security nor political issues that have a significant effect to the SAARC member countries. Since conflicts between India and others member of SAARC still happen without any solution, economic integration in South Asia is yet optimum.

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CHAPTER 3

INDONESIA'S ROLE IN PRODUCING STABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER UNDER PRESIDENT SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO ADMINISTRATION (2004-2010)

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ABSTRACT

This paper will analyze Indonesia's role in making itself a credible state in the increasingly dynamic Southeast Asian region, when the country was led by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) from 2004-2014. This was an interesting period in the modern Indonesia, when the country was governed using modern ideas which received international appreciation. This paper will argue that despite facing domestic economic downturn, internal instability, as well as regional economic and security uncertainties, the SBY administration managed to balance the country and made itself a credible regional power. The level of analysis will combine the Indonesian bureaucracy and the personal involvement of President SBY in operating the country's foreign policies. This paper will cover five sections. One, a review on SBY's ideas prior to committing himself to lead the country, and SBY's policies soon after he won the presidential election. Two, it is the domestic settings of Indonesia and the country's specific way to recover following the Asian financial crisis. Particular attention will be given to the way Indonesia responded to modern ideas such as Good Governance, Meritocracy, Free Market Economy, Rule of Law, as well as the domestic promotion for science and technology. Three, the regional economic settings perceived by the Indonesian government, covering ideas such as the reduced capacity of the Indonesian economy on one hand, and the increasingly competitive neighbors. Four, there is the regional security settings, covering the conflicting responses among the ASEAN partners in dealing with the South China Sea issues. Five, there is the Indonesian regional policies and responses in order to produce a conducive region and improve Indonesian regional credibility. Critical analysis will focus on President SBY's ability to produce better policies during his second five years of leadership, learning from the challenges the country had faced during his first five years in power.

Keywords: Producing Stable, International Order, SBY

INTRODUCTION

This paper will argue that despite facing domestic economic downturn, internal instability, as well as regional economic and security uncertainties, the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) managed to balance the country and made itself a credible regional power. In understanding this development, it is necessary to critically examine the nature of Indonesia from its domestic and international context.

SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO AND THE STATE BUREAUCRACY

Under President Yudhoyono, Indonesian bureaucracy has no significant changing.

The bureaucracy reformation done by President Yudhoyono stresses on corruption problem. To respond it, he creates President instruction (Instruksi Presiden/Inpres) No 5/2004 about acceleration of corruption problem that focuses on all ministers in every department to prevent and solve corruption in every level. This instruction should be shock therapy for the doers. The problem appears when the implementation goes to failed. There is no any significant progress achieved. The establishment of judiciary surveillance commission which is expected to recover institution and strengthen judiciary performance and recommend discharge of attorney if convicted misappropriation in law enforcement, as constructed Law (Undang-Undang), No. 16/2004, has not seen as

strategic step in the field.[1]

Another bureaucracy problem, President Yudhoyono runs government set a vision and mission of economics based on the principle Esbeyenomics. This thinking explains SBY in building a nation of Indonesia cannot be separated from its cultural roots. Esbeyenomics has three characteristics. First, Esbeyenomics pay great attention to efforts to reduce poverty and unemployment. High rates of poverty and unemployment in Indonesia become President Yudhoyono foothold in establishing this principle. According to the ILO (International Labour Organization) the number of unemployment in Indonesia is increasing from year to year. In 2001 as many as 6.1 million later in 2002 as many as 8.6 million and 2003 raise up to 10, 3 million. Furthermore, this figure will describe how big the potential of government should be allocated to tackle. Moreover, in the promise - the promise expressed during the campaign, SBY - JK will reduce the number because it relates directly with the fulfillment of the economic rights of citizens.

The content of the principle Esbeyenomics is putting a priority the Development in the agricultural sector and rural areas. In addition to lowering the unemployment rate and poverty are concentrated on the poor and job seekers in the agricultural sector and rural areas, the second principle is also done in an effort to move the center businesses are concentrated in urban centers to rural as new industrial centers and economic wheel drive. In fact, it is possible to move the axis rotation of the wheels of the national economy from the international market to domestic market.[2]

The third is the policy of liberalization. In the policy stated on chapter RPJM, increasing Investment and Non-Oil Exports, economic ministers agreed to increase international trade cooperation through the principle of co-operation trade mutually beneficial, fair and open. In the context of real, liberalization

conducted with socialization and application of the results of the WTO negotiations, APEC, ASEM, ASEAN, and opened the widest breadth of foreign investors to invest in Indonesia.[3]

To do so, bureaucracy reform is done into acceleration and expansion of Indonesia economic development needs strong support from government through bureaucratic reforms that are based on the following principles:

1. Creating an effective bureaucracy, which is able to better manage and enhance the people's livelihood as well as supporting the needs of the business sector;

2. Bureaucracy supported by strong and effective institutions, which creates a well managed bureaucracy and administration, responsible legislature, independent judicial institutions;

3. Building a commitment to the implementation of good governance; A strong and effective bureaucracy and institution structure will also act as a feedback channel for future planning.

It can be said that President Yudhoyono only stresses on the big picture of foreign policy target. Indonesian diplomats more typically lament its failure to convert political diplomacy into increased market access, rather than talk of how Indonesia's trade relations or economic heft provide political leverage.[4]

While in region level, President Yudhoyono Bureaucracy stress on that ASEAN centrality is a permanent feature of Indonesia's foreign policy. No one the author spoke to suggest this centrality was something a new president might change. ASEAN covers Indonesia's immediate geographic region, where its interests are most directly engaged.[5]

On the relation to Islamic atmosphere, Dewi Fortuna Anwar characterizes Islam as

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1   Aly Yusuf, Evaluasi Pemerintahan SBY-Kalla, Policy Assessment, Juni 2005, The Indonesian Institute, p. 27
2   Aly Yusuf, Evaluasi Pemerintahan SBY-Kalla, *Op. Cit*., p. 30

3   *Ibid*. p. 31
4   Dave McRae, More Talk Than Walk: Indonesia as a Foreign Policy Actor, Lowy Institute for International Policy, February 2014, p. 5.
5   *Ibid*. p. 10.

playing primarily a limiting role on Indonesian foreign policy, making certain positions untenable for the Indonesian government, notably diplomatic relations with Israel. One issue where Indonesia has taken an Islamic stance has been its support for an international instrument to prevent blasphemy. President Yudhoyono used his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2012 to call for " an international instrument to effectively prevent incitement to hostility or violence based on religions or beliefs". President Yudhoyono made specific reference to the film " Innocence of Muslims". He was also, however, careful to phrase his support for an international instrument in secular terms, citing restrictions on the freedom of expression in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[6] On the other words, His mark on Indonesian foreign policy, while rooted in nonalignment and pragmatism, has been noteworthy for its willingness to address values of democracy and human rights head-on.[7]

Indonesia within the Southeast Asian Landscape

Southeast Asia's growing role as the hub of regional integration and increasing market potential, observers are watchful on how the development of regional trade agreements in the area may shape international relations in East Asia, particularly with the realization of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.[8]

Since U.S. and China play important roles in Southeast Asia, it can be said that the geopolitical changing already happened which highlights the improvement of economic activities as the central of the world.

Market power gives Southeast Asia economic significance in the world. Southeast

Asia harbors several fast growing economies and a market of more than 500 million people. ASEAN's total sum of GDP doubled between 2004-2010, growing from USD 715 billion to USD 1800 billion for an increase of 2.5 times. In terms of trade, ASEAN's total amount of trade also doubled between 2003-2009, growing from USD 825 billion to USD 1537 billion. In the fourth ASEAN + 3 summit (2000), China's ex-premier Zhu Ronnie proposed joining with ASEAN to advance free trade in the region. The signing of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in 2002 between China and ASEAN officially put the China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA) in motion. The CAFTA market has a population of almost two billion people and a total sum of production of $7.7 trillion. The region is the largest free trade area in terms of population while trailing only NAFTA and the EU in terms of economic scale.[9]

In the other side, economy is not the only issue, which marks Southeast Asia. The sphere of influence becomes the strategic way for major power, especially U.S. Since the Islamic Radical Groups appear as the non-state actor, which "decide" to create the instability, U.S. willingly raises up this issue into global concern.

Since 9/11, Southeast Asia has gained strategic significance under the US global war on terrorism. Penetrated by international terrorists, the so called "New Crescent" region that spreads out across the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Burma has become a new hotbed for terrorism and a serious challenge for regional security. Even though the goals between terrorist organizations and revolutionary groups in Southeast Asia are different, the common need for survival contributes to the formation of a cooperative network that has brought about a relatively high level of threat against regional stability.[10]

The next issue, as interesting as other ones, is energy security. It has been known that Southeast Asia has unique dominion. Standing between two oceans, it gives

6   Dave McRae, More Talk Than Walk, *Op. Cit*, p. 12.

7   Ted Piccone and Bimo Yusman, Indonesian Foreign Policy: 'A Million Friends and Zero Enemies', downloaded from http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/indonesian-foreign-policy-a-million-friends-and-zero-enemies/, on November 16, 2015, at 11:53 AM

8   Hung Ming-Te and Tony Tai-Ting Liu, Sino-U.S. Strategic Competition in Southeast Asia; China's Rise and U.S. Foreign Policy Transformation since9/11, Political Perspective 2011, Volume 5 (3), P. 96.

9   *Ibid*., P. 98.

10   *Ibid*.,P. 98-99.

strategic point of view for all nations around the world to be aware with energy security issue.

Energy security becoming an important issue in the new century, Southeast Asia's strategic location began to stand out. Southeast Asia lies at the intersection of the world's two most heavily traveled sea-lanes. The east-west route connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans while the north-south one links Australia and New Zealand to Northeast Asia. Both routes are economic lifelines by which China, Japan and Korea receive critical inputs like oil and other natural resources and export finished goods to the rest of the world. Nearly all shipping from the Middle East to the Pacific must go through three straits or "chokepoints" in the region: the Strait of Malacca, Sunda Strait and the Straits of Lombok and Makassar. The so called sea lines of communication (SLOC) greatly affect the outflow of critical natural resources from the Middle East abroad and generate great power competition over control of the maritime lifelines.[11]

This situation can be understood as, willy-nilly, the causes of the resulting triangular relationship among the United States, Japan, and China has offered both opportunities and challenges for Southeast Asia.[12]

To deal with the opportunities and challenges, those countries create relations to countries in Southeast Asia region, especially countries that have great role, like Indonesia, in regional institution, namely ASEAN.

During the President Yudhoyono (SBY) administration, Indonesia is facing the transition of political and economic constellation where United States of America (U.S) and China get involved much in Southeast Asia Region. To see the role of Indonesia in this region, President Yudhoyono Administration policies play important role in responding economic and political challenges, especially regional integration within ASEAN, which consists of economic, and security issues.

In this region, Indonesia is no exception. As the third largest democracy, the fourth most populated country in the world and is among the twenty biggest economies.[13] It is also fostered by Indonesia's status as a middle power, an emerging economy and a member of the G-20. Despite Indonesia's list of strong points, it is not to say that Indonesia is completely devoid of internal challenges that it needs to tackle in order to be a more credible power. Indonesian leaders are acutely aware of the weaknesses that still plague the country, but it does not prevent them from promoting Indonesia as a "pivotal state".[14]

Looking at the strategic environment in Southeast Asia region, Indonesia, under President Yudhoyono, creates policies to respond economic and security issues. The significant policies made are to play role as one of the great power in region. But in the other side, domestically, the activity of terrorism is not handled quite seriously. The shadow of terrorism threat became nightmare for all citizens, including foreigners who stay and work in Indonesia.

Another domestic problem during President Yudhoyono, are about domestic problems, like Aceh Conflict and economic instability. Communal conflict and the development of infrastructure, together with unemployment become the problems where President Yudhoyono does not look at this as the reflection of foreign policy to adapt the opportunities and challenges in region. The economic involvement done by Indonesia only achieves the macro level. The successful involvement of Indonesia in diplomatic level is not automatically solving the domestic problems.

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11   *Ibid.*,P. 100.
12   Nobuto Yamamoto, Southeast Asia: A New Regional Order, downloaded from http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090201_bsa_yamamoto.pdf, on November 16, 2015, at 11.11 AM, P. 2.

13   Renita J. Moniaga, Indonesia's Past, Present and Future Power, Image and Foreign Policy, downloaded from http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/GSCIS%20Singapore%202015/Archive/aa29b834-52c5-40c9-b12a-1f42c1edb61e.pdf, on November 16, 2015, at 11.20, P. 2.
14   *Ibid*.

Indonesian Foreign Policy under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 2004-2009

Under President Yudhoyono Administration, Indonesia reformed itself politically, economically, and socially in a short period of time. Much of this change can be attributed to the democratically elected leaders and political elites who have initiated reforms in the county and have rebuild Indonesia into an important player in global affairs.[15]

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia is a country endowed with the highest population and the richest natural resources within its archipelago of 17 thousand islands spread across a vast region. These blessings put Indonesia as South East Asia's number one powerhouse. However, the planned implementation of ASEAN's Economic Community and the existence of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) mandate Indonesia to increase its competitiveness. This is to ensure that Indonesia will get the full benefits of those economic integrations. In consideration of these factors, the acceleration of the economic transformation formulated in MP3EI (the Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Economic Development of Indonesia) is aimed at providing a catalytic force to increase Indonesia's competitiveness.[16]

The 2025's vision is achieved by focusing on 3 main goals:

1. Increase value adding and expanding value chain for industrial production processes, and increase the efficiency of the distribution network. In addition increase the capability of the industry to access and utilize natural resources and human resources. These increases can be attained by the creation of economic activities within regions as well as among regional centers of economic growth.

2. Encourage efficiency in production and improve marketing efforts to further integrate domestic markets in order to push for competitiveness and strengthen the national economy.

3. To push for the strengthening of the national innovation system in the areas of production, process, and marketing with a focus on the overall strengthening of sustainable global competitiveness towards an innovation-driven economy.[17]

The role of Government in the implementation of MP3EI is to provide a set of rules and regulations that provide incentives for investors to build sector of industries and infrastructure. Incentives can be conducive policies on tariff, taxes, import duties, labor regulations, licensing and permits, land procurements, etc. The central and local governments must build a reliable link within and beyond the centers of economic growth.[18]

The plan of President Yudhoyono to reflect the national or domestic problem to region and international opportunities unfortunately has not yet touched the real advantage. At that time, Indonesia still faces the economic problem, especially in micro level.

On the other issue, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda stated, "as the country with the largest Muslim population, Indonesia has proven that Islam can be a bastion of democracy and social justice.[19] Major powers have praised Indonesia's success at establishing a democratic government in a predominantly Islamic society. During Hillary Clinton's visit to Indonesia as Secretary of State in 2009, she exclaimed: "If you want to know if Islam, democracy, modernity and women's rights can coexist, go to Indonesia.[20]

Indonesia's foreign policy began to take a more charm building character, which

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15   Renita J. Moniaga, Indonesia's Past, Present and Future Power, Image and Foreign Policy, *Op. Cit,* p. 2.
16   Master Plan Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 2011-2015 downloaded from www.aseanbriefing.com, on November 16, 2015, at 13:27 AM, P.20.

17   *Ibid*., p. 25.
18   *Ibid*.
19   Renita J. Moniaga, Indonesia's Past, Present and Future Power, Image and Foreign Policy, *Op. Cit*, p. 15.
20   Renita J. Moniaga, Indonesia's Past, Present and Future Power, Image and Foreign Policy, *Op. Cit*, p.15.

was dominated by refrains of cooperation (Million Friends Zero Enemies" approach), Indonesia's role as a peace broker in the Asia Pacific region and the bridge between Islam and the West.[21]

What exactly President Yudhoyono done through Indonesian foreign policies is amazingly putting Indonesia in quite bigger involvement, especially in building stable relations to major powers.

Under President Yudhoyono, the role of Indonesia in 2004-2009 periods significantly boost up. Indonesia known by other as the most influencing countries in Southeast Asia, especially in mediating conflict potential and the representative of Muslim word.

Indonesian Foreign Policy under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 2010-2014

In his second presidential period, President Yudhoyono, asserts that it is through engagement with other countries that "an architecture for durable peace" can be achieved.[22] Indonesia's response to its global ambition is to conduct a foreign policy that is active where cooperation and building diplomatic ties is crucial for Indonesia. In this sense, Indonesia's worldview appears to be shaped by liberal perspectives, such as the role of institutions and cooperation among states in helping to minimize the anarchy that could exist in the international system. Indonesia's investment on enhancing ASEAN mechanisms and has made ASEAN a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Minister Natalegawa's proposal to create an Indo-Pacific wide treaty of friendship and cooperation is an added measure on top of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and the East Asia Summit's Bali Principles to reduce tension in the region. Indonesia has continuously stated that it adheres to multilateral frameworks to resolve conflicts.[23]

In a country obsessed with Facebook and other social media, SBY used his 2009 inaugural address to describe the strategic outlook of Indonesia's current foreign policy this way: "Indonesia is facing a strategic environment where no country perceives Indonesia as an enemy and there is no country which Indonesia considers an enemy. Thus Indonesia can exercise its foreign policy freely in all directions, having a million friends and zero enemies".[24]

For Indonesia, having "a million friends and zero enemies" does much to help sustain its impressive growth in foreign trade and investment. It also helps explain its reluctance to take hard human rights positions that might upset major economic partners that have poor human rights records, such as China. Furthermore, Indonesia is generally timid in making strong commitments to uphold human rights at the international level because it continues to struggle with its own human rights issues. Recently, for example, Indonesia has seen a significant uptick in religious intolerance and government infringement on civil rights and liberties. As the Muslim world's largest democracy, such troubling internal human rights issues pose a real threat to the credibility of its leaders' claim to be a beacon of democracy for other fragile democracies.[25]

In President Yudhoyono Administration Policy, democracy become very strategic tools to get involved in global and regional level. For President Yudhoyono, Muslim, Democracy, and the bridge of West East, could bring Indonesia as one of nations, which concerns more on global peace.

Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa (2009-2014) stating that Indonesia is "a living proof that democracy, Islam and modernization can flourish together".[26] For Indonesia, it was necessary to promote the country as a tolerant society because in recent years the government has been highly criticized for its inability to handle the

21   *Ibid*., p. 2.
22   *Ibid*., p. 23.
23   *Ibid*., p.24.

24   Renita J. Moniaga, Indonesia's Past, Present and Future Power, Image and Foreign Policy, *Op. Cit*, p. 24.
25   Ted Piccone and Bimo Yusman, Indonesian Foreign Policy: 'A Million Friends and Zero Enemies', *Op. Cit*
26   Renita J. Moniaga, Indonesia's Past, Present and Future Power, Image and Foreign Policy, *Op. Cit*, p. 15.

rise of religious intolerance, radicalism and communal conflicts. President Yudhoyono reiterated Indonesia's pledge to maintain pluralism and harmony in the society during his acceptance speech of the World Statesman Award in 2013:

> We are one of the most ethnically diverse nations in the world, home of a quarter billion people who profess to the world's 5 major religions, living across our 17,000 islands. And from day one of our independence, we have always aspired to be a nation united in diversity. A nation where citizens of various race, faith and creed live together in harmony. A nation based on the rule of law. All these core principles are enshrined in our Constitution, and in our state ideology: Pancasila. And our ability to live by these ideals would determine not just our progress but also our survival as a nation.[27]

Domestically, President Yudhoyono has often used the Aceh peace agreement in his statements to depict Indonesia's ability to engage in a constructive and open dialogue to reach a peaceful solution. However, Indonesia is still facing several domestic challenges due to its large population and the politics of identity that can engulf such a diverse country. The leaders have affirmed that although protecting Indonesia's unity is essential, their response to communal conflicts and religious violence will always be "a democratic response". Hence, Indonesia has been fostering numerous interfaith and intercultural dialogues throughout the country as a way of increasing tolerance and exchanging views. Internationally, Indonesia has worked alongside other countries to conduct regional interfaith conferences and supports the UN Alliance of Civilization, which Indonesia hosted in August 2014 with the country's theme of "unity in diversity"[28]

Indonesia consistently put peace in the frame of Indonesian foreign policy to mediating conflict around the world. Indonesia plays as "peace keeper" to show its role in region and global. Under President Yudhoyono, Indonesia brings democracy as the way to achieve cooperation and stability.

Indonesia has offered its expertise and advice to countries in the wake of the Arab Spring, particularly Egypt and Tunisia. It has also encouraged Myanmar's democratic transition and has been supporting the reforms made by the Burmese government.[29] Indonesian leaders have incorporated as part of their diplomacy to establish Indonesia's global reputation and influence, which leads us to Indonesia's foreign policy as a soft power quality.

President Yudhoyono stated, "It is only natural that all these achievements have strengthened Indonesia's capacity to project a new activism in its foreign policy, to play greater and diverse roles, to help shape regional and global order."[30]

Type of activist foreign policy that Indonesia is trying to project, which is mainly centered on its willingness to cooperate and build partnerships with various countries. Concepts, such as the "geopolitics of cooperation", "dynamic equilibrium" and "a million friends-zero enemies" outlines Indonesia's cooperative and peaceful foreign policy. Indonesia has been able to establish comprehensive and strategic partnerships with around 14 countries, including the major powers. It is also a member of over 50 international organizations and has a vocal voice in the UN, ASEAN, WTO, G20, APEC, NAM and OIC. Indonesia has ratified around 200 international treaties, including all the major human rights conventions. In addition, Indonesia has held the chairmanship of several high-level forums, including ASEAN in 2011 and APEC in 2013.[31]

Around region and regional institution, Indonesia sees Southeast Asia as the main object of foreign policy. Looking at the region where Indonesia stays, Southeast Asia become the main ground for Indonesia through its policy to play as leader.

Indonesia is the Southeast Asia's

27   Renita J. Moniaga, Indonesia's Past, Present and Future Power, Image and Foreign Policy, *Op. Cit*, p. 15-16.
28   *Ibid*., p. 16.

29   Ibid.
30   *Ibid*. p. 17.
31   Renita J. Moniaga, Indonesia's Past, Present and Future Power, Image and Foreign Policy, *Op. Cit*

biggest economy and only ASEAN country in the G20 and second fastest growing economy after China in the G20.[32] But in Indonesia' s economic growth has enabled it to increase its military budget even though it has done so inconsistently and from a very low base. Despite its goal of increasing the defense budget to 1.5 per cent of GDP, military spending has remained consistently below 1 per cent of GDP and spending may actually have declined in real terms between 2012 and 2013.[33]

The strategy used by President Yudhoyono proved works. Many world leaders appreciate what Indonesia has done. Besides, there are so many involvements of Indonesia to show the world that Indonesia is very active in sounding that Indonesia is very important player, not only in Asia but also in global level.

A visit to Jakarta features on the itineraries of various world leaders. In 2013 the Chinese premier Xi Jinping, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe were all visitors to Indonesia's capital. Indonesia enjoys additional prominence through its involvement in multilateral forums, including the G20, where it casts itself as a representative of developing countries, as well as others such as APEC. In think tank and academic circles, much scholarly energy is devoted to the prospect of Indonesia rising.[34]

Regionally, Indonesia had framed its interests based on collective peace and stability. For instance, Indonesia's strategy of balancing the roles of external powers in Southeast Asian affairs through the concept of "dynamic equilibrium" was seen as a credible approach in maintaining regional autonomy while still engaging with foreign powers. This vision of a "peaceful coexistence among the great powers in Asia"[35]

In 2011, Yudhoyono told the nation

Indonesia had shaken off its 60 year old tag as a third world country to become an emerging economy. The world increasingly frequently asks, " What does Indonesia think?" on global problems, the president said to Indonesians in 2012.3 " Indonesia resolves to always be part of the solution to global problems" , he remarked in his 2013 speech.[36]

Due to Indonesia's political transformation, Indonesia assumes its role in international affairs is to be this voice of reason for many issues from being a mediator between Islam and the West to raising the concerns of developing countries in international forums. As Minister Natalegawa puts it, Indonesia can be a "net contributor to international peace and security".[37]

As a country in which a majority of the people are Muslims, Indonesia does pay extra attention to international conflicts involving Muslim populations, even if its diplomats do not name Muslim-majority countries in particular as among Indonesia' s most important relations. For example, conflicts in the Middle East occupy a prominent place in Indonesian foreign policy rhetoric. Various foreign policy actors attribute this prominence variously to the presence of large numbers of Indonesian migrant workers in the region, Muslim solidarity, and historic ties with particular countries. Senior foreign affairs officials nominated the Middle East as a region where Indonesia would like to be influential, although it is not. For example, President Yudhoyono devoted a third of the foreign policy section of his 2013 Independence Day speech to the Palestinian question, Syria, and Egypt.[38]

SBY's administration has been eager to share its experiences on democratic transition with other leaders of aspiring democracies, including Myanmar and Egypt, and hosts an annual Asia-Pacific forum on democracy designed to lend legitimacy to

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32   *Ibid*., p. 12.
33   Dave McRae, More Talk Than Walk: Indonesia as a Foreign Policy Actor, Lowy Institute for International Policy, February 2014, P. 6.
34   Dave McRae, More Talk Than Walk: Indonesia as a Foreign Policy Actor, *Op. Cit*, p. 4.
35   *Ibid*., p. 17.

36   Dave McRae, More Talk Than Walk: Indonesia as a Foreign Policy Actor, *Op. Cit*, p. 4.
37   Renita J. Moniaga, Indonesia's Past, Present and Future Power, Image and Foreign Policy, *Op. Cit,* p. 23.
38   Dave McRae, More Talk Than Walk: Indonesia as a Foreign Policy Actor, *Op. Cit*, p. 11.

a political reform agenda. SBY also has chosen gradually to increase Indonesia's international profile by taking part in the G-20 summits and co-chairing the UN Secretary General's 27-member High Level Panel on the Post-2015 (Millennium Development Goals) Development Agenda. Although this strategy has elevated Indonesia's standing in the international spotlight, doubts on its rise as an influential global player persist, as SBY's administration has avoided major commitments that would compromise its historic preference for neutrality and non-interference.[39]

Closer to home, Indonesia has also sought to intercede in regional conflicts involving Southeast Asian Muslim populations. In the Southern Philippines, Indonesia offered to broker peace talks following renewed violence in September 2013. Violence against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar has attracted Indonesia's attention, as well as the attention of Indonesian jihadis who have attempted retaliatory terror attacks. Indonesia has been able to do little on the issue beyond making concerned statements. President Yudhoyono raised the issue during his state visit to Naypyidaw in 2013. Indonesia also prompted a joint ASEAN ministerial statement on the Rohingya in 2012.[40]

Indonesia's economic attractiveness is also based on Indonesia's willingness to build economic cooperation with various countries as part of its economic diplomacy. Starting in 2012, the Indonesian government included economic diplomacy as a foreign policy priority and urged Indonesia's diplomatic missions to play an increasing role in securing investments into the country and concluding economic partnerships with not only traditional markets but also emerging markets in the global south. Indonesia understands that its economy needs to remain attractive and draw in investment and long-term economic growth if it wants to be an important global player.

Thus, the projection of Indonesia's economic activities as based on building economic partnerships, conducting international trade and negotiating important free trade agreements.[41]

In the whole aspects, Indonesian foreign policy under President Yudhoyono Administration can be categorized as follows as Independent and Active foreign policy posture:[42]

1. Million friends zero enemies doctrine
2. Sets regional agenda in ASEAN
3. A respected player in a number of international organizations, namely NAM and OIC.
4. Believes in multilateralism and rejects actions taken outside of UN framework
5. Respects international norms and institutions
6. Tries to bridge the gap between developing and developed nations.
7. Tries to be a bridge builder between Islam and the West
8. Tries to increase South-South Cooperation
9. An ally of major powers on the War on Terror, having successfully tackled domestic terrorist threats through their elite anti-terrorism squad Detachment 88.

CONCLUSION

Indonesia aspires to play an active and influential role in regional and global affairs even though in the short term lacks the resources to flex its muscles in support of its foreign policy ideas. Although its foreign policy community knows Indonesia's international limitations, its public expects broader influence. The data sees Indonesia voicing foreign policy stances on the Middle East and Muslim populations around the world, on democratization, on global issues like post-Millennium Development Goals development, and generally doing so in multilateral settings. This provides something

39   Ted Piccone and Bimo Yusman, Indonesian Foreign Policy: 'A Million Friends and Zero Enemies', *Op. Cit*
40   Dave McRae, More Talk Than Walk: Indonesia as a Foreign Policy Actor, *Op. Cit*, p. 11.

41   Renita J. Moniaga, Indonesia's Past, Present and Future Power, Image and Foreign Policy, *Op. Cit*, p. 20.
42   *Ibid*, p. 13.

of an opportunity for other countries seeking to engage with Indonesia. By engaging on regional and global issues that are important to Indonesia and help it be seen as a global player.

Identifying Indonesian foreign policy during President Yudhoyono from his first presidential period can be said that getting friends as much as he can is so important for his leadership. The involvement in region and global issues has been a proof that Indonesia is building up its role become bigger and bigger.

In his second presidential period, it can be said that what exactly President Yudhoyono learns from his first leadership period is about how to strengthen and continue policies he made. There is no any significant changing in President Yudhoyono Foreign Policy, except the involvement of Indonesia in Southeast Asia that is more active since dynamic equilibrium takes a part.

Indonesia Foreign Policy under President Yudhoyono has given Indonesia very important position in global. Its role has been admitted by other countries even though domestically, Indonesian foreign policy less contribute in achieving its national interests related to social, economy, and military aspects.

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THE RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE RSPO: TOWARDS A MORE SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL?

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Abstract

The emergence of private sustainability standards have been developed for several agricultural commodities, such as palm oil, coffee, cocoa and soya. These standards and certification requirements aim to improve the social and environmental aspects of production at farmer level while maintaining or improving the economic prospects of international trade. Many of them were initiated by collaborative arrangements of businesses and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from mainly the North and particularly address the production of agricultural commodities in the South. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) is a prominent private certification on palm oil, which initiated by World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and some multi-national companies to transform the palm oil industry into a more sustainable palm oil. Governments, from both the North and the South, are hardly ever an official member of the new arrangements, although the schemes keep many connections with them, and some 'enlightened' governments from the North sustain them. Therefore, roles of governments could have effects on the implementation of private sustainability standards and certification schemes of agricultural commodities. This paper observes a new development; one in which Southern governments take over the initiative from mainly Northern-based businesses and NGOs. It examines how the Indonesian government responds to the RSPO. The paper observes that a change takes place from a non-responsive stance; a modest involvement in terms of sustaining the implementation of private certifications; to an active development of alternative public national standards and certifications.

Keywords: palm oil, sustainability standards, private certification, roles of governments, the Indonesian government

INTRODUCTION

The general acceptance of the concept of sustainable development has strongly influenced the way we discuss agricultural production. Next to generic public quality standards, many and often competing, private sustainability standards have been developed for several agricultural commodities, such as palm oil, coffee, and cocoa, since the mid-1990s (Bartley, 2010; Bitzer and Glasbergen, 2015). These standards and connected certification requirements aim to improve the social and environmental aspects of production at farmer level while maintaining or improving the economic prospects of international trade.

The emergence of private sustainability standards is considered as a new phase in the on-going process of restructuring global hegemony (Falkner, 2003). The discussion about globalization could not be separated with the topic of its impact to environmental degradation and labor condition in producing countries (van de Staaij, 2008). It also change the market mechanism, which more ruled by consumer demand. Consumer wants a better-healthy products and concern to environmental conservation. The both combination led to the form of sustainability standards in agriculture sector.

Many of sustainability standard and certification were initiated by collaborative arrangements of businesses and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from mainly the North and particularly address the production of agricultural commodities in the South (Neilson, 2008). The private standard becomes a new solution approach to link producers, exporters and consumers in the world without any constrain (TSPN, 2011). The agriculture standards are characterized by the viability livelihood of farmers, environmental

conservation and social responsibility. The first emergence of private certification is in the forest governance namely the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) in 1993, which initiated by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) as a response of forest degradation in developing countries and government failure to develop a regulation in forest management (Gulbrandsen, 2012). In the recent decade, the number of certification programs highly increased on many agricultural commodities, such as Fair trade, Rainforest alliance, Utz for coffee and cocoa and the Roundtables Sustainable of Palm Oil (RSPO) for palm oil.

However, governments from both the North and the South are hardly ever an official member of the new arrangements, although the schemes keep many connections with them, and some 'enlightened' governments from the North sustain them. Given their private and voluntary character the new certifying schemes neatly fit into the liberal idea that sustainability can be realized through the market mechanism in a situation where governments are not willing or not able to address many of the sustainability aspects of the production of agricultural commodities. However, with their aim to create new management practices, private certifications not only interfere in the market, but also change the relationships between the actors involved in trade, among them governments (Henson & Humphrey, 2010). Once these certifying schemes are institutionalized, governments, particularly from producing countries in the South, cannot refrain from taking position and defining their roles.

Their economies are for a large part dependent on the export of agricultural products and the new conditions under which agricultural commodities are traded will somehow affect their economic and development policies. Moreover, through private regulatory activities in the areas of protection of human rights and natural resources, the new arrangements fulfill functions that are commonly thought to be the domain of the state (Bitzer, 2012; Glasbergen, 2013).

The central question for this paper is: How does the Indonesian government respond to the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil and how can this explained?

In 2004, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) was officially established. RSPO is an international multi-stakeholders organization and certification scheme which focuses on the actualization of sustainable palm oil. The establishment is as a response to the discussion on sustainable palm oil worldwide. WWF as environmental NGO initiated to hold a meeting in 2002 with several Europe business stakeholders. The first meeting only represented European stakeholder as consumer and manufacturer. However, the roundtable would not be completed unless it involved all actors in palm oil supply chain including palm oil producers. Later, Malaysian Palm Oil Association (MPOA) joined RSPO in 2003 and then followed by Indonesian Palm Oil Association –GAPKI- in the next year (Schouten and Glasbergen, 2011). However, RSPO is a private governance system on palm oil which excluded government role from their development.

The paper will go as follows the first section is the introduction of the emergence of private sustainability standards at the global market, which the governments need to determine their response and position. The second section will discuss the palm oil debate. The third section will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of participating in sustainability standards. The next section will explain research methods of this paper. Then, the section of result and discussion will discuss next and continued with conclusion.

THE PALM OIL DEBATE

Palm tree is a phenomenon in Indonesian agriculture. This plant is not originally from Indonesia but brought by the Dutch colonial. In 1911, the first palm tree plantation developed commercially in Sumatera Island (Caroko et.al., 2011). The political situation in that time, in particular the struggle for Indonesian independence and the transition of government, resulted in the modest growth of palm tree industry until 1970s. Then, Indonesian participation

International Conference
on Social Politics

in Stockholm Conference in 1972 concerning sustainable development influenced the direction of Indonesian agriculture policy.

In the early 1980s, Ministry of Agriculture launched the scheme of Nucleus Estate Smallholder (NES), also called as *Perkebunan Inti Rakyat Perkebunan (PIR-Bun),* in several regions in Indonesia. This programme also gained financial aid from the World Bank (Caroko et.al., 2011). The massive implementation of PIR-Bun scheme in Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi had resulted to the impressive amount of the productivity of palm tree (Badrun, 2013). The rising popularity of palm oil as highly valued vegetable oil in international market had resulted to the demand of palm oil as if its area expansion in 1990s. Until 1997-1998 when monetary crisis attacked Indonesia, palm oil industry could survive and kept supporting national economy through its nucleus estate. Moreover, the increasing global demand of palm oil particularly from India, China, and European Union (World Growth, 2011) strengthened Indonesia as the largest producer of palm oil in 2006. The benefit of this industry is not only felt by big companies but also smallholders in remote areas. They gain the same benefit socially and economically from palm oil. The Indonesian government through the development of palm oil industry focused on poverty alleviation in remote area (Caroko et.al 2011). In 2012, palm tree plantation was not only big plantation owned by company but around 42% owned and managed by smallholder with 9.08 million hectare of land area (Badrun, 2013; Caroko et.al 2011).

Behind its success, Indonesian palm oil industry faced accusation from many foreign parties about the social and environmental cost should be paid by society for this industry. These foreign parties –mostly Western NGOs-made accusation that palm oil industry in Indonesia gives big contribution to the climate change and global warming. In the early 1980s, American Soybean Association (ASA) banned the use of palm oil as the bad effect on health (Suharo, 2010). Environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace blamed palm oil industry as the main cause of environmental damage, such as deforestation and the loss of *Orang-utan* in many forests in Indonesia. The massive expansion and forest conversion to palm tree plantation in Sumatera and Kalimantan not only made animal lose their habitat but also create social conflicts with local people (Simamora, 2008). Greenpeace urged business sector –mainly Europe and US based- to stop purchasing Crude Palm Oil (CPO) from Indonesia unless its sustainable palm oil certified (The Jakarta Post, 2010).

