CHAPTER IV
EUROPEAN UNION’S IDENTITY AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS TURKEY AND ITS ACCESSION

The endlessly prolonging process of the accession, for most part, is absolutely determined by the decision made by European representatives in the European Union. Copenhagen Criteria is the guideline for any European countries by the means of joining the union. After knowing that European Union is decisive in the process of accession, we can start to analyze the distinguished perspectives of both sides, on this case we will try to gather any comprehensive information on the reason why European Union appear to slow down the process of negotiation. It will also be analyzed how Turkey with their history, identity, and attitude are perceived by the European Union, in which drives the European Union to put most of the negotiation in talks as a form of decision-making process towards Turkey.

A. The EU Historical Relations Towards Turkey as European ‘Other’

Samuel Huntington on his famous books The Clash of Civilizations has argued that religion provides the best common means of historically distinguishing between European and the rest, which in particular refers to the Judeo-Christian tradition confronting Islam (Guibernau, 2011). This argument, however, seems to ignore that in the Middle Ages most intra-European wars had a religious character and that, by and large, such wars did not imply the existence of different civilizations within Europe, rather they consisted of wars between countries defending different and revise ‘versions’ of a religion which had a unique origin. It is precisely from this perspective that it seems plausible to point at religion as a key feature in constructing what we now term as an embryonic
European norms and values (Guibernau, 2011). The distinctive religious community of norms and values will be analyzed comprehensively as a reference to European’s attitude towards Turkey.

While it can be argues that Turkey has been in Europe since the fall of Constantinople in 1453, public opinion within the EU display strong doubts over Turkey over Turkey’s bid for formal membership of ‘Europe through the EU (Kylstad, 2010). The 2005 Standard Eurobarometer showed that in EU-27, one out of two respondents are opposed to Turkey joining the EU, 54% thinks that the cultural difference between the EU and Turkey are too many to allow for, accession, although 55% also agrees that Turkey ‘partly belongs to Europe by its geography’ (Kylstad, 2010). The same report goes on to show that the opposition is strongest within the EU-15. Although history displays that Turkey has always been in Europe appears to be less attractive and thus less convincing to the public of the European Union (Kylstad, 2010). In some years ago, the enthusiasm from European publics regarding to Turkey joining the union is still low. Many people still think that Turkey is way too different in terms of cultures and identity. The only thing that can be considered as adherence between European and Turkey is that fact Turkey is partly Europe by geography areas.

Since the late 1990, Turkey’s EU membership bid has taken a significant place in the EU’s political agenda and has become an issue of public opinion debate in relation to the perceived threat of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. The post-September-11 era has witnessed an increased tension in the Western world in terms of concerns over Islam and Muslims (Canan-Sokullu, 2011). The subsequent Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005) bombings contributed further to antagonism towards Muslims and the fear of radical Islam (Canan-Sokullu, 2011). Various incidents have publicly demonstrated European attitudes against Muslims, while at the same time further hindering Turkey’s long-drawn-out
accession process (Canan-Sokullu, 2011). European attitudes towards the Muslim world have been reflected by the global Islamic thread in the post-Cold-War which has created reservoir hostility to Islam.

In 1995, Marc Gale, a former member of the European Parliament and co-chair of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee in the 1990’s wrote a book entitled *Turkey, the disliked country*. The title gave a glimpse of the perception that has persisted for a long time regarding Turkey integration. As Diez argues, following the end of the Cold War, ‘Central and Eastern Europe now become the incarnation of Europe’s past, as past that the West had overcome, and a zone of war and nationalism was stuck in history’. However, certain aspects of contemporary European society have also been projected as important ‘Others’ for an EU seen as based on ‘universal norms’ and ‘unity in diversity’; particularly the rise of xenophobia, racism, and the far right. As Manners, for instance, suggests; “The reactions to Jorg Haider, Pia Kjaersgaard, Rocco Butiglione, George W. Bush, and the hatred they attract are interesting exactly because of the ambiguity between abject-foreignness in questions of immigration, European integration, Christian fundamentalism, homophobia, and imperialism. From this point of view, it is interesting as Laffan points out that many of the Austrians who took to the streets of Vienna in 2000 to protest against the presence of Haider’s Freedom Party in power carried EU flags (MacMillan, 2013). In Turkish discourse, too, various groups have often been Othered. In traditional Kemalist discourse, for example, the Ottoman past and political Islam are often portrayed as internal Others, as are ethnic and religious minorities (MacMillan, 2013). Many countries in Europe have always been under the threat of religious values. Its elites are highly anticipative when it comes to extremist groups in their countries. Turkey’s people are one of the most populous immigrants in Europe. The accession to EU permanent membership would facilitate the immigrants at ease in getting into the EU. Most of the Eastern European countries still
cannot accept it based on their abysmal history with Turkish people in the past and that they are afraid if Turkey is in the EU, it would easily trigger the source of conflict in the society.

As leader for the German Christian Democratic Party (CDU), Angela Merkel in 2004 wrote in the German newspaper *Die Welt* that ‘The EU is more than an economic association. It is a political and economic union of the states and people of Europe, (and it is) based on a value-system that has historical roots’ (Kylstad, 2010). The article was devoted to the idea that short of granting Turkey full membership of the EU, it should instead be offered a ‘privileged partnership’. Turkey is according to this position not seen to be sharing the historical roots that the rest of the EU has in common; it is seen as political, culturally, and historically Other. What are these roots that make it possible to claim that Europe is and must continue to be a presumably culturally homogenous entity? (Kylstad, 2010). Turkey, on this case, is not considered to share similar culture and politics by the EU if we take the reference from historical roots. In fact, Turkey is perceived as the ‘Other’ because in the past Ottoman was not part of the European culture although it established relations with European countries.

### B. The EU Identity and Its Distinction Towards Turkey

The uniquely European problem of identity has become a far larger issue today than it ever was in the past. Enlargement of the EU up to 28 members countries has created a crisis of identity. This has influenced a raising problem (religion and cultural) in the relation of Europe and Turkey’s—accession has played a central role in the development of this debate (Mehmet & Tomasz, 2013). It is important to remember the more than 3 million Turks that already live within the borders of the EU. In the same way that the EU elite is helping to influence Europeans attitudes towards a European identity that this Turkish minority
highlights the ‘social fact of an ongoing process linking Turkish and European identities that significantly pre-dates the formal process of Turkey’s accession to the EU (Mehmet & Tomasz, 2013). The idea that there is distinctive identity between Turkey and the EU has become the major problem related to the accession. The religion norms and cultural values play the most important role in setting the policy of the EU towards Turkey.

Constructivism claims that the identities of political actors, as well as the shaping of preferences, are endogenous to the political process. A consequence of this assumption is that the characteristics of political actors have the potential of undergoing significant change over time, and as do the actual identities of these actors. Here an important question is how Europe perceives itself (Svensson, 2007). To sort this out, the notion of Europe’s Self will be utilized, contrasting Europe’s Other. This presented dualism simply aims at defining the boundaries of Europe. One way to define the European Self is of course to try to find out what ‘European characteristics’ really are—in other words, what the European essence is. Such approaches are, however, generally considered fruitless. Most definitions of Europeanness; neither geographic, ethnic, religious, nor political definitions have provided any satisfactory solution (Svensson, 2007).

In Manner’s view, the ‘Other’ is always a part of the ‘Self’. His basis for this is work by Habermas and Derrida and, in particular, Kristeva’s concept of the abject’. As Kristeva argues, for instance (MacMillan, 2013),

*The foreigner is within us. And when we flee from or struggle against foreigner, we are fighting our unconsciousness – that “Improper” facet of our impossible ‘own and proper’. To discover our disturbing otherness, for that indeed is what bursts*
in to confront that ‘demon’, that threat, that apprehension generated by the projective apparition of other at the heart of what we persist in maintaining as a proper, solid ‘us’. (Kristeva, 1991)

Derrida also stresses that, in common with other cultures, there is no defining essence on which European culture is based. In his view, then (MacMillan, 2013);

What is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself. Not to not have an identity, but not to be able to identify with itself, to be able to say ‘we’ or ‘me’, to be able to take the form of the subject only in the non-identity to itself or, if you prefer, only in the difference with itself. There is no culture or cultural identity without this difference with itself. (Derrida, 1994)

As Manners argues, ‘the projection of otherness onto individuals and the social groups they represent is so strong precisely because they are also an objected and disturbing part of ourselves (MacMillan, 2013). It has frequently been put forward, for instance, that Europe’s own past is an important Other for the U, particularly, but certainly not exclusively in German discourse. As Hobsbawm notes, ‘to be a member of any human community is to situate oneself with regard to one’s past, if only by rejecting it. In fact, as Diez and Waever have argued, such ‘temporal Othering’ has, at least until recently been particularly pervasive in EU discourse (MacMillan, 2013).