Deforestation is also being responsible for the increase of GHG (Greenhouse Gas) emission. Indonesia is placed as the third contributor of carbon emissions with about 1.8 billion tons or 4 % of carbon released from forest conversion into palm oil plantation (The Jakarta Post, 2010). In order to overcome international pressure on that, Indonesian government shows its commitment to reduce GHG emission by signing Letter of Intent (LoI) in 2010 (Suharto, 2010). This action was followed by the issue of Presidential Decree Number 10 year 2011 on Forest Moratorium Instruction. This decree was extended through Presidential Decree Number 6 year 2013 concerning New Permit Suspension and Improving Governance of Primary Forest and Peat land. Even though these policies are protested by entrepreneurs on palm oil, the government seems seriously to run the commitment to be more sustainable in forest management.

However, global market asked for a proof, what we called today as sustainability certification. Indonesian palm oil industry could fulfill any kind of certification schemes, such as: RSPO, ISCC, and ISPO (Media Perkebunan, 2013). Badrun (2013) stated that Indonesian palm oil should be ready for its challenges and business competition in the vegetable oil production. Ministry of Agriculture performs many efforts to counter that negative issues and develops palm oil industry to be more sustainable and competitive as we can see next on the discussion on the response of the Indonesian government.

PROS AND CONS OF SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENTS

The new private arrangements may have both advantages and disadvantages for Southern countries. First, private sustainability standards and certification schemes may be favorable for governments because participating in them or sustaining them creates a good image at the international level (Martinez & Poole, 2004; TSPN, 2011). Second, and related, certification expresses a sense of good governance, which conveys a spirit of transparency, accountability, and efficiency. This is particularly important in developing countries that struggle with bad governance practices, such as corruption, and mismanagement of natural resources (Bartley, 2010; Vermeulen & Kok, 2012). Third, governments may also indirectly receive the positive effects of certification. Certification may result in the transfer of technology, knowledge, and skills, induce more efficient management systems, and therefore upgrade the agricultural market conditions for the developing countries (Douma & van Wijk, 2012; Martinez & Poole, 2004).

Besides the opportunities, governments in the South may also face serious challenges related to private certifications. Agricultural commodities are crucial resources in developing countries and national governments often play an important management role (Birner & Resnick, 2010). With the new governance systems producing countries are forced to share their authority in the agricultural management system. States may feel threatened because certification influences their national sovereignty and a state that is not ready for the global market may feel that private standards and certifications are a subterfuge of Northern countries (TSPN, 2011). Southern governments may also consider certification as a tool to discriminate their products, because it is hard to fulfill the requirements and market access for some commodities may become more difficult (Gulbrandsen, 2012; Karns & Mingst, 2010). Few scholars also recognize that the implementation of private standards can further increase what they call 'asymmetric power' between Northern and Southern countries due to an imbalance in power and competitiveness (Todaro & Smith, 2003; Bartley, 2010; Hatanaka, 2010). Southern countries may feel that with the acceptance of the private schemes they are only meeting developed countries' needs, which are favorable for Northern multinationals, and, intended or not, disregard the needs of smallholders, their difficulty to change their way of farming, and their local values (Hatanaka, 2010).

RESEARCH METHODS

In order to understand the response of the Indonesian national government to private certification schemes we took a qualitative research approach. We specifically focused on responses to palm oil private certification scheme because of the importance of palm oil as an export-driven commodity in the Indonesian economy. The data collection process was undertaken in 2014. In-depth interviews and documents analysis are the main research methods employed in this study. In order to gain a comprehensive view of the Indonesian government response to private certification, we interviewed not only government officials but also informants outside the governmental bodies The informants were chosen by purposive sample, due to their expertise in agriculture and private certification, and some of them by snowball-sampling.

The process of data validation was undertaken continuously during the interview period. We also analyzed various documents such as government regulations, news articles from online media (i.e. The Jakarta Post, which actively discussed Indonesian palm oil), and magazines such as 'Media Perkebunan', which shows the government's position on estate crop issues in Indonesia. In addition, we also attended an important conferences of the Indonesian Palm Oil Conference (IPOC). During these events, we gained crucial information from stakeholders based on their speeches, presentation material and informal interviews concerning the topics of private standards and certification schemes.

THE RSPO IN A BRIEF

In response to the discussion on sustainable palm oil worldwide, WWF as environmental NGOs initiated to hold a meeting in 2002 with several Europe business stakeholders. The first meeting only represented European stakeholder as consumer and manufacturer. However, the roundtable would not be completed unless it involved all actors in palm oil supply chain including palm oil producers. Later, Malaysian Palm Oil Association (MPOA) joined RSPO in 2003 and then followed by Indonesian Palm Oil Association –GAPKI- in the next year (Schouten and Glasbergen, 2011). The main reason GAPKI joined RSPO is to eliminate accusation on environmental destruction and the market access. Malaysia and Indonesia are the two biggest CPO producers which control more than 90 % of the global production.

The difference of RSPO with similar organization is coming out from its memberships. RSPO holds all actors in palm oil supply chain which places the producer and consumer together. The members of RSPO consist of seven sectors. They are palm tree growers, palm oil processors and traders, consumer goods manufacturers, retailers, bank/investors, social NGOs, and environmental NGOs. Each sector has its representative sitting on the Executive Board of RSPO. Malaysia and Indonesia are considered to have strategic position in RSPO to support sustainable palm oil. This roundtable enables the members to have equal position to sound their interest. The dynamic relation among the members in the annual discussion reflects their power to defense their own interest.

In order to perform its Principles and Criteria (P&C) and build good relation with the national government, RSPO formed National Interpretation Working Group (NIWG) which is adapted for each country. In May 2008, the final document of "National Interpretation of RSPO Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production Republic Indonesia" was issued. This document conforms to the National Laws and Regulations of the Republic of Indonesia. The total member of Indonesian National Interpretation Working Group (INA-NIWG) is 65 people from various sectors. Interestingly, 27,7 % from total members are from 8 national governmental bodies at national level.

THE RESPONSE OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE RSPO

When the RSPO established in 2004, the process of land conversion to palm oil plantations with its devastating environmental effects was likely to increase, given the government's positive attitude towards expansion and the profitability of private investment in palm oil. However, drawing on our fieldwork in Indonesia we observe that the response of the Indonesian government to the RSPO shows some remarkable changes over time.

First Response: Leave it to the Market

The initiation of the RSPO, with its objective to induce a more sustainable production of palm oil, did not change the Indonesian focus on productivity. The Indonesian Palm Oil Association or GAPKI (*Gabungan Asosiasi Pengusaha Kelapa sawit Indonesia*), the leading palm oil producer association in Indonesia, and also a main driver of the economic success of the sector, has been an early member of the RSPO. Founded in 1981, GAPKI is an initiative of palm oil entrepreneurs to face the challenges and opportunities in the development of the palm oil industry in Indonesia and in the global market. Over 630 company plantations are members, and they include state plantation companies, national and foreign private companies in Indonesian palm oil, and palm oil farmer groups (GAPKI, 2013). GAPKI takes a strong position in the Indonesian palm oil sector. Although its main interest to participate was to prevent reputational damage of the Indonesian palm oil industry, this was seen as a success from the viewpoint of the RSPO initiators (Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011). Given its important position in the palm oil sector in Indonesia, GAPKI keeps a close relationship with the Indonesian government.

The government considers GAPKI as a partner, particularly for the economic development of the palm oil sector because (1) its ability to link the government with the producers, which reflects in the advisory role it plays regarding formulation of public policies for the palm oil sector; and (2) its ability to voice the interests and represent the Indonesian palm oil stakeholders in the international market. For instance, GAPKI often accompanies government officials in international forums discussing the palm oil industry (Bangun, 2010).

Indonesia, as the primary producer of palm oil in the world, could not fully neglect the new sustainable palm oil certification scheme. However, in the early years of the RSPO, the government regarded private standards and the certification as a business-to-business matter; so it was not regarded necessary for the government to be involved in it. The government left it to the producers to decide on participation in the voluntary RSPO scheme. Through its close relationship with GAPKI, which fulfilled a watchdog role, the government could consider the advantages and disadvantages of the RSPO activities. Moreover, through GAPKI's membership in the RSPO, the government could get valuable information about the development of the new sustainability requirements the palm oil industry started to be confronted with.

Even though the national government took the stance of non-involvement with the RSPO, a relationship could not be avoided. The second principle of the RSPO states that producers/growers must comply with the laws and regulations applied in the country of the producers (RSPO, 2007). This stipulated an indirect role of the government as the legal provider of requirements that need to be fulfilled to make the implementation of the RSPO standards possible. Vermeulen & Kok (2012) referred to this as the "side line support" of the government because its position is outside the chain, but important in order to provide instruments (e.g. regulations) that influence the implementation of the certification. These regulations, for instance the law of plant cultivation system, the forest

law, and the environmental laws, had to fill the blank space that could not be filled by the private actors.

Second Response: Involvement in the RSPO Activities

The establishment of the RILO (the RSPO Indonesia Liaison Office) in 2006, as a representative office of the RSPO, has further influenced the implementation of this certification scheme in Indonesia. One of RILO's tasks was to establish the relationship with relevant agencies in the palm oil industry, particularly the Indonesian government. RILO recognized the potential role of the Indonesian government in supporting the implementation phase of the RSPO certification and initiated the Indonesian National Interpretation Working Group (INA-NIWG) in 2006 and the Indonesian Smallholders Working Group (INA-SWG) in 2007. These 'spaces of engagement' (Pesqueira & Glasbergen, 2013) were necessary to adjust the principles and criteria of the RSPO to the national context in Indonesia.

The first working group, INA-NIWG, involves six different ministries, the National Land Agency, and the National Standardization Agency, next to other stakeholders such as GAPKI, WWF Indonesia, and banks (RSPO, 2008). The main task of this group was not only to translate the generic principles and criteria (P&C) of the RSPO into Bahasa Indonesia, but also to make an inventory of the national regulations and laws that had to be used as the basis for the implementation of the RSPO P&C. The activities of this group were not only beneficial for the RSPO, but also for the government itself as the national interpretation was supposed to help the implementation of the national regulations as well. The outcome of this group is the 'National Interpretation of RSPO Principles & Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production' so the producers might be able to easily follow them.

The second working group, INA-SWG, comprises the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the Indonesia palm oil commission (IPOC) from the government, Sawit Watch and WWF-Indonesia as NGOs, and GAPKI as

representative of the producers. Smallholder representatives in this working group are the Oil Palm Growers Union (SPKS), the Indonesian Oil Palm Growers Association (APKASINDO), and the Nucleus Estate Smallholder-Oil Palm Growers Association (ASPEK-PIR). The main task of this group was the development of a national interpretation of RSPO P&C for scheme and independent smallholders (RSPO, 2008).

Later on, RSPO and the MoA continued their work through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU No. 39/KL.410/E.5.1/02/2009) about the implementation of sustainable palm oil in Indonesia. With this MoU, the government aimed to accelerate the development of sustainable oil palm plantations, particularly for smallholders.

These new developments show that the attitude of the government towards the RSPO had changed from just leaving it to the market to accepting the RSPO and sustaining the standards and certification by providing legal regulations and technical expertise. This sustaining role is deemed necessary by all involved actors for the success of the RSPO standards' dissemination. Initially, the government is willing to be involved in the RSPO due to the invitation to give some thoughts regarding the RSPO P&C, however, the government also considers advantages and opportunities for the development of the palm oil industry. This involvement is supposed to encourage producers to improve their production and gain a better market access. The government also participates in the expectation of gaining valuable knowledge on sustainability standards in this sector. Moreover, by supporting the RSPO, the government considers that Indonesia might be able to address the negative campaigns of international NGOs against the environmental effects of the palm oil industry.

Third Response: the Establishment of ISPO as A National Standard

The full support of the RSPO did not last for long; only from 2006 until 2009/2010. The government considers that the voluntary character of the RSPO would not help to enforce the national laws and regulations. Moreover, the Indonesian government argues that the appropriate authority to regulate the sustainability of palm oil should be the government. It seems that, based also on the experiences with the RSPO, the government gradually got the confidence to formulate its own national standards for sustainable palm oil.

In March 2011, the MoA issued a ministerial decree on Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO). ISPO was developed by the MoA and the Indonesian Palm Oil Commission (IPOC). IPOC is an official body, which was established by the Minister of Agriculture in 2003. This commission was initially established as a response of the government to the challenges and opportunities faced by the palm oil industry. The commission advices the Minister of Agriculture on every aspect related to the development of the palm oil industry, including preparing the establishment of the Indonesian sustainable standards for palm oil.

The development process of the ISPO was divided into four main stages: discussion, pilot test, public hearing and finalization. First, several meetings and discussions were organized by the government. The meetings aimed to formulate the standards and principles that are appropriate in the Indonesian context. Second, field testing of 15-20 companies was organized by auditors from independent certification bodies. Third, a public consultation-website based in Bahasa Indonesia and English languages was developed to obtain input from the stakeholders and community. Fourth, finalization meeting of the draft with the palm oil stakeholders and provincial/local offices as the implementers of ISPO (ISPO, 2013). Finally, the MoA issued the Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture Number 19/Permentan/OT.140/3/2011 concerning Guidelines of Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) at the celebration of 100 years of Indonesian palm oil industry (Directorate General of Estate Crops, 2011).

GAPKI fully supported the development of ISPO. GAPKI withdrew its membership from

the RSPO in September 2011. GAPKI gives its members the freedom to remain a member of the RSPO, but requires its members to adhere to ISPO as a legal framework for the sustainable management of the palm oil sector. Feelings of unfair treatment by the RSPO mechanism play an important role in this decision. GAPKI is particularly disappointed about the implementation of RSPO because of the high cost of obtaining the certificate; what is regarded an unbalanced position in the decision making process between producers and other private actors; the uncertainties about a premium price for sustainable Crude Palm Oil (CPO); and the low uptake of sustainable certified CPO.

REFLECTION

This case study reveals a state-driven response to global claims for a more sustainable palm oil production in the South. When the RSPO became active in Indonesia the government's attitude was that sustainability certification is something the market actors have to deal with, with no need of the government to be involved, while an allied representative of the sector fulfilled a watchdog function for the government. In what can be seen as an interim period the government recognized that sustainability certification might become a prerequisite for global trade, started to cooperate with the RSPO, and played a role as a technical advisor and provider of the legal infrastructure to sustain the RSPO implementation. In the last phase, the government, for several reasons, changed its attitude, withdraw its involvement with the RSPO, and developed its own sustainability standards and certification scheme.

Underlying these changes is, first, that the Indonesian government started to see the development of sustainable palm oil regulation as a national problem and, therefore, as a governmental responsibility. Even though the MoA supported the implementation of the RSPO earlier, it now regarded the alliance as less representative of the palm oil industry in Indonesia.

National pride plays a role in this reasoning. Indonesia would like to assert its identity as a nation by establishing ISPO as a national standard (Media Perkebunan, 2013). Moreover, the government officials emphasize that Indonesia does not want to be led by Northern countries and assert that their identity through ISPO must be seen as part of their mandate to regulate. The national pride also concerns the Indonesian commitment to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) emission resulting from palm oil plantations (Suharto, 2010; World Growth, 2011).

At the 9th Indonesian Palm Oil Conference (IPOC) organized by GAPKI, the President of Indonesia expressed this as follows:

> *"Palm oil is one of the national prides. There is no doubt that the Indonesian Palm oil industries contribute to many positive impacts on society. Why do not we hear about these stories more than the bad ones?" (IPOC, November 28, 2013).*

Second, the RSPO came to be seen as an illustration of an unbalanced power relationship between consumer countries and producer countries. GAPKI joined the RSPO, in accordance with the government's expectations, to improve access to the market and to dismiss allegations that the Indonesian palm oil is unsustainable. However, difficult requirements and expensive costs of the RSPO certification became disapproved by palm oil producers/growers. Moreover, more intense negative campaigns by international NGOs were seen as detrimental to the industry; for example, the case of Unilever suspending its purchase of CPO from PT Smart was critically valued in Indonesia (Caroko et. al., 2011; Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011). In addition, the decision-making system in the RSPO was seen as unfavorable for the voice of producers (Lestari, 2010). As we can see from the composition of the RSPO membership, the balance between producers and other private actors is 40:60, which implies that in the case of voting the producer's voice will probably lose.

Third, the government came to see the private sustainability certification scheme more as a trade barrier. Palm oil is probably the most debatable vegetable oil and all the

attention is directed to the producer countries of palm oil. These countries are held responsible for the environmental damage that goes together with the massive expansion of palm oil. Some palm oil entrepreneurs regret that the demand and consuming site of palm oil trade is hardly addressed.

Last, the Indonesian government aspires to use ISPO to expand new emerging markets of Crude Palm Oil (CPO). RSPO certified palm oil is mostly asked by European buyers. However, the increasing demand for CPO is coming from Asian countries rather than European countries. According to the Data Center and Agricultural Information System of the Ministry of Agriculture (2013), India is the biggest importer of CPO with more than five million tons and the second is China with more than three million tons, and their demand is increasing every year. These markets do not require sustainable certification; they only want a good quality and a reasonable price.

Against this background it can be understood that the RSPO is no longer seen as in the interest of the Indonesian government and other Indonesian stakeholders in the palm oil industry. The Indonesian government started to play a more substantial role as a regulator of the sustainability standards of palm oil production (Hospes, 2014). Although the stringency of the ISPO standards might be debated, the RSPO certainly brought about important changes in the government's policies. One of them is the recognition that, next to productivity, sustainability standards are important requirements for the future trade in palm oil. Another one is the recognition that a better enforcement of the many laws and regulations, in a more coordinated way among the many governmental agencies that are involved in palm oil, is necessary to keep the agricultural economy viable.

However, the ISPO is also criticized. Contrary to the RSPO, which was initiated by and involved international development and environmental NGOs, national NGOs knowledgeable in oil palm issues in Indonesia were not involved in the initiation of the ISPO. Sawit Watch (SW) is one of the well-known

Indonesian NGOs representing local people affected by the negative impacts of the large oil palm plantation system. SW joined as a member of the RSPO since it first established and even served as a member of the Executive Board (2005-2012). As a critical organization, SW believes that the RSPO could be a channel to voice the interests of marginalized people, who are harmed by the oil palm plantations, in international forums. However, SW is also disappointed about the complaints procedure in the RSPO. SW has reported that some of the certified companies do not implement the standards as they should do; land burning continues and there are still many conflicts with local people. However, the RSPO did not take actual action based on their report (Sawit Watch, 2010). Moreover, SW feels that it did not have much freedom to express its voice as a member of the Executive Board. As a consequence, SW choose to be an ordinary member and be involved in RSPO working groups to ensure that the RSPO P&C fit with the national and local context. With those experiences in the RSPO, SW might be considered a valuable contributor to the initiation and implementation of ISPO, but SW nevertheless decided not to get involved in it.

ISPO is a completely state-driven regulation sustained by the producers. Even though the government tried to invite NGOs in the implementation stage they did not respond. Our interviews indicate that NGOs doubt the credibility of ISPO and the government. The NGOs suggest that the government should be a strong regulator and put more effort on law enforcement rather than applying its own certification scheme. However, the implementation of the ISPO has still a long way to go. Since its launch in 2011, the ISPO commission has developed various implementation plans.

CONCLUSION

This study reveals the development of a new scenario in sustainability certification for the production of agricultural commodities in Southern countries. Many private sustainability certifications were introduced since the 1990th by mainly Northern based

NGOs and businesses. These certifications gradually changed the global trade in export-oriented commodities such as palm oil. This change induced Southern governments, with Indonesia as the main producer of palm oil, to react. The market impact of the private certifications, even the effectiveness of them, cannot be isolated from the role that governments need to fulfill. As we have seen in our in-depth study of the interactions between the RSPO, as a leading private sustainability certification of palm oil, and the Indonesian (national) government, new insights about the value of sustainability certification steadily emerged.

In the last decade, the Indonesian government changed its response towards the RSPO. In an early phase it took a non-responsive position. The government drew a line between the private and the public domain and let involvement in the RSPO over to the palm oil producers. Trade liberalization and the decentralization policy lie behind this early response. However, some role for the government could not be denied as the implementation of the RSPO had to take place through the existing legal framework related to the palm oil industry. Moreover, it did not take a long time for the government to become more aware of the importance of the RSPO as a new sustainability standard. It tended to accept it as a new management model and became involved in the role of an expert. Becoming more known with private certification, confidence grew that the government itself would be able to develop its own system of sustainability standards and certification. In this phase, the government started to view the RSPO as a trade barrier for their palm oil industry, in which national sovereignty plays a role, while important parts of the market of palm oil were supposed to be best approached with an Indonesian and legally based certification scheme.

The development of this new scenario is mainly influenced by the dynamics of the global markets and the value of commodities. In palm oil case, the Indonesian government moved quickly and attempted to protect this industry from detrimental campaigns by international environmental NGOs. The initiation process of national standards might be also influenced by the value of commodities. The government considers that the palm oil is more valuable in the global market than others, so issuing the ISPO regulation is the main concern.

An important consequence of the earlier private schemes has been that the Indonesian government started to reflect on its legal systems for the production of agricultural commodities and the necessity to improve implementation of the rules. Although the first Indonesian sustainability standard may not be that stringent, the fact that it is mandatory makes a more sustainable production less dependent on the market dynamics, of which the private certifications are part. With the new scenario, the Indonesia government would address shortages of private certification, particularly in terms of cost and the certificate holder. Gradually sustainability standards and certifications had become something that the government could not neglect anymore, and which they recognized as an important new marketing tool for vital parts of the Southern economy.

However, the commitments still need to be translated in changes on the ground. There are still many implementation problems to solve. In the palm oil case, for example, the RSPO aimed to address the environmental degradation caused by the massive expansion of plantations. Deforestation and other social problems kept occurring during the implementation phase of the RSPO. The question remains whether ISPO may be better able to address this problem. The weak law enforcement is generally framed as the main cause of the environmental degradation. Therefore, the mandatory ISPO based on law enforcement might be an improvement, but are also dependent on the coordination between the national government and the local governments. It is still uncertain how the new scenario will further develop; particularly whether the public national sustainability certifications will push the private certifications from the market. The most probable short-term scenario will be that of a very differentiated

and fragmented market of private and public sustainability certifications, each of them serving parts of the global market.

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THE NARRATIVES OF CONDUCTING A FEMINIST RESEARCH: FIELDWORK CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL AND WEST JAVA, INDONESIA[1]

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Abstract

This paper describes the way in which the research was undertaken from a feminist standpoint with a commitment to the identification of the social conditions of women and gender relations - particularly related to female domestic workers (FDWs) from Indonesia, especially from West and Central Java. This paper aims to explain the challenges which arose during the fieldwork phase as an important tool that allows the researcher to negotiate the differences and the similarities with the participants. Just as we cannot reduce all women to one particular group with a uniform experience, race, class, or culture, there is no single method that informs feminist research. Feminist research does not indicate any particular choice of one method or subject of the research over another. Feminist research challenges the basic structures and ideologies that oppress women, by presenting the documentation of women's lives, experiences, and concerns, in order to promote empowerment and emancipation for women, which leads to promoting social change and social justice for women. At the same time, as with all qualitative research, this study is bounded by the codes of ethical practice. However, ethical considerations do not only include the generic matters listed above, but also situation-specific issues, which depend on the field of the study and the emotional interaction and behavior of the researcher and the participants. In this study, there were four issues that emerged as prominent in the process of undertaking the fieldwork: cultural challenges; the dual characteristics of the researcher; sensitivity or taboo; and emotional reaction. In this paper, the challenges of undertaking this research in an ethical manner are explored.

Keywords: feminist research; female domestic workers; mothering

INTRODUCTION

This paper describes the way in which the research of Indonesian Female Domestic Workers (FDWs) was designed and undertaken in villages of Central Java and West Java, Indonesia. It also shows how the research was undertaken from a feminist standpoint with a commitment to the identification of the social conditions of women and gender relations - particularly related to FDWs from Indonesia.

Although there is a relatively broad range of literature which discusses the impact of the growing international demand for Indonesian FDWs, clearly missing so far, is an analysis of the impact of female migration on mothering. Studies have also not paid attention to the economic capacity-building phenomenon that increased income brings to the household as well as to the wider community, especially among women migrant workers in Indonesia.

This paper aims to explain the methodology and the methodological process in stage of the fieldwork in order to meet the aims of the study. It examines the ethical issues which arose during the fieldwork phase as an important tool that allows the researcher to negotiate the differences and the similarities with the participants.

METHODOLOGY

The feminist approach and method used in this study was incorporating in all stages of the research process, from the theoretical to the practical, from the formulation of research questions to the write-up of research findings. As a feminist research, the structures and framework of this study, is guided by feminist theory; reaching across disciplinary boundaries; and attempting to transform gender relations and the societies in which we live (Reinharz, 1992). I have used qualitative

methods, especially in-depth interviews, for three reasons. Firstly, in-depth interviewing is a way to get access to the voices of those who are marginalized and oppressed in a society: women, children and the poor in this case (Hesse-Biber, 2007). Secondly, interviewing is a way feminist researchers have attempted to access women's hidden knowledge. Finally, in-depth interviewing has played a significant role in recent feminist research, since 'the fundamental focus for feminist researchers is the validation of women's subjectivity experiences as women and as people' (Minichiello, 1995).

In addition, in this study, in-depth interviews were also conducted with people from two other groups around the woman, especially: daughters and representatives of recruitment agencies, in order to collect whole experiences of each woman. All of the interviews were conducted in an open-ended flexible manner, to obtain as comprehensive a picture of the society of villages in Central Java and West Java, Indonesia, as possible, and in order to facilitate the interviewees to raise issues of concern to them.

Similarly with other studies on migration and the family in Indonesia, this study faces the paucity of data. Indeed, the complexity and variability of situations to do with the value of family and the value of family relations require the employment of a variety of methods and a wide-ranging perspective that could accommodate the analysis of this issue. I utilize Ribbens' (1994) arguments on the feminist position as a framework to analyze both women and (later) men's experiences in relation to this issue:

(a) as far as possible, I consider this issue as part of both women and men's lives without evaluation, and without the imposition of professional or expert agenda;

(b) I take both women and men's experiences and cultures seriously, using the 'insider' perspective to understand women and men's experiences on their own terms. By understanding women and men's cultures, I can both value women and men's lives and ideas, and also become more self-conscious about them;

(c) I also need to take an 'outsider' perspective to approach this issue reflectively and analytically within the context of a wider social analysis;

(d) I have to be conscious of the multiplicity of women and men's cultures, and the circumstances in which they are situated. I must always remain sensitive to issues of significant social identities such as family relations, which are inter-related with gender and the broader social context.

FEMINIST RESEARCH

The feminist approach and method used in this study was informed by literature on feminist research methodology (Brooks, 2007; Brooks & Hesse-Biber, 2007; Brunskell, 1998; Hesse-Biber, 2007; Kitzinger, 2007; Reinharz, 1992; Sands, 2004). All of these authors agree that feminist research is a whole endeavour that incorporates all stages of the research process, from the theoretical to the practical, from the formulation of research questions to the write-up of research findings. They also emphasize the synergy that intimately links:

a) epistemology - a theory of knowledge that delineates a set of assumptions about the social world and about who can be a knower and what can be known;

b) methodology - a theory of how research is done or should proceed; and

c) method - technique for (or way of proceeding in) gathering evidence (Brooks & Hesse-Biber, 2007)

Thus, I was invited to make decisions rooted in these definitions that influence *what* is studied (based on what can be studied) and *how* the study is conducted.

Just as we cannot reduce all women to one particular group with a uniform experience, race, class, or culture, there is no single method, methodology, or epistemology that informs feminist research (Brooks & Hesse-Biber, 2007). As Brunskell (1998) states, feminist research does not indicate any particular choice of one method or subject

of the research over another. It is a 'window onto the social reality and encompasses a wide range of perspectives and practices' (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2007). In many ways, the reclaiming and validation of women's experiences through listening to women and hearing what they have to say about their experience, is the central tenet of feminist research (Kitzinger, 2007). In addition, it is always framed to identify power relations within a society characterized by male social dominance, in which women are subordinated (Brunskell, 1998).

Brooks and Hesse-Biber point out that feminist research is primarily 'connected in principle to feminist struggle' (2007, p.4). In other words, feminist research challenges the basic structures and ideologies that oppress women, by presenting the documentation of women's lives, experiences, and concerns, in order to promote empowerment and emancipation for women, which leads to promoting social change and social justice for women (Brooks & Hesse-Biber, 2007).

In summary, feminist research, which structures the framework of this study, is identified as:
a) …guided by feminist theory;
b) …reaching across disciplinary boundaries;
c) …attempting to transform gender relations and the societies in which we live (Reinharz, 1992, p.240).

Although Indonesian women's culture, history and lives have for the most part remained 'underground and invisible' until the downfall of President Soeharto in 1998; this study also involves other voices and experiences from men in their families, communities and workplaces. In this respect, this study is making women's concrete experiences the 'point of entry', while at the same time acknowledging the major contribution that women have brought back for their community, through performing nurturing tasks on a daily basis. These nurturing tasks include a range of activities from cooking, cleaning, taking care of their families, to caring for the children of others and caring for their children from afar (Brooks, 2007, p.240).

It also looks at the capacity building, and migrant women's perceptions of their own mothering, and their role in both their nuclear and extended families. This consequently directed the course of the selection of aims of this study, which focussed on some of the impacts on familial and community relationships, which Indonesian female domestic workers' overseas employment brings. As a result, it is necessary to include men for this study because:
a) the employment of these women mostly occurred within the marital relationship that involves two of the most intimate personal relationships, that of husband to wife, and of parent to child;
b) the employment of these women mostly involved their husbands (occasionally their fathers) in relation to providing permission to go and distributing the money that they earned overseas;
c) the employment of these women should be considered as a challenge to society, because it breaks with long-established patterns of family life, and with the values and beliefs supporting them, which are maintained by men (and women).

In other words, it is significant to interview husbands because of their importance to the women, as described by Reinharz:

> …In exploring the dynamics of family life it is essential to hear "both sides of the story". It is customary for the woman's version to be neglected, but in redressing this imbalance I did not want to leave out of the account what the men had to say (1992, p.41).

Another consideration is the 'dual role' concept that focuses on the position of women in the labour force, and the issues arising from combining paid and unpaid work. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the nuances which affect this, it is important to hear men's perspectives about the place of women in the areas of family, marriage, industry and work. In particular, in the context of families where the primary domestic worker is absent for long periods of time, the work must be carried out by someone else – possibly the husband. Of key interest then were the perceptions of

these men, about this work. Did they believe, as Oakley suggests, that:

a) women belong in the family, while 'men' belong at work;

b) therefore men work, while women do not work;

c) therefore housework is not a form of work (2005, p.204)?

Through exploring a sample of men's views of women migrant workers, it is hoped that this study will make a contribution to a more complete understanding of the implications of absence for both men and women. Achieving a shared position or standpoint on this issue promotes the most promising course of action for social change, especially for women.

ETHICAL ISSUES

As with all qualitative research, this study is bounded by the codes of ethical practice. For all of the interviews for instance, informed consent had to be secured from all participants, and interviews had to be conducted in ways that were sensitive to participants' rights, concerns and feelings. The participants' identities also had to be protected through the use of pseudonyms. However, as Marshall and Rossman (2006) note, ethical considerations do not only include the generic matters listed above, but also situation-specific issues, which depend on the field of the study and the emotional interaction and behaviour of the researcher and the participants.

In this study, there were four issues that emerged as prominent in the process of undertaking the fieldwork: cultural challenges; the dual characteristics of the researcher; sensitivity or taboo; and emotional reaction. In the following, the nuances of undertaking this research in an ethical manner are explored.

Cultural challenges

The consent form for this study was based on the principles of individualism and free will which are characteristics foundational to consenting to social research in conventional research settings. As expected, the notion of informed consent did not play out very well in the communities that form the

settings for this study, since this is a uniquely Western cultural assumption (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). The members of the Indonesian communities under consideration here, hold different cultural beliefs and values, which are both collectivist and hierarchical. In these communities, members tend to follow what other members or the leaders of their community do. In other words, trust and good faith are observed through word and action rather than one's signature. Thus, asking someone to sign a form is commonly taken as a sign of disrespect, and thus associated with sinister connotations.

Furthermore, the formality and legal status of a written consent form would be bewildering to the participants and disruptive to this study for three reasons. Firstly, I had already verbally offered the participants their anonymity and confidentiality, yet they were still asked to sign a legal form saying they were participating in the study. In this case, the promise of anonymous participation is taken away by the need to sign informed consent forms, and this might create fears about loss of confidentiality among research participants (Liamputtong, 2008). This would lead to confusion and the likelihood that that they might refuse to speak to me (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).

Secondly, I made contact with a *penghubung* in each village as a cooperative and helpful partner, who oriented me to the village and helped me to find some key participants for the interviews. In this study, a *penghubung* also helped to conduct a prolonged negotiation between the researcher and participants, rather than establishing one formalized document-signing moment (Waldrop, 2004). So, the natural transition from a *penghubung* to participants was anticipated in this study. In other words, the act of pulling out a written consent form to sign, was an abrupt departure that could be interpreted as saying that something had changed and that now the conversation would be somehow risky (Rubin & Rubin, 2005)

Thirdly, I had to focus on the participants' nonverbal behaviour when the situation became intrusive for the participants. I was

aware of the social desirability, among the members of the community, of not wanting to display rudeness or impoliteness to a 'guest' like the researcher by saying 'no', but at the same time also feeling hesitant . For example, I was able to see their reluctance to sign an informed consent form, mainly from their body language and expression. Under these circumstances, it was appropriate and sensible for me to read it out to the participants prior to the interview and record their verbal consent.

Dual characteristics of the researcher

Given the fact that I was able to find the *penghubung* via the networks that I have through my work in women's NGOs in Bandung, Indonesia, most participants continued to relate to me as an activist rather than a researcher. Although I explained to the participants in my study that they were experts on their own lives and communities, and considered as active collaborators in this study, they still asked for solutions to issues that were not only ethical dilemmas, but also difficult and problematic for me.

The following is an example of an interview which concluded with the interviewee asking for a solution and help from me at a practical level, based on my activism in a women's NGO in Bandung. It took place with Tini (a carer) in the living room of a *penghubung*'s sister's house in the village of West Java. The interviewee was sixty years old and the first participant from that village. She started the interview with a harrowing story about her daughter who had gone overseas as a migrant domestic worker and had not contacted her for more than a year. This mother knew from her neighbours that her daughter was in a detention centre. Her neighbours had seen the daughter there and observed her crying, holding a photograph of her son and not speaking. She clearly had a mental illness which may have been connected to her recent divorce. This mother cried not only because she felt so sad about her daughter, but also because she could see no hope available for herself, her daughter or her grandchildren. She asked for

my help for free to find her daughter and help bring her back to her village, since this mother had no money at all.

At that time, I found it quite difficult to maintain the role of researcher, and I felt myself caught in the middle of events that seemed to call for urgent action. On the one hand, I was aware that I should stay focused on the purpose of the interview, to gather high-quality data for this study. On the other hand, both as a person and an activist, I also considered the importance of moral obligation and human responsibility in deciding what to do. As a result, I asked this lady to give me any documents about her daughter, including her recent picture and told her that I would try to help her without promising anything.

In this case, the contradiction between my social and personal characteristics can be seen in what is 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' from the viewpoint of research protocol. However, this protocol assumes a 'predominantly masculine model' and 'undervaluation of women's model' (Oakley, 2005, p.271). Thus, there is a lack of fit between protocol and the practice of interviewing, especially when an activist feminist is interviewing women.

On the basis of this situation, I was able to send a few emails to some NGOs in Indonesia and asked them to follow up this matter further. Fortunately, while I was waiting for some feedback from those NGOs, I received a SMS from my *penghubung*, that the woman concerned had already come home safely with assistance from her friends from the neighbouring village.

Sensitivity or taboo

The fieldwork raised issues which the researcher had not foreseen, regarding the intersection between the personal, private and semi-public in interviews, in terms of socially invisible relationships. A number of difficulties surfaced when researching and gathering data on this matter. Firstly, lack of discussion of socially invisible relationships from public institutions and research literature; and secondly, the tension between voicing and silencing private and personal experiences in the semi-public space of the

interview situation (Mauthner, 1998). In this situation, participants might feel reluctant and vulnerable when exposing emotional aspects of certain issues, in this case, intimate relationships between a father and an *anak Arab*[2].

During my stay in a *penghubung*'s house in Central Java, I met one girl and one boy who had Middle Eastern physical characteristics. Others in the village had also told me privately that these children's mother had returned from overseas pregnant. When I asked the *penghubung* about them, he just smiled wisely and pretended he did not hear my question. Then, I asked about the same matter with more subtlety. Finally, he answered my question by explaining that that child was a 'souvenir' from Saudi Arabia who was brought back in her or his mother's womb, when she returned to the village. There was no more explanation from him after that. He only mentioned that it was a 'public secret' in the village.

I then asked similar questions of another participant who was a community leader of the village, and who I assumed knew much more than the *penghubung*. But my guess was wrong. The only additional information that I received from him was about the father of the child. He mentioned that the father accepted this child as his own and treated this child like his other children. He said that it was a 'public secret' in the village, everybody knew about it, but nobody talked about it. In another interview, I met one of the *anak Arab* again when I was going to interview his father. Once again, I asked him about that 'public secret'. In response, he asked me to turn the tape off and said, *'Sudah yah bu, saya selesai'* (I am finished).

It is clear from the example above, that researching an invisible relationship is difficult for two reasons:

1. The act of making public private facets of life, raised problems for both participants and myself to do with exposing personal, contradictory and taboo aspects of an idealized and significant bond – emotions and power relations.

2. The challenge of separating out one relationship from many other more prominent ones in the public eye and attempting to focus on it alone (Mauthner, 1998, p.51).

Asking questions related to this sensitive issue could be problematic. Although I was interested in ascertaining whether the migrant workers were sexually exploited whilst overseas; whether the sexual relationships were consensual; and what impact 'unfaithfulness' might have on the marriage itself, I could not discover any of this in any interviews.

Emotional reactions

As Patton (1990) argues, interviews raise ethical dilemmas derived from the power of the interviews. Since the interviews relate to many kinds of human issues, they not only included great suffering, pain, stress and conflict, but they also unfolded and opened old wounds, second-guessed decisions made before, or even brought forth memories of dreams of the participants. It was also very common that people in interviews would tell the researcher things they never intended to tell. In addition, Waldrop (2004, p.242) argues that:

One of the most common outcomes of in-depth interviews is a participant's unforeseen emotional reaction. Emotional reactions are a natural response to the discussion of an intense experience and crucial for a complete understanding of the participant's perception of the event or issued being studied.

In one interview with Indah (a daughter), the questions moved away from the interview schedule, towards more personal material. It involved an issue of distress for the participant – the end of her parents' marriage, which arose during the question about her dreams for the future. The participant began to cry. She was distressed about the situation because she really wanted her mother and her father to live together again, despite the fact that her father had already remarried another returned woman migrant worker in another city and planned to divorce her

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mother when she returned from overseas. At this point, I turned the tape recorder off and tried to calm her down for approximately fifteen minutes and apologized for making her cry. I also apologized to her grandmother, as her guardian, and explained the context of the interview to her.

At this point in the interview, it seemed unethical to continue recording for two reasons. Firstly, I did not want to adopt a manipulative attitude to the participants as resources of data for this study; I would rather adopt a concept of 'sisterhood' as the basis of my relationship with the women and girl participants in my study (Oakley, 2005). Secondly, in the case of Indah and myself, we shared the same gender socialisation, critical life experiences and membership of the same ethnicity that minimized the social distance between us (Oakley, 2005). Both of us were women originally from a Javanese background with the same local language, and had been taught to be a woman with particular behaviour considered 'proper' in the community.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, the theme of the subjective position of the researcher, and the very complex area of ethical issues in the research setting is explored. The essential nature of this research as qualitative research necessitates the exploration of the deeper elements of social action; and because qualitative research is itself a social action, the relationship between the researcher and the participants, is an issue which unavoidable exist in all aspects of my fieldwork.

Like many other feminist researchers, I was particularly concerned with reducing the hierarchy between myself and the researched. During all in-depth interviews I was trying to offer the warmth and personality exchange of a conversation with the participants in order to achieve my research aims. I also shared the openness, engagement and the development of a potentially long-lasting relationship that includes self-disclosure and believing the interviewee; in contrast with the scientific ethic of detachment and role differentiation

between researcher and subject. Using these ideas, a participatory model that stresses the importance of the researcher sharing her own biography with the researched, was adopted in this study.

However, it is also important to highlight the reality in this study, that there were obvious ethical problems between myself and the researched and there should be much attention paid to the interview process as a co-construction of meaning within the community and its culture.

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(Endnotes)

1   The narratives of this paper are primarily based on the 2010 PhD thesis of Elisabeth Dewi entitled "Relationships between Women Migrant Workers and their Children in Indonesia: Feminist Perspectives, Community Values and Motherhood" in Women's Studies at Victoria University, Melbourne.

2   Anak means child and Arab represents Saudi Arabia. So, *anak Arab* means a child (son or daughter) that was brought in the womb of a woman migrant worker when she came back from Saudi Arabia, in most cases, to her village in Indonesia.

THE ROLE OF INDONESIA IN SHAPING ASEAN
AND THE INDONESIA-ASEAN PARALLELS OF INTERESTS

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Abstract

Indonesia is, being ASEAN's largest and most populous state and one of the fastest-growing states in the world, often considered as the region's primus inter pares, and this paper argues as such. Analysis on Indonesia's historical and contemporary role in ASEAN shows that its existence and involvement has been proven vital for the regional organization since its inception—while Indonesia has steered clear of de jure leadership position, it doesn't shy away from providing substantial contribution to regional cooperation and being actively involved in ASEAN's political evolution. This paper also argues that Indonesia's acknowledged role in the mediation of regional conflicts and in pushing forward initiatives has not done out of goodwill alone, but rather as a means to leverage greater regional power with ASEAN as its platform. This is evidenced by how initiatives put forward by Indonesia in ASEAN are largely drawn from its own foreign policy evolution; as it shifts to a more activist, democratic approach, so does its role in encouraging greater democratization in the region. This study concludes that Indonesia indeed is ASEAN's de facto primus inter pares—something the state acknowledges and utilizes to bring further its own national interest of regional hegemony forward.

KEYWORDS: Indonesia-ASEAN regional relations, ASEAN, primus inter pares, regional hegemony

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia has long been seen as the *primus inter pares* and the 'natural-born leader' of ASEAN; its eventful history since its independence from the Dutch is that of a continuously rising power and an increasingly important nation, both in Asia and the world as a whole. Its abundance of strategic resources, including its large population and bountiful natural resources, along with its geographically strategic location, has led to its considerable importance and influence among its regional neighbours. Its leadership role dates back to when ASEAN was first formally established in 1967—Indonesia willingness to join the regional institution was vital to its formation (Widyaningsih & Roberts, 2014). Paradoxically, the founding of ASEAN was also interpreted to be in accordance to some reference to the practice of balance of power, including through the restraining of Indonesia's intra-mural hegemonic disposition in the region, not dissimilar to the establishment of European Economic Community (EEC) to manage German power (Emmers, 2003).

Indonesia was a willing party to such constraint through its active integration in the cooperative security arrangement, as seen in the conscious restraint noticeable in its actions and behaviour within ASEAN even at the lowest level of diplomatic interaction— Jakarta has steered clear from any position of assertive leadership within the association, and Soeharto's policy towards ASEAN had been greatly influenced by its desire to reassure and diminish the fears of Indonesia's regional neighbours of a potential hegemony in the interest of Indonesia's international rehabilitation (Emmers, 2003).

That is not to say that Indonesia completely excludes itself from playing significant role in the political evolution of ASEAN, as evidenced by its influence in the initial cooperative process of ASEAN, which is based on the exclusive managerial role of Southeast Asian states as indicated in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration. It was also Indonesia's preference for a regional security zone free from outside intervention, as stated

by its former Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik in 1974, which led to ASEAN principles of national and regional resilience, which was central to Indonesia's sense of nationalism and its foreign policy.

By 1980s, Indonesia was considered to be among the most obvious candidates for medium-power status, which were expected to create around themselves a regional order or limited sphere of influence (Pauker, 1976). Southeast Asia and ASEAN therefore constitute the main area of interest in Indonesia's foreign relations, often described as 'the first concentric circle' and the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy (Sukma, 2013). Indonesia has presented itself as a strong advocate of 'regional solution to regional problems', believing that a regional vision of a secure Southeast Asia can only be achieved through cooperative security system among the states in the region instead of through military alliance or collective defence arrangements among regional states or between regional states and an extra-regional power.

Indonesia's repeated affirmation for a regional cooperation without extra-regional interference is not without basis—it has been using preventive diplomacy as a mean of creating favourable regional environment to ensure its own security well-being through the establishment of cooperate regional interrelationships relatively free from extra-regional interference, thereby ameliorating perceived security concerns without any need for the use of force (Sebastian, 2006). It has played a critical role in dealing with issues that might have moved into a sphere of military conflict while at the same time embellished its claim to regional leadership.

The paper will further analyze the depth of Indonesia put ASEAN to use as a platform of greater regional power through the evaluation of its historical significance and its contemporary foreign policy vis-a-vis ASEAN and its regional instruments in the global politics of the 21st century.

Taking into account Indonesia's political power as *de-facto primus inter pares* of the Southeast Asia region vis-a-vis its geopolitical ascendancy as analyzed through its historical and contemporary significance in the economic and political sector of the region, how does it utilize the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and its respective instruments as a leverage for greater regional power?

THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION
I. Defining Structural Realism

The paper will largely draw upon the structural neorealism theory as stated by Kenneth Waltz in his book, *Theory of International Politics* as opposed to Hobbesian classical realism. Although definitions of realism differ in details, numerous realism theories share a quite distinctive trait that define them—it emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human selfishness, or egoism, and the absence of international government which require the primacy in all political life of power and security(Donnelly, 2005). However, quite unlike Hobbesian classical realism which gives a roughly equal emphasis to anarchy and egoism, Waltzian structural neorealism has been described as rigorously structural; it attempts to 'abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities' in order to highlight the impact of anarchy and the distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 1979; Donnelly, 2005). International structures, including ASEAN, emerge from the interaction of states and constrain them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others' (Donnelly, 2005).

Among the core theoretical conclusions of structural neorealism is that states 'balance' rather than 'bandwagon' other states in an anarchical power structure, as opposed to the practice of bandwagoning that tends to occur in a hierarchic political order. The logical explanation behind this reasoning is that, in an anarchic political order, bandwagoning serves no purpose than courting disaster by strengthening someone who may later turn on you, whereas the practice of balancing, whether internally through the reallocation of resources to national security or externally through alliances and other agreements (Donnelly, 2005).

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Anarchy and egoism, however, greatly impede cooperation, as represented by the Prisoners' Dilemma where, in spite of the knowledge that the two parties could be better off by cooperating by staying silent, both parties ended up with a confession because this is the only way to assure that each could avoid the worst possible outcome.

Conflicts, therefore, does not arise from any special defect in the actors—no actor is particularly vicious or desiring conflict, but in an environment of anarchy, actors are pushed by fear towards treating everyone else as an enemy unless there exists an insurance schemes that may reduce the risk of cooperation. Such is the basis of security dilemma as explained by Snyder—"Given the irreducible uncertainty about the intention of others, security measures taken by one actor are perceived by others as threatening; the others take steps to protect themselves; these steps are interpreted by the first actor as confirming its initial hypothesis that the others are dangerous; and so on in a spiral of illusionary fears and 'unnecessary' defenses" (Christensen & Snyder, 1990).

II. Role of Institutions in Waltzian Neorealism

Simply introducing state motives is relation to structural neorealism and its practical application in analyzing the realm of international politics is arguably insufficient to develop a coherent and comprehensive analysis in the contemporarily interconnected global political field of the 21st century—there is a need to, quoting Glenn Snyder, introduce 'process variables', including the roles of institutions, norms, and identities, into structural realist theorizing to address the issues brought by changes in international relations in recent years

The Prisoners' Dilemma

Snyder tried to expand Waltz' extraordinarily narrow structuralism by introducing a series of 'process variables' through the rethinking of the nature of system-level theorizing, where a system is defined as a bounded space defined by: a) units that interact with each other much more intensively than they interact with those outside the system; (b) the structure within which they interact; and c) the characteristic interactions of the units within that structure (Donnelly, 2005).

Alignment is especially important—states may stand in relations of amity or enmity, but are more likely to balance against adversaries than allies. Common interests help in facilitate cooperation, whereas competing interests may, on the other hand, prevent balancing against common enemies. But the significance of institutions is often downplayed by realists—they are often regarded as largely reducible to the material interests of the powerful (Donnelly, 2005). In the perspective of neorealist such as

Kenneth Waltz and Mearsheimer, institutions "matter only on the margins" and "have minimal influence on state behaviour"(Schweller & Priess, 1997). They argues that institutions matter only to the extent that they cause states to behave in ways they otherwise would not behave, including forgoing short-term self-interest in favour of long-term community goals; it constraints, rather than enables, states behaviour. Realists of all stripes do not deny the neoliberal claim that international or regional regimes may be created through negotiated processes, these kinds of orders merely act as a form of

collusion among oligopolistic actors to serve their perceived interests at the expense of the "others" (Schweller & Priess, 1997).

Edward Mansfield in Schweller & Priest (1997) has argued that, "States and interest groups have an incentive to capture international institutions because they can generate power for those that control them. Actors that gain power within an institution have the ability to set its agenda and influence the distribution of benefits and costs among members." Institutions are also used to advance the interests of particular states through the strategy of 'binding", in which state seeks to exert some control over another state's policies by incorporating it in a web of institutional arrangements. Alliances, as pointed out by the historian Paul Schroeder (1976), are often designed to restrain or control partners' actions as well as to balance adversaries.

Through binding, it is possible for rising power to have a "place at the table" in an attempt to meet their prestige demands, as well as giving them the opportunities for an effective voice while at the same time continue to foster the sense of legitimacy in the established international order (Schweller & Priess, 1997; Christensen & Snyder, 1990).

ANALYSIS

I. The Foundations of ASEAN and the Historical Significance of Indonesia in Southeast Asia

Michael Leifer argued that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born of the need for "regional conciliation", as opposed to economic integration; the need for reconciliation arose out of the conflictual recent past among the young states of the region, including Indonesia's military confrontation against Malaysia from 1963 to 1966, which serves as an example of the absence of shared assumptions and its consequences in the region (Emmers & Liow, 2006).

The formation of ASEAN in 1967, following the end of Soekarno's romantic-nationalist regime, affirmed the existence of mutual interests and common problems faced by the Member States of the Association, and how, "in the spirit of equality and partnership," they sought to contribute towards peace, progress, and prosperity in Southeast Asia.

Even during the first years of ASEAN, Indonesia's contribution in shaping the Association was clear—it was Indonesia which pushed the view that Southeast Asian states should be the ones bearing the primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region, along with ensuring their stability and security from external interference (Emmers & Liow, 2006).

Leifer further argued that the reason behind Indonesia's insistence upon the paragraph about Southeast Asian states being the ones responsible for the region's order was that due to Indonesia's conception of a regional order in which it, as the first among equal in ASEAN entourage, would have a predominant role in shaping the regional order of Southeast Asia.

By reserving the primary responsibility for shaping the region's stability and security solely to the Southeast Asian states, Indonesia ensured that powerful extra-regional states, including Japan, China, and the United States of America, would not be given prominent roles in shaping Southeast Asia's regional order (Emmers & Liow, 2006; Keling, et al., 2011). Suffice to say that this sentiment, based on Indonesia's sense of entitlement to certain prerogatives as the region's largest and most populous state, was not shared by its neighbours.

The attempt to balance Indonesia's sense of *primus inter pares* came from Malaysia through the creation of ASEAN's Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) following the impending geopolitical changes of the region triggered by the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam as well as the US-China rapprochement. Malaysia's original proposal for ZOPFAN involved the extra-regional great powers—United States of America, Russian Federation, and People's Republic of China—in guaranteeing the neutrality of Southeast Asia, which went directly against Indonesia's vision for regional

order. Indonesia viewed Malaysia's proposal for ZOPFAN as a presumptuous attempt in unilaterally prescribing for regional order, which was a role it would prefer to reserve for itself as the region's first among equal.

It was also Indonesia whose less explicit definition on the allowable role of outside power which put the motion of ZOPFAN onward in accordance of its own vision, which had also been incorporated in the preamble to ASEAN's founding document (Emmers & Liow, 2006; Keling, et al., 2011).

Indeed, Indonesian external security policy has long been identified by the idea that the maintenance of national regional security is the fundamental right and responsibility of the countries of the region themselves, whether separately or in concert with one another (Sebastian, 2006).

The view is derived from the perception that extra-regional powers, however benign they may seem at first, will seek to dominate smaller and weaker states for their own interest to the extent that these states are vulnerable and divided among themselves; in order to safeguard their long-term stability and independence, it is important for Southeast Asian states to ensure their full and active participation in all decisions affecting the region, as opposed to merely witnessing the manipulation of events by competing extra-regional powers or by passively accepting the imposition of certain kinds of regional structure that may not reflect the initiative of the Southeast Asian states themselves.

Former President Soekarno managed to reassert this point of view in the 1963 Manila Accord between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines—the third point of the Accord, for instance, stated that, "The Ministers were of one mind that the three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form of manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities."

The commitment was further reaffirmed through a joint statement issued by the three heads of government—Soekarno, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and President Macapagal—

one year later, which seemed to go even further in embracing the Indonesian point of view of non-interference. The joint statement stated that the countries of Southeast Asia, "are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form and manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their people […] all foreign bases are temporary." (Sebastian, 2006).

And thus it was hardly surprising, nor was it illegitimate, for Soeharto to report to Indonesia's People Consultative Assembly (trans. Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) in March 1968 that ASEAN had been created "at Indonesia's initiative."

II. Indonesia's Foreign Policy Nexus

Indonesian foreign policy has changed substantially since the fall of Soeharto in 1998—the Indonesian foreign policy priorities for 2013, for instance, is dubbed as a more 'activist' approach of Indonesia's foreign relations, with an emphasis for peace, prosperity, and stability in the region and in the realm of global politics, and Indonesia's role in pursuing these goals (Poole, 2014).

Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa has argued that these aspirations reflected the Indonesian approach of 'dynamic equilibrium'; a notion that the dynamic changes in the region can not only be managed buy also embraced, thereby recognizing the nexus between security, common interest, and partnership.

The evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy reflects the shifting political roles and interests of Indonesia towards the so-called democratization process, including through closer engagement with its regional neighbours.

In 2013 Marty Natalegawa set out Indonesia's foreign policy priorities, which are outlined in nine specific objectives: 1) to improve bilateral cooperation with strategic partners; 2) to expand Indonesia's non-traditional export markets; 3) to intensify border diplomacy with Indonesia's neighbors; 4) to enhance protection of Indonesians overseas;

5) to maintain peace and stability in the region; 6) to consolidate democracy and human rights values in the region and at the global level; 7) to strengthen regional economic resilience and growth; 8) to contribute to global peace, security, and justice; and 9) to promote a just global economic and development order (Poole, 2014).

Indonesia intended to be a positive force for regional stability as well as an increasingly vocal player in global issues, a vision it aims to achieve through its role in high-level forums, including ASEAN.

Indonesia's role in encouraging democracy and political transformation in the region involves advancing democracy and human rights as priorities of the ASEAN Political and Security Community, the creation of which was an Indonesian initiative.

This democratic identity is seen as beneficial to Indonesia's international image, which explain why its government seek to leverage his country's stature as the world's third largest democracy, bolstered by Indonesia's global ranking as the world's fourth most populous nation and the world's most populous Muslim state. Indonesia's democratic values are also promoted as a part of its regional role, as evidenced by Natalegawa's statement in May 2012 at the UNHRC's Universal Periodic Review when he stated that, "Indonesia, as then Chair of ASEAN [in 2003], introduced the concept of an SEAN Community that is fully committed to democratic values and the promotion and protection of human rights.

Since then, ASEAN has adopted its Charter, by virtue of which the Member States committed themselves to democratic values and to the promotion and protection of human rights," reasserting the argument that Indonesia's democratic transition is parallel to the democratic change within ASEAN.

III. The Contemporary Role of Indonesia in ASEAN

The leadership role of Indonesia in ASEAN dates back to the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. In the period following ASEAN's formation, "Indonesia's restraint,

plus its substantial contribution to regional cooperation, has earned the country the respect and recognition of the other members as *primus inter pares*." (Widyaningsih & Roberts, 2014).

Indonesia has had both the power and influence necessary to undertake an important role in almost all conflicts and crisis which potentially jeopardize the region's stability, including when the diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines received a heavy blow in 1968 over the allegation that Manila had been plotting to fund a separatist religion in Sabah, during which President Soeharto intervened at an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting with a proposal for a cooling-off period.

Such was also the case of Indonesia's role during the Cambodian conflict in 1980; when other attempts to resolve the crisis had failed, it was Indonesia which sent its military chief to negotiate directly with Hanoi, after which ASEAN appointed Indonesia as its official interlocutor for the negotiation between Cambodia and Vietnam, leading to the successful final resolution at the Paris Conference chaired by Indonesia.

It was also Indonesian pressure, along with the diplomacy of then-ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan, that managed to persuade Burmese military junta to permit foreign aid organizations into the country following the devastating Cyclone Nargis in 2008. Indonesia also took a leading role in responding to the armed conflict between Thailand and Cambodie over the PreahVihear temple in 2011; during the ASEAN Informal Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta on 22 February 2011, convened by Indonesia, the two parties agreed to accept Indonesian military and civilian observers along the border to monitor a ceasefire agreement (Widyaningsih & Roberts, 2014)

Indonesia's greatest mediatory role, however, is related to the South China Sea conflict between several ASEAN states and the People's Republic of China. After the failure of ASEAN to issue a joint communiqué—the first time such thing happened since ASEAN was first founded—Indonesia immediately sought

to resolve the impasse by holding meeting with leaders from Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, resulting in a six-point plant which was publicly released in late July 2012, where each of ASEAN Member States provided their approval to the six principles of ASEAN's Common Principle.

Although the six-point plan falls far short of resolving the dispute of South China Sea, Indonesia's role was incredibly pivotal in reducing regional tensions (Sukma, 2013; Widyaningsih & Roberts, 2014).

Indonesia's willingness to maintain an active role in mediating disputes and crises is mutually beneficial, both for the archipelagic state and for ASEAN, as ASEAN cannot expect its weaker members, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, or even Brunei Darussalam, to take such a role. Dr. Yayan Mulyana, a Senior Official of the Indonesian President's Office, has argued that Indonesia has maintained a very important role as 'consensus builder' within ASEAN, and that its ASEAN counterparts have recognized this role (Widyaningsih & Roberts, 2014).

The size of Indonesian population and geography, along with the fast pace of its economic growth, translates into shaping it as a well-placed representation of ASEAN's interests in the broader Indo-Pacific region. It has played a role as a creator of ideas, which is also beneficial to the evolution of the Association as it becomes more effective as a coordinating and decision-making body capable of protecting the interests of its Member States. The nature of Indonesia's ascent as a *primus inter pares* has improved ASEAN's international profile and enhanced the opportunities to promote ASEAN's interests in global fora—although some within ASEAN has resented or attempted to compete against Indonesia's leadership within ASEAN, such resistance has yet to lessen Indonesia's power and influence in the region.

CONCLUSION

Indonesia has an incredibly important significance to the establishment and the development of ASEAN, as evidenced by its dominant role in shaping some of the most vital points of ASEAN development, including the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the establishment of ASEAN Political and Security Community, as well as its role as a mediator in numerous regional conflicts occurring in the aftermath of the establishment of ASEAN. Its active role in Southeast Asian regional politics, however, isn't done out of a sense of camaraderie with its fellow Southeast Asian states, but rather through a rather neorealist vision of regional hegemony as it intends to position itself to be.

This vision is supported by its large population and the sheer size of its geographical features, along with its speedily growing economic power, which places it as the *de facto*, if not *de jure*, *primus inter pares* in the region. Although other states and some fractions within ASEAN has tried to compete against Indonesia's de facto leadership within ASEAN along the way, none could match Indonesia's power and influence in the region, and it is incredibly likely that Indonesia will continue to maintain its leadership role in ASEAN and to exert great influence to its regional policies for the years to come.

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SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIME IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

Southeast Asia is one of the most prone regions to disasters in the world. This article investigates the cooperative efforts of Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN member countries) to deal with the natural. Different from previous studies on disaster management in Southeast Asia, this article tries to make use of regime theory of international relations to investigate how cooperation among states in this region has evolved and developed in responding potential disasters and to what extent the emerging regime is effective. This piece tries to provide insights and lessons for the way forward for strengthened cooperative efforts in responding the threat of disasters in ASEAN.

KEYWORDS: Southeast Asia, disaster, international regime, and effectiveness

INTRODUCTON

This article investigates the cooperative efforts of Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN member countries) to deal with the natural disasters. Southeast Asia is one of the most prone regions to disasters in the world. Countries in this region experiences frequent disasters, such as, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic activity, floods, and other disasters of varying intensity.

In Indonesia, a huge natural calamity—the tsunami—struck the westernmost Province of Aceh on December 26, 2004. The tsunami also hit Thailand and the South Indian coastline. The huge waves were preceded by a strong earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale under the Indian Ocean seabed. The death toll of the tsunami was put at 2, 89,944 in South and Southeast Asia. Two years later, Bantul Regency and parts of central Java were also rocked by an earthquake on May 27, 2006. The disaster took 6,000 lives and destroyed most infrastructures (Singh, 2012).

In the Philippines, a landslide occurred in on February 17, 2006 in the southern Leyte Island following two weeks of sustained rain and a mild earthquake. It buried an entire village leaving as many as 1,800 dead. Leyte island had witnessed a landslide in 1993 when 133 people died and in 1991 when as many as 5,000 were killed. In December 2011, at least 650 people were also confirmed dead as flash floods and landslides spawned by Tropical Storm Sendong hit Mindanao Island (Singh, 2012).

In Myanmar, Cyclone Nargis struck the Ayeyarwady delta region on May 2, 2008. It left an estimated 140,000 dead or missing, and disrupted the lives of 2.4 million people. With wind speeds reaching over 200 km per hour and storm surge of up to 3.6 millions homes, infrastructure, and agricultural produce were all destroyed. In neighboring country, Thailand, the worst floods in 50 years, have claimed nearly 700 lives in July 2011 (Singh, 2012).

Besides the natural disasters mentioned above, many ASEAN states were also hit by epidemics of serious infectious diseases, such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian Flu, which posed grave security implications for each of them. When SARS hit the region in early 2003, it exposed

the vulnerability of South East Asian nations (Singh, 2012).

There are other natural disasters that have not been mentioned above. However, the above storyline is enough to show how the region is prone to various disasters. The question here is how countries in Southeast Asia respond to the disasters?

INTERNATIONAL REGIME

Different from previous studies on disaster management in Southeast Asia, this piece tries to make use of regime theory of international relations to investigate how cooperation among states in this region has evolved in responding potential disasters and to what extent the emerging regime is effective. Before answering the above question, therefore, it is important to elaborate the concept of "international regime" which be used in this article.

Since world politics is lack central authoritative governmental institutions, states have developed multilateral collaboration to deal with various common problems. In many issue-area—such security, environment, trade, disaster, etc.—states institutionalize their cooperative efforts in the form of international regimes. Stephen Krasner defines international regimes as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge" in a specific issue-area. Regimes can take the form of established organizations or of rules and regulations without an existing organizing body (Krasner, 1983). The basic assumption of a regime is that behavior in the international system is being increasingly institutionalized.

The primary function of regimes results from the anarchical structure of the international system and the condition of pervasive uncertainty that governs the behavior of states. Since world politics is anarchic, a major function of international regimes is to facilitate the making of mutually beneficial agreements among governments (Young & Zürn, 2006: 121).

Regimes also function to facilitate finding a solution for collective problems in a specific policy field (Zürn, 1998: 632). The means how to reach a solution is to impact on the behavior of the participating states. Regimes create shared expectations about appropriate behavior and by upgrading the level of transparency in the issue-area, regimes help states to cooperate with a view to reaping joint gains in the form of additional welfare or security (Hasenclever et al. 2000: 3).

By reducing uncertainty regimes help states to reduce security dilemmas and to achieve collective gains. Moreover, regimes also facilitate cooperation by signaling the parties' commitment to an ongoing relationship, hence lengthening the shadow of the future. Regimes generate information, increase transparency, and facilitate reciprocity (Bernauer 1995: 364). The fundamental *raison d'être* of regimes is to "cause people to do things they would not otherwise do" (Mitchell 1994:425).

Hasenclever et al (2006) outline three schools of regime theory–power-based "realism," interest-based "neoliberalism," and knowledge-based "cognitivism." Realists posit relatively weak institutions in a world of rational relative-gains-maximizing units; Neoliberals suppose somewhat stronger institutions, with the rational units maximizing absolute gains; and cognitivists have the strongest institutions of all operating in a world of sociologically-derived role playing units.

Therefore, regimes are conceptualized in one of three main ways: behaviorally (regimes can be observed from state actions), cognitively (regimes are best examined via inter-subjective reactions to non-compliance), or formally (regimes rely on explicit agreements). Realists and neoliberals favor formal and (to a lesser extent) behavioral conceptualizations; cognitivists prefer cognitive conceptions

There are theoretical Perspectives on International Regimes (Hasenclever, et al, 1997: 6).

	Realism	Neoliberalism	Cognitivism
Central Variable	Power	Interests	Knowledge
Meta-theoretical Orientation	Rationalist	Rationalist	Sociological
Behavioral Model	Relative Gains Seeker	Absolute Gains Maximizer	Role Player
Institutionalism	Weak	Medium	Strong

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REGIONAL REGIME: AADMER

The member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are famed for clinging to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and resisting the shift to 'post-Westphalian' sovereignty. However, Jones notes that the historical record shows that Southeast Asian states have also been involved in subversion, invasion, annexation, proxy warfare, peacekeeping, state-building and humanitarian interventions (Jones, 2011). ASEAN member countries have worked together to form regional regime in disaster management and have tried to intervene 'internal affairs' of member states for humanitarian reasons. In particular, ASEAN member countries have develop regional regime in dealing with disasters.

"Disasters" are conceptualized as a security challenge, alongside issues such as maritime security, infectious diseases and climate change (Fan and Krebs, 2014:3). ASEAN member countries realized the importance of collaborative effort to response to disaster which date back to 1976 when five ASEAN states issued the *Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters.* In the declaration, it is stated that the Member Countries shall, within their respective capabilities, cooperate in the: (a). improvement of communication channels among themselves as regards disaster warnings; (b). exchange of experts and trainees; (c). exchange of information and documents; and (d). dissemination of medical supplies, services and relief assistance. The experts group (set up after the declaration was adopted) was elevated to the level of an ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) in 2003. It adopted the ASEAN Regional Program on Disaster Management for 2004–2010 and set about drafting the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). (Fan and Krebs, 2014:3).

AADMER was an innovative *legally binding accord*. It is policy framework for cooperation, coordination, technical assistance and resource mobilization in all aspects of disaster management in the 10 ASEAN Member states. The objective is to provide an effective mechanism to achieve substantial reduction of disaster losses in lives and in social, economic and environmental assets, and to jointly respond to emergencies through concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international co-operation. The AADMER Work Program for the period of 2010-2015 translates the intent and spirit of AADMER into a comprehensive and holistic action plan (OCHA-ROAP, 2013: 9).

Through its Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP), the AADMER enables ASEAN Member States to mobilize and deploy resources and for emergency response. The AADMER was signed by ASEAN Member States in 2005 and entered into force in December 2009. (OCHA-ROAP, 2013: 9).

An ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Relief Fund, with voluntary contributions, were also set up. Disaster-related specialized training was imparted, a database was set up, technical cooperation established, training institutes linked, technical cooperation instituted and simulation exercises conducted. Lessons learnt were incorporated into the ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures (Floristela, 2015).

The emergence and rise of cooperation in the area of disaster management is

interesting development. Because this domain has been traditionally consigned to the exclusive competence of nation states, the creation of formal structures and procedures to cope with disasters comes as a surprise. Due to historical and political circumstances, ASEAN members have pursued an individualistic approach, refusing joint undertakings and maintaining the Westphalian state as the centerpiece around which standards of behavior for regional cooperation have been designed (Floristela, 2015).

It is noteworthy that the impetus of the development was major natural disaster in 2004: Tsunami. Having suffered from the devastating disaster, Indonesia sought support for two disaster prevention and mitigation activities earlier mandated by the Special ASEAN Leaders' Meeting: (i) a regional instrument for disaster management and emergency response; and (ii) the establishment of a tsunami early-warning system for the Indian Ocean Rim and South-east Asia. Another impetus was major disaster in 2008 when Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar. ASEAN, again, used the opportunity to exercise its leadership through an ASEAN led mechanism, in support of the affected country, and institutionalized the experience gained into the implementation of AADMER.

The development of the AADMER Work Programme, which kick-started through a visioning workshop in July 2009 in Bali, utilized the experience gained from this mega disaster. The ACDM, which has been the key driving force in the implementation of AADMER, adopted the AADMER Work Program (2010-2015) as a rolling plan at the 15th Meeting of the ACDM held in March 2010 in Singapore. Phase 1 (2010-2012) captured on-going activities from the previous cycle (i.e. the ASEAN Regional Program on Disaster Management or ARPDM, 2004-2010) and those that were in the pipeline. Phase 1 also kick-started many strategic activities, such as the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre). Phase 2 (2013-2015) activities are expected to sustain the momentum and further strengthen disaster management capacities, mechanisms and systems that have been put in place in Phase 1.

The AADMER Work Program outlines a detailed plan for four Strategic Components, and six Building Blocks. The ACDM provides oversight to the implementation of the Work Program, while the Working Groups (for the Strategic Components) and Lead Shepherd Countries (for the Building Blocks) take the lead in the implementation. The ACDM also serves as the Governing Board for the AHA Centre. AHA Centre serves the main operational engine for AADMER, while ASEAN Secretariat provides policy and strategic coordination support to the whole machinery, and assists in the Monitoring and Evaluation of the Work Program. The ACDM reports directly to the Ministers in charge of Disaster Management, who also serve as Conference of the Parties (COP). COP provides the overall oversight and policy guidance.

INSTITUTION: AHA CENTRE

As has been mentioned above, regional agreements on disaster management and institutional mechanisms in the form of expert groups have existed since the 1970s and were strengthened in 2003 with the creation of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM)—the main platform for ASEAN's policy-making on humanitarian issues. The Committee, which meets annually, is governed by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management and consists of the heads of the ten member states' national disaster management organizations. The ACDM is responsible for the overall coordination and implementation of regional activities on disaster management, and acts as the primary forum for exchanges on humanitarian issues with external actors—including the UN, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Pacific Disaster Centre and the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (Labbé, Fan and Kemp, 2013: 11).

The AADMER also provides for the establishment of an ASEAN Coordinating

Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (the AHA Centre) to undertake operational coordination of activities. Established in 2011 as an operational engine for the AADMER's implementation and with the ACDM as its governing board, the AHA Centre is aimed at facilitating 'cooperation and coordination among the Parties, and with relevant United Nations and international organizations, in promoting regional collaboration.' The AHA Centre works on the basis that the affected party will act first to manage and respond to a disaster. In the event that an affected country's national capacity proves insufficient to cope with the disaster by itself, it may ask the AHA Centre to facilitate requests for outside assistance (Labbé, Fan and Kemp, 2013: 11).

The AHA Centre launched the AHA Centre Executive Program in January 2014 to provide capacity building training over six months for prospective ASEAN leaders in disaster management. It is aimed at strengthening the disaster management capability of ASEAN as a whole, and of member states' national disaster management agencies. Since then, ASEAN and the PDC have co-developed a Disaster Monitoring and Response System (DMRS), which became operational in January 2013. Complemented by other tools, such as the ASEAN Disaster Information Network), the DMRS provides monitoring services and disaster information to national disaster management organizations (Fan dan Krebs, 2014).

The introduction of these systems was part of the 'Risk Assessment, Monitoring and Early Warning' component of Phase 1 of the AADMER Work Program 2010–2015. The Program is conducting a series of regional projects, activities and workshops designed to institutionalize the AADMER. Phase 1 (2010–2012) also saw the promotion of civil–military coordination in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief through increased joint exercises, as well as the finalization and institutionalization of the ASEAN Standard Operating Procedures for Regional Standby Agreements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response

Operations (SASOP). (Fan dan Krebs, 2014).