The socialization process of new member states into the European Union according to the constructivist approach is to “transmit the constitutive normative rules of the international community to individual state”. The desired outcome for constructivists in the international socialization
agency take hold in the target state, eventually the identity of the target state will change and become more compatible with larger institution (Wilson, 2009). Similar norms and values within an organization such as the European Union make it easier to create common policy for its member states and citizens. Although norms and values vary from state to state within the EU, Turkey brings a new set of challenge to the table. EU member state populations are majority Christian, whereas Turkey is a majority Muslim state. Although, both secular practice, diverse cultural norms exist within EU and Turkey respectively that are associated with Christianity and Islam. It will be more difficult for Turkey to embrace the norms and values of the European Union (Wilson, 2009). The accession from Turkey has this unique of identity brought upon the European Union. If the reason is because conservative religious and cultural values, then Easters European countries should face similar problems. However this was not the case, Islamic norms and values brought by Turkey has the characteristics of dark and barbaric in the eye of European countries.

Bruter, who conceptually confirmed and empirically demonstrated the complementarity between various political identities, considers that there is no reason why there should be any contradiction between a European identity and a national identity. Citizens identifying civically or culturally to Europe can, at the same time, look at their nation-state as another relevant political system for them and feel closer to fellow nationals, for example, than to other Europeans. In exactly the same way, national identity will not prevent citizens from feeling closer to fellow town persons than to fellow nationals from a different town (Ecirli, 2011). Such an approach, based on complementarity of identities and relating European identity to a “civic” conception of “Europanness” and to “constitutional patriotism”, could provide a more favorable background for Turkey integration, as questions related to history, culture, and ethnicity come second (Ecirli, 2011). The voice of Turkey’s society is represented by their
national identity and political identity is the way to enforce their national identity. Political identity play an important role to shape public opinion in Turkey and the European sees this as regressing turn of event. Most Europeans have hidden hatred towards Turkey due to the national identity and not mention the long history between the societies.

A number of opinion polls conducted in Turkey and Europe confirmed this supposition (Ecirli, 2011). Thus, a 2006 survey, in nine EU member states (UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain) measured degree of “affection” for certain countries ranking from “0”, meaning “no affection” and 100 – “full affection”. Among these states, Turkey was one of the least liked countries, with an average “affection grade” of 42, above only Palestine (38) and Iran (28). European “affection” towards China (46) and Russia (47) remained low, but above that for Turkey (Ecirli, 2011). One of the consequences of this perception is that Turkey is one of the least wanted countries, when it comes to European integration. In April 2008, only 16% of Germans and 19% of French favored Turkey integration, while more than 70% in both cases, were against it. Turkey seems to receive more public support from the Romanian respondents, who declared themselves supporters of Turkey’s integration in the same percent as the Turks themselves (Ecirli, 2011). The graphic for the poll is displayed below:

Figure 4.3.1 The EU Future Cooperation Poll with Turkey
The image perceived by Turkey from European society gives signal that there is a dislike of European country upon Turkey as a country in what so-called as Turcoscepticism. Turcoscepticism has recently been encouraged by fears associated with Islam and Muslim immigration. While Europe has experienced immigration from Muslim countries – from Turkey since the 1920s – in the post-September-11 era, concerns about whether Europe would be Islamized following Turkey’s EU membership have made the European vox populi gradually more anxious (Canan-Sokullu, 2011). Many voices have suggested that the Turkish ‘crescent’ would endanger the European ‘cross’, in that the Islamisation of Europe would most likely come about through Turkey’s EU membership. The future immigration of Muslim Turks into Europe has, inter alia, heightened popular worries, the prospect of Turkey joining the EU generating unease among Europeans (Canan-Sokullu, 2011). Blatant sentiments have been taken into account regarding the distinctive religious values between both sides. Turkey is considered to be a thread in European society that would endanger the peacefulness of religions norms in some of the European countries. However, the notion that Turkey possessed Islamic extremist not only delivered by the public voice. The elites of European Union have delivered similar statement as well which reflected many public polls and surveys regarding the endlessly prolonging Turkey’s accession into European Union. This becomes the core foundation of the reasoning why Turkey should never step feet in European Union.