The SASOP is intended to facilitate regional cooperation through the establishment of joint operations in providing relief to disaster-affected areas in line with the AADMER. Signed by member states in 2005, it was used for the first time in response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and entered into force in 2009. Phase 1 also saw the establishment of the AADMER Partnership Group (APG), a partnership framework between ASEAN and civil society organizations. Between 2012 and 2013, the APG reached out to a total of 194 civil society organizations to promote understanding of AADMER at regional, national and subnational levels. The APG's policy research was used to review Cambodia's National Emergency Management Policy to accommodate the provisions of the AADMER. In the Philippines, a series of multi-stakeholder consultations using the AADMER as a starting point have facilitated the selection of four civil society representatives to the NDRRMC (Fan dan Krebs, 2014).

ASEAN has been involved in the response to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008, Typhoon Ketsana in 2010, Typhoon Bopha in Mindanao in 2012 and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. Regional policy debate and institutionalization through instruments such as the ADMM indicate that ASEAN states are willing to commit to their sovereign obligation to provide for their people, and to pursue international assistance in developing their national and regional capacities to that end. However, the region's characteristic preoccupation with state sovereignty is an impediment to this process (Fan dan Krebs, 2014:5).

CONCLUSION

Southeast Asia is one of the most prone regions to disasters in the world. This article elaborated the cooperative efforts of Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN member countries) to deal with the natural as well as man-made disasters. Different from previous studies on disaster management in Southeast Asia, it tries to make use of regime

theory of international relations to investigate how cooperation among states in this region has evolved and developed in responding potential disasters and to what extent the emerging regime is effective. This piece tries to provide insights and lessons for the way forward for strengthened cooperative efforts in responding the threat of disasters in ASEAN

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THE NUCLEAR IRAN DEAL: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

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Abstract

Negotiation between Iran and P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; plus Germany) about Iran nuclear crisis had reached agreement. It contains in JCPoA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) that all of countries must compliance this deal. To reach this deal, they had extended more than eighteen months. Debating from negosiators involve this meeting. On the one hand, Iran believes that their nuclear program used to enrich energies and to buffer economic growth. On the other hand, P5+1 must have guarantee from Iran that their nuclear only for non proliferation program. Some supporters of the agreement argue that this new opportunity for Iran both in economics and politics. Iran will have chance to grow their economic and to develop new relationship with Middle East states. Under this deal, Iran will be able trading with European countries which are huge market for Iran products. In politics perspective, it can decrease fearfulness of Iran's neighbors, especially GCC members. This also as a guarantee for international community, that Iran does not make their nuclear power to support terrorism in the Middle East. In contrast, this deal can be as a challenge for P5+1 to prove that Iran will commit with it. However, many states doubt that Iran will not comply this proposal. Iran is widely acknowledged as a common enemy for many countries in Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel. Hence, many countries want to see the next agenda after this agreement.

Keyword: iran nuclear crisis, negotiation, agreement.

INTRODUCTION

Iran nuclear issue has ignited debating between Iran and international community since 2006. The aim of the solution was to stop Iran activities on nuclear program, which made international community worry about it. Most of Western countries believe that Iran want to be a nuclear state and produce MDW (mass destruction weapon). This happens because of Iran history that indicated Iran want to be a powerful state in Middle East. Furthermore, Iran announces to the world that they want to be a powerful state in the world, particularly in order to transfer Iranian Revolution.

This was massive debate in international forum in Ahmadinejad era who called provocateur leader. In General assembly of United Nations, he said that Western countries were not fair, they could make a nuclear as their energy and weapon, but it does not work for Iran. Iran will keep fighting to survive Iran nuclear program and prove it that Iran will not produce MDW. Although Ahmadinejad want to prove it, it does not give any influences to Western paradigm. They still believe Iran has agenda making bomb from nuclear.

In the end of 2006, Iran did not want to stop the program because they believe that this negotiation is only the representation of Western interest then Western countries ignored Iran proposal. Thus, Iran got sanction from SC (Security Council) United Nations six times, which were 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747(2007), 1803(2008), 1835(2008), and 1929 (2010). All of the sanctions were focus on three points (UN Security Council Resolution). First, banning on Iranian certain nuclear and missile investment abroad. It was including conventional arm, ballistic missile, and cargo inspection. Second, banning on bunkering services. This was to stop Iran financial transfer from and to Iran. Third, targeting of this sanctions on specific individuals and entities, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and Iran Air's cargo division.

The sanctions were not only from SC

but also from EU (European Union). This organisation usually added the sanction (Chang & Mihan, 2014: 1). Such as, giving ban for Iran to export and import product from and to EU. Furthermore, it was also ban for Iran air traverse and frozen bank account in EU. Although, Iran got the embargo to press Iranian politics and economics, this sanction could not make Iran gave up to continue their program. Iran thought that their nuclear program is on the right track, as a proof it joins as one of sates signing NPT (Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty).

This sanction did not make Iran stop the program. It was continued to enrich nuclear ability until 20 %. In the history, it is widely known that Iran has problem with Western states, especially after Iran Revolution in 1979. Nuclear program has become complex problems after Ahmadinejad became president of Iran Republic. Iran under Ahmadinejad Era had been progressive to attack Western country; it was not only about nuclear but also about Genocide history in the Europe. Then Western responsibility is very important in Palestine-Israel war. Thus, diplomacy as a key to solve this crisis under Ahmadinejad was unsuccessful.

In 2013, Hassan Rouhani replaced Ahmadinejad as Iran President, then negotiation became more flexible. Hassan Rouhani had different perspective to reach the goal about Iran nuclear crisis. Talking Iran nuclear program with Western countries has been a long way to go. On September 2013, US-Iran phone call led the to more talks. Due to this communication, Iran and P5+1 negotiated in Geneva on October 2013. Until Iran and P5+1 agree to join JCPoA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).

FOCUS DEBATING

Iran and P5+1 had debated about three points that very crucial to discuss. First is the scope of permissible uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. On one side, Iran want to keep their goal to enrich uranium until 20 %, then Iran should minimize through a reduction in the number of centrifuges (Adel: 2015). P5+1 believe that the new reactor at Arak

can produce plutonium. This is potential to be a basic material to make nuclear devises. Furthermore, the main debate topic was on limit for Iran to enrich their centrifuges. Iran must allow stopping building addition each reactor for a defined period of time (Albright, Stricker, Vergantini & Houston Wood, 2015: 3).

Second, IAEA (International Atom Energy Agreement) want to be a guide to control Iran program. In the fact, IAEA sometimes refused by Iran government. On Iran's perspective, IAEA is as a Western representative. Its reports were not match with the fact in the field. Nevertheless, the main problem is IAEA want to have access anywhere and anytime, including to the military sites those are research, development, and production of nuclear (Albright, Stricker, Vergantini & Houston Wood, 2015: 10). For this case, Iran as an object of an idea which states Iran is not a sovereign state.

Third, Iran sanction will be lifted by United Nations, United States and European Union when Iran commit with this agreement. It will be applicable after three months. In contrast, Iran wants a guarantee, and this sanction must be lifted after agreement signed (Cordesman, 2015: 2). This is quite difficult for P5+1, they are aware that Iran will be noncompliance with this commitment.

Iran is in a weak position, because all of P5+1 are in same perspective that Iran will make nuclear as weapon and more than nine years, all of member in SC usually agree to give sanction to Iran. In the fact, China and Russia usually do not implement this agenda. On the other hand, Iran is actually in top position. This is because Iran has proven that they still commit to build nuclear program under the sanction. It means Iran still struggle although under sanction. In addition, this negotiation can be only the last alternative from SC, though sanction does not have big impact for internal life of Iran both to the people and the government.

Beside of this debating, Iran said based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), encourage all of the members to give a guarantee that their

program is aimed for peace. The Iran nuclear deal is repetitive as proven for who does not believe that NPT is not messy but it works. Some people think that NPT is only forum for sharing and talking nuclear (Cordesman, 2015: 3). There are only four states which did not sign, they were India, Pakistan, Israel and South Sudan, although North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003 (Kaplow & Gibbons, 2015: 2). For Iran this is injustice law, Iran signed NPT but they got terror from SC, though there are several countries do not join NPT can produce nuclear without it.

Finally, Iran and P5+1 reach agreement on seven points in JCPoA (Kaplow & Gibbons, 2015), first, Iran assented to limit their centrifuges. Iran should refrain from installing additional centrifuges at the Natanz facility. Second, they allowed enriching uranium until 5 % and pledged to convert uranium oxide to uranium hexafluoride. Third, Centrifuge only could enrich low-enriched uranium. Forth, Under IAEA safeguards Iran was permitted to continue centrifuges. Fifth, Iran must provide video records off enrichment additional facilities. Sixth, Iran refrained from additional reactor at Arack Reactor. In addition, the last, Iran must provide information about their nuclear facilities. This deal will cut off all of Iran's potential pathways to a bomb. Such as facility in Natanz and Fordow which are blocked. It could be potential to make a nuclear weapon with plutonium.

This deal will adopt 90 days after endorsement of JCPoA by the SC. Thus, October 18 2015 JCPoA will be adoption, and all of members of this deal are required to begin making nuclear legal and administrative prepetition to implement JCPoA commitment.

Furthermore, the IAEA will check Iran nuclear program and report about Iran commitment under JCPoA. The sanction will reveal if Iran follow the deal. After eight years, transition law will be applied on 18 October 2023. When Iran is obedient under deal, all of sanction economic and financial sanction will be lifted. SC will take place ten years after adoption day 18 October 2025, the provision under SC will reveal. Finally, the deal is based on verification, not trust.

United Nation has committed to take the actions of implementation day, such as transaction between non-US persons and certain entities, including the Central Bank of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) (Kaplow & Gibbons, 2015). UE under JCPoA will be lifted Iran sanction like, prohibition and authorization regimes on financial transfers to and from Iran, banking, insurance, financial, grants, import of oil, gas and petrochemical products from Iran and Shipping and shipbuilding.

KEY SUCCES OF IRAN PROGRAM

This agreement can be achieved between Iran and P5+1 because the internal and external factors. From the internal factor, Hasan Rouhani became a big influencer for the deal. Some scholars believe Iran under Rouhani has different perspective to solve Iran nuclear program. As a graduate from Glasgow Caledonian University, he thought to see another way to keep Iran's interest and to develop the nuclear program. In this step, Rouhani show that Iran under his era wants to change Western perception about Iran.

To do this agenda, Rouhani open his arms to make some diplomatic approaches with Western. He wants Iran avoiding bad term in international system like "Great satan" or "Exist of evil". Although this term is not linking in internal Iran, but is like judgment for Iran holly. After he was been elected, Rouhani called Obama by phone and they talked about Iran-US relationship.

Iran under Rouhani era had changed their way to show this part. It changed the approach of this meeting, and agreed moving backwards to push Iran in the top position in this case (Tetrais, 2015: 7). When they began the meeting, Iran believed that Western needed to fight Islamic State, Europe needed Iran gas, then Russia and China wanted to help Iran, but these assumptions were wrong. Moreover, Iran under Rouhani had problem with oil. Oil of Iran trading slashed until 50%, this was a big problem for Iran economic. The barrel price in 2008 $80, but had risen to $136 in 2014, then on February 2015 it was only around 60%. Because of this case, Iran want

to change their position in negotiation.

In addition, Payam Mohseni finds some reasons as a factor in this deal; first Rouhani can be a bridge for Iranian official and the public, and the military open their mind to see the conflict. It means, Rouhani as a president can communicate with the public that dealing is one of important thing for Iran's interest. Second, Hilal Khashan supposes that Iran's desire for recognition and partnership with the U.S in the Gulf. In contrast, some people said that U.S want to alleviate Israel security from U.S power depending (Mohseni, 2015: 7).

For external factor, P5+1 felt that sanction cannot stop Iran program. Since 2006 until 2010, Iran has gotten six resolutions including giving pressure to Iran. Although Iran had the impact of this sanction, they still develop nuclear agenda. On the other hand, Iran had economic problem as the implication from the resolution. Their oil was forbidden to sale to other countries and to their economic partner in Europe, particularly Germany as the biggest bussiness partner of Iran.

United States under Obama regime gives new paradigm about them selves. Obama wants U.S approaching diplomacy as a good way to make world in more peace. Including Iran crisis, Obama wants to talk as a good step to find gap between Iran and Western states. In this position, both Iran and U.S are the main player have the same perception to decrease Iran crisis.

Russia as Iran partner believes that Iran should be allowed to produce nuclear with some limit. In the fact, Russia has some contributions for Iran program. In 2013, Busher nuclear program was helped by Russian firm atomstroyexport, then Russia agreed to build two new reactor units in Iran. It means, by the time Iran is a partner of Russia. In addition, Mehdi Sanaei as Rusian Ambassador said, Russia has had bilateral relations with Iran in bilateral trade, although Iran was under sanction. It wants to minimize the effect of SC sanction (Borshchevskaya, 2015).

China as the important player is behind the reason why Russia wants to support this agreement. China wanted to invest on gas and oil in Iran, because this country has a lot of energy (Baev, 2015). It needs a big supplier to buffer China's economy and needs market, particularly in Middle East. From demographic aspect, Iran is the second largest population and it has young population to be an interesting market.

Before Iran and P5+1 dealt, many scholars supposed that the deal would not difficult to get deal. An Iran-US relation was complicated. The big challenges were mistrust and deep ideological antipathy (Eranmayeh, 2015: 8). This mistrust was because of Iran Revolution and the leader after it, it was quite difficult to compromise. Especially after Ahmadinejad showed that Iran always found U.S alliances which impeded Iran. Then, Iran has a different perspective with other countries related to Iran ambition in the Middle East. These are two big challanges for the negotiation.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RESPOND

The announcement of Iran deal with P5+1 was one of the greatest history in Middle East. JCPoA was like unpredictable, because more than ten years Iran defended to keep their nuclear program under their regulation. Under SC sanction, Iran still developed nuclear program and did not care about embargo. Hence, this agreement was like new wave of Iran foreign policy.

This agreement has some implications for domestic and international relations. For Iran, this is a good time to develop their economics. Since 2006, after first sanction from UN and UE, Iran had problems to sale it product and to promote it harvest. Based on economy data Unemployment people in Iran had been steady in 2013, it was only 10.4%, but in 2014 reached up to 11.4%. Jobless was still big problem in Iran. Moreover, World Bank projections estimate that only 0.7% people in Iran lived under poverty in 2010. This population reached half a million people. It means poverty became problem for Iran's goverment.

Jahangir Abuzegar as an economic analyst saw that Iran had unemployment crisis (Abuzegar, 2014: 56). He found Iran economics cannot be as buffer for Iran

people, their economic depended on natural resources and the fact is that this only absorb few workers. Providing gainful for young generation is still constant and quiet difficult to make it. Trading with non natural resources is a big problem, because Iran has impact from their politic goal about nuclear. In this step, Iran should remember that this is a great challange for Iran to change their perspective on their economics goal. It must make big project to build economic system, which influence Iran people. It actually have potential to be key player in Middle East. Iran is the second largest economy in Middle East and south of Africa and the second largest population after Egypt.

After Iran deal, Iran's foreign minister, Javad Zarif has indicated that nuclear deal will create the room for cooperation with Iran's neighbours, regional and international community (Alcaro, 2015: 3-4). For neighbours, Iran would take new method for the Gulf. Admittedly, Iran and Saudi are two players, which want to give their influences in this region. In regional, especially in Middle East, Iran believes that they can be a balance of power of the Israel power. Then, Iran wants to open their market for international community. Because Iran is one of the biggest gas and oil supplier, they can sell their gas to Asia as a big market.

Michael Tockuss from head of the German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce argues that a lot of company will join on Iran business (Birnbaum & Morello, 2015). Iran as a new market for multinational company product that many people want. Germany has big trading with Iran before UE sanction and after this deal; they desire to develop Germany-Iran relation.

For Iran regional, they are divided into three groups. The first group is sceptics, these are Saudi Arabia and their Arab Monarchical partners, including Gulf States and Jordan Morocco. They device that the deal does not have any big positive impact for Iran's relation with this group. The most resistance for this deal come from Saudi Arabia which said this nothing for Middle East. They believe the way to solve Iran nuclear problem is by stopping

nuclear program and embargo Iranian's arm fully. This is Saudis' government thought (Kalout, 2015: 24).

The second"Pro Iran Block", composed Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.Because of interrelationships between them. They believe it can be a big motivation for Iran to improve their position in international forum. Automatically, this block has positive impact both economics and politics.

The final group is "third way", like North African states, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan (Kalout, 2015: 25). They are in the neutral position, this condition depends on their interest. In the fact, they do not have any direct relation, especially in politics and economic. Then, they still have big problem for their internal government.

This deal results some benefits for the international regime (Bunn, 2015: 2-4). Reducing Iran potential make a the bomb or covert site as Iran declared before. Many experts suggest that Iran will able to make bomb in 10-20 years, this agreement will guarantee that Iran does not make any bomb. It can make a new phase to Iran and U.S cooperation, although this is difficult to proof but it is possible. On other side, oil and gas supply for other countries can be sold and make oil price expensive.

THE CHALLENGES IN THE FUTURE

Agreement between P5+1 and Iran still face multiple challenges, including: (Davis, 2015: 2) first, ensuring that Iran will commit to JCPoA, this because Iran has essential problem with Western States, especially United States. For this part, the trust is not only about Iran commitment but also the other countries' support. It will be nothing, when some countries still support Iran to produce nuclear more than limit. For example, the sanction from SC, UE, and U.S did not effective because Russia, China and Turkey still have trade with Iran and they did not implement it.

Second, the consequences of this deal is not clear enough. This is because, the goal for this time only to prove that Iran compliances with statement. If P5+1 want to

stop Iran nuclear program fully,it is impossible. Hence, this agreement will be reviewed after 15 years later. It means, Iran has time to grow it economics and after it they can enrich more than limit. It should be remembered that Iran nuclear activity is under IAEA control.

Third, U.S partners in Middle East are in doubt what the meaning of this agreement for their politic interests. Their doubt is not only for this deal but also about Iran foreign policy since 1979. It is no meaning for Iran nuclear, but they still does not have good relation with Iran.

Fourth, Iran potentially has problem with the region behaviour. This actually depends on U.S position, when U.S can make Iran as partner to control Middle East conditions that have positive impact. Terrorism issue in this region can be reduced by Iran conduct.

Fifth, congress and American public are sceptical with this agreement. This sceptical does not come from this time; since Iran hostaged Americans in Iran. This is normal perception because mistrust is still big challenge for Iran-U.S relation.

The impact of a deal with Iran on the future is in doubt, especially for the people who wants to stop this deal. Survey found data; most of people in the world suggest that this deal can be as a camouflage for Iran to continue their nuclear program. In the United States, most of respondents ignore that Iran nuclear deal will make their condition better. Jews people in the United States vote Iran agreement will not make the condition better. However, in Iran many people suggest this is the best way to make Iran condition more peaceful. Iran's people, as many as 57% are supporting this agreement (Sargent, 2015). In Germany as a partner trade of Iran, people support this agreement reach by 63%, while only 18% oppose it and 20% do not know (William Jordan, 2015).

Testimony of Kenneth M. Polack, a senior fellow the Brookings Institution showed information that Israel would not take a war with Iran. Although this state is still in doubt about this deal, they always say less safe and awareness. Particularly, it is about Iran and Palestine relation, and Iran-Syria and Iran-Lebanon (Polack, 2009: 4-5).

This is supported by data from The State Department's latest terrorist which was reported in June that Iran continue to sponsor terrorism group around the world by pushing Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRFC-QF). Then, IRFC-QF support Lebanese Hizbullah, Shia Militant in Iraq, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Mattew Levitt (2015) believes that Iran will make IRGC as a bodyguard for all of Iran alliances, particularly for terrorism. This is supported by data that Iran still contact and transfer money for them, though Iran is under sanctions. Hence, this sanction will show that Iran and cronies will be threat for international community.

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee defined that Iran and P5+1 negotiation is a bad policy because of the doubtful Iran nuclear agreement (AIPAC, 2015: 4-10). First is about inspection and verification, in this agreement IAEA must permit unimpeded access to suspect sites. In this term, Iran can hide their nuclear. Second, possible military dimension, Iran must fully explain their prior weaponization effort. This deal is unclear, Iran in one side is possible to continue their nuclear weapon program, because it does not specify explicit consequences for Iran. Third, the deal will make Iran receiving $150 billion when IAEA has verified Iran reactor. Fourth, Duration for this agreement should be revisited, because Iran get legitimation to develop nuclear program in limit time. Fifth, dismantled, their nuclear installation should be dismantled. However, Arak heavy water reactor can be altering for Iran plan in the future.

Even before P5+1 and Iran nuclear deal, Israel has shown that they unintended to this talks. Israel believe this meeting only to spend time, because Israel keeps strike for Iran nuclear agenda. In addition, Prime Minster Netanyahu has called this a "wolf in sheep's clothing" (Kaye & Martini, 2015: 3). Rouhani is like Ahmadinejad, this deal is rhetoric and has hidden agendas. The same comment from not only the government but also the public in Israel. 77% people believed

that the Geneva agreement will not end Iran's Nuclear weapon program.

U.S believe Iran is one of important player to fight ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham). After Taliban fall, Iran has good relation with Afghan government, thus this is an opportunity to kick out ISIS in Middle East region. IRGC with Shia militias will have U.S to war with ISIS.

Furthermore, this deal can make U.S goal in Middle East can be achieved by Iran help. U.S wants to end Iran's support acts of international terrorism, particularly for groups such Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Jihad. All this time, it is quite difficult to stop Iran's influence because of sanction and embargo from SC. So, this problem can be solved by rebuilding Iran-U.S relation.

CONCLUSION

All in all, Iran nuclear deal depends on Iran itself and P5+1which must be complied by Iran. For Iran, it is like opportunities to show that nuclear program only to non-proliferation agenda. It commits with this agreement and will not compliance. Then, it can develop Iran economy, thus trade sanctions has lifted.

In the next agenda is facing challenges that come from U.S, Israel and Arab Saudi. Many people in the world are still in doubt; they believe Iran will not compliance. It has hidden agenda, especially when they want to join in this agreement. Israel as Iran enemy still shows this agenda only to make Iran bigger and bigger. Iran will add the capacity to influence Middle East and build nuclear as buffer for war agenda. This is because Iran has relation with terrorism groups and still has good relationship.

In addition, Iran must take these opportunities to develop nuclear agenda to non-proliferation. Then, because the sanction has lifted, it can be a good way to prove that Iran want to be a part of international community. The doubt from U.S, Israel and Saudi Arabia is challenge for Iran who still commits with this agreement.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES' PERSPECTIVE ON DISASTER DIPLOMACY AS A MODE OF COOPERATION AMONG STATES: CASE STUDY YOGYAKARTA SPECIAL REGION INDONESIA

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Abstract

This paper aims at examining how the issue of disasters in Indonesia can be modified into a positive social capital to solve social, economic, political and social cultural problems in disaster prone areas. The natural geographic and physical setting of Indonesia located between the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and Pacific Ocean places the country at the center of typhoon, tectonic and volcanic belts. It has significant levels of exposure to earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, droughts, floods, and cyclones. Some of the latest and most destructive natural disasters were that the earthquake followed by tsunami hit Aceh in 2004, earthquake hit Yogyakarta and Central Java in 2006, and volcanic eruption of Mount Merapi Yogyakarta and Central Java 2011. Data and analysis of this paper were conducted by distributing questionnaires, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussion with the local government bureaucracy and practitioners in Yogyakarta. This paper found that local government bureaucracy believed that disaster diplomacy can be utilized as a strategic means to increase cooperation between state, as well as social capital to solve certain problems in disaster-prone areas. Using Para diplomacy practices in term of disaster issues, local government bureaucracy and Indonesian government in general have abundance of possibility to improve cooperation and collaboration among states that can reduce the disasters' material and immaterial losses, as well as intensify development of other potential cooperation in the wider issues.

Keywords: disaster, diplomacy, international cooperation, para diplomacy

BACKGROUND

Indonesia is one of the most disaster-prone nations in the world. According to United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), Indonesia is prone to disasters like earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, floods, landslides, dryness, and forest fires. In fact, Indonesia has the greatest number of people passing away due to natural disasters. In 2008, WALHI counted that a number of areas in Indonesia were hit by 359 natural disasters like floods, landslides, and earthquakes. National Disaster Management Agency (BNBP) also noted that the number of the disaster escalated year by year. In 2008, it increased 46.66% of the previous year that there occurred 888 disasters in 2007 and 1,306 in 2008.

In 2010, UNISDR mentioned that Indonesia possessed the second greatest number of dead because of disaster in Asia Pacific for the recent twenty years, counted 191.164 dead. The agency also reported that financial loss was predicted about US$ 22.5 billion. Besides, Bappenas mentioned that, in 2007, government spent US$ 12 trillion or 110 trillion rupiahs. These facts brought Indonesia into one of the most disaster-prone nations in the world.

Noticing the facts, it is normal that some people and government consider the disasters negative phenomena damaging and bringing traumatic stories affecting the future. Moreover, disaster management often showed that government was falter and reactionary whereas, when a disaster happens, it needs coordination, cooperation, and mobilization of human resources or finance occasionally involving not only internal parties but also external parties such as foreign donor

agencies or states. The circumstance must entail comprehensive disaster management regarding mitigation, contingency, plans and the implementation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

Disaster management in Indonesia generally engage several parties that most of them are government bureaucracies like central government represented by President of Republic of Indonesia, local government represented by a governor, a regent/ mayor or local government board, National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) as a non-department government on equal to minister established by government as an agency to manage national disasters, and Local Management Disaster Agency (BDPD) established by a governor for the province and a regent/mayor for regency/city to manage disasters in local regions after coordinating and consulting with head of the BNPB. From the disaster management agencies, local government bureaucracies can take a strategic position by engaging the parties in managing and anticipating natural disasters in their area since they geographically recognize information and condition of their local disasters. However, in several cases, the local government is not ready and they seem like an operator instead of having strategic initiations.

Government of Indonesia, indeed, has constructed several laws of disaster management, namely Law No. 24/997 on Disaster Management, Government Regulation No. 22/2008 on Funding and Management of Disaster, Government Regulation No. 23/2008 on Roles of International Agencies and Non-Government Foreign Agencies, Presidential Regulation No. 8/2008 on Disaster Management National Agency. All law agencies are expected to ease disaster management performance although operational efforts of good, appropriate, and coordinated disaster management are still necessary in pre-disaster, during emergency response, post-disaster.

Nevertheless, legislation of natural disasters has not included disaster diplomacy yet as an essential instrument in the process

of disaster management. The circumstance leads to the reactionary disaster management or so-called 'natural disaster begins from 0' by Jusuf Kalla. In diplomatic studies, natural disasters can be capitalized as a strategic instrument to create regional and international cooperation to foster infrastructures which can alleviate material and immaterial loss because of unexpected disasters. Pro-active disaster management through disaster diplomacy may provide huge contribution to central and local government to modify the disaster issues into a social way to coin productive international cooperation to reduce the impacts of the disasters.

One of the nations implemented the disaster diplomacy is China. According to Weizhun, the progressive economic growth of China in these recent ten years cannot be separated from capitalization efforts of government of China to manage disasters as a mode to intertwine international cooperation with states which have been suspecting interventionist policy of China. China is no longer considered as an enemy since the state displays emphatic politics to involve in cooperation among disaster prone-states. It brings a good impact that investment of China can be put in states refusing capital investment of China, as Weizhun conveyed:

> The practice of Disaster Diplomacy has a great influence and actual values on improving national and international interests. Disaster Diplomacy is flexible and multiform yet uncertain and there are some restrictions in the process of diplomatic practice. Disaster Diplomacy can also promote the Chinese role "as a responsible and powerful country".

The experience of China illustrates that Indonesia as a disaster-prone state can modify the disaster into a positive energy to broaden cooperation. It can be achieved if central and local government has social awareness of disaster diplomacy issues. Therefore, the increasing of capability of local government as the spearhead of disaster management will become a significant instrument for regions to enhance international cooperation with various parties to prepare infrastructure

and superstructure for decreasing disaster impacts. To improve the government bureaucracies, it is formerly necessary to explore how government bureaucracies' perspective on disaster diplomacy.

RESEARCH QUESTION

How government bureaucracies' perspective on disaster diplomacy as a mode of international cooperation in Yogyakarta Special Region (DIY)?

METHODOLOGY

This study was a qualitative research aiming at finding our definition and relevance of disaster diplomacy as an international cooperation instrument to diminish impacts of disasters. To gather valid information, the research was conducted by distributing questionnaires and focus group discussion to bureaucrats of local government of the DIY Province; those are executives, legislatives, BNPB, Satkorlak, PMI, and stakeholders of other natural disasters. It points at exploring the bureaucrats' experiences of managing disaster issues.

The data of the research were analyzed by discourse analysis and content analysis on law documents of disasters and practices of disaster diplomacy of several countries to understand the significance of disaster diplomacy agency in deconstructing the relevance of disaster diplomacy to decrease disaster impacts.

The research population is bureaucracies in the executive and the legislative of the DIY Province that the research sample was selected employing stratified random sampling. The DIY Province was chosen as the research setting since the geography of the province is prone to earthquakes and Merapi volcanic eruption. The earthquakes caused that 700 thousand people dead, 15.000 people got injured, 200 thousand houses were destroyed, while the Merapi volcanic eruption affected that 1000 people dead, 5000 got injured, and 55 thousand houses were damaged.

DISASTER DIPLOMACY: ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

Ilan Kelman is an academician advocating the implementation of disaster diplomacy. He categorized disaster diplomacy into natural hazard and natural disaster. The natural hazard will not turn into natural hazard. It will not bring destructive impacts if the prevention and technical as well as political preparation are carried out well. If the disaster can be avoided, it can be modified into capital which benefits regions or states where the disaster occurs. Disaster diplomacy may work based on the perspective. Occasions can emerge from crisis impacts, and the crisis itself can become a profound opportunity.

Disaster diplomacy literally refers to a study of how and why disasters can contribute to and cannot contribute to peace or conflicts examined in pre-disaster and post-disaster. In pre-disaster, the diplomacy discusses prevention, mitigation, and efforts to diminish the victims, while in post-disaster the diplomacy talks about how conflicts and peace are influenced by the disaster. The definition of the post-disaster diplomacy is in line with a proverb that "if we do not wish the condition to ensue, we have to look for occasions to change the condition." UNISDR maintained that disaster diplomacy, either pre-disaster including prevention and mitigation or post-disaster including response and restoration, contributes and do not contribute to cooperation and peace. Furthermore, Kelman explained that the disaster diplomacy discusses that the roles and activities of the disaster are in not only international relations but also political conflicts in an independent country. Disaster diplomacy can be carried out for all disasters, for not only destructive disasters such as earthquakes and industry explosion but also other disasters like dryness, epidemics, and climate change.

The concept of disasters which can be used as a framework will be adjusted with local and national issues as a part of soft diplomacy supporting cooperation that benefits all parties. The disaster diplomacy can be applied in inter-country and among countries. Research and history showed

that activities regarding disasters have not appeared yet new diplomacy, but it can become a catalyst and support for prior diplomacy like culture, economy, or secret negotiation among constituents. The disaster impacts on endlessly cooperation so that the disaster diplomacy needs support of the other diplomacy to create subsistence capitalization.

Andrew J. Snyder mentioned that disaster diplomacy indisputably is very beneficial in international interaction. Due to the disaster, a state can notice how policy of other countries gives responses. International relations also often stagnate in a policy response cycle so that a disaster hitting a state will be assumed as a chance to start a new cycle based on cooperation. If a disaster occurs in A state, B state having less closed relation with B state can utilize the condition as B state provides aids for disaster management. According to Snyder, this normative framework is in line with TIT-FOR-TAT strategy by Robert Axelrod. The strategy is one of the most effective interaction strategies in international cooperation. In the TIT-FOR-TAT strategy, the cooperation among parties can be noticed that 'the agent using this strategy invites to cooperate firstly, but, if the agent does not, the cooperation stops.' The strategy will benefit both parties in international interaction because policy response cycle rarely stops. If it stops, the party having responsibility will be punished so that it can be said that the cycle remain continuing. Nevertheless, the problem is whether or not the cycle is considered as cooperation. Indeed, disaster diplomacy can renew the cycle significantly to become cooperation.

One of the cooperation opportunities in disaster issues is para diplomacy. Para diplomacy is a relatively new phenomenon and subject in the study of international relations. It refers to what on could describe as a "foreign policy capacity" of sub-state entities, their participation, independent of their metropolitan state, in the international arena in pursuit of their own specific international interests. In this concept, local government possesses an occasion to cooperate with foreign entities like central or local government, actors of other countries including cooperation dealing with disasters.

Employing this framework, the urgency of disaster diplomacy is established by utilizing disaster diplomacy issues as a mode of international cooperation. In this research, local government bureaucracies have essential roles to implement it.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Government bureaucracies as the vanguard of public services are demanded to prioritize aspects of responsivity, accountability, and efficiency. First, the responsivity requires that public services can fulfil public interest including in emergency situation like disaster management. Second, the accountability indicated that public services focus on transparency and access equality for each citizen to receive public services that they need. The process and price of the public services have to be transparent, and be supported by certain procedures as well as service time. Third, the efficiency comprises rapid and efficient public service fulfilment.

Bureaucracy, based on Max Weber, refers to an organization that the characteristics are following procedures of share of duties, having hierarchies, and having impersonal relations. The bureaucracy can be defined as a governmental organization that the government system can run through the established offices. The bureaucracy becomes the spearhead of public services including in disasters.

Government bureaucracies becoming this research object were bureaucracies related to disaster management in Yogyakarta Special Region Province; those are representative of BPBD, PMI, Bapedda, DPRD, and Sekda of Sleman Regency, Bantul, and local government of Yogyakarta Special Region. The research respondents were required to fill a questionnaire and to engage in forum group discussion (FGD). Each respondent got the questionnaire comprising 20 questions, and the results were

discussed in the forum group discussion to explore further their perspective on disaster diplomacy.

The questions were dealing with six topics, namely respondents' understanding of disaster issues and the impacts, understanding of Law on Disasters, cooperation experience and initiation of disaster issues, understanding of disaster diplomacy including the actors involving in diplomacy and the roles, understanding of paradiplomacy and the implementation, and techniques of international cooperation of disaster issues.

First, the respondents were given three questions of their understanding of disaster issues. Most of them comprehended well the issues of natural geography of Indonesia which is prone to disasters. In fact, Indonesia is in the top four of disaster hazards in Asia Pacific. Two enormous disasters in Yogyakarta, namely Bantul earthquake and Merapi volcanic eruption, not only killed and injured people but also damaged infrastructures like houses and schools, as well as impacted trauma of post-disaster becoming a complicated issue to overcome. The research respondents also understood the history of disasters in Indonesia stating that DIY had high disaster history, particularly earthquakes and volcanic eruption. Their understanding and awareness of living in a disaster-prone area were obtained from their experiences of perceiving and involving in disaster management in short time like Bantul Earthquake in 2006 and Merapi Eruption in 2011. The respondent also acknowledged Law No. 2/2007 on Disaster Management. The law becomes the basis of stakeholders to take actions regarding disasters including local government bureaucracies having huge roles to perform the actions like anticipation, mitigation, emergency response, rehabilitation, and disaster reconstruction.

Dealing with the third question, most of the respondents stated that they had international cooperation regarding disaster mitigation in their own organization. They also told that they initiated to conduct international cooperation with foreign parties in disaster

management. For instance, the respondent of Sekda of Sleman undertook cooperation with several European countries of dam and mountainside construction to restrain lava. The respondent of PMI also cooperated with International Red Cross to conduct training of emergency response to disasters. It showed that local government bureaucracies of Yogyakarta have had experiences of international cooperation and noticed the significance of the cooperation.

Nevertheless, most of the respondents were less understanding of the disaster diplomacy practice. Indeed, several respondents argued that disaster diplomacy was an activity utilizing disaster issues consisting of suffering, sadness, and losing family as well as wealth as a strategy of crying diplomacy exploiting disasters as a medium to gain mercy and aids of other countries. In the FGD, the understanding shifted when they recognized that disaster diplomacy is an activity employing disaster issues to provide occasions of cooperation or conflict resolution happening to a state or among states. The disaster diplomacy can become a positive opportunity to foster cooperation of disaster management like mitigation, reconstruction, and disaster rehabilitation. The respondents recognized parties engaging in the disaster diplomacy even though they did not understand that what they did was disaster diplomacy operationalization. It was supported by their statement that they comprehended strategic roles of the disaster diplomacy.