The threat to Europe’s cultural and religious identity that has nurtured Turcoscepticism lies at the heart of the problem for European political and bureaucratic elites as well. Former French President d’Estaing, for Example, claimed that Turkey is a different culture and that its membership would bring the EU project to an end (Canan-Sokullu, 2011). In Germany, the former chairman of the Christian Social Union, Edmund Stoiber, translated this into rejecting Turkey’s accession. Like Huntington, who argued that ‘the
identification of Europe with Western Christendom provides a clear criterion for the admission of new members to the western organizations’, Stoiber claimed that the EU’s borders of shared values, culture and identity would be breached by Turkish membership (Canan-Sokullu, 2011). In contrast to d’Estaing’s and Stoiber’s Turcoscepticism, former UK Prime Minister suggested, more constructively, that Turkish membership would add to Europe’s multicultural assets, and that the inclusion of a Muslim country would facilitate the rapprochement between Western and Eastern civilizations (Canan-Sokullu, 2011). It is implicitly known in the European society that the EU is divided into two strong blocs when it comes to Turkey’s accession to the European Union; Germany and France with their clear stance on opposing Turkey’s accession which reflected always on their political agenda by whoever is in charge in both countries and UK with its full support towards Turkey’s accession towards European Union. We all know the end of United Kingdom in 2016 with its most famous exit called ‘Brexit’ which no longer giving support to the status. Tony Blair on his speech in 2003 in Glasgow stated that;

For hundreds of years, Europe was at war, the boundaries of many nations shifting with each passing army, small countries occupied and re-occupied, their people never at peace. Large countries fought each other literally for decades at a time with only the briefest respite to draw breath before the resumption of hostilities. For my father’s generation that was the Europe they were brought up in. Today in Europe former enemies are friends, at one, if not always diplomatically. The EU is a massive achievement of peace and prosperity. (Blair, 2003)
A comparable norm-based dynamic was present in EU forums regarding the Turkish application, with supporters of the Turkish case (including the Commission) laying particular stress on the importance of bolstering Turkey’s developing political democratization and liberalization – all the more so as the promotion of these values and practices increasingly became core aim of the EU’s external political relations (Nugent, 2007). However, whatever the impact the ‘furthering of democracy’ arguments had in bringing it about – and arguably the political pressures noted above were of at least equal importance – from the late 1990s the unquestionable was a gradually increasing rhetorical commitment on the part of the EU towards the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey (Nugent, 2007). Apparently to analyze this prolonging accession, it is not sufficient to just weigh the cost and benefit because there are abstract matters such as history, identity, attitude being taken into account in analyzing the discourse.

The discourse on an EU identity based on culture makes explicit reference to ‘history’ and ‘heritage’ as ways to delineate Europe. It is a discourse that sees culture as an artifact of the past, not as a complex interplay of language of language, religion, economics, art, lifestyles, feelings and opinions. In order to better understand the opposition which argues that Turkey is “too different” to become member of the EU, we need to address the presumed uniqueness of European culture as well with a special emphasis on secularism before exploring how this spills over into the arguments against Turkey’s accession to the EU.

The EU can be seen as the attempt to bring about the specific European identity that Enlightenment promised. Thus, Turkey’s bid for EU membership presents a two-fold challenge; first, it exposes tensions within the EU as to what the EU ought to be and secondly, for the opponents of Turkish membership the challenge is to construct their opposition in ways that does not impinge on their self-image as enlightened Europeans (Kylstad, 2010). Turkey’s bid for EU membership
forcefully calls for an ontological inquiry into the nature of the EU. On a pragmatic level, the arguments against Turkey joining the EU cover a wide range of themes, from economics to demographics to domestic political problems with democratization and human rights. Turkey is perceived by many as being ‘too big, too poor, and too different’ (Kylstad, 2010). The point of being different perceived by Europeans regarding Turkey status in getting into EU play an important role rather than economics. Europeans also see that there is a stagnant process of democratization advancement and development of human right in Turkey. Hence, it can be relatively justified to see beyond the pragmatic level that focused on energy security and strategic interest is the concern of the enlargement towards Turkey, because on those aspects Turkey is prepared to facilitate in their countries. It is also not that Turkey is too big or too poor for the EU, the main concern from the Turcosceticism was all about Turkey being too different with other European countries.

Further complicating Turkey’s roads towards the EU, and connected to the above, is the question of exactly to what extent the idea of homogeneity acts as an underlying premise of the EU-project. To what extent is the ideal of a homogenous nation-state still part of the EU’s DNA? The current political climate in Europe suggests that cultural homogeneity remains a strong desire. Turkey, being the ultimate Other as a predominantly Muslim country, suffers the consequences of this (Kylstad, 2010). It is an unfortunate view to realize that in European society circles, they still embrace cultural homogeneity. This is similar to bullying but in nation-state level. European conservatives simply cannot accept Turkey as a predominantly Muslim country given the conflicted matters that it will cause in shifting the identity of European community with its majority being the Christian community as firmly stated Erdogan in his speech regarding to the prolonging accession of Turkey towards European Union.
However, the notion that Turkey is in but not of Europe is not a new one. Arguing that since Turkey has historically been Europe’s significant Other due to its military might, physical proximity and a strong religious, rivaling tradition, Neumann also finds that it is Europe’s constitutive Other, especially with respect to state-building (Kylstad, 2010). Turks were not only some among other barbarians, they were instead positively recognized as Muslim and thus as representatives of Islam, a religion too similar to Christianity to not be perceived as a threat (Kylstad, 2010). But, history is a long time ago. And yet the image of Turkey in the European public mind is still that of a negatively construed Other (Kylstad, 2010).

C. The EU Attitude Towards Turkey’s Accession

It is also possible to think of Islam as a ‘cultural threat’ to Europe, which McLaren defines as a perceived threat posed by other cultures, or antipathy towards other cultures stemming from nationalist attachments (Canan-Sokullu, 2011). She argues that antipathy within the EU towards the integration process relates to the fear of, or hostility towards, other cultures. Drawing on these conceptualizations of Islamophobia, and of whether Turkey’s EU membership has become the subject of Islamophobic discussion in Europe, this study proposes the ‘Islamic fundamentalist threat hypothesis’ (HI): ‘If Islamic fundamentalism is perceived as an important threat to Europe, then this will cause negative feelings towards Turkey’s accession to the EU (Canan-Sokullu, 2011).

The Kurdish issue is one of the concerns to impede the process of the accession. The Kurdish issue and options for a solution were widely discussed; however, the 2009 democratic reforms opening aimed at addressing amongst others the Kurdish issue was not followed through. Erdogan’s government began secret talks with the leaders of Kurdistan Workers’ Party PKK leaders. Justice and Development Party (AKP), also made a number of overtures toward the Kurds,
including bans on Kurdish-language TV station. The Justice and Development Party AKP actually did more for the Kurds than anyone up until now (Mehmet & Tomasz, 2013). Over the decades, Turkey succeeded in forging alliances with neighboring Iran, Syria, and Iraq to target Kurdish rebels operating in their respective territories. But Turkey’s relations with all three governments have deteriorated sharply over the past several years, and the conflict threatens to spill across borders (Mehmet & Tomasz, 2013). Kurdish is a matter of ethnic conflict in Turkey and they demand separation from Turkey’s country. The main concern here is human rights issue. Turkish governments have been known to cause myriad of casualties regarding to Kurdish issue. It appears to the Europeans community that Turkey is not in line with the EU in guaranteeing human rights.

Terrorist attacks by PKK members, which are on the EU list of terrorist organizations, multiplied, intensified and claimed many victims. The attacks were strongly condemned by the EU. There has been a worrying increase in kidnapping of security personnel and civilians, including elected politicians. The high number of arrests and detentions in the context of operation against the Union of Communities of Kurdistan (KCK), the alleged urban wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, led to serious tension (Mehmet & Tomasz, 2013). The government announced that the state had abandoned confidential talks with PKK leaders, but expressed the intention to continue a dialogue with political parties not associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Mehmet & Tomasz, 2013). Turkey’s inability to come to grips with its Kurdish citizens’ demand for cultural recognition not only prevents a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish problem but also impedes the country’s acceptance by, integration into, and identification with Europe and the West (Mehmet & Tomasz, 2013). The European Union, which Turkey want to join, has consistently maintained that improvements in Turkey’s human rights record are required if its candidacy for EU membership is to be successful (Mehmet & Tomasz, 2013). The terrorist
threat have made the EU towards no more inclination to advance the process of accession before Turkey can take this human rights issue very seriously.