Although the respondents stated that they involved in international cooperation of disaster management issues, most of them were lack of understanding of paradiplomacy concept. Paradiplomacy defined as a diplomatic activitiy undertaken by sub-government or local government was considered as a new diplomacy by the respondents. However, most of the respondents noticed cooperation of sister city of sister province as a part of paradiplomacy practice. They told that several local governments of DIY conducted sister city or sister province with a number of overseas local governments. Most of the cooperation

was carried out in social and cultural aspects. The development of sister city and sister province of disaster management issues was novel for the respondents, and they said that the diplomacy can be fostered in disaster management issues.

Then, the respondents were given questions of steps to do to coin international cooperation of disaster issues, cooperation development administration, and stages as well as parties assisting the international cooperation. Most of the respondents answered that they were less understanding and did not know. The respondents were less understanding of inventing disaster issues to be capitalized to international cooperation, significant roles of KJRI (Indonesian Consulate General) in facilitating international cooperation by local government, how to write letter of intern in creating international cooperation of disaster management, writing MOU to have international cooperation of disaster issues, requirements of partners of international cooperation based on Parmenlu No. 9/A/KP/XII/2006/01, and how to write an international cooperation proposal based on Article 11 Paragraph 2 of Permendagi 2008. Hence, it was necessary to conduct FGD to explore their understanding of the issues. In the end of the discussion, the respondents admitted that their understanding of how to prepare and create international cooperation of disaster issues improved.

The results of the questionnaires and FGD can be concluded that local government bureaucracies of DIY had positive perspective on disaster management issues as a mode of international cooperation. They were aware that DIY as a disaster-prone area in Indonesia ought to be prepared for mitigation, responses, and systematic disaster reconstruction, and the bureaucracies have essential roles to perform the preparation. Merapi volcanic eruption and earthquake in 2006 can be fascinating examples as the success of 'cooperation of disasters' with many parties. It could be more successful if DIY could have capitalized the disasters and intertwined national and international networks in municipalities and regents for research and

disaster management. Cooperation of sister provinces, twin provinces, sister cities, and twin cities managed well in DIY can become a way of disaster diplomacy based Province Government, City Government, and Regency Government. The activities of para-diplomacy based NGO and academicians are supposed to be facilitated more to support the disaster diplomacy in government.

Moreover, the essential aspect is strategic partners that are symmetrical and active to look for various parties in DIY regarding disaster diplomacy. Sister province of DIY like California, Perfektur Kyoto, and Chian Mai Province became the good instance as strategic partners of DIY in disaster diplomacy since those three sister provinces have similar disaster hazards to DIY, namely earthquakes and tsunamis. Research cooperation and sharing data of disaster management are important and valuable. Feeling togetherness can also become intensive cooperation catalyst in other fields. Activities of Para diplomacy supporting the disaster diplomacy are necessary to be the concern as well. The good cooperation between UGM and Kyoto University as well as Chiang Mai University as universities in sister province of DIY will take a lot of roles on the disaster diplomacy initiated by DIY. Universities can become media to conduct joint research including sharing data which will have vital roles. The activities of paradiplomacy are supposed to be encouraged since they were effective, inexpensive, and little political expenses.

CONCLUSION

Disasters which are prone to occur more often and to escalate the amount of loss in Indonesia can raise awareness of how to view the disaster positively and to be utilized as a mode to foster international cooperation. Central government no longer takes central roles in disaster issues due to the limitation. Thus, local government through the bureaucracies is expected to take strategic roles in the disaster managements.

The research revealed that local government bureaucracies of DIY have

positive perspective on the disaster issues. Their experiences of having cooperation of sister city and sister province with several overseas sub-governments, particularly on social and cultural fields, became their basic understanding of paradiplomacy. They were aware that local government bureaucracies have central roles to encourage the development of international cooperation of disaster management in their area through paradiplomacy mechanism by enhancing cooperation among foreign local governments.

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CHAPTER 4

UN ROLE IN THE FIGHT VIOLATION
HUMAN RIGHTS: CASE STUDY REGARDING THE ROHINGNYA IN MYANMAR

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Abstract

This paper discusses about a human rights violence case that happened to the Muslim Rohingya ethnic minorities that contained in Myanmar, attacked by ethnic majorities inhumanity Buddha and Injustice government of Myanmar. The method used is that literature with descriptive presentation and analyst qualitatively from books, magazines, international agreement, papers, journals, Articles, news, and the Internet and media that Involved. Based on the result of discussions that we've done and tested we can conclude that any violence happen and directed to Rohingya by the Government of Myanmar can not be justified. Moreover, the violence still within of the United Nations that controlling a whole human rights in Southeast Asia, as a part of the United Nations it is time for Myanmar submit to the rules and laws that agreed together and used for guidance to minimize violations of human rights that happen in United Nations especially in Muslim Rohingya.

Keywords: Human Rights, Rohingya, Untied Nations.

INTRODUCTION

Over time human rights more widely discussed. This is because human rights are basic rights of human beings are derived from birth until death. *According to the 1945* Human Rights is a fundamental right or fundamental rights of human beings from birth as a gift of God Almighty. Human rights are a gift of Almighty God from birth, then no one can take it or break it. Meanwhile, according *According to Franz (1997)* Human Rights are the rights possessed by humans, not because it was given by the community. Not because of positive law, but based on dignity as human beings. Humans have human rights because he is a human being. Therefore, we should appreciate this gift with no background distinguishes humans based on race, ethnicity, religion, color, gender, occupation, culture, and others. And keep in mind it does not mean a person can act arbitrarily, because humans also have to respect other human rights.

But in fact, often times the person or group to do as they wish in order to realize personal desires and his group and they forget that they also have to respect other human rights, Therefore, humans must work together, side by side, and live in peace. However, sometimes there is a conflict of interest in achieving its objectives. Similarly, people who want to work together with other groups, at times, conflict of interest was inevitable. As a result of a conflict of interest, sometimes, can lead to conflict. Lots going actions outside of the essence of human rights itself, crimes against humanity (crime against humanity) experienced by ethnic Rohingya among other mass killings and arbitrary executions, rape, torture, confiscation of land and buildings, Labor and Slavery, forced relocation, extortion certain minorities for the sake of upholding the faction *(Heru Susetyo & Nurul Islam,*2015).Actions carried out either by individuals or specific groups and even countries, which have their own interests be it for reasons of national security or national interest. Surely such a thing cannot be justified given the human rights is not just the usual rules, but the grace of God. Moreover, to achieve their targets is often used military force. Obviously this will impact on the human rights violations of every civilians affected by the action on behalf of the national interest.

The tragic story Rohingya Muslims seize our attention, how this violation does not add a dark record of human rights violations that exist in the world. The fate of these minorities do not always get treated well in the occupied territory, violations of human rights are often experienced by ethnic minorities. This violates *the UN Law Article*7: *All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.* With the development of events that happened, one of them in the country of Myanmar. Rohingya ethnic conflict is a conflict that is based on discrimination because of ethnic and religious differences. *According Susanti (2014)* conflict is allowed by the Myanmar government to legalize government action expel Myanmar Rohingya of Myanmar country. Issue severe human rights violations that occurred in Myanmar is one very serious problem in this world, because not only have a negative impact for people who are in the region of Myanmar alone but the impact on other countries. Therefore, it should be treated seriously in addressing this issue.

From the conceptual background, the writer interested to do the writing with the title:

THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM

Based on the description above, it can be formulated several problems as follows What is the role of legal protection of the UN against the Rohingya?

FRAMEWORK THEORETICAL

United Nations is an international organization which is the biggest so far in the history of the growth of the cooperation of all nations in the world in various sectors of international life (Suryokusumo, 1987 : 1). Therefore, as one of the functions of the United Nations is to resolve international cases that occurred and has the main purpose of the establishment of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security that covers all countries in the world, both members of the United Nations or not part of the United Nations.

1. Role of the United Nations Theory (UN):

International organizations like the United Nations categorized as an organization that has a very complex role because it has the following functions (Mandalangi, 1986: 56).

1. Serves as Judge, meaning that the United Nations carry out judicial function through the agency principals are well known, namely *the International Court of Justice* (ICJ), as well as through *the Administrative Tribunal of the* ILO established under article 37 of the Constitution as well as by a body of quasi-judicial such as *the Committee on Freedom of Association,* which acts at times on behalf of the *governing body* of the ILO.

2. Functioning as a legislative or administrative, is said to be so because the United Nations legislative or administrative function through resolutions and decisions taken in the General Assembly session; as well as through the decisions and regulations made by the Economic and Social Council, through a wide range of conventions, *regulations* and *procedures* that resulted in *the International Labor Organization* (ILO) and others.

3. Functioning as an executive or politics, said that because through bodies principals*(principalorgans)*such as the General Assemblyand the Security Councilin the sense of maintaining international peace and security, through the*"relatedagency"*that is not specialized agencies such as *the international atomic energy agency* (IAEA), even so through *UnitedNations Emergency*Force who had served for example in Korea, Congo, Cyprus, the Middle East and so on.

The functions described above show how extensive and complicated the problems addressed the United Nations

as an international organization. Given the functions and authority of diverse it is, the United Nations can not view merely as a "subject of international law" or "jurisdictions" (legal institution) alone, but should be seen as a "political institution" (political institution) that very dynamic and influential in the governance of international relations of life.

2. Violations of Human Rights Theory:

Human Rights Violations weight of the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Court only covers two types of crimes as follows (Halili, 2010: 3).

First, crime, genocide. Genocide means any act committed with intent to destroy or annihilate whole or in part the group of nations, races, ethnic groups, religious groups, by the way:

a. Killing members of the group
b. Resulted in serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
c. Created the group conditions of life will result in the physical obliteration whole or in part,
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and
e. Forcibly Moving children of the group to another group.

Secondly, crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity is one of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack with knowledge of the attack directed against any civilian population, such as:

a. Murder
b. Destruction of
c. Slavery
d. Expulsion or forcible transfer of population
e. Deprivation of liberty or other deprivation of physical liberty arbitrarily treatment in violation (principles) basic provisions of international law,
f. Torture,
g. Rape, sexual slavery, prostitution by force, forced pregnancy, scouting or sterilization by force or other forms of sexual violence other equivalent
h. Persecution of a particular group or association that is based equation political opinion, race, nationality, ethnicity, culture, religion, gender or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law,
i. Enforced disappearance, and the
j. The crime of apartheid as "a crime against humanity and that the act inhuman resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid, regarding segregation and racial discrimination which violate the principles of international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and constituting a serious threat to peace and international security, such as the events in South Africa. (Nasutiondan M. Zen, 2006: 368).

In general terms and explanation of the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity referred to in Law no. 26 of 2000 with the notion of 1998. According to the Rome Statute (Fileindi, 2012: 51) "The Rome Statute is an International agreement, Roma statute applies only to countries that have ratified it. This is natural because as an international treaty, the countries that ratified the Rome Statute will be subject to the rules in the Statute of Rome, also called jurisdiction automatically ".

METHOD OF WRITING

In this study, the authors use the description method of analysis that is the way to describe and illustrate the phenomenon is based on the observation data obtained. In this study, the authors attempted to describe any acts of human rights violations carried out by the Government of Myanmar against ethnic Rohingya minority.

The authors in this study using the technique of secondary data collection or via Studies Library by collecting theories and concepts related to the issues discussed in the study This, like books, literature, both newspaper and internet articles and other sources that are considered relevant.

DISCUSSION

Human rights are universal, but its implementation in a particular place or country to experience adjustments. This is where the problem arises, namely the discrepancy between the will of the universal-paced normative ideal and empirical implementation at a certain time and space are very varied. Conceptually, human rights have a very broad sense, both are relevant to the region and concerns the entry into force of connotations. Rights of human rights refer to the rights that gained

International recognition or rights are defended and maintained internationally.

HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MUSLIMS MYANMAR'S ROHINGYA

Rohingya is the name of an ethnic inhabit the Arakan region, west Myanmar and directly adjacent to Bangladesh. Rohingya is one of 135 ethnic groups in Myanmar. The ethnic Rohingya Muslims are people who actually grow and live since the 7th century AD. The ethnic Rohingya decades of experience discrimination until the cause of their status now do not have a country. Rohingya hasn't recognized by the Government of Myanmar and did not get citizenship. This is evidenced by the issuance of a Regulation MyanmarCitizenship *BurmaSusanti in the 1982 Citizenship Law*(2014), Myanmar Rohingya removes from the list of eight main ethnic Burmans, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Chin, Mon, Arakan, Shan and from 135 other smaller ethnic groups. They've considered not citizens, now the document is not there, when no documents and no place for them, moving was not allowed to go from one place to another should not be, there are laws that insulate the association, even insulate love, then finally they find a way. *(Source: Tan Sri Syed Hamid Albar, Special Envoy of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to Myanmar).*

At the peak of the problems began in 2012 occurred as a result of racial riots broke out between ethnic Rakhine and the Rohingya were triggered by the rape and murder of a Rakhine girl by the Rohingya youths who followed the murder of ten Muslim youth in a bus by the Rakhine. According to the government of Myanmar, as a result of the violence, 78 people were killed, 87 people were injured, and more than 140,000 people were displaced on both sides both ethnic Rakhine and Rohingya. The government imposed a curfew and a state of emergency that allows the military to act in Rakhine. Although the activist NGO Rohingya alleged that the police and military forces have participated in the violence and arrest the Rohingya people, but an investigation by the organization International Crisis Group reported that both sides get the protection and security of the military. *(Kompasianan Rohingya: An Overview Over the history of conflict Prolonged, June 17, 2015).* Another cause of conflict is the envy of the Rohingya. The ethnic Rohingya population in decades continues to rise. Of course, this causes suspicion and jealousy on the majority ethnic Rakhine. For them, the existence of the ethnic Rohingya were highly likely to be considered "a pebble in the shoe", IE, something that kept bothering. The existence of ethnic Rohingya considered to reduce the rights to the land and the economy, particularly in the region of Arakan, Rakhine which is central to the ethnic Muslim.

ACTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION THE GOVERNMENT OF MYANMAR

Discrimination received by the ethnic Rohingya in Arakan region has caused the prolonged conflict and result in security conditions in the region unstable. Embassy of The Republic of Indonesia, in Yangon *(Nurdiana. M, 2015)*Human Rights Watch based in New York pointed out that the government, including Buddhist monks, local politicians, government officials and state security forces have mobilized a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Muslims.

The Myanmar government has several times issued a policy that contains discrimination against ethnic Rohingya that the policy in the form of prohibition to conduct worship, prohibition had two children and they also issued a policy in Article 144 containing

Rohingya ban gatherings of more than five people. When in fact the 144 emergency regulations issued Myanmar is in response to a conflict situation. Supposedly this rule also applies to all ethnic-related. But that looks precisely because ethnic Buddhist religious discrimination can still celebrate their religion in the temple, while the Rohingya Muslims are not permitted. *(Nurdiana, M.* 2015): Violence and discrimination against ethnic Rohigya in Arakan initially unknown to the world, only local media that anti-Muslim can operate and spreading false information. Too many humanitarian staff were prevented from Arakan to even arrest. The Myanmar government also gave a warning to the United Nations and its organs, UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and other humanitarian agencies to carry out humanitarian activities in Arakan. And more alarming, Myanmar President Thein Sein has aggravated the Arakan Rohingya crisis by saying that: "The Rohingya are not our people and we have no duty to protect them. ' He wants that the Rohingya are managed by UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) whose job it is is to protect and provide assistance to reugee by request of government or the United Nations and then to assist the refugees in the process of relocation of settling them to the place that is new or accommodated in a third country that is willing to hold them. He called the Rohingya in Arakan as: a 'threat to national security. (Heru Susetyo & Nurul Islam, 2015).

Date	Location	Event / Action Government
May 28, 2012	Yanbye	The rape and murder of a seamstress Buddha named Ma Thida Htwe allegedly committed by three young Muslim Rohingya.
3, 2012 June	Taunggup	Buddhists who hear the murder case was immediately retaliated by blocking a passenger bus and killed ten Muslims.
08Juni 2012	Maungdaw	Rohingya Muslims reportedly retaliated by killing and burning houses Buddhist people after Friday prayers.

Mid June to the end of June	Sittwe, Pauktaw, Maungdaw and Buthidaung	Some riot action of revenge is still emerging.
July 2012	Myanmar's	Interior minister told parliament that the authorities will tighten regulations to regulate births, deaths, traveling, wedding and forth for Rohingya people.
October 21	Minbya,	Massive riots second phase back

Chronological and Measures Government ofMyanmar:

In 2012	Kyaukpyu, Myebon, and 7 other cities	Broke out in the region of Rakhine. Riots spread to several cities that are not affected by the unrest in June 2012. The first phase of
Maret2013	Minbya	Three Rohingya Muslims found dead in the water. Murder allegedly committed by extremist Rakhine.
Maret2013	Meikhtila	Unrest reached Meikhtila. Although not involving Rohingya Muslims by Buddhist Rakhine, but managed to make ten people were killed and 42 buildings burned.
March 2013	Rakhine	Recording killing of Rohingya Muslims conducted by the Nasaka uploaded kesebuah website.
April 2013	Myanmar	Unrest began to subside.
April 2013 30	Oakkan	Occurred assault Muslim mosques and shops.
May 6, 2013	Yangon	President Thein Sein promised to do everything possible to resolve the conflict.
May 2013	Rakhine	Government policy to implement the program 'Family Planning' maximum of two children only to Rohingyas. This discriminatory policy making Rohingya women were forced to have abortions.
June 2013	Rakhine	Several mosques and schools Rohingya
		Many are locked and destroyed. As well as the prohibition to conduct worship Ramadan month.
August 2013	Maungdaw	Rohingya can not perform Eid prayer Eid since last year. Including Eid prayers which falls on Thursday, 08 August 2013. This is the impact of the emergency regulations 144.
3, 2013 October	Thandwe	Mass BuddhistThandwe invaded the city with swords. The riots killed five people and 100 houses burned.
2013 December	Maungda, Buthidaung	Held a secret meeting between the army officers with extremist Buddhist indicate subsequent attacks in Rakhine.

Source: Nurdiana May. 2015. The role of Indonesia in Conflict Resolution Rohingya. Malang: UMM

LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST ROHINGYA

Sectarian unrest between Buddhists and Muslim Rohingya occurred provoked by leaflets circulating news of the rape and murder of a Buddhist woman, allegedly carried out by three Muslim men. It was sparked revenge by Buddhists to cause more than

500 houses were burned, and 60,000 people displaced. By because it as the International Organization of the United Nations take a firm stand with the UNHCR delegate sent, to come to Myanmar in addressing the Rohingya are still in the area of Myanmar as a form of international attention on the case of the Rohingyas. The UN and its agencies are also an important body in upholding and implementing the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. With regard to the concern and the role of the UN and the world international for the rights of human rights worldwide, then it is appropriate that in the life of society and the state must respect and treat every human being in accordance with the dignity of their human rights.

Myanmar is one of the countries in Southeast Asia and is also a member of the United Nations since the 4th of April 1948. However, as part of a member of the United Nations, Myanmar is obliged to respect the provisions contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter. However, the role of UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) here merely as an auxiliary only and are temporary, they cannot penetrate the policy taken by the government of Myanmar. So that effort of the United Nations is not able to prevent discrimination by the government of Myanmar. This is evidenced by the problems of Rohingya to date remain in line with the still exist assistance from UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in Myanmar.

Many of the provisions of the UDHR have been violated by the government of Myanmar, among others, the Right to Life (Article 3) to not tortured (Article 5), on every person to a nationality (Article 15) and hasquotes everyone to have the something (Article 17). In addition to violations of the provisions of the UDHR, Myanmar bya member of the United Nations have an obligation to maintain world peace and security as defined in the United Nations Charter. Based on the description above, it is clear that human rights violations

in Myanmar have been very frightening and can be categorized by type of serious human rights violations. The United Nations as a body that has a function to uphold human rights and peace in the world naturally play a role in restoring the situation in Myanmar. A United Nations Security Council, which is the main organ of the United Nations assigned to maintain peace and security between states should issue a decision for the creation of the back country of Myanmar democratic and safe.

SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AGAINST MEMBER STATES THAT DO NOT COMPLY CHARTER

Of the United Nations (UN) has 6 main bodies. One of them is the Security Council. The Security Council has the authority granted by members of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. For the sake of peace and international security, the UN Security Council takes two approaches, namely the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the settlement of disputes by force. According to (Starke, 1977: 690) Ways of peaceful resolution of disputes include: negotiation *(negotiation),* arbitration *(arbitration),* the completion of the judicial *(judicial settlement),* investigation *(inquiry)* and settlement under the auspices of the United Nations (Article 33 *Charter).* Meanwhile, the settlement of disputes by force includes: war, *rotation,* acts of retaliation *(reprisals),* blockade peacefully *(pacific blockade)* and intervention *(intervention).*

In addition to the sanctions provided in accordance with the above explanation, There are other sanctions provided by the security council. The sanctions that can be imposed on countries that do not abide by the UN Charter in the form of economic sanctions, termination of the economy, communication of air, sea, rail, radio and other communications, either partially or wholly, and broke off diplomatic relations (Suryokusumo, 1997: 21).

With economic sanctions are expected to state that aggression immediately stop its aggression. However, if economic sanctions

perceived to be inadequate, ineffective and still not adhered to, then, the Security Council can apply military sanctions. Such measures include demonstrations, blockade, and military operations by air, sea and land undertaken by member states in accordance with Article 42 of the UN Charter. Sanctions are never imposed on Libya, Iraq, and other countries. Thus, the economic sanctions imposed on a country, meant that the country no longer obtains strategic needs, so it is no longer no other choice but to obey the decision of UN Security Council (Suryokusumo, 1997: 22).

Each of these means of violence is as follows:

a. The war and non-war armed action. War and non-war actions aiming to conquer the opponent, state and to impose the terms of the settlement and the conquered countries have no alternative but to obey. Not every armed conflict known as war. A dispute is regarded as a war and can apply the law of war is determined by the following: 1. The amount of conflict, 2. The purpose of the parties to the dispute, 3. Attitude and reaction to third parties. Thus, war is a weapon continuation that meets certain requirements, namely the parties to the dispute is the state and is accompanied by a declaration of war. Being armed conflict is not a war is armed conflict that does not meet the requirements set for the war.

b. Retortion is the technical term for retaliation by a State against actions inappropriate or improper from other countries. Revenge is done in the form of acts of unlawful unfriendly at the conference honor state honor insulted, for example loose diplomatic relations, revocation privilege-privilege diplomatic,

c. Measures of retaliation is the method used by countries to pursue obtaining redress from other countries to take actions that are retaliatory. The difference between retaliation and retortion is retaliation include actions in general may be regarded as an illegal act was retortioninclude acts of revenge that are justified by the law.

d. The blockade peacefully is an action taken in time of peace. Sometimes classified as a retaliation, in general, the action was aimed at forcing countries that harbor blockaded to comply with a request for compensation losses suffered by countries that blockade.

e. The intervention is an interference dictator by a State against the domestic affairs of another with the intent either to maintain or change the state, situation or goods in the country.

The means of dispute resolution at the top, well done peacefully or by force is an attempt to avoid a wider conflict that allows the disruption of international peace and security. However, if the efforts of peaceful resolution of disputes, failed and the conflicting parties do not abide by the UN Charter, which is engaging in acts that threaten the peace, violate peace, and the country remains aggression against other countries, then, the Security Council could impose sanctions the country through a resolution.

CONCLUSION

From the discussion above violations of the Rohingya case is a case of human rights violations because it had captured most severe fundamental rights of life. Where the right to life is the most fundamental rights of every human being as a creation of God Almighty. Not only the right to life is being violated but property rights, the right to embrace a belief and the right to a safe life had been violated. With so many human rights violations that have been carried out appropriately if the case should be resolved quickly in order to avoid further violations of other human rights. The United Nations as one of the Organization upheld Internasianal that upholds human rights are also obliged to solve those problems. Violence on ethnic Rohingya originated from a Myanmar government policy that does not recognize the existence of the Rohingya people as citizens of Myanmar.

By because the role of the United

Nations in resolving international disputes can be done in two ways, namely businesses peaceful resolution of disputes, and the settlement of disputes by force, in the form of action against the threat to the peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression.

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THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

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Abstract

In the situation of crisis, there are real and fact problem of humanity. The extreme crisis is the war. In the last decade the wars always been initiated with an aggression of the super power's country against a little one. In the war situation, no one can promote and protect the human rights and peace. In these situations we have obligations to promote and to protect the value of human persons and their fundamental rights. Many people struggle for justice, fundamental freedom and human rights. They suffer, caused the violations of their rights. The violations of human rights are very terrible and uncountable again. The violation of human rights spread in all over the world/ The human persons have value in their freedom and dignities. All human persons have the equal dignity, with differences in function and activity in their society. With this reason, the promotion and protection of human rights for justice must be a priority program of the international community, in every country. The promotion and protection of human rights are considered as an obligation to promote, to protect and to observe the human value, which is the dignity of human person to create the international justice. The people will achieve the common good and welfare with protection by the government, and this obligations will be real challenges for our society.

Key Words*: Promotion and Protection, Violation, Human Rights, International Justice.*

THE CRISIS SITUATION

The general situation of the world is full of crisis, which is crisis of communication, crisis of democracy, crisis of economy and political crisis in many countries all over the world[1]. The extreme crisis is the war. In the last decade the wars always been initiated with an attach of the super power's country against a little one. In the war situation, no one can promote and protect the human rights and peace. We need to cheese fire, no more war, it is because the war is crime, and to begin build this world more just, peaceful and democratic[2]. In these situations we have obligations to promote and to protect the value of human persons and their fundamental rights. The human rights, justice and peace are inherent rights in our dignity as human person.

No one can offence the value of human person of human dignity. In the background of Asian Charter, we read the situation of asian people in relations of human rights: "The Asian struggle for rights and freedoms has deep historical roots, in the fight against oppression in civil society and the political oppression of colonialism, and subsequently for the establishment or restoration of democracy. The reaffirmation of rights is necessary now more than ever before. Asia is passing through a period of rapid change, which affects social structures, political institutions and the economy. Traditional values are under threat from new forms of development and technologies as well as political authorities and economic organisations that manage these changes"[3]. In the same document continues that "These changes threaten many valued

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[1] Martino Sardi, "Conflict, Reconciliation toward Peace in the Indonesian Context: the role of Media and interreligious Dialogue", *Proceeding International Seminar: Globalization, Religion, and Media in the Islamic World: Intercultural Dialogue, Yogyakarta, Octber 8th – 9 th, 2002* (Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University, Yogyakarta 2003), 207 – 219.

[2] Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (ed.), *Human Rights in Global Politics*, Cambrige University Press, 2014.

[3] Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), *The Asian Charter on Human Rights,* 1.1.

aspects of life, the result of the dehumanising effect of technology, the material orientation of the market, and the destruction of the community. People have decreasing control over their lives and environment, and some communities do not have protection even against eviction from their traditional homes and grounds. There is a massive exploitation of workers, with wages that are frequently inadequate for even bare subsistence and low safety standards that put the lives of workers in constant danger"[4]. The crisis situation, oppression and also the struggle of the people for fundamental rights and freedoms are real historical fact, which must be resolved for the better life in the future. Respect on human dignity as a first principle for all people and the authorities may not against the principle. But in the reality, for example, we can observe the annual report of the situation of Human Rights in every country for 2014, made by Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor of the US Department of the Sates. In the last report, we can see that the situation of human rights in quasi all country are real very terrible, many victims and human rights violations.

In this Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, the Secretary's Preface affirms that the fundamental struggle for dignity has been a driving force in human history worldwide, and what drives us toward it is a set of universal values and aspirations. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are ideals that cannot be contained by national boundaries or ocean shores. That is why it is especially troubling that so many people in so many places face grotesque restrictions on their freedoms and rights from their own governments. For far too many people, 2014 was defined by suffering and abuse perpetrated by terrorist groups exploiting religious discourse and divisions to advance their totalitarian ideology, or by governments, such as Syria, sometimes acting in the name of combating terrorism[5]. In the same preface

said that In parts of the Middle East and Africa, violent extremists have made it clear that not only do they have zero regard for human rights; they have zero regard for human life[6]. The situation in quasi all country in this world demands the more human action.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION

Reading the annual Human Report made by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and also Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor of the US Department of the Sates, the situation of human rights in all over the world is really demand the humanitarian intervention to repair the humanity. The situation of human rights in Asia is far of ideal. Many victims caused by discriminations, dehumanization, human degradation, offence and violence against the human person and human dignity, are really to become daily panorama. Human Rights violation remains potential to destruct the value of humanity, especially in Asia.

The Asian Charter, made by Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) affirms, "Asians have in recent decades suffered from various forms of conflict and violence, arising from ultra-nationalism, perverted ideologies, ethnic differences, and fundamentalism of all religions. Violence emanates from both the state and sections of civil society. For large masses, there is little security of person, property or community. There is massive displacement of communities and there are an increasing number of refugees"[7] The people always to be victims, and the Governments program do not always protect the rights of the people. The same documents states that the Governments have arrogated enormous powers to themselves. They have enacted legislation to suppress people's rights and freedoms and colluded with foreign firms and groups in the plunder of national resources. Corruption and nepotism are rampant and there is little accountability of those holding

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4   Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), *The Asian Charter on Human Rights,* 1: 2
5   John F. Kerry, Preface of *Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, made by* Bureau of

Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, of the US Department of the Sates
6   Idem
7   Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), The Asian Charter, 1: 4

public or private power. Authoritarianism has in many states been raised to the level of national ideology, with the deprivation of the rights and freedoms of their citizens, which are denounced as foreign ideas inappropriate to the religious and cultural traditions of Asia. Instead there is the exhortation of spurious theories of `Asian Values' which are a thin disguise for their authoritarianism. Not surprisingly, Asia, of all the major regions of the world, is without a regional official charter or other regional arrangements for the protection of rights and freedoms[8]. The situation of human rights in Asia is really terrible and demands to all who have the good will to participate the fulfillment of these rights[9].

For more profound this issue, *the Millennium Declaration*[10], stated that entering the third millennium, the fulfillment of human rights is threatened by numerous challenges. The increasing economic gaps and the unprecedented increase in poverty that are the result of the existing world economic order, constitute the greatest and most unjust violations of human rights: the misery and death of millions of innocent people every year. In the same document, they affirm: "We are witnessing some of the worst violations of human rights, including the use of food as a weapon, in the context of the armed conflicts and civil wars, which have been erupting with increasing frequency. Moreover, civilians are bearing the brunt of the deployment of weapons of mass and indiscriminate destruction in such conflicts. We are also witnessing a resurgence of racism, fascism, xenophobia, homophobia, hate-crimes, ethnocide and genocide, which impact most

greatly on indigenous peoples and other disadvantaged or under-represented groups; the resurgence of patriarchy that threatens to erode the gains made by women; the persistence of the worst forms of child labor; the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of massive and systematic violations of human rights; the on-going and deepening process of globalization which undermines internationally recognized human rights, labor rights and environmental standards; the continued insulation from human rights accountability of non-state actors, ranging from transnational corporations and international financial institutions to fundamentalist civil society organizations and criminal syndicates; an upsurge of violence, militarism and armed conflict; the increase and growth of authoritarian regimes; and the fact that human rights defenders continue to be highly vulnerable targets of repression in many areas of the globe"[11].

Many people struggle for justice, fundamental freedom and human rights. They suffer, caused the violations of their rights. The struggle for human rights, especially for justice has deep historical and political roots, in the fight against oppression in civil society and the political oppression. The violation of human rights spread in all over the world, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The violation of human rights in these three continents invite us to know more profound the meaning and value of human dignity. The human persons have value in their freedom and dignities. All human persons have the equal dignity, with differences in function and activity in their society.

THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The decision of the World Conference on Human Rights, in Vienna Declaration and Programme Action[12] affirms, "that the promotion and protection of human rights

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8   Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), The Asian Charter, 1: 5
9   Tony Evans, *Politics of Human Rights: A Global Perspective*, Pluto Press, London, 2014.
10   Cf. *We the Peoples Millennium Forum*: Declaration and Agenda for Action, Strengthening the United Nations for the 21st Century, have gathered at the United Nations (UN) Headquarters in New York from 22 – 26 May 2000 or *Millenium Declaration*, part D. about "Human Rights". In This meeting there are 1,350 representatives of over 1,000 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society organizations from more than 100 countries.

11   Idem
12   The Vienna Declaration: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14-25 June 1993,U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I) at 20 (1993).

is a matter of priority for the international community, and that the Conference affords a unique opportunity to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the international human rights system and of the machinery for the protection of human rights, in order to enhance and thus promote a fuller observance of those rights, in a just and balanced manner"[13] In the same consideration recognize that all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person, and that the human person is the central subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and consequently should be the principal beneficiary and should participate actively in the realization of these rights and freedoms,[14] These principles must be respected in the social life in every country, but the reality, it is not easy to fullfil the degradation of the human person. In the srvrnth consideration, The Vienna declaration Recalls the determination expressed in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, to practice tolerance and good neighbourliness, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples[15].

The world conference would like that Promotion and Protection of Human Rights is a programme and agenda for action. Human Rights must be promoted and protected in all situations as a priority programme for action'. In the Vienna Declaration establishes that the promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms must be considered as a priority objective of the United Nations in accordance with its purposes and principles, in particular the purpose of international cooperation. In the framework of these purposes and principles, the promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community. The organs and specialized agencies related to human rights should therefore further enhance the coordination of their activities based on the consistent and objective application of international human rights instruments[16].

The international community understands these obligations destination to all human races. The promotion and protection of human rights are considered as an obligation to promote, to protect and to observe the human value, which is the dignity of human person. In fact the human rights have the universal value. The Vienna Declaration affirms that all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms[17]. We need the universal respect for human rights and to observe them. So the efforts of the international community's attitude towards the universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, contribute to the stability and well-being necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, and to improved conditions for peace and security as well as social and economic development[18]. The people will achieve the common good and welfare with protection by the government.

In front of the violations of human rights, all the people must respect the value of human person. With this reason, the promotion and protection of human rights for justice must be a priority program of the international community, in every country.

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13   The First Consideration of Vienna Declaration and Program Action
14   The Second Consideration of Vienna Declaration and Program Action
15   The seventh consideration of Vienna Declaration and Program Action

16   The Vienna Declaration, 4
17   The Vienna Declaration, 5.
18   The Vienna Declaration, 6.

The promotion and protection of human rights are considered as an obligation to promote, to protect and to observe the human value, which is the dignity of human person to create the international justice.

With the human rights violation, I means the offences of the international justice. To promote the international justice, the international community must stop the impunity against the human rights. For this reason, in the Rome Statute, which stablishs the international criminal court affirms, "that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation"[19] It means to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators, who inflicted the violations of human rights.

To protect the human rights, the government must ratify the international instruments of human rights of United Nations, which protect them. The government gives the guarantee for protection to the people with the just law, good policy, and the other guarantees, so they live in justice, peace and safety in their own country[20]. The people will achieve the common good and welfare with protection by the government, and this obligations will be real challenges for our society.

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HUDAIBIYAH TREATY AS A MODEL OF COMPLIANCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT IN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

This study aims to explain why the Prophet Muhammad comply to The Hudaybiya Treaty although in its articles are considered harmful. By answering the question above, it is expected to build a model of compliance to international agreement in the Islamic perspective. Christian Reus-Smit's intertistial conception of politics considered appropriate in this study because it provides space for the role of ideas such as identity and norm in explaining a political action. This study found Prophet Muhammad comply to Treaty of Hudaibiyah because of political deliberation wich integrate four type or reason: idiographic, purposive, ethical, and instrumental. Ideographic deliberation determine the formulation of interest (purposive deliberation). The formulation of these interests will determine the action (instrumental deliberation) in accordance with the available resources and external constrain faced, as well as appropriate with or not contrary to Islamic norms and universally applicable norms (ethical deliberation). Ideographicly, based on identities: as believers who should obey Allah and His Messenger, as a noble people who hold the promise. Purposively, the mission of Muslims is to preach the religion of monotheism to all mankind, therefore the condition of peace and religious freedom must be realized. Ethically, the question of how should we act is answered by everything done must in concordance with Islamic rules and customary law norms which emphasize the obligation to comply with the concluded agreements. Instrumentally, the chosen action wich in line with the formulated interest and in accordance with the norms of Islam is comply to the peace treaty.

Keywords: Hudaibiyah Treaty , Compliance, International Agreements, Islam

INTRODUCTION

In *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia*, Acharya and Buzan (2010) stated that until now study of international relations is still very poor with thet non-Western perspective, including Islam. In fact, more and more scholars of international relations began to question the universality of the empiricism and materialism of Western international relations theory approach. An effort to examines various perspectives from outside the West is required in order to understand the international phenomenon better, especially in the different spaces in the Islamic world such as in the Middle East. Acharya and Buzan questioned if there is a disjuncture between Western international relations theory (IRT) and the universality of human experience, can one use the Islamic worldview, and by extension the Islamic world, as the basis for generalizations that could provide alternative optics for theorization?

Although there are still many limitations, using Islam as a source of theorising in the study of international relations is possible. Tadjbakhsh offers what is practiced by the Prophet Muhammad as one of sources of Islamic theoretical framework in International Relations: "A primary foundation for the classical understanding of IR in Islam is based on the original sources of the Qur'an, the Hadith (Sayings of the Prophet), the Sunnah (the conduct of the Prophet) or ijtihad (interpretation), which could correspond to what Acharya and Buzan call classical ideas, traditions and thinking contributing to 'localist exceptionalism' " (Tadjbakhsh, 2010: 176)

While in terms of nature, Tadjbakhs (2010: 185) states that the Islamic theory of International Relations is normative: "The nature of the Islamic theory on international

relations is decisively normative,in the Aristotelian sense of sciences as not only a reflection on what is, but also on what should be/what must be done. It is based fundamentally not on empirical observations of behaviours between states and predictions of what behaviour would be, but on how institutions reflect the essence of an idea, a norm, a morality." Therefore, what is inferred from classical sources of Islamic theory of International Relations is a major premise in a logis of deductive silogisma.

This research is an effort to use the classical sources of international relations theory in the Islamic perspective i.e what is practiced by the Prophet Muhammad or also known as the sunnah. This research will discuss about the political dimension of international law of Hudaibiyah Treaty by focusing on the issue of compliance.

Hudaibiyah Treaty is a peace agreement made by the Prophet Muhammad with the Quraysh of Mecca in March 628 AD (Dzulqaidah, 6 H). This agreement is considered as the most important event in the history of the struggle of the Prophet Muhammad. Most historians sira nabawiyah mention the victory of the Muslims against the Quraysh of Mecca does not occur in the event Fathu Makah, but it happens on occasion Hudaibiyah Agreement when most friends judging clauses in it as weakness and defeat for the Muslims (Al Ghadban, 2008; Al Buthy, 2010; Al Muafiri, 2010; An Nadwi, 2009). Many Islamic scholars mention this agreement as a real victory with reference to the Quran Surah Al Fath first verse: "Verily, We have given you a real victory". (Ar Rifai, 2010: Qutb, 2004)

In realm of Islamic international law, in addition to the verses of the Quran and Qiyas or analogy, words and what is practiced in the life of the Prophet Muhammad is the source of law (Khadduri, 1956). Hudaibiyah agreement in this case become the main reference of the scholars in formulating principles and law of international agreement in Islam. Hudaibiyah agreement became a legitimate model of international agreements in Islam. This is caused by several things: first, this agreement is done directly by the Prophet Muhammad,

second these agreements produce a very strong precedent of international agreements as an instrument to fight for Islam, and the third shows that victory can be obtained just by keeping the agreement. This victory was even informed directly by God through the revelation of the first verses of surah Al Fath. Based on the Hudaibiyah Agreement Islamic Scholars establishes an absolute permissibility of peace treaty between Muslim with a non-Muslim country. (Khadduri, 2006: Bsoul, 2008)

What interesting is the commitment of Prophet Muhammad and the Muslims to the signed agreement, despite the clauses in the agreement are considered very harmful. The rejection to the agreement even verbally indicated by the Muslim leaders of the caliber of Umar bin Khattab. However, at the end of the Muslims can accept the Prophet's decision accepting the agreement and comply with all clauses including those considered to be very harmful. Therefore, this study will focus on answering the question of why the Prophet Muhammad and the Muslims remain committed and faithful to the Hudaibiyah Treaty although its clauses considered harmful. By examining this question, it is expected to get a model of compliance to international agreements in islamic perspective

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this study the author used a constructivist's perspective about the politics international law and the concept of compliance.

1. Politics of International Law

According to Reus-Smit (2004: 14) politics of international law can be interpreted in two readings. The first is how "politics informs, structures, and disciplines the law". This view is most commonly adopted by international relations scholars, which puts international law as epiphenomena. International law placed as a reflection of the underlying political force or as a functional solution of the problem of cooperation among countries. Another reading is about political ideas in the law. The idea that the law can

also shape politics. Politics will have a different shape when placed in the reason and practice of law

Differs from realist and rationalist that puts politics as a function of interest, construtivist puts politics in the dimensions of reason and action (political reason and political action). In this case political action determined by political reason (political reason). Political Reason constitutively formed by four elements: idiographic, purposive, ethical and intsrumental. Ideographic deliberation is when trying to answer the question Who are we? While purposive deliberation is answering questions What do I / we want? Ethical deliberation is to answer the question how we should act? And instrumental deliberation answers questions how do we get what we want?

2. Compliance

One of the major issues in international law is a matter of compliance. The existence of international law and often measured by the presence or absence of compliace. Therefore scholars of international relations and international law has been much study about whether international law be obeyed or why do states comply to international agreements. (Guzman, 2002: 1826)

According to Kingsbury (1999: 346) the concept of compliance, although widely used in studies of international relations and international law, is not a concept that has a single meaning and stand alone. Definition of compliance is derived from theories about the meaning and usefulness of international law itself. Therefore different theories will produce different notions of compliance. In the constructivist view, international law is not seen as a regulatory in nature, but is constitutive. Compliance with international law began as far as the internalization of norms by the international community so that it becomes habit to comply, compliance has also appeared as an actor to accept it as something legitimate rule, the right thing to do (identitive motive) or something that is justified by the thinkers of constructivism.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study conducted with qualitative method. Qualitative method is used because it enable to gain a more holistic and depth understanding of a social phenomenon (Silverman, 2005: 10) As social phenomena can not be reduced to the variables in the same way as physical phenomena, then it must be understood from the perspective of "the insider "which involves subjectivity of the researcher. Qualitative methods suitable to answer the research questions that begin with why? how do? In what way (in what way)? (Trent Focus, 1998: 3-4).

The data in this study were collected through literature studies. The data either in the form of books, journals, articles, news in print and online documents on the Internet will be used for the analysis and understanding of phenomena around Hudaibiyahh Treaty.

ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CAUSING COMPLIANCE OF PROPHET MUHAMMAD AND MUSLIMS TO THE HUDAIBIYAH TREATY

Based on the above conceptual framework, the compliance of Prophe Muhammad and Muslims to the Hudaibiyah Agreement may be explained by identifying the ideational structure or political reason, including idiographic deliberation, purposive deliberation, ethical deliberation and instrumental deliberation. Intersection of four political reason, which in turn determines the political action of actors.

1. Idiographic Deliberation

Ideographic deliberation take place when an actor is confronted with the question of who we are? Thus the ideographic deliberation is an aspect that is identitif. Constructivism sees the social construction of identity and inter-actor meaning in the international system plays an important role in international relations. Alexander Wendt (in Kingsbury, 1998) recognizes that the state is a major actor in international relations, but he found the key that determines the structure of the international system is not a material interest but intersubjective relationships

which in turn form a social identity.

He said there are two types of identity of the state, namely corporate identity (corporate identity) and social identity (social identity). Corporate identity consists of intrinsic elements, which form a self-organizing qualities of individuality actor. While social identity is a set of meanings given by the actors themselves while at the same time taking the perspective of the other actors in interaction with the international system. Like what actors wants to be interpreted in the perspective of other, that is a social identity.

We can see the identity of Muslims wich are projected to other actors in the social interaction in the expression of Ja'far bin Abi Talib before King Najasy. Ja'far ibn Abi Talib was one of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad who was sent to lead the group of Muslims to seek asylum from King Najasy in Ethiopia as a result of abuse and hostility of the pagans in Mecca. In the presence of the king who embraced Christianity is Jafar stated identity of Muslims as follows.

> *"O King! we were plunged in the depth of ignorance and barbarism; we adored idols, we lived in unchastity, we ate the dead bodies, and we spoke abominations, we disregarded every feeling of humanity, and the duties of hospitality and neighborhood were neglected; we knew no law but that of the strong, when Allah raised among us a man, of whose birth, truthfulness, honesty, and purity we were aware; and he called to the Oneness of Allah , and taught us not to associate anything with Him. "He forbade us the worship of idols; and he enjoined us to speak the truth, to be faithful to our trusts, to be merciful and to regard the rights of the neighbors and kith and kin; he forbade us to speak evil of women, or to eat the substance of orphans; he ordered us to flee from the vices, and to abstain from evil; to offer prayers, to render alms, and to observe fast. "We have believed in him, we have accepted his teachings and his injunctions to worship Allah, and not to associate anything with Him, and we have allowed what He has allowed, and prohibited what He has prohibited. "For this reason, our people have risen against us have persecuted us in order to make us*

> *forsake the worship of Allah and return to the worship of idols and other abominations. They have tortured and injured us, until finding no safety among them; we have come to your country, and hope you will protect us from oppression." (al Mubarakfury,1997:130-131)*

From Ja'far statement can be concluded that the of Muslims in their social interactions projecting himself with some identity attributes: people who believe in Allah as the only God who is worshiped and obeyed the commands and prohibitions, people believe in Muhammad as a prophet of Allah and obey the messenger, the that respects human beings and interact socially with such noble character telling the truth, carry out the mandate, to establish kinship, do good to the neighbor, respecting the things that purified and blood, do not say fake, do not take the property of an orphan and accuse women.

Muslims projecting theirself as a noble because they embrace the religion of truth and glory. They think themselves as civilized community. They felt he had come out of the shackles of ignorance teachings of their ancestors. They now are noble Ummah. Therefore of Muslims willing to suffer and struggle to maintain their religious glory, defending the Prophet Muhammad as their leader, and spread their religion.

Muslims identity as noble ummah as they embrace the true religion, reflected from the statement of Ummar bin Khattab when Prophet Muhammad agreed Hudaibiyah Agreement wich are considered harmful and humiliating the Muslims. Ummar sued the Prophet Muhammad:

> *'Umar Ibn al-Khattab. Said to the Prophet., "O Messenger of Allah, is not you the Messenger of Allah?"*
> *"True," replied the Prophet.*
> *"Do not we are in the truth?" Asked Umar anyway.*
> *"Yes," he replied.*
> *"Is not our enemies that are on the sleaze?*
> *"Yes," replied the Prophet.*
> *"But, why do we give debasement of our religion?" Asked Umar.*
> *Prophet asserted, "Surely I am the apostle*

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of Allah. I will not disobey Him. He was not going to waste me. "(Al Ghadban, 2008: 49)

Islamic Ummah as a noble and civilized community feel unworthy to be insulted and bullied by the other community. Especially by people whom they think are in ignorance of pagan religion and uncivilized ancestors customs as the pagans of Mecca. Therefore Muslims feel entitled to be recognized as other tribes in the Arab region at the time. The Muslims feel should be treated equally before the law prevailing custom in Arab society at that time, including the right to make a pilgrimage to the Kaaba in Mecca.

At that time almost all the tribes of Arabia with various religion and belief considers the Kaaba as the holy place. They have traditions of worship ritual tawaf around the Ka'bah with the ordinances of worship respectively. (Al Mubarakfury, 1997: 49-58). The Quraysh of Mecca has a distinguished position because they considered as the guardian of the Ka'bah. Makah get many economic benefits because of the pilgrims who came to the Kaaba, especially in the months that sacred. Month which is forbidden to fight and shed blood. In the event of Hudaibiyah the Muslims intend to perform umrah to Mecca although they are in the state of war with Qurays Meccan. As a civilized community that they went to Mecca without weapons because war is forbidden and their purpose is to worship.

2. Purposive Deliberation

Purposive deliberation occurs when there is a question what do we want? The phrase indicates purposive deliberation of the Muslims is an expression of Rib'i bin Amir to Rustum Persian warlords "Allah has sent us to bring forth whomsoever He wills from the worship of people to the worship of Allah alone, from the hardship of this world to its ease, from the injustice of other religions to the justice of Islam. (Qardhawy, 1997: 15)

The expression above clearly states that the purposive deliberation of Islamic ummah is preaching Islam to all mankind. When the have formed an Islamic state, the mission then is carried out by the state. This mission is in line with the coming of the prophet Muhammad as the last prophet. Unlike the previous prophet whose teaching is only valid on a particular community, the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad applies to all mankind throughout the ages. Even Prophet Muhammad was sent as a mercy of God for the whole universe. It is rooted in the Qur'an:

"And We have not sent you but to all mankind as a bearer of good news and as a warner, but most people do not know. (QS. Saba`: 28)
And We sent thee not, but to (become) a mercy to the worlds ". (QS. Al-Anbiyaa`: 107)

Abo-Kazleh stated that the role of the state in the classical Islamic jurisprudence is internally propagation of Islam, to protect life, property and the faith of the Muslims and externally invite people to Islam because Islam is a universal religion. As quoted by Tadjbakhsh (2010: 190) " Classical Islamic jurisprudence clarifies the role of the Islamic state in the binary division of international relations, whether war or peace is the organizing principle between the two, on the imperative of abiding by the rule of Islamic law: internally, preaching Islam and protecting the lives, property and faith of believers within, and externally, inviting people to Islam because Islam is a universal religion" (Abo-Kazleh 2006: 43)

In carrying out dakwah should be done by peaceful means full of wisdom, teaching and good arguments (Qur'an, Surah An-Nahl: 125). In preaching also prohibited from using means of coercion and intimidation because Islam respects freedom of religion. In the Qur'an declared *"There is no compulsion to (enter) religion (Islam); actually has a clear path right than wrong path.* "(Surat al-Baqoroh: 256). This paragraph requires the dakwah should be done in a peaceful situation and the guarantee of freedom of religion. Only in a state of peace and free the process of seeking clarity "right path rather than a false path" can be done with discretion.

Based on the above the situation desired by Islam is a peaceful state. The basic principle of inter-state relations in

Islam is peace (Abu Zahra, 1973). Hence the Prophet Muhammad, in the event Hudaibiyah Agreement, from the beginning has been looking for peace with Quraiys (al Ghadban, 2008: 28-29). This is done by deliberately not carry weapons inside the pilgrimage mission. Expected to permissibility the Muslims entered Mecca in peace, there has been a symbolic recognition of the existence of the Muslims in Medina as a political entity on par with the other tribes. However, these expectations did not happen because of the Quraysh insist on rejecting the entry of Muslims to Mecca, even provocation in order to clashes. Until finally there was a peace agreement between the two sides though they have almost all agreed clauses are considered detrimental to the Muslims.

3. Ethical Deliberation

Ethical deliberation is an answer when of question how we should act. This deliberation put purposive reasoning and instrumental reason in the scales of norms that are internal believed and social norms or customary law prevailing at that time. Socially, at that times it has been applicable customary law which states that the agreement must be adhered to. Those who do not adhere to the agreement will be considered as dishonourable and therefore will get a social sanction. Internally, for Muslims obligation to comply to the concluded agreement has a very strong foundation. This is explicitly stated in the Qur'an in many verses:

"O ye who believe, fulfill the promises." (Al-Maidah: 1)

"And stick to an agreement with God if you do not cancel the promises and vows that after uphold the law ...." (An-Nahl: 91)

"Unless the idolaters that you have entered into an agreement (with them) and they do not detract anything (of the agreement) and you do not (also) they help someone hostile to you, then to them fulfill his promise until the deadline. Allah loves those who fear Allah. "(At-Tawbah: 4)

And do not make oaths as a means fraudsters among you ... "(An-Nahl: 94-95)

From the above verses clearly that

fulfill the promise for muslims is not only the obligations arising from the agreement of the parties, but also a spiritual obligation. Non-compliance with the agreement not only lets get social sanction, but also will get penalized in the Hereafter (sin). In this case the norm meet the agreement strongly internalized in the Muslims.

4. Instrumental Deliberation

Instrumental reason is the consideration confronting a two questions. The first is strategic instrumental, namely the question of how I / we get what we want? (how do I / we get what I / we want?). The second one is resource- instrumental, that is the question what I / we need to get what I / we want? (what do I / we need to get what I / we want?) This deliberation compromise between alternative strategies available in an effort to achieve the goal with the availability of resources required to implement certain strategies. Considerations for selecting a particular action or strategic steps to achieve the goal is ultimately limited by the availability of resources required to implement certain strategies well.

In the case of the implementation of the Hudaibiyah Treaty, when the implementation of the agreement turns deemed harmful or aggravating the interests of the Muslims, there are two options strategy: obey or ignore the treaty agreement. When the option strategy is to comply with the agreement, then what needed is the solidity of the line follower for restraint and calm the emotions. Meanwhile, when the choice is ignore the agreement, then the necessary resources are military strength and moral readiness for battle against the Quraysh of Mecca and its allies.

When we look at the expected goal from the peace agreements are the creation of an conducive environment for the implementation of the preaching mission, if the chosen option is ignoring the agreement with the risk of war, the necessary resources is a military force capable to defeat the Quraish. Only by defeating Quraisy, the goal to create an atmosphere of peace and safety in carrying out the mission dakwah will be

achieved. Another resource is the ability to maintain or establish a positive image in the presence of nomadic or other tribes in the Arabian peninsula. Violated the agreement is something that is deemed improperly actions. Such actions would also conflict with the identity of the Muslims as a people who keep their promises.

At the time of the Hudaibiyah Treaty,the reputation of Muslim force is actually quite good. They managed to survive from the siege 10,000 Quraish and their allies in the battle of Ahzab. Post-war Ahzab there is no Arab tribes that states joined the Quraish because they no longer convinced in the ability of the Quraish army to defeat the Muslims in Medina. But at that time, in the same time muslims facing the threat of Khaibar Jews who are in the north of Medina. If the Muslims have an expedition to Khaibar, the Medinawill be empty and likely to be utilized by the Quraish, and vice versa. Islamic forces are not sufficient to deal with both of these threats at the same time. That is why the Prophet Muhammad wanted peace with the Quraysh so they can concentrate on facing the Jews of Khaibar (Hamidullah, 1987)

Based on these considerations, the answer to the question of how we achieve what we want is answered by adhere to the agreement. While the question "what do we need to get what we want?" Is answered with a commitment to refrain from emotions and actions that violate the agreement and discipline adhere to the agreement.

CONCLUSION

This study has been found Prophet Muhammad comply to Treaty of Hudaibiyah because of political deliberation which integrate four type or reason: idiographic, purposive, ethical, and instrumental. Ideographic deliberation determine the formulation of interest (purposive deliberation). The formulation of these interests will determine the action (instrumental deliberation) in accordance with the available resources and external constrain faced, as well as appropriate with or not contrary to Islamic norms and universally applicable norms (ethical deliberation). Ideographicly, based on identities: as believers who should obey Allah and His Messenger, as a noble people who hold the promise. Purposively, the mission of Muslims is to preach the religion of monotheism to all mankind, therefore the condition of peace and religious freedom must be realized. Ethically, the question of how should we act is answered by everything done must in concordance with Islamic rules and customary law norms which emphasize the obligation to comply with the concluded agreements. Instrumentally, the chosen action wich in line with the formulated interest and in accordance with the norms of Islam is comply to the peace treaty.

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CHINA'S MARITIME SILK ROAD AND INDONESIA'S MARITIME NEXUS POICIES: TOWARDS POLICY CONVERGENCE?

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Abstract

This research is a modest effort to explain the convergence between China's Maritime Silk Road and Indonesia's global maritime nexus policies. China has since 2013 been promoting cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific region to implement the policy. In 2014, China established Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB) and Maritime Silk Road Bank, and President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang traveled to 22 countries to promote infrastructural investments around the "belt". In the same year, Indonesia's newly elected President, Joko Widodo, agreed on Chinese investments and aids on Indonesia's maritime infrastructure. Envisioned to promote Indonesia to be the global maritime nexus, Joko Widodo's administration sees the promised aids and investments supportive to the Indonesian government's vision. However, it is not clear whether or not the openness that Indonesia had shown to the Chinese Maritime Silk Road development plan was based on shared vision of both powers on the regional strategic architecture. This study examines the sinergy or convergence of China and Indonesia's current policies. It questions both states' perceptions and intentions that shaped each states' maritime policies. Employing qualitative methodology, this research adopts three methods of data collection: in-depth interviews, content analysis, and literature study. The three methods are inter-complementary and equally important in understanding perceptions on the policies, strategic situation, and reactions to the policies by various actors in the region. The research argues that policy convergence is more than likely.

Keywords: maritime silk road, China, Indonesia, global maritim nexus, Indo-Pacific.

A. INTRODUCTION

During his speech in Indonesian in 2013, Prime Minister Li Keqiang expressed the *one belt one road* policy that incited debates and controversy. It was argued that the policy emphasizes "peaceful economic development" without the necessity of signing on to strong "political strings". The policy revives the historical silk roads that channelled Chinese old time international trade through Asian mainland and across the Pacific and Indian Ocean. Especially on the maritime silk road, It proposes to rebuild maritime connectivities between countries around the 'belt' to promote international trade in the region. The Maritime Silk Road supposedly will connect China, Southeast Asian countries, India, African coastline countries, and Latin American. In the past (1000 AD), the Maritime Silk Road had enabled Chinese merchants' trade, even with the Mexicans which is halfway across the world. With the growing economic interactions between China and those countries, increased maritime connectivities will likely pave the way for increased trade and investments among the countries.

Chinese administration has so far been consistent with the idea of Maritime Silk Road. In order to support the policy financially, China established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Maritime Silk Road Bank. The banks supposedly will provide financial supports for maritime infrastructure development along the "belt". President Xi Jinping visited 14 countries during his four trips in 2014 to promote this maritime cooperation. At the same time, Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited eight countries to do the similar public diplomacy. Overall, the two top leaders of China visited 22 countries and pledges support for building maritime connectivities to increase the flow of international trade

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and investments among the countries in the region.

Indonesia, on the other hand, started a new course of maritime policy since Joko Widodo (Jokowi) won the election in 2014. The new government under Jokowi leadership places maritime sector development among the top priorities of Indonesian national development. In the document of Joko Widodo's election campaign, called Nawacita, Indonesia's state of maritime economy is described as losing from lack of development, extraction, infrastructure and protection. As an archipelagic country with rich maritime economic potentials, the Joko Widodo's campaign team felt the need to reform the pre-existing poor governance. With the vision to promote Indonesia as the "global maritime nexus", the Nawacita proposes maritime development in three strategic policies. **First**, maritime infrastructure development. The document suggested that Indonesia will build and renovate 300 ports all over Nusantara. **Second**, building capabilities in maritime industry. In order to support national maritime development and connectivity, Indonesia will need sufficient amount of supply of ships and surveillance vessels. Therefore, building maritime industry became necessity. **Third**, increasing maritime cooperation and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region. Increasing international trade through sea lanes and investment on maritime development is thus indispensable to uplift the limit of Indonesian maritime development.

During the East Asia Summit and G-20 meeting in 2014, Joko Widodo expressed Indonesian aspiration to become the so-called "global maritime nexus" and gain explicit literal supports from many leaders. The United States (US) President Obama stated that the US will support Indonesian vision to become the global maritime nexus in terms of infrastructural development and maritime cooperation. Chinese President, Xi Jinping, during his visit to Indonesia went even further by pledging to invest in all maritime infrastructure development in Indonesia. If China is serious with this pledge, then it will have to build and/or renovate over

300 ports/harbors along the coastlines of Indonesian archipelago. According to Joko Widodo's Nawacita document, Indonesia should build the ports within five year. Which means, in the short term China will have a lot of infrastructural projects in Indonesia within the next five years. While in the long run, economic and political ties of Indonesia and China might potentially become stronger than ever.

1. Research Problem and Questions

Although the form of *Maritime Silk Road* policy is economic development through a wide span of cross-regional sealanes, the impact of the policy is strategic. It is more than likely that China will benefit economically from investing in Indonesian maritim infrastructural development. Increasing connectivity and infrastructure development is believed to boost economic growth in the less developed Eastern Indonesia. However, two things are uncertain for Indonesia. First, the strategic relations that has been the core of Indonesian foreign relations might be undermined under the future maritime regime under China's leadership. Success implementation of this policy may strengthen Chinese leadership among the cooperating parties of the Maritime Silk Road. While on the other hand, it is unclear whether or not Indonesia's aspiration of becoming the "global maritime nexus" will be accommodated under the new regime. Indonesia's ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN) and the US may well changed under the future regime.

Second, Indonesia's capability to respond and contribute to the regional dispute settlements may also changed under the new maritime regime. Indonesia is known for its contribution in making and building peace in Cambodia in early 1990s, and also leading the ASEAN-China agreement on the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC). If the policy fails to induce South China Sea claimants such as Vietnam and the Philippines into peaceful economic cooperation and drive the two claimants to flock together to balance China with other

powers, Indonesia's role and contribution in maintaining the new regional order may be undermined.

So how will Indonesia cope with the strategic impacts of bandwagoning the Maritime Silk Road policy? How does Indonesian government perceive its geopolitical position in the so-called Asian Century? How does China see the diplomatic dilemma that Indonesia faces as the fulcrum of regional balance of power? How does China perceive the geopolitical architecture inside the Maritime Silk Road and relations with the outside powers? How does China see major powers' position in the proposed regime? These are the questions that this research will deal with.

2. Research Methodology

This study uses qualitative research methods. Qualitative research assumes knowledge production through interpretation of normative and perceptional aspects, the way people see situations, history, institution, and the contexts of politics, economy, society and culture. This method is relevant to uncover informations that are normally hidden from the common knowledge on politics, economy, society and culture.

Data is collected by three methods, i.e. literature and archive study, discourse analysis, and in-depth interview. Literature and archive study were conducted on policy documents, archives and research reports on the subject. Discourse analysis was carried out on news, speech and policy-making records that represents the ideas and prolicy preferences of the policy makers in Indonesia, China and related states. In-depth interviews were also conducted with policy makers in the ministry level and scholars, both in Indonesia and China.

This study employs explanatory type of research. Foreign policy perspectives of involving states in relation to Indonesia and China, i.e. the United States, Southeast Asian states, and major powers in the Indo-Pacific region, is described with explanations on factors shaping the perspectives and its institutional constraints. The level of analysis

of this study is limited on the state level.

B. CHINA'S MARITIME SILK ROAD: HISTORY AND POLICY

When the President of People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, stated the intention to promote Maritime Silk Road development in 2013 during his visit in Indonesia, the idea of the policy was not firmly defined and well planned. It was rather a spontaneous response from the President on Chinese intention for promoting further economic cooperation with Indonesia and other countries in the region. It was only then and afterwards, the government under Xi's administration started to develop the Maritim Silk Road policy. After 2 years of elaboration and strategic planning, the government in the national and local levels are all determined to promote the realization of the policy. The explanation of the policy can be found in the whitebook on One-Belt-One-Road policy, published by the Chinese Communist Party (2015)[1].

The term "Maritime Silk Road" is actually not new in Chinese history. According to Hamashita, Arrighi and Selden (2004), China managed to develop maritime trading network since around 2300 years ago. The trading network spans accross Indian and Pacific oceans, from Latin America to East Africa. According to the study, the trading network consists of many port cities in the region – now called Indo-Pacific. The trading network contributed to the wealth and strength of the then Chinese empire.

This chapter discusses the concept of Maritime Silk Road by exploring the development of the trading network in world history and the new "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" policy under President Xi Jinping. It will be divided into two parts; the first part will elaborate the development of Maritime Silk Road through out history since 1112 BC,

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1   See joint publication by National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, *Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road*, (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2015).

and the second part will discuss the policy and intention to develop the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The idea of developing the 21st Century MSR has become one of the most debated issue in the media, as the clarity and the intention of the policy are still in question.

1. Trading Network in the Historical Maritime Silk Road

The trading network in the historical Maritime Silk Road can be traced as early as 1112 BC, particularly in the Yellow Sea (also known as the Sea of Japan). The sea route was utilized initially for transport of Chinese people to teach ancient China's farming and sericulture during the Zhou dynasty. In order to further develop Korean silk production and trade with China, in 221 BC many Chinese were sent to introduce the production process to Korean industry. The newly introduced technology helped Korean silk industry to speed up the spinning process. After Korean industry grew, the trade and transport between China, Korea and Japan also grew larger through the Yellow Sea. Trade increased between China and Japan during Tang and Song dynasty, but soon declined after Ming and Qing dynasty banned maritime activities.

In Southeast Asia, the MSR route was mainly went through the South China Sea. The route was considered to have high importance for Chinese interaction with the outside world. The cycle of the silk road development was also similar with the East Asian silk road. It was first blooming during the Qin and Han dynasties and increased popularity during the Sui dynasty. During the Sui and Tang dynasties, the MSR route in the South China Sea became more important for Chinese international trade, especially as the mainland silk road was overrun by wars in the western area. Most of the international trade then was diverted to the MSR route. In the late Tang and Song dynasties, technology advancement in shipbuilding industry and navigation foster the opening of new sealanes to Southeast Asia, Malacca, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and African continent. However, similar to the East Asian MSR, the utilization

of the sealane was fading during the Qing and Ming dynasties due the seclusion policy.

The number of main harbors in China used for international trade during the golden age of the MSR was rather limited. The main harbors were Guangzhou, Quanzhou and Ningbo. Other than that, according to historical records, other harbors were also used including Shandong, Hepu, Quanzhou, Shanghai, Ganpu, Wenzhou, and Hangzhou.

In the 1400s, Admiral Zheng He[2] conducted the famous maritime expedition through the maritime silk road from China to Southeast Asia and Africa. During his journey in 1405-1433, Zheng He visited Vietnam (Cochin), Cambodia (Champa), Thailand (Siam), Malaysia (Pahang and Kelantan), Singapore (Malacca), and Indonesia (Malacca, Palembang, Java, and Aru), in Southeast Asia. In South Asia, Zheng He visited India and Srilanka. In the Middle East, He made stops at Yaman and many other Arabic countries. In Africa, He visited Egypt and Mozambique. His fleet consisted of 307 ships with 27.000 crew.

Among many Indonesians, the name of Admiral Zheng He is familiar as his visit to Indonesia also marked the history of Indonesian interaction with other countries. One of Indonesian big cities, Semarang, was named after him (Sam Po Kong). Zheng He's relations with local Indonesian people was made easy by his religion. He was muslim and during his visit to Middle East, he even took the chance to do the Islamic pilgrimage (hajj).

2. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: Ideas, International Context, and Chinese Initiative

MSR initiative is part of the larger policy, namely the One Belt One Road initiative. The main idea of the policy is to generate support for Chinese industrial growth. China industrial production grew at average 12.75% annually in the period 1990-2015. It reached all time record in 1994 at 29.40%. In November, it grew 6.20% despite global economic slowdown.

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2   In Indonesian historical records, Admiral Zheng He is known as *Laksamana Cheng Ho*, 1371-1433.

International Conference
on Social Politics

[3] Overall, China's economy grows 10.88% annually in average (1989-2015, current price GDP) and especially in 2015, its GDP grew 7.1% amidst global crisis.[4]

As a consequence of its industrial growth, China will need global or regional market with significant growth that can absorp its production. In the context of global economic slowdown since 2008 global economic crisis, it is only logical that China needs to support regional economic development. This initiative is then comparable with Japanese co-prosperity sphere model during the World War II and ODA since the 1950s.

The Belt and Road, according to Long Xingchun, an academic think tank based in Beijing, "aimed at expanding road, rail and port infrastructure to further China's trade and influence" in the region. It "has a maze of network connectivity which included a Eurasian highway connecting China with Europe through central Asia, the MSR, Bangladesh, India, China, Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor and the PakistanChina Economic Corridor (CPEC)".[5] The initiative is actually very ambitious and seriously carried out by the Chinese government, indicated by wide span of area coverage and negotiation effort so far. Soon after the leaders of the country address the speech on the initiative to revive the historical maritime and overland Silk Road, all levels of the bureaucracy immediately responded by interpreting and developing programs in accordance to the initiative. Ministries and local governments in China, are assigned to participate in promoting the initiative.[6] Each part of the government of PRC has been developing programs for implementing the OBOR initiative in each own capacity.

The seriousness of the implementation of the initiative is also shown by PRC government's effort to develop supporting system in financial sector. At least, there are three channels through which China can support the development of the 21st century MSR financially, i.e. MSR Bank, Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank established by BRICS[7] states. The MSRB is provided with 40 billion US$ for financing maritime infrastructure along the maritime Silk Road. AIIB, however, is a multilateral infrastructural financial institution with 57 member states. The total fund collected through the Bank reached 1 trillion US$, with China contributed the largest share, 297.8 billion US$ (30.34%). The New Development Bank was established by the five BRICS states also to promote infrastructure development, as an alternative to the two US dominated international financial institution, World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The bank issued 1.000.000 shares since June 2015, with each share equals to 100.000 US$. In total, the Bank should have 100 billion US$ fund for infrastructure development, including for MSR infrastructure.

C. ECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS AND GEOPOLITICAL SETTINGS

In economic point of view, the MSR initiative offers economic cooperation for mutual benefit between China and its partners, including Indonesia. While global economy strives to recover from crisis since 2010 with relatively slow pace, the initiative to develop the Silk Road may provide the chance to stimulate further economic growth, market growth and further flow of investments necessary for China and participating countries. It would be a surprise if Indonesia is not interested to take part in the MSR economic development.

MSR, or which Chinese refers to the 21st century MSR, covers a large area that include two important oceans, namely Indian

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3   See "China Industrial Growth" at Trading Economics website, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/industrial-production.

4   See "China GDP Annual Growth Rate", retrieved from http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual, on 16 December 2015.

5   "China should Detail MSR Projects to Get India's Support", retrieved from http://www.outlookindia.com/news/article/china-should-detail-msr-projects-to-get-indias-support/906917 on 15 December 2015.

6   Interview with members of Central Committee, Communist Party of China, Beijing, 19 December 2015, 14.00-17.30.

7   BRICS refers to the forum of five states, consisting Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

and Pacific ocean. This means that two out of three oceans, with the absence of the Atlantic, are parts of the initiative. Two third of the global trade is operating within these two rims. In the maritime policy discourse globally, the term "Indo-Pacific" as a region started to gain attention since early 2000s, and it became foreign policy priority of the major powers – such as the United States' and Australia's – since 2010s. Geographically, MSR and Indo-Pacific region covers the same area: Indian and Pacific Rim, except that the US and Japan has so far been reluctant to join in the MSR initiative.

However, there are problems with the MSR initiative in two distinct categories, i.e. (1) geopolitical implication; and (2) administrative implementation. Geopolitically, MSR initiative was launched in the context of power and economic contestation between the US and China with each proponents. The US has been considering –and to some extent, treating– China as competitor in economy (including energy) and power in the region.[8] This competition was actually shown during Chinese MSR diplomacy. China, on the one hand, did not include the US in the MSRB and New Development Bank. The US, on the other hand, refused to join in the AIIB as share holder with 57 other members. China also reluctant to take part in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiated by the US, although the idea of TPP is also to enlarge regional economic partnership beyond the Pacific Rim. It can be said that there is a mutual inertia between the two contesting powers in terms of Indo-Pacific economic development.

As a regional conception in geopolitics, Indo-Pacific is undoubtfully important. International trade through Indian and Pacific oceans accounts for approximately 80% of total global shipments. The United States (US) was among the first to use the term Indo-Pacific as a regional conception to refer to regional geopolitical architecture that

includes major powers such as China, India, Russia and Australia. Partly in response to the rapid rise of Chinese economy and political influence in the region, the US seeks to maintain the regional balance of power through building regional security architecture that benefits from existing regional forces and alliance. United States' role and presence in the region will most likely still visible in the foreseeable future. Australia was later joined US' policy in the region by strenthening ties with Japan and India since 2006 (Curtis, et.al., 2011). Australian Foreign Minister, Julia Bishop, in her speech in 2013 preferred the term 'Indo-Pacific' rather than the traditional Asia-Pacific. The four countries agreed on improving cooperation in some issues in the Indo-Pacific region such as maritime security, counterterrorism, non-proliferation, energy, trade liberalization, and democracy.

The geopolitical architecture in the Indo-Pacific region may provide difficult challenges along with great opportunities for both China and Indonesia. On one hand, China and the US –with its geopolitical architecture construction– are both equally important partners for Indonesia. China has recently become the number one trading partner for Indonesia, especially since 2010 ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) full implementation. China's expressed commitment to assist Indonesia's long-term industrial development might well create stronger ties between the two countries for a long term. However, US' cautiousness for a stronger and more assertive China, and thus soft balancing strategy alongside constructive engagement on China, has made Indonesia's relations with China less than simple. During the G-20 meeting in 2014, President Obama stated literally his support for Indonesia's aspiration to become the 'global maritime axis', with which Indonesia may expect further cooperation in maritime security and maritime infrastructure development. The power contest between the two great powers, in maritime policy, also reflected in indonesia's relations with both states.

US allies in geopolitics and international security do not necessarily share the same

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8   See for instance, Meidi Kosandi, "Shifting Paradigms and Dynamics of Indonesia-China Relations: Towards the Best Use of Theoretical Eclecticism", *Asian Politics and Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 2013.

policy toward China and MSR initiative. Britain and Australia are actually among the parties of the AIIB with considerable share of fund and votes. Australia contributed as much as 36.9 billion US$ to the AIIB and gain 3.46% vote. Britain contributed 30.5 billion US$ share and get 3.11% vote in the AIIB. Japan, on the other hand, although initially shows open gesture to the AIIB proposal, recently refused to join in. Japan's competition with China seems to be intensive, especially if we look at its response to Indonesia's preference to China's investment over Japan's in high speed train development project in mid-2015 project tender. When China won the project, Japan's leader was disappointed and reacted quickly by stating that Japan will reevaluate all Japan's investments in Indonesia.

Will US-China competition for power in the region intensified and contaged to their allies? The answer is yet to be seen and takes thorough and careful further research through strategies and implementation. However, the opportunities and challenges for Indonesia and China to increase cooperation in maritime sector are clearly reflected in the economic policies and geopolitical settings of the region.

Administrative implementation of the partnership in maritime development between China and Indonesia has also encountered problems. This was indicated in the recent high-tensed argument between the two on South China Sea claims. Indonesia's Coordinative Minister for Politics, Law and Security, Luhut B. Panjaitan, strongly denounced China's claim of 9-dash South China Sea policy, particularly regarding Natuna islands being part of the claimed area. The Minister even threat China's government to bring this issue to International Court of Justice if China continue to proceed with the claim.

During this high tension in 2015, the Minister tend to see China's maritime policy as an aggressive strategy to control the economy and security in the region against US' regional security architecture strategy to soft balance China. The justification of this view was the recurring claims over the 9-dash area in the South China Sea and the lack of

implementation of MSR initiative in Indonesia. Panjaitan questions China's intention with the MSR initiative as after 2 years of promise to invest in Indonesian maritime development results in no implementation.[9]

D. TOWARDS CONVERGENCE AND REALIZATION OF INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION?

In an age of Asian century, Indonesia is now seeking to increase its attention to the Indo-Pacific regional cooperation. During the 2014 East Asia Summit, the newly elected President, Jokowi, expressed Indonesia's aspiration to increase cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and to become one of the regional leading maritime power. The term he used for the aspiration was "global maritime axis". As a considerably large archipelagic country, Indonesia's undersea natural resources has yet been optimally explored and extracted. Jokowi administration envisioned on prioritizing maritime industry and infrastructure development for the next five years in order to benefit optimally from Indonesia's maritime potentials. As Indonesia is located between Indian and Pacific Oceans, extending maritime cooperation into Indo-Pacific region was considered important to realize the vision.

In the context of MSR initiative implementation by China, has Indonesia gain benefit in the form of financial and technical support for maritime infrastructural development? As stated by Panjaitan, so far there is no implementation of the promised support for infrastructure development. It appears that there was miscommunications between Indonesian and Chinese diplomats regarding the implementation of the MSR initiative. If China is serious with MSR initiative, there should be some active implementation in developing the infrastructures along the MSR area, including Indonesia. However, according to China's policy makers in the Communist Party, Chinese government was having difficulties in determining what kind

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9   Interview with Gen. (ret.) Luhut B. Panjaitan, Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law and Security in Jakarta, October 2015.

of project in which area of Indonesia needs maritime infrastructure and have sufficient economic potentials to be developed. Chinese government has not yet received any proposal with prospect and budget estimation from Indonesian government. China is ready to assist and endorse Chinese investors to participate in Indonesian maritime infrastructural projects, but there is no sufficient information about the projects. In this perspective, China has actually been waiting for communication and coordination with Indonesian counterparts to assist infrastructure development projects that will definitely converge with Chinese MSR initiative.

If, or when, the implementation of maritime infrastructure development in Indonesia is operational and parallel with implementation in other countries and regions, integration in the Indo-Pacific region is achievable. The remaining problem for Indonesia is the state's aspiration to maintain leadership in the region. Indonesia has been considered by many as the leader in the Southeast Asian region and the government meant to keep it that way. However, the question is, would it still possible under Chinese leadership in the Indo-Pacific economic integration, Indonesia become the leader in the region? What kind of power structure will be generated in the region under Chinese initiative and others' responses?

The answer lies on the nature of the geopolitical architecture and the nature of Chinese diplomacy. With power contest between US and China, and others careful responses to the two, Chinese leadership would be balanced by other states, including the US and Japan. The trend in the global politics is toward multipolar or non-polar power structure.[10] China has also been showing consistency in "peaceful rising" diplomacy, although showing also cautiousness by consistency in increasing defense budget. Indonesia's role to balance between the two camps in the regional integration may provide great opportunity for Indonesia for greater contribution in the regional balance of power.

E. CONCLUSION

If implemented succesfully, the MSR initiative would also mean deepening and widening regional economic integration to include Indo-Pacific region. This result is in line with both Indonesia and China's regional policy. In the context of regional balance of power, problems arise from power contest between US and China. Here Indonesia can swiftly play between the two powers and take the most from the balancing or rebalancing acts, just like how it has been playing since Suharto's leadership. However, if Indonesia seeks to actively contribute to shape the form of regional order in the midst of China-US contention, for whatever form, a constructive policy and active diplomacy are needed.

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RE-UNDERSTANDING BORDER AREA AS THE COMMON SPACE FOR INTRA STATES

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Abstract

In general, border was widely understood as the line between two states. The existing interests within that border area was therefore the representation of two states' interests. Any problems which occured in regards to the border area had potential influences in the two neighborhood states. This writing aimed to reveal the fact that the problems and interests in the border area could not only be the problem of the two neighborhood countries but also the external actor such as other states who had no overlapping border. This writing proposed the concept of common space as the strategic action to overcome any different perspective about border. A space managed together, in either planning or implementation, is hoped to minimize a number of conflicts in the border area. In addition, this concept is also expected to strengthen the relationship between the two neighborhood states and the external actors holding the mutual interests. Therefore we call it as the coomon space fot intra states

Keyword : common space, border area, border problem

INTRODUCTION

Border area often leads to the complex problems. Some of the potential problems happening are illegal migration, disintegration threat, conflict of natural resources ownership, and so on. Mostly, border conflict is often triggered by problems of understanding the territorial border, or any states' claim over particular area since the exact border remains unclear.

Apart from that, Indonesia has been recently trying to change its perception and policy in the border area. Security approach that used to be applied is no longer relevant now. Through the newly applied Prosperity Approach, the border area would therefore be the at main forefront. Also, there expected to be new policies in order to overcome the border problem.

By analysing the border understanding as the exact border between two neighborhood states, we would therefore understand whether or not the problems and interests in the border only belong to the two neighborhood states. Or, do other states have interests within? If the latter happened, the existing border diplomacy do not only need a bilateral effort but also a multilateral effort.

This writing aimed to portray an essential understanding of border to the states in search of potential alternatives solution of any border problem, more specifically with the case studies of Indonesian border with its neighbor, Malaysia and Australia. The stakeholders might have different perspectives about border. This circumstance could therefore lead to the different approach of undertaking actions in regards to the border. This writing also proposed the concept of *common space* as the strategic action to overcome any different perspective about border. A space managed together, in either planning or implementation, is hoped to minimize a number of conflicts in the border area and to accomodate all interests. In addition, this concept is also expected to strengthen the relationship between the two neighborhood states and the external actors holding the mutual interests.

UNDERSTANDING BORDER, HOW TO SET BORDER, AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN INDONESIA

Border is one of the most important

elements of the state. Nation-state is widely known as the existence of an eligible government, a group of citizen, and a territory with the exact border. Thus, the process of identifying nation state should be conducted by understanding its border area.

An introduction to the border understanding and the related terms could be useful in mapping the limit of both rights and duties of states in dealing with the importance of border area. Defining border could be derived from the ideas of Stephen B Jones about *Boundary Making* which emphasized on *Allocation, Delimitation, Demarcation, dan Administration*.

Allocation: itcovers the state's territory which includes the border area. International law has regulated the way in which state may possess or lose its territory. Indonesia interprets its territory as inherited by the Dutch during collonalization. It is in line with the principle of international law on *Uti Possidetis Juris*which stated that one state inherits its collonialist's territory, for instance the border agreement between West Borneo and Serawak which established an exact peg by based on the border area left by the collonialists.

Delimitation: after having set the territory up, the following step to do is identifying the overlapping claim over some particular areas which remains unclear.

Demarcation: this is step taken after delimitation by mostly applying border agreement. Demarcation is conducted in the ground. This is important as it becomes the beginning and the end of rights, duties, and state sovereignty. The demarcation is decided by putting signs and pegs along the borderlines as agreed by all parties.

Administration/ development management. Despite the last step conducted, it does not mean that administration could only be taken after the previous three steps accomplished. *Theory of Boundary Making*pointed that border area management could be overlapped or applied alongwith the process of establishing border and demarcation. It is logical as it takes a long time to deal with the problem solving processes and development in economic, social, culture, and politics. Besides, it also requires a process of understanding socialization to those living in the border area. For instance, after the demarcation has been set up, they may live separately with families living in the different administrative area, and possibly different nationalities. In this step, all national stakeholders also include within. Local government could participate actively in the border management.

Besides, there has been known the Maritime Border. The delimitation of maritime border is regulated under the Law of the Sea. The UN Conference has produced three conventions on the law of the sea notably known as *the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* /UNCLOS (Arsana, 2007:6).

In setting the border area, we could take an example on how Indonesian government considers its border. As an archipelagic state, Indonesia under international law possess various national borders in both the fully sovereigned border and the border with natural resources utilization (continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone).

*Archipelagic state principle*is the manifestation of Indonesian archipelagic vision *(wawasan nusantara)* which considers sea as the thing that unites all part of Indonesia, not the one that divides. According to this principle, Indonesian sea has widened from $100.000km^2$ to approximately $3.000.000km^2$. Indonesian sea holding a full sovereignty consists of Internal Waters, Archipelagic Sea or Indonesian Archipelagic Sea, and Territorial Sea.

However, the existing border definition reveals: that border area covers land area, sea and air above along the mutual border of two states would be based on the need and agreement of all parties involved. Also, Contiguous zone *(Kawasan Penyangga Perbatasan)* is also applied in order to forge a national security control from the flow of goods and individuals in Indonesian territory.

Geographically, Indonesia is the fifth largest states in the world separated by two big "matra"; at the sea with ten states: Australia,

Malaysia, Singapura, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Filipina, Palau, Papua New Guinea and East Timor; and in the land with three states: Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and East Timor.

Beside the land border, Indonesia also has the sea border. In order to set the sea border between two states, there are two concepts applied: Territorial Sea concept and Economic Exclusive Zone (Gatra, 2006:20). This is a set of law agreed under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea regulating the Territorial Sea concept and Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) accross 200 mil from the basic borderline in setting territorial sea border of particular state (Gatra, 2006:20).

According to the two points above, the model or conflict potential within the Territorial Sea would be different with the conflict in the Exclusive Economic Zone. Conflict in the Territorial Sea is the conflict in the use of ocean shore. Thus, it requires an ocean administration and applies sea "cadaster". Conflict in the Exclusive Economic Zone deals with the natural resources utilization such as fishing infringement. The states bound into the Exclusive Economic Zone has to apply the fishery zones and total allowable catch. Cadaster principle cannot be applied here in where an ocean administration should be easily understood with the strict supervision.

In the ocean, Additional Sea Zones has been added (OC Kaligis, 2003: 88).It covers the strategic value of the sea border with Additional Sea Zones of 12 mil from the sea surrounding in 12 mil. The 12 mil zone has helped Indonesia to supervise any problem dealing with customs, fiscal, imigration, and health (OC Kaligis, 2003: 165).

Beside the Territorial Sea, EEZ, and Additional Sea Zones, Rudolf Matindas has also added the fishery zones and continental shelf (OC Kaligis, 2003: 88).Fishery Zone is different with EEZ despite many states have now turned to use EEZ as their considerations. Fishery Zone usually only refers to the fish resources within its water colum. Continental Shelf is sea ground and its sea-bed and subsoil which has border with the sea ground under Territorial Sea until the maximum limit of 350 mil from baseline, or 100 mil from a depth of 2.500 m. In Continental Shelf, states have the sovereign rights to utilize and manage its natural resources (OC Kaligis, 2003: 67). According to 1973 Regulationnumber 1, Indonesian Continental Shelf is defined as the sea ground and its subsoil outsides Indonesian coean in a depth of 200 mor more (OC Kaligis, 2003: 69).

State border at the sea is therefore derived from drawing a Base Line which connects the furthest set of dots called as Base Point. These Base Points are decided through a hidography survey conducted by Hydro-Oceanography Agency of Indonesian Navy (OC Kaligis, 2003: 83).

POTENTIAL CONFLICT AND PROBLEMS IN THE BORDER AREA

Border is the manifestation of territorial power, therefore border area could also be understood as the area or separating lanes of political units (Balai Pustaka, 1999:98). This separation is phisically seen in Great Wall in China, Berlin Wall, Jerussalem Wall, Israel Wall, and so on. This physical separation therefore shows states' ownership toward some particular areas, alongwith all resources within such as natural resources, buildings, and people.

Ownership interest, usually based on sovereignty, is more likely to lead to conflict. In general, border problems can be identifed by based on these issues:

Territorial-geographic issue. It happened since agreement with the neighborhood states on land and sea borders have not been achieved. For instance, Indonesia and Malaysia have overlapping borders in some particular area. Malaysia, in its north part is bordered with Malacca Strait. In Singapore Strait, it has not achieved any agreement in dealing with Continental Shelf border over the South China Sea, Territorial Sea border, and continental shelf in the eastern part of Sebatik Island. Deciding border through the furthest islands consideration is not appropriate since Malaysia is not an archipelagic state.

Security and national sovereignty issue such as organized cross-border crimes such

as people smuggling, illegal trade (drugs, individual, raw materials) and the dispute area which remains unclear given the decrease of Indonesia national territory.

Border area concept also has social impacts. Administrative consideration has divided two group of people having same historical and cultural background. They are forced to live separatedly with different nationalities. It will then overlap with the problems of understanding border area for the native people as follows:

THE MODEL OF STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE BORDER AREA

Indeed, cooperation in dealing with common space and models of common space for intra space among states (intra states) have been conducted in other forms, for instance:

Spratly Islands, part of the South China Sea, located approximately 1.100 km in the southern part of Hainan Islands, China and 500 km in the northern part of Borneo Islands. Spratly Islands has a strategic spot which becomes a potential zone for military and defense spot, as well as international trade lanes. The South China Sea holds potentials in its economic, politics, and strategic given its importance as the main sea lanes of communications connecting India Ocean and Pacific Ocean. Therefore, the South China Sea becomes one of the busiest routes in the world since almost half of the international trade routes will have to cross this sea. In this area, there has been predicted an abundant amount of oil and natural gas with the number of 18 billion ton. These facts have led to the overlapping claim done by six states surrounding the South China Sea; China,Taiwan, Vietnam, The Philippines, Malaysia dan Brunei Darussalam. Indonesia declares to be a non-claimant state in this regard despite China's nine-dash line which includes Indonesian EEZ and continental shelf to become theirs. This claim will automatically include the Indonesia's potential gas resources in the Natuna Islands.

Beside the international border disputes, there is also territorial dispute in Indonesia: first, the Timor Gap. Timor Gap or Celah Timor is the continental shelf area that lies between East Timor and Australia. There was a join cooperation between Indonesia and Australia in exploring the oil and natural gas in this area when Timor Leste was part of Indonesia's province. In 1972, Indonesia and Australia signed the agreement of Timor seabed boundaries in which assigned as western part on Arafura Sea and southern part of Tanimbar Islands. This agreement extended the boundaries that previously determined in 1971 (Warsito, 2008: 73-74). Timor Gap bacame a strategic location because of its oil and natural gas reserves. Timor Gap was one of six locations that have big oil reserve beside the middle part of Timor Leste, Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, and Madagacar. The oil reserves contained in the Timor Gap is estimated at about 5 billion barrels and gas deposition about 50 billion cubic feet (Warsito, 2008: 76-78).

Second dispute is Elang Kakatua. The oil reservein this area was relativelly small, explored by oil company, Conoco Philips. When Timor Leste was part of Indonesia, 50 millions US$ of exploration revenue was devided between Indonesia and Australia. After the independece, Timor Leste replace Indonesia in this profit share.

Third, Bayu Udan. This reservoir was rich of liquid natural gas and also explored by Conoco Phillips. Since its production in 2004 with target of exploration for 20 years, Timor Leste is expected to earn 1.8 millions US$.

Fourth, Greater Sunrise. Natural gas reserve in Greater Sunrise was twice of Bayu Udan's. 20% of this reservoir area was managed under Joint Petroleum Development Area or *Wilayah PengembanganMinyakBersama,* while 80% of the area managed by Australia, although claimed by Timor Leste.

Fifth, Laminaria-Corralina. This oilfield was explored by Woddside and located outside the Joint Petroleum Development Area, however, the location is close to Timor Leste. This oilfield was claimed by both Timor Leste and Australia.

Sixth, Berikat Area. Berikat area is an estate, place or area in which within its

border performed in manufacturing activities of goods and materials, activities of design, engineering, sorting, initial inspection, final inspection and packing of goods and materials imported or goods and materials from Indonesian customs area or *Daerah Pabean Indonesia Lainnya (DPIL),* which results mainly for export purposes. Although this area is neither join development area nor place near the state border, through this example, it will show the special treatment applied to this area. The special treatment allows some parole to enter and remove goods activities. Included also in this group is the Customs Area. Customs area is an area with certain limits in sea ports, airports, and other places which were assigned for export and import goods under the Direktorat Jenderal Bea dan Cukai sulveilance.

The cases above showed that the management of natural resources are mostly for economic purpose, because of people can see the direct economic benefits through its masive national revenue. Until nowadays, oil is used as important source of power plants, and other production and consumption activities of humans. The availability of oil and enegy balance, and also its distribution is unwell distributed through the world, it makes the oil become a very important commodity and has strategic value in economy and politics. Oil has relation with important matters, such as inflation, economic growth, unemployment, trade and foreign policy orientation of a state. In result, anything that has relation with oil and natural gas, will be the top priority issue in both exporter and importer countries. Because of this benefits, the border land which has abundant natural resources will be an interesting object for the countries sharing the border to be disputed or became join cooperation.

BORDER AREA IS A COMMON SPACE INTRA SPACE FOR MANY STATES (INTRA STATES), NOT ONLY BETWEEN TWO STATES

As written before, this paper would try to explore the posibility of border dispute as not only about the interests of two states who share the same border, but also can involve multiple states who do not have direct border. To explain this phenomena, the writer will show from the case below:

First, wars that happened in Arab countries caused masive waves of refugees. The continuity of war in Syria cause the emergence of refugees management issue in several states in Middle East and Europe. Civilians in Syria have to take refuge to the safe zone and non-fly zone that have been agreed between the disputants. Most of the refugees fled to Turkey because of Erdogan, president of Turkey, applied open door policy that believed to provide betterment for the Syrian refugees. This policy is not applied in other countries arround Syria, such as Israel, Quwait, and Saudi Arabia. Although the flow of refugees could cause another problem for Turkey, as in some regions the Syrian refugees have outnumber the local people.

Turkey become the destination for the refugees as Turkey can be the entrance gate to European countries. In Europe, the refugees expect to get asylum status. In some Middle East countries have strict regulation about asylum seeker, except for staying in refugee camps. This strict regulation in some countries like Oman, Quwait, and Qatar, was caused by imbalace composition of local people and foreign worker for South Asia. Turkey became a transit place for refugees before they go to Europe because the realised that Turkey could not afford to accpet more refugees from Syria, as previously Turkey also became the destination for another refugees from Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no employment and proper life if these refugees keep staying at the refugee camps, unless they cross to Europe to seek for asylum.

Another factor that made Turkey as the main refugee route, although there is Egypt that can be the route to Europe, is not only because the open door policy of Tukey and asylum status offered by some European countries might varies based on the route they took, but also because of the refugee route in Lebanon has been closed since last October. The government of Lebanon decided to close the route because of the

number of refugees were already burdenizing the country. Meanwhile, the government of Jordania also found difficulty in dealing with the refugees, and resulting in bad condition of refugees in camps. Jordania was not a good place for transit as Saudi Arabia and Quwait do not give any asylum. Beside the asylum issue, there is also sectarian issue that will bring more difficulty for Saudi Arabia and Quwait, so the flow of refugees stoped at Jordania.

The space for Syrian refugees did not automatically given, but because it was a political commodity among the European states. Angela Merkel called for other influential politicians in Europe to be more open in their border policy and more supportive to the Syrian refugees, based on the quota calculation that the increasing number of the refugees was unavoidable. However, this noble idea can be failed if Hungary's plan to build 1,755 kilometeres of wall were implemented and refusal policy toward refugees were signed. Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister stated that the presence of refugee would bring more harm for the state's economy and security. This wall is planed to block the flow of refugees using the Serbia-Hungary route before continuing the journey to more prosperous counties like German and France. Hungary insisted theta they have the right to protect their country from the potential domestic disruption.

German became the favorite destinations for asylum seekers since this country givesa bigger quota for refugees than other European countries. This policy, according to Washington Post and BBC, is a win-win solution for the demographic problem of German in which this country needs young and skilled labors. In its demographic data, in near future German will lack of labors to fill the need of the industry.

Another example of refugee case and border problems also happened in Southeast Asia. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Indonesia stated that there is an increasing number of refugees came to Indonesia in the recent years. The Head of UNHCR representation in Indonesia, Thomas Vargas, predicted the increasing number of refugees was caused by several problems. First is the conflict in several countries. The conflicts in Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Syria are more unlikely close to an end. There is a cycle when ships are more to be used to ship the refugees between October to May. Outside of this season, the flows of refugees are lower because of the climate and weather. The ship accomodated people with different background, migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. They all fled with different motives and purposes. UNHCR data showed that until June 2015 there are 13,188 people who became their concern. Among those people, 5,277 of them are refugees and 7,911 are asylum seekers. Most of them fled from the conflict and human right violation in their coutries such as Afghanistan, Myanmar, Somali, Iran, and Iraq.

Facing this problem, Indonesia is considering to provide one island to proceed the refugees who were captured on their way to Australia. This effort makes Indonesia the third country that offered assistance regarding the strict Australia's immigration policy.

The Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Security stated that the government has already created a small team to discuss the probability of providing an island for the refugees, and ask Australia government to fund this project. The discussion that planned to be held at the end of 2015 will also discuss about terrorism and trading issues.

The refugee problem is a serious problem faced by the government of Indonesia and Australia. The relation of both countries became tense as Tony Abbot sending back the ships full of asylum seekers to Indonesia. This policy became popular in Australia, however irritated the Indonesia government who saw this problem as violation of sovereignty. Regarding to the refugees form Myanmar and Bangladesh, Indonesia called for international community to share the burden in helping the refugees.

Related to the refugee problem, Australia received many critics from United Nations and other Human Rights groups about its hardline policy in dealing with

refugee. Since 2012, Australia sent the refugees who came by boats to the camp in Nauru, an reported that there were attacks and systematic violation toward to refugees. Other than that, there is also camp in Manus Island in Papua New Guinea where Australia built refugee camps in this island. Papua New Guinea government stated that the refuges were hold in these controvertial camps and will be settled in this island. Despite of the under spotlighttreatment regarding Australia's action towards the refugees in this island, the refugees were forbidden to enter the Australian territory regardless their status as refugees.

Since the camp was opened in Manus island under the instruction of Labor Party three years ago, about 50 of asylum seekers were accepted. And based on the immigration data, more than 900 men were hold in Manus island, and about 600 men, women, and children wer hold in Nauru. The people in Manus island were placed, accomodated, and funded by the Australian government, but were not permitted to work and leave the island.

Since the processing camp in Manus Islands has been opened by Australian Labor Party 3 years ago, there have been reported around 50 asylum seekers whose applications are accepted. However, there are more than 900 men under detention in Mnaus Islands, 600 men, women, and children are under detention in Nauru. Those under detention in Manus get financial support from Australia despite the regulation for not being able to work. They may leave the home but remain staying at this island.

Thus, what would be the lesson learned? Indeed, border area is not only about interests representation of two neighborhood states. There may have been external actors involved within. Not only Europe who get the impacts of Turkey's opening border policy, but also Oman, Quwait, and Qatar.

Australia relies heavily on the border security system in all parts of Indonesian in dealing with refugee problems and its negative impacts to their nations.

Australia also needs Papua New Guinea in order to provide a shelter to those refugees who want to migrate to Australia.

Then, we could say that border area is a common space for intra states, not only between states. It needs a careful attention, support, and cooperation from many states surrounding the border zones. Therefore, border diplomacy needs to be conducted not only through bilateral effort but also multilateral effort.

There is no other reason for the local government and the other governments to avoid dealing with development in that area. Government are obliged to develop the area under a cooperative framework between two states, and even in the intra state.

In the future, if the bilateral cooperation in the border area could run smoothly, it could therefore be adopted into multilateral cooperation especially to the states who have border problem in regional level.

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BUSINESSPEOPLE CO-OPTATION IN CHINA'S COMMUNIST PARTY ADAPTION

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Abstract:

The co-optation of businesspeople is an interesting phenomenon in the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) institutionalization. Involvement of the rich and wealthy not only contradicts the party's ideology of egalitarianism but is also strictly prohibited due to the Tiananmen incident in 1989. However, because of the massive development of Chinese social and economical landscape, businesspeople emerge as an important social base of civil society. They possess abundant economical resource and hold an important role in the Chinese society as capital owner. The CCP is aware of this situation and therefore attempt to involve businesspeople in political process through co-optation. The CCP implements co-optation to involve businesspeople in political process. The co-optation was recognized since the 16th National Party Congress in 2002, during the Jiang Zemin administration. As China's economic and political setting become more complex, ideology alone is not enough to sustain the CCP's power. A new structurized mechanism was required to guarantee that it remains as a legitimate ruler. The co-optation is considered as an attempt of the CCP to assure regime's survival as well as to strengthen its legitimacy. The article will discuss how and why the CCP co-opts businesspeople into the party.

Keywords: co-optation, Chinese Communist Party, businessman, legitimacy.

CHINA'S ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND INTERNAL PARTY DYNAMIC

CCP's organizational complexity is an interesting phenomenon. Since 1949 until now, CCP is the ruling party of China. In 2015, CCP members are noted to be more than 85 million ar around 6% of China's population (Communist Party of China, 2013). As a party governing more than 1,3 trillion citizens, CCP is required to continuously renew its supporting basis. The socioeconomic complexity in contemporary China demands continuous regime adaptation for survival. Under the role of Mao, party cadres mostly consist farmers and labors. Nowadays, CCP's membership has expanded into various profession: labors, farmers, government officials, service providers, merchants, students, retiree, etc. Number of party cadres from trading and service sector is noted to be the second highest; 23,3% from total party members. This number exceeds the number of party cadres that works as labors, that is 8,5% from total party members (see diagram 2).

As the party composition turns more heterogenic, ideology basis alone is not sufficient to guarantee the party's legitimacy. A structured mechanism is required to sustain the party role. Institutionalization becomes CCP's main agenda to remain as a ruling party. To avoid power opposition, CCP builds corporate connection between the state and the private sector through involving businesspeople.

If we take a look at the history of CCP since its establishment in 1921, businesspeople is not a significant component in party's institutionalization. According to Mao Zedong, capitalisme is a crime; those "capitalist walkers" ought to be put away for good. During the rule of Mao, CCP's leadership is very centralized; Mao is a very domineering leader. His words is considered as law and those opposing it will be given consequences.

During Deng's leadership, China underwent massive economic growth. The private sector in China grows very rapidly during these times. The rapid economic growth brought implication on CCP's member

recruitment. Along with China's remarkable growth, government official are aware of the urgency to recruit competent and highly capable cadres; academia, technocrats, and also business people. By the end of 1980, business people are involved as party cadre. By that time, political participation given to business people is very limited. According to Industrial, Commercial Administration, and State Management Bureau, 15% of private enterprises are owned by party members. A survey conducted in 1989 involving businesspeople in Wenzhou showa that 31,7% of them are party members 17% are former party cadre (Dickson, 2003). This isn't without controversy. On one hand, recruitment towards businesspeople indicates the significant of China's middle class and CCP's effort to build a connection with them. Simbolically, this conveys the success of economic modernization. On the other hand, the emergence of businesspeople is a new phenomenon against CCP's tradition.

Having had a harmonious relation with businesspeople, CCP re-applied prohibition for businesspeople to be involved in party's activities due the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Businessman was accused in mobilizing mass that leads to the outbreak of the insident. This involved material and moral help given to the student demonstrants from Wang Runman, a former CEO of Beijing Stone Coorporation (Shambaugh, 2008; Fewnsmith, 2008). Tiananmen Incident 1989 becomes a wakeup call for the CCP that businesspeople possess resources to support democratization movement that may threaten the regime. As a result, CCP banned businesspeople from joining the party.

However, Chinese businesspeople are well trained citizens that possess resource for mass mobilization. Government are aware that suspicion and antipathy towards businesspeople will do more harm than good. This doesn't only indicates CCP's slow response in China's rapidly changing socioeconomic landscape, but also its failure in initiating political reform.

Three Represents by Jiang Zemin was adapted by CCP to adopt China's newly emerging social strata. CCP proclaims that it doesn't only recruit society based on their social standing. CCP's history confirmed that there has been some interesting changes regarding cadre recruitment. Having socialism ideology, proletariat interest wasn't only represented through labor recruitment; farmers, soldiers, and students were also noted as party members. Aside of that, CCP is highly selective in recruiting its members. Businesspeople must comply particular requirement to be able to join on board.

Since the implementation of Three Represents, business people's political participation in CCP continuously improves. From 1993 to 2004, businesspeople representation in CCP constantly increases; 13% in 1993, 17% in 1995, 20% in 1999, 30% in 2002, and 34% in 2004 (Li, 2009). According to CCP's Organizational Department's statistics in 2007, there are 3.180.000 party members working in private sector and 810.000 are entrepreneurs in commercial business and industry (China Today, 2007). In the opening of 18th National Party Congress, 8 November 2012 in Beijing, the number of businesspeople delegation was noted to increase, from 17 to 24 people (Xiajuan, 2012). They run strategic position, such as representative of People's Congress and also *Chinese People's Political Consultancy Conference.* Other interesting phenomenon is the kids of senior CCP members such as Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Zeng Qinghong that has a career in business sector.

For businesspeople, relation with CCP is a mutualism symbiosis; mutually beneficial. Business people's political participation is strongly encouraged by economical motives. As mentioned in previous researchs, China's businesspeople aren't interested to be political transformation agents, neither thorough internal system change nor collective persuasion act (Li, 2009; Shambaugh, 2008 ; Dickson, 2003; Dickson & Rublee, 2000; Zheng & Yang, 2009; Guiheux, 2006). Business people's concern is the correlation between political stability and economic growth. Businesspeople are

interested to contribute in creating stable political environment to foster economic development. The longer businesspeople are involved in political participation, the more they believe that the rich and wealthy should be more involved in decision making process (Dickson, 2003). Businesspeople perceive that their involvement in CCP will support their economic activities. Below are some of the richest Chinese businesspeople that possess CCP's membership.

Table 2. Businesspeople with CCP Membership

Name	Company	Wealth (in US$ trillion)
Robin Li	Baidu	14,7
Ma Huateng	Tencent Holdings Ltd.	14,4
Lei Jun	Xiaomi	13,5
Wang Jianlin	Dalian Wanda Group	13,2
Li Hejun	Hanergy Holdings	13
Zong Qinghou	Hangzhou Wahaha Group	11,7
Guo Guangchang	Fosun International	9,5
Liu Yunghao	New Hope Liuhe Co	6
Liang Wengen	Sany Group	5,7

Data obtained from 'China Rich List,' *Forbes*, 28 October 2014; 'China's Richer than Romney Lawmakers Reveal Reform Challenge,' *Bloomberg*, 7 March 2013; '5 of China's 10 Wealthiest to Take Part in Key Political Meetings,' *Business Insider*, 2 March 2015.

Chinese businesspeople are rarely against decision/policy preference government officials. Economical growth excited businesspeople way more than the prospect of democratization. Businesspeople tend to support policy innovation that is launched by government instead on initiating new political policy innovation. Businesspeople are looking forward to be government's partner instead of their opposition. Business people's orientation is economic interest, not politics. CCP's existence benefits businessmen ; as China's government constantly aims economic growth and boosts investment.

According to Xiaolin Duan, CCP nowadays is no longer a dictatorship regime, it is a *"benign authoritarian"* that considers social stability and most suitable policy to promote economic development (Duan,

2015). Businesspeople aren't looking forward to change China's political system . Connection that business people possess enable them to channel their economical influence in political activities. This popular support basis doesn't only benefit businesspeople but also CCP. Businesspeople are pleased to obtain political acknowledgement. While CCP elites benefit with the presence of businesspeople that improves Party's credibility in people's eye. The more heterogenic support basis, the stronger legitimacy a government possess. CCP manages good relation with businesspeople. Inviting them to seminars and trainings are very simple things to do. Party elites needn't put a lot of energy on doing this. Aside from consolidating CCP's credibility, businesspeople co-optation also enable CCP to control social process through involving relevant actors.

BUSINESSPEOPLE CO-OPTATION INTO THE PARTY

Cooptation is an institutional strategy done by CCP to remain in power. Co-optation is an effort to win support from particular groups through assimilation. In the context of CCP regime, co-optation is done to manifest political control and nurture its ruling period. Businesspeople involvement in the party definitely increases CCP's recourse, as there are membership retribution and other administrative requirement. CCP wants to control China's society by involving as many relevant actors as possible, including businesspeople.

During Jiang Zemin's era, relation between CCP and businesspeople develops rapidly. Businesspeople's significance in the social ladder brought various political implications. Instead of marginalizing businesspeople, Jiang Zemin aims to actively involve them in various political process. Businesspeople's involvement in CCP was officially regulated in party constitution implemented in July 2001. According to Dickson, around 200.000 businesspeople apply for membership after Jiang Zemin's official announcement. This idea was named *Three Represents (sange daibao),* a concept

later on adapted to be party's constitution. Jiang Zemin's idea was adapted as a constitution.

Jiang Zemin withdraws the ban of for businesspeople to be involved in party membership and implement regulation to justify their political participation. This controversial idea withdraw loud protest from orthodox CCP elites. A group of rich and wealthy people in a party which ideology is egalitarianism is a very odd concept. In such condition, Jiang attempts to adapt CCP in order to attain stable organizational mechanism and value. Jiang Zemin introduces a new doctrine named "*Three Represents*". Jiang Zemin's agenda through *Three Represents* is to improve economy productivity, filter incoming western culture, and increase a broader social class representation. Specifically, in the third point related with *representing the large majority of Chinese people,* Jiang Zemin refers to the co-optation of businesspeople and adding party membership. Jiang Zemin is aware that the entrepreneurs and company owners cannot be represented properly without the right of party membership. Therefore, Jiang Zemin wants to broaden the concept of mass by inducing emerging social strata: businesspeople. Jiang Zemin believes that *"Most of these people in the new social strata have contributed to the development of productive forces and are working for building socialism ... The party needs to accept those outstanding elements from other sectors of society"* (Jiang, 2001).

According to China's law, private businesspeople are allowed to be involved in CCP while undergoing their business activities. (Duan, 2015). Businesspeople involvement in CCP is under the social organization run by CCP. Business people's position in party hierarchy is different with government official. Unlike CCP's openness towards businesspeople, government officials aren't allowed to run business. CCP members who are willing to set up their business are required to leave their position in the party.

Co-optation towards businesspeople advances CCP's adaptability. When an organization build relation with other organization outside its environment, its adaptability is facilitated. Relation with external environment will push the inflow of information, draw support, and strengthen CCP's legitimacy. This connection enables CCP to control society without resorting to coercive means. Both CCP and businesspeople can articulate their interest. Later on, clash of interest could be managed by CCP. This effort shows CCP's willingness to accommodate various class interest in a complex society. Instead of using symbol and propaganda to gain popular support, CCP nowadays manipulate public organization used to interact with state, including businesspeople association (Dickson, 2000).

Recruitment of businesspeople into CCP brought implication to its institutional complexity. The more members in a unit, it will be the higher level of institutionalization. Co-optation towards businesspeople is an effective means to ensure their loyalty to the party. Businesspeople are involved in various CCP organizational structures, from *township, county, municipal, provincial,* until *national.* There is a tendency for businesspeople to fill crucial posts in local government hierarchy, for example as head of village. Involving businesspeople in the party hierarchy makes it easier for CCP to control them. Furthermore, networking between CCP and external environment will facilitate CCP's adaptation.

Co-optation towards businesspeople isn't done without turbulence. Resistance tend to come from the Maoist group in CCP. The concern is that organization may be threatened if co-opted actor's goals aint inline with organization. Organization may get required support. However, it cannot stick with its initial mission. Those against co-optation refer to norms and tradition as a legal formal basis to justify its resistance. Maoists are concerned that business people's autonomy in managing economic assets will weaken institutional pillars in communism system. Independent civil society will be less dependent to its government. Ruling party's control will be decreased.

The presence of rich people in CCP is contradictory with the party's proletariat

idea. As consequence, arise the question on party's identity and norm. The increase of wealth in the party may lead to the increase of corruption, luxurious lifestyle, and also admiration towards capitalistic (Dickson, 2003). Businesspeople are exploiter of labors. CCP is protector of the labors. Ideally, Businesspeople and CCP aren't on the same board. Allowing a group of exploiter to enter party membership conveys program inconsistence of party's mission and tradition.

Jiang Zemin received a lot of critiques regarding party's cohesiveness. Critics came from orthodox/Maoist party elites. They perceive business involvement is against party ideology and therefore it is harmful. One of the critics came from Jilin's Party Secretary Deputy, Lin Yanzhi:

> If we allow private entrepreneurs (to join the party), it would create serious conceptual chaos within the party, and destroy the unified foundation of the political thought of the party that is now united, and destroy the baseline of what the party is able to accommodate in terms of its advanced class nature ... The party name, the party constitution, and the party platform all would have to be changed.

Other critics come from Zhang Dejiang who thinks that businesspeople are representative of civil society that may weaken CCP's control capacity and power: *"If (private entrepreneurs) are allowed into the party, some of them may even use their economic strength to stage-manage grassroots level elections and control grass roots organization. This will have serious political ramifications."*

The Maoist party elites not only criticize businessman involvement in party. They also criticize Jiang Zemin's leadership style. Jiang Zemin is deemed to be against party discipline for implementing *"Three Represents"* without consulting Central Committee and Politburo. Involvement of businesspeople in CCP very likely hampers elite synergy. Jiang Zemin was expected to prove that his recommendation is a right step to keep party's integration.

Related with organizational autonomy, it is crucial for the party to build a protective mechanism to prevent and limit the implication from newly recruited groups. By co-opting businesspeople into the party's hierarchy, Jiang Zemin prevents them from joining movements that threatens regime's existence. Businesspeople have resource to mobilize China's society. Businesspeople may initiate opposition movement to impeach government. However, this wasn't the case. It didn't happen. In particular opportunities, businesspeople tend to criticize government policy, especially when it is related with economic issues. Nevertheless, businesspeople tend not to use their position in political movement to actively protest China's government. China's rapid economic growth put both CCP and businesspeople in the same boat. Such harmony grows not because CCP adapt their perspective from the pressure of businesspeople. It is businesspeople whom adjust their perspective to comply CCP's. Relation with businesspeople strengthens party with new identity.

In January 2003, CCP appointed Yin Mingshan, one China's wealthiest businessman, as the Party deputy in Chongqing. Yin, owner of Chongqing Lifan Industry Group, signed up to obtain CCP's membership in 2002 (The Economist, 2003). He is the first private entrepreneur which obtains a high position. Yin admits that he expect a friendlier investment climate for private entrepreneur. Despite of China's rapid economic growth, it is very hard for businesspeople to obtain credits from central bank. Business people's position as party elites don't automatically give them significant political authority. However, this indicates a starting point for private sector's further contribution in decision making process.

As mentioned in *"Three Represents,"* admission criteria for party cadres have grown to be more technical and pragmatic. The main criteria to admit a person into the party are whether he or she works hard wholeheartedly for the implementation of the party's line and program and meets the requirement for the party leadership. The so called criteria emphasizes on loyalty and performances without limitation for particular class or profession. Business people's productivity

becomes an extra point in the context of party membership. It should be noted that businesspeople are requires to pay a certain number of tax and invest in production sector to be accepted as party member (Bakken, 2002).

In the case of CCP, change is implemented to strengthen the system rather than to change the system. Such change is initiated by party elites. CCP holds enormous power to implement change. As an organization, CCP has a set of functioning and coordinating components to run governmental functions. In respond to the emergence of businesspeople, instead of perceiving them as a threat, CCP attempts to co-opt them systematically. Co-optation is a long term adaptation strategy underwent by CCP in accelerating its capacity to overcome threat. Co-optation is a strategy of CCP to promote the best people, including businesspeople, that is near with change. CCP's support towards businesspeople will later on strengthen CCP's ideology basis. As an adaptation strategy, co-optation enables CCP to be more responsive and integrated with external environment. Organization co-opts actors deemed crucial to access resource that supports their survival. This point will be explained below:

Firstly, businessmen is a significant social strata. Rapid growth of China's economy brought various social and economical implications; this includes the emergence private businesspeople. Post economic reform, society's living standards increased. As a result, more businesspeople emerge. To respond the rapid economic growth, CCP requires cadres with excellent technical competence and managerial skills. Managing the state has become more complex, that it is hard for labors and farmers cadres to comply. Alienation towards businesspeople will be harmful for CCP. Businesspeople will seek for other means to accommodate their interest which China's government failed to accommodate. If businesspeople feel that their interest isn't properly accommodated by government, businesspeople will seek other alternative to aggregate their interests, like

refusing to pay tax or setting up other mass organization against the government. As this is what happened in Tiananmen Incident 1989. Businesspeople co-optation by CCP is motivated by a very pragmatic idea, that is to sustain regime's survival, not to improve civil society representative.

The ssecond is co-optation to sustain CCP's legitimacy. With the increasing complexity of contemporary Chinese society, ideological justification alone is not enough to guarantee the legitimacy of the ruling party. Efforts need to be structured and planned to maintain the continuity of the organization. Legitimacy is the foundation of government power. Co-optation is an organizational strategy undertaken by the CCP to maintain monopoly power. CCP seeks to be responsive to political and economic dynamics of contemporary China, including embracing businessmen in the party organization. Without the congruence between public trust with the rules of the regime, government is likely to fail. Conversely, when society's expectations of government are met, public trust will increase. Without representation of important social strata, it will be difficult for the CCP to mobilize public support. This is in line with the goal of "tongzhan", involving as many people in the political process. More and more members of the heterogeneity of social background will further strengthen the legitimacy of the party.

Thirdly, the CCP wanted a change from within the system, not against the system. CCP aims to survive as the ruling party. Thus, CCP elites ought to initiate the changes. During the establishment of the CCP, the involvement of a group of rich people in an organization which ideology is egalitarianism will obviously not happen. However, along with the contemporary political situation in Chinese economy, this becomes inevitable. Cooptation of the business means opening the party to new ideas and concepts. For the CCP, strengthened relations with business people will strengthen its legitimacy and ensure the availability of human and material resources. More rich people are involved in the party means more revenue. This cooptation

benefits businesspeople. They gain access to resources that had been reserved for members of the party: Faster liquid accounts, the ease of paying taxes, the ease of taking care of business licenses, and others (Duan, 2015). CCP and businesspeople relation is a mutually beneficial symbiosis.

Forth, CCP is conscious of the potential threat from businesspeople. Businesspeople is considered as a threat towards CCP's legitimacy related with domination, ideology, administrative authority, and moral standards (Yang, 2002). Business people's economical interest gives them orientation towards liberalization and free market economy that is related democracy and liberalism. This is CCP's major concern; as CCP is a non democratic government. Tiananmen incident in 1989 becomes a note for CCP related with business people's capability in fostering democratization. On the other hand, if China's government exceeds in intervening the market, for an example in the case of licensing, businesspeople become opportunists. Businesspeople attempts to maximize the profit that will cause CCP politicians become more opportunists. Business people's attempt in maximizing profit will turn CCP politicians more corrupt. Business people's profit seeking behavior becomes and opportunity for party members to offer the easiest solution with particular incentive (Duan, 2015). Corruption of public sector to attain private gains is a polemic that haunts CCP. Corruption causes system imbalance, an system imbalance clearly can't stand the hand of time.

CONCLUSION

Co-optation towards businesspeople is CCP's means of institutional adaptation. CCP is demanded to adapt itself with China's contemporary setting in order to sustain its domination as ruling party. To avoid reformation from outside the party, CCP initiates reform from the inside. Transformation is done systematically to behold party's conduciveness. Adaptation efforts done by CCP conveys ruling elites' responsiveness in tackling obstacles and solving contemporary complexities.

Author believes that CCP maintain is political domination using four indicators. The firstis adaptability. Relation with businesspeople enables CCP to obtain inflow of information and manage collective interest peacefully. Business people's involvement in the political process shows CCP's effort to accommodate various society interest that has become more heterogenic and complex. The ssecond is institutional complexity. Businesspeople co-optation is a means of CCP to ensure business people's loyalty to the ruling party. Businesspeople are involved in various level of organizational hierarchy. The third is sustaining party's cohesiveness. Businesspeople admission in party structure weren't openly supported by all party members. Some Maoist elites are concerned that new norms and values from businesspeople will ruin party member's synergy. Forth, organizational autonomy. Autonomy limita and neutralize complexity of new recruits. Co-optation towards businesspeople prevent them from joining movements that threatens regime's existence. Businesspeople tend to harmonize their perspective with China's government.

Co-optation towards businesspeople is done by CCP to strengthen the system. Authors discover CCP's motivations in co-opting businesspeople. The first is businesspeople is a crucial social strata. Therefore, businesspeople possess both economical and social capital to mobilize society. CCP requires cadres with high technical an managerial skills in order to adapt with China's contemporary socioeconomically landscape. Second, co-optation is done to sustain CCP's legitimacy. Business people's involvement in political process increases their credibility. The more heterogenic society channeling their support for CCP, the stronger CCP's legitimacy will be. Third, CCP wants change to happen from inside the system, not against the system. CCP wants to control socioeconomic dynamics by involving as many relevant actors as possible. As businesspeople are part of society that is mostly open to changes, CCP aims to obtain

new knowledge and ideas by welcoming them abroad. Forth, CCP notices the potential threat coming from businesspeople. Co-optation towards businesspeople enables CCP to prevent them from joining association outside the party that counters its agenda.

Relation between CCP and businesspeople is a mutually beneficial symbiosis, not interdependence. The relations benefits both CCP as well as businesspeople. CCP's aim in co-opting businesspeople is to sustain the regime's domination. As for businesspeople, political participation is motivated from their economic interest.

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A MORE DOMESTIC ORIENTATION IN INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT JOKOWI

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Abstract

This paper argues that a more domestic orientation of Indonesian foreign policy has strongly remarked the Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo's diplomacy. Presidential change from Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) to Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo has remarked potential shifts in the way the country has practiced its diplomacy towards others. Different from SBY's government, the newly elected president has gradually taken more attention to domestic orientation. While maintaining SBY's achievement on international activism of Indonesian diplomacy, Jokowi's government seeks to find a new space for filling the gap that the previous government seemed to be ignored, that is domestic orientation. With the domestic orientation, President Jokowi would promote Indonesia as the global maritime axis. In doing so, Indonesia has used its international position for increasing its national economic interests and political sovereignty. By analyzing the importance of nexus between democratic domestic politics and foreign policy, this paper explains two cases on vessel sinks and death penalty. These cases have actually reflected a more domestic orientation of Indonesian foreign policy and significantly contributed to the reorientation of Indonesia's foreign policy under the Jokowi government. Although democratisation has diversified actors in formulating foreign policy, the case of Indonesia interestingly also shows the importance of President in determining its foreign policy. Finally, the shift of orientation in Indonesian foreign policy has strengthened the link between domestic political changes in foreign policy.

Keywords: *Indonesia's foreign policy, domestic orientation, death penalty, sinking boat, Jokowi's government.*

INTRODUCTION

Since taking office a year ago, Indonesian President Joko Widodo has pursued a stridently different style of foreign policy that marks a departure from the multilateralism of his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY).[1] In his inauguration address in October 2014, Jokowi stated that Indonesia, as the third-most populous democracy, the most populous Muslim-majority country and the largest economy in Southeast Asia, would keep pursuing the "free and active" foreign policy of old, but backed by stronger defensive capabilities. By strengthening the importance of global maritime fulcrum as the new orientation of his foreign policy[2], President Jokowi also stressed the importance of his so-called Nawa Cita program, which included calls to build up a credible national security and defense infrastructure. He also mentioned the importance of modernizing the Indonesian Military (TNI)'s outdated equipment and the need to strengthen the national defense industry.[3]

Indonesia today is more assertive in defending its sovereignty and national interests. The free and active foreign policy has been reinterpreted. Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono the policy was interpreted as "a thousand friends, zero enemies". Now, the

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1   Jonathan Pincus, "Widodo's foreign policy drifts towards Sukarnoism", October 12, 2015, http:// asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Widodo-s-foreign-policy-drifts-towards-Sukarnoism, accessed 25 November 2015.
2   See Retno LP Marsudi, "Diplomasi Poros Maritim

Indonesia", harian *Kompas*, 19 September 2014; Rene L. Pattiradjawane, "Maritim Dunia Presiden Jokowi", harian *Kompas*, 23 Oktober 2014.
3   Asrudin Azwar & Yohanes Sulaiman, "One Year On, Jokowi's Foreign Policy Still Lacks Purpose,"http:// jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/opinion/commentary-one-year-jokowis-foreign-policy-still-lacks-purpose/, accessed 20 November 2015.

policy has been reinterpreted to become "all nations are friends until Indonesia's sovereignty is degraded and national interests are jeopardized".[4] The reinterpretation is not to say that president Yudhoyono was wrong, but it was needed to make Indonesia's role at the international level visible.[5] The new interpretation of a free and active foreign policy is shown in two accounts: Sinking foreign ships that commit illegal fishing in Indonesian waters and death penalty for drug-related offenders.

While maintaining SBY's achievement on international activism of Indonesian diplomacy, Jokowi's government seeks to find a new space for filling the gap that the previous government seemed to be ignored, that is domestic orientation. With the domestic orientation, President Jokowi has used its international position for increasing its national economic interests and political sovereignty. Taking into account the nexus between democratic domestic politics and foreign policy in recent Indonesia, this paper explains two cases on vessel sinks and death penalty in order to reflect a more domestic orientation of Indonesian foreign policy. Finally this paper argues that the shift of orientation in Indonesia's foreign policy has strengthened the role of President in determining its foreign policy.

SHIFTING ORIENTATION OF INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Indonesia has been rising and is on its way to becoming a major regional and global actor. This has become a challenge for President Jokowi's administration. Thus, it is imperative that Indonesia develop a new interpretation of free and active foreign policy.[6] The new interpretation would take into account the diverse political interests of its neighbors and would engage in international relations, which can respond to the fast-changing geopolitical map. However, just like any other country, Indonesia also has its own interests and must take into account the aspirations of its people.

An assertive foreign policy may be interpreted by other countries as nationalistic and a self-centered foreign policy. Today's Indonesia is very different from what it used to be. Its emerging economy coupled with the doctrines of sovereignty and national interests has given confidence, leading to a more assertive stance. It knows what it wants and is willing to strive to get it. When it comes to national interest, the administration is unwilling to negotiate and ready to confront whatever or whoever stands in its way. Furthermore, countries must understand that the new shape of foreign policy is not merely what President Jokowi desires, but it is the aspiration of the people. Jokowi's asserted that Indonesia's foreign policy must "bring diplomacy back to earth" (diplomasi membumi).[7] In a growing democracy, citizens have more say in shaping Indonesia's relations with other countries compared to the past. Thus, Indonesia's assertive foreign policy has taken into account what the public wants. Most of Jokowi's policies mentioned above, such as sinking foreign ships that commit illegal fishing and executions of drug kingpins, were widely supported by the Indonesian public.[8]

Considering the promise of a Global Maritime Axis and the fact that Indonesia indeed occupies a very important geostrategic space at a time when the world is witnessing a shift to a "Pacific Century" and growing economic and political importance of this region, the foreign policy accomplishments of Jokowi's administration so far have been underwhelming.[9] Indonesia could play a

4   Hikmahanto Juwana, "Insight: Jokowi's foreign policy: Assertive or nationalistic?" June 25 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/06/25/insight-jokowi-s-foreign-policy-assertive-or-nationalistic.html, accessed 20 November 2015.
5   Ludiro Madu, "Reorientasi Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia pada Pemerintahan Joko Widodo, 2014-2019", Transnasional: Journal of International Relations, Universitas Budi Luhur, Jakarta, Vol. 9, No. 2, December 2014, pp.104-17.
6   Ibid.

7   Aaron L. Connelly, "Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo's Foreign Policy Challenges", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2015, p.6.
8   Juwana, op.cit.
9   Rizal Sukma, "Gagasan Poros Maritim", Kompas, August 21, 2014

much more important role in the region and beyond, but for that to happen the president and his aides should craft coherent and persuasive long-term strategies. Taking the nation's foreign relations seriously would be good start.[10]

Jokowi's actions contrast with former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's motto of "a million friends and zero enemies," where Indonesia kept a low profile despite being Southeast Asia's largest economy and the world's fourth-most populous nation. While Jokowi may want Indonesia to be more visible, a proactive foreign policy could also distract him from an ambitious agenda to revive economic growth at home.[11] President Jokowi started stepping away from his predecessor's foreign policy of keeping everyone happy. Jokowi, criticized the United Nations and International Monetary Fund at the Asian African Conference in Jakarta. He pledged to increase defense spending, ordered foreign boats seized for illegal fishing to be destroyed, and declined to pardon two Australian drug smugglers facing a firing squad, leading to warnings of damaged ties. In addition, Jokowi seems unafraid of making enemies to further domestic priorities, whereas it would be unthinkable for Yudhoyono to criticize the IMF and the UN.[12] Jokowi looked to be more relaxed and confident as he was flanked by the leaders of China and Japan during the conference in Jakarta, as he woos foreign capital to help fund his 7 percent economic growth target. That compared with his early

forays on the regional stage -- including the G-20 summit in Brisbane in November 2014 soon after he took office -- where he appeared ill at ease and said little in public.[13]

Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor of international law and relations at the University of Indonesia thinks the current inward focus of Indonesia's foreign policy under Jokowi is a counteraction to that of the SBY administration. Indonesia's international roles during the SBY and Marty era were appreciated by the public, but the local public ---SBYs own constituents--- wanted something more concrete or 'down to earth' and give real benefit to Indonesian society. During SBY's government, Indonesia's regional and internal roles are not something concrete to them. On the other hand, Jokowi wants to give something real to the people, thus the attention to Indonesian migrant workers and Indonesian crew members in South Korea, to show the Indonesian people that the cabinet was really working.[14] By implementing different foreign policy from SBY's, it does not mean that Jokowi must abandon its international roles.[15]

Reorientation of Indonesia's foreign policy also increased the idea of nationalism. This idea has always been in Indonesian politics because it is a notion that would sell well. During presidential campaigns in 2014, both candidates championed the nationalism idea in their own way.[16] For Jokowi's campaign, the nationalism pitch was always going to be there whether he liked it or not because of his Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) party's strong nationalistic sentiments. According to Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, Jokowi's foreign policy is not reflecting a narrow nationalism, but was more results-driven and people-oriented. In her special remark at the Washington DC.,

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10   Azwar & Sulaiman, *op.cit*.
11   "Indonesia's Foreign Policy Turns Domestic Under Jokowi," http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu. com/news/indonesias-foreign-policy-turns-domestic-jokowi/, accessed 25 November 2015.
12   That compares with Jokowi's rhetoric that harks back to Sukarno, the nation's first president and father of the head of Jokowi's political party, who helped initiate the Asian African Conference in West Java in 1955. The meeting presented a united front against colonialism and laid the groundwork for the non-aligned movement, a group of states not formally allied with any major bloc during the Cold War. See Pincus, op.cit.; Frederic Camroux David, "Jokowi's Indonesia: Executions, Diplomacy and the Sukarnoist Turn", Les analyses du CERI, 21/05/2015, http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/fr/content/jokowi-s-indonesia-executions-diplomacy-and-sukarnoist-turn, accessed 20 November 2015.

13   Yudith Ho and Rieka Rahadiana, "Indonesia Under Widodo Shifts From 'Zero-Enemies' Diplomacy," April 24, 2015, http://www.bloom berg.com/news/articles/2015-04-23/indonesia-under-widodo-steps-away-from-zero-enemies-diplomacy, accessed 25 November 2015.
14   "Indonesia's Foreign Policy Turns...", *op.cit*.
15   Madu, "Reorientasi Politik Luar Negeri...", *op.cit.*
16   Ludiro Madu, "Uji Politik Luar Negeri Presiden", *Suara Merdeka* daily, July 31, 2014.

Retno Marsudi rejected criticism of its narrow nationalism and stressing its important contributions regionally and globally. She confirms that "What has changed, however, is that today, Indonesia wants its foreign policy to bring as much possible tangible results that can be felt by everyday Indonesians. Indonesian foreign policy serves the immediate needs of our national interests; the needs of the Indonesian people."[17]

Jokowi's pro-people approach further reinforced this nationalism ideal, as many people in Indonesia have for years been accustomed to the doctrine of foreign capitalists acquiring or "robbing" Indonesia of its assets and dominating its vast market. A piece of analysis by Lowly Institute argued that "anti-foreign sentiments" and Jokowi's "populist preferences" have factored in the making of protectionist policies.[18] However, it also argues the policies are prompted by economic by certain economic strains, including the movement in the exchange rate and a drop in Indonesia's trade competitiveness.[19]

The tendency of domestic orientation, instead of nationalism, in Indonesia's foreign policy does not eliminate Indonesia's activism in international diplomacy. Foreign Ministry spokesman Michael Tene refused accusations that the Indonesian government under Joko was abandoning its international roles. Several weeks after taking Presidential office, Jokowi had attended a series of multilateral summits, such as the APEC, G-20, and Asean forums, as well as a series of bilateral meetings on the sidelines of those multilateral events. The bilateral meetings with her German, Australian, and Singaporean counterparts were among others. These diplomatic involvement strongly confirms Indonesia's continued active roles in various regional and international forums. Jokowi introduced himself in those international forums and promoted his economic policies and maritime doctrine as a signal of Indonesia's for Indonesia's oppennes for foreign investment. In addition to dynamict security architecture in Asia with particular reference to claim conflicts at the South China Sea, the Foreign Ministry continued to pay attention to talks over a code of conduct for the South China Sea, preparation for the Asean Economic Community, and other planned regional and international agreements that had begun during SBY's era.[20]

After one year in office, President Joko's foreign policy has succeeded in recovering state sovereignty and national pride. Tthe vast majority of domestic society has a positive perception of the nation's foreign policies. For instance, the execution of transnational drugs smugglers, the destruction of illegal fishing boats, and the policy on high speed train. The people largely are satisfied with what the government has done in terms of a 'free' or 'independent' foreign policy emphasizing short-term national interests.[21]

SHOCK THERAPY TO ILLEGAL FISHING BOATS

Just like his predecessors, Jokowi does not downplay the relevance of geography and geopolitics in the making of foreign policy. In a nation that is fast emerging as a middle power, Jokowi has to take into account demography and domestic politics, including managing rising nationalist sentiments in foreign policy making. To be one among equals in the region, President Jokowi needs to formulate

17   Prashanth Parameswaran, "Indonesia Defends its Foreign Policy Record under Jokowi", September 22, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/indonesia-defends-its-foreign-policy-record-under-jokowi/, accessed 22 November 2015.

18   Aaron L. Connelly, "Indonesian Foreign Policy under President Jokowi", *Lowy Institute Analysis*, October 2014.

19   Ardi Wirdana, "Is Indonesia Nationalism Going to Suffocate Foreign Businesses?"October 27, 2015,http://www.establishmentpost.com/Indone sia-nationalism-going-suffocate-foreign-business es/, accessed 22 November 2015.

20   "Indonesia's Foreign Policy Turns Domestic Under Jokowi," http://jakarta globe.beritasatu. com/news/indonesias-foreign-policy-turns-domes tic-jokowi/, accessed 27 November 2015.

21   Mohamad Rosyidin, "Redesigning Indonesia's foreign policy in the 21st century: Niche diplomacy the way forward on the regional and global stage", *Strategic Review*, 10 November 2015, http://www.sr-indonesia.com/web-exclusi ves/view/redesigning-indonesia-s-foreign-policy-in-the-21st-century, accessed 30 November 2015.

a pragmatic foreign policy. As he goes about strengthening his credentials at home, he should not burn the proverbial diplomatic bridges. The seizure of the fishing vessels is Jokowi's way of telling Indonesians that he is no pushover when it comes to defending the sovereignty and national resources of the state.[22]

Since coming to power, Jokowi has vowed to toughen Indonesia's approach as part of his broader vision of turning the country into a "global maritime fulcrum" between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In Jokowi's view, Jakarta can no longer tolerate a situation where over 5,000 ships operate illegally in its waters every day, making a mockery out of Indonesian sovereignty and resulting in annual losses of over $20 billion. Through his Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti's, Jokowi launched a "shock therapy" policy on sinking boats which allegedly took illegal fishing in Indonesia's marine territory. She ordered the Navy to blow up foreign boats suspected of conducting illegal fishing activities in Indonesian waters.[23] Domestically, this is wildly popular and seen as a sign that Indonesia finally got its act together in reclaiming maritime sovereignty.

The sinking was also accompanied by the usual nationalist rhetoric by Indonesian officials. Susi herself noted that since Indonesia – the world's largest archipelagic nation – has two thirds of its territory comprised of water, it must have sovereignty over its territorial waters to ensure its unity. The Indonesia's Minister for Maritime and Fisheries Susi Pudjiastuti had actually said publicly that the country may blow up 70 foreign sips – a number which coincides with the 70th year of Indonesian independence. The number have made it the largest mass public sinking since President Jokowi first introduced his tough crackdown on illegal fishing in Indonesian waters since coming to power. The last one of its kind, which occurred on May 20

to commemorate National Awakening Day, involved 41 foreign vessels, including the first vessel from China to be sunk.[24]

At the same time, the move has shocked Indonesia's neighbors, notably fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, who were used to the relaxed attitude of Indonesian officials in previous administrations. Some are now warning that this policy threatens the development of a closer-knit ASEAN community. Even China expressed its concerns over this issue, though not very strongly, most likely because it is valuing its current relationship with Indonesia too much. What is clear, however, is that everybody is paying attention -- in that sense the "shock therapy" has worked. Yet the government seems unable to use this opportunity to craft a long-term solution. It would be very beneficial for Indonesia to team up with other nations, especially fellow Asean members and even China, India and Japan, to push for a comprehensive agreement to fight illegal fishing and to promote sustainable fishery practices, while cementing Indonesia's status as the natural leader of the Southeast Asia region.[25]

President Jokowi's policy of transforming the Indonesian maritime space is three-pronged. The first prong deals with strengthening internal resilience. The crackdown on illegal fishing is just one aspect of it. Upgrading the capabilities of the navy and air force is the second. The third prong involves the construction of some 24 deep-seaports across the entire archipelago as well as improving other support facilities in the maritime sector.[26] Jakarta gave signal not only its willingness to apply its 'sink the

22   B.A. Hamzah, "Sinking the Ships: Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Jokowi", *RSIS Commentary*, No. 016 – 20 January 2015.
23   Ludiro Madu, "Daulat Maritim", *Kedaulatan Rakyat* daily, December 3, 2014.

24   Prashanth Parameswaran, "Indonesia Sinks 34 Foreign Ships in War on Illegal Fishing: A closer look at Jakarta's latest mass public sinking", http://thediplomat. com/2015/08/indone   sia-sinks-34-foreign-vessels-in-its-war-on-illegal-fishing/, accessed 30 November 2015.
25   Many observers look at this policy tends to put Indonesia away from its neigbouring countries in Southeast Asia, see Prashanth Parameswaran, "Jakarta's policy of sinking illegal vessels looks set to continue despite lingering concerns", January 13, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/ 2015/ 01/explaining-indonesias-sink-the-vessels-policy-under-jokowi/, accessed 30 November 2015.
26   B.A. Hamzah, *op.cit.*

vessels' policy consistently, but perhaps its desire to take a harder line on illegal fishing more generally as well — albeit within limits. It was notable, for instance, that Indonesia's Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti told The Jakarta Post following the sinking that the government had been too lenient in dealing with illegal fishing.[27] Strengthening the implementation of this policy in Indonesia's maritime territory has hallmarked the increasing tense of domestic-oriented foreign policy in Jokowi's era.

EXECUTION TO DRUG SMUGGLERS

President Jokowi has also reintroduced the death penalty for drug smugglers after a hiatus under SBY's government. Brazil and the Netherlands recalled their ambassadors after Indonesia executed their citizens in January 2015. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff declined to accept the credentials of the nation's new envoy, leading Indonesia to recall its ambassador. Indonesia has ordered preparations for the executions of two Australian drug smugglers -- Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, part of a group known as the Bali Nine. Recent development, however, shows that the death penalty did not distur bilateral relations between Indonesia and those countries.[28]

The executions of foreign nationals convicted of drug-related offenses, despite repeated appeals by the countries whose nationals were on death row, Indonesia proceeded with the executions. President Jokowi continuously emphasized that imposing a death penalty on drug-related convicts was Indonesia's sovereign right, which had to be respected by all other countries. His message was clear: The executions had to be carried out, even at

the risk of losing friends or turning them into enemies. This message also applied to a longtime ally and Indonesia's traditionally great friend, Australia, whose citizens were among those executed.[29]

This policy directly signalled the nationalist rhetoric in the new president's early forays into foreign policy. In April 2015, President Jokowi justified the execution of seven foreigners convicted of drug smuggling as a defense of national sovereignty. "No one may intervene with the executions because it is our sovereign right to exercise our laws," he announced in reply to last-minute appeals from foreign governments and the United Nations. Another example of the government being caught off guard by international reactions was the execution of drug convicts. Fourteen people have been killed this year, including 12 foreign nationals.[30] Drug smuggling and its distribution -- especially to minors -- are very serious offenses and Joko's administration has the duty to clamp down on drug abuse in Indonesia. These convicts were warned that they were gambling with their lives by bringing drugs to Indonesia.

At the same time, however, by simply executing the drug convicts, Jokowi gave up bargaining chips he could have used to pressure those nations whose citizens were on death row -- for instance to help Indonesia to rescue its own nationals facing the death penalty in the Middle East. The president, instead of skillfully using this issue for the nation's benefit, kept framing the whole affair

27   Prashanth Parameswaran, "Why Did Indone sia Just Sink a Vessel From China? A brief look behind a significant development," May 22, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/why-did-indone sia-just-sink-a-vessel-from-china/, accessed 30 November 2015.
28   Ludiro Madu, "Hukuman Mati Mengganggu Hubungan Bilateral", *Kolom Detiknews.com*, January 19, 2015, http://detik.com/news/kolom/ 2807478/hukuman-mati-mengganggu-hubungan-bilateral/2, accessed 30 November 2015.

29   Juwana, *op.cit*.
30   Currently, 360 Indonesians face the death penalty abroad. Based on 2012 data from Migrant Care, 31 citizens were condemned to death and awaiting execution in Malaysia, China and Saudi Arabia. This, too, may present a diabolical dilemma for Jokowi. Aside from the Indonesian nationals on death row, over a third of the remainder are from countries where Indonesian citizens currently face execution for a range of offences. Jokowi's vow to refuse clemency to all 64 drug offenders will limit any prospects of reciprocity and almost undoubtedly hamper efforts to save Indonesian citizens, see Sarah Gill, "Capital punishment: Jokowi's twin policy positions", the Jakarta Post, March 05, 2015, http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/ 03/05/capital-punishment-jokowi-s-twin-policy-positions.html, accessed 30 November 2015.

as the only way for Indonesia to deal with its drug problems. Moreover, by executing these people instead of letting them spend their lives in prison without any chance of parole, Indonesia gained nothing but the wrath of other nations. Australia, Brazil and the Netherlands withdrew their ambassadors, and France was threatening to do the same, with additional threats to review its agreement to invest in Indonesia and to put up additional roadblocks to Indonesian exports, had its citizen, Serge Atlaoui, been executed.[31] The whole affair was a major distraction, with precious time wasted that could have been used to make trade deals or help Indonesians in trouble abroad.

The more the international community fought the president's decision on executions, the more Jokowi gained from it. Moreover, On March 2, Kompas – one of Indonesia's biggest daily newspapers – published an opinion poll about how people saw Jokowi's foreign policy. One of the questions asked was about Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran's executions. Some 86% of respondents agreed that Chan and Sukumaran should be executed regardless of the Australian government's protests. To these people, Jokowi's move represents strength – a character that leaders must possess. In the same opinion poll, 57.8% respondents were willing to cut off diplomatic relations with any country that failed to show respect for Indonesia's law, including Australia. This noticeably high percentage shows that, for most Indonesians, national pride is something important to hold on to.[32] The 86.3% of death penalty supporters maintain that this punishment has to be conducted despite the threat from other countries to limit diplomatic and trade relations. This indicates that the ensuing media reports has made many in Indonesia to consider the issue of death penalty mainly as part of the country's struggle to fight off "foreign pressure".[33]

Yet Jokowi's actions cannot be understood without reference to the wider context of Indonesia's foreign relations. Jokowi's foreign policy represents a return to the guided democracy period of Indonesia's founding president, Sukarno. Certainly the 'boy from the kampongs' has a very different persona from the aristocratic Sukarno, yet both their direct charismatic appeal to the masses and their political philosophies have common features. Both view the international stage as being, above all, a means of advancing their domestic agenda. Former president SBY issued a moratorium on the use of the death penalty. This showed he understood that demonstrating the emerging power of the 'world's largest Muslim country and third largest democracy' required being sensitive to Western norms. Jokowi, like Sukarno, would appear to have no such qualms.[34]

When Jokowi came to power, he promised to be decisive and to stand up for Indonesia. Yet even before the latest executions, Jokowi had signalled a break with the past. The execution and other policies strongly indicates that Jokowi abandoned the "thousand friends" policy after returning from his first foreign trip as president. Jokowi favours those countries "who give the most benefit to the people. What's the point of having many friends if we only get the disadvantages?"[35] As countries around the world need to adjust to Indonesia's foreign policy, powerful and developed states may no longer exert pressure on issues inherently within the domestic jurisdiction of Indonesia. Furthermore, other countries must understand that the new shape of foreign policy is not merely what President Jokowi desires, but it is the aspiration of the people.

To many in the Indonesian public, countries exerting pressure on Indonesia were defending criminals. The public then reacted

31   Madu, "Hukuman Mati…", *op.cit.*
32   Kompas, March 2, 2015.
33   Deasy Simandjuntak, "Spectacle Of The Scaffold? The Politics Of Death Penalty In Indonesia", *Institute of Southeast Asian Studies*, September 17, 2015,   http://www.eurasia   review.com/17092015-

spectacle-of-the-scaffold-the-politics-of-death-penalty-in-indonesia-analysis/, accessed 2 December 2015.
34   Camroux, *op.cit.*
35   "Indonesia's foreign policy: A thousand jilted friends", May 2nd 2015, http://www.economist. com/news/asia/21650173-new-president-charts-markedly-different-course-thousand-jilted-friends, accessed 2 December 2015.

in giving more support to the government to resist. In a growing democracy, citizens have more say in shaping Indonesia's relations with other countries compared to the past.[36]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Those two accounts strongly explain a more domestic foreign policy that President Jokowi has implemented in his first year. The fact that this nature is different from that of President SBY shows the increasing attention of Indonesian people in supporting or opposing foreign policy that Jokowi has practised. More importantly, the shift of foreign policy from promoting Indonesia in international stage in the era of SBY to weighing more domestic orientation in Jokowi's era also strengthens tendency on growing role and influence of President as one of veto players in democratic Indonesia. Although democracy promotes other players to determined foreign policy making, the two cases shows the dominant role of President in foreign policy decision making in Indonesia.

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36   Juwana, *op.cit.*

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