The problem for Turkey is that most Europeans only know how secularism built on Christianity looks like. Adding to that is the problem that there is no one European model of secularism (Kylstad, 2010). The smallest common denominator among European states is that there is a degree of institutional autonomy between church and state, but there are variances as to how that autonomy is codified (Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2004). As of 2000, 30 out of 48 European states fell into the category ‘states which promote (one) religion or religious institutions’ while only 17 states, among which is Turkey, were considered secular as in neither promoting nor discouraging religion. (ibid.). Consequently, what makes European secularism not found in its implementation but rather in its Christian and Enlightenment roots, and this is what makes Turkish secularism so difficult for European to understand and accept (Kylstad, 2010). The Europeans do not see the idea of secularism being undertaken properly under the Turkey political system. They also think that the secularism implemented in Turkey is flawed due to the constant influence of the Muslim community whereas the groups are insistent on uniting the religion values into political decision-making.

A European Union dominated by democracy, human rights, rule of law, minority, protection and a market economy seems at a first glace to be a political union only, without any definitive cultural characteristics. Its principles are phrased in a universal language owing to the European enlightenment. And yet: although Turkey is well underway towards fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria it is kept at bay. It seems to have hit the glass ceiling of ‘the unspoken “cultural” requirements. It is these unspoken cultural requirements that form the fundament of a European cultural identity (Kylstad, 2010). It is simple to say that even though Turkey have fulfilled the criterion of
Copenhagen agreement, it simply cannot fulfill the fundamental identity of becoming European countries.

The accession of Turkey to the European Union must be considered highly sensitive and delicate, because it poses a double-sided identity issue: externally, concerning the identity and boundaries of the European Union; and internally — through immigration and failing integration — regarding national identity and social belonging (Volten, 2009). The Turkish question is at the centre of the dispute about the presumed problematic erosion of traditional identities, both from within and from the outside. In the public perception of most Europeans, developments in Turkey itself, such as instability between secular and Islamic forces within Turkey, such as the clash between the AKP and the Court of Justice, do not play a major role (Volten, 2009). There is a general lack of knowledge and information about Turkish politics and society, which is comparable to the lack of knowledge and information about all other enlargement countries. While it is true that Turkey is perceived to have national instability, the EU has constantly ignored any improvements made by Turkey in getting in to have full membership in the Union. In the process, far-right movements have blatantly taken into action when the government appears to be weak in the world. EU should know better that the process of democratization and secularism in Turkey will not be as easy as Eastern European countries, although distinguished by cultures, the Muslim community still can accept the idea of getting into EU. Besides, their political system and practice are not as complex as Turkey. This should be taken into consideration beside any conflicts in Turkey.

There might also be a mistaken belief that the concern of the general public in Europe over Turkish accession is related to foreign policy issues, such as the problem of Cyprus or the compliance with the Copenhagen criteria or the case of the Armenian genocide (Volten, 2009). However, these are the topics of the international policy community, the concerns of the political elites. The general population, in sharp contrast, is
dealing with an overall disenchantment with the European Project, with uncertainty about the future of the European welfare state model, worries about globalisation and mass unemployment, fear of Islam and fundamentalist terrorism, anxieties about new waves of immigration when there are already serious integration problems in the major cities of Europe (Volten, 2009). In this gloomy worldview, Turkish accession symbolizes overstretch and overkill in all these aspects. It is true indeed, beside the norms and values possessed by Turkey, the massive conflicts in Turkey play an important role to be the obstacles in accession process. Turkey is conflicted with Cyprus, the Greece, and its immigrant policy towards European countries especially Germany and France. And that there is fear there will be excessive amount of people entering Europe since Turkey is the opening areas of the refugee to have a better life, something EU cannot bear to happen if Turkey ever step their feet permanently in the EU.

In the context of EU enlargement, immigration poses a perceived egocentric threat to an individual’s pocket economy. Already, economic integration is tending to move production to member states with cheap unskilled labor, leaving local, costlier, workers jobless. According to McLaren, ‘members of the dominant group may come to feel that certain resources belong to them, and when those resources are threatened by a minority group, members of the dominant group. Carey identifies ‘the protection of the in-group and the group identity from the out-group’ and argues that individuals who favor in-group protection tend to be less supportive of immigration into Europe. Buzan argues similarly that immigration threatens ‘communal identity and culture’ by changing the ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic characteristics of the population. Thus, the out-group is seen as a ‘threat’ to the ‘self’. The immigrant issue is highly sensitive and vital to the identity matter. The locals have always demanded the government to priorities local labors rather than foreign labors. If this issue escalates, it could threaten the national security and the national identity.
The paradox is that although there are strong (negative) sentiments about Turkish accession, as opinion polls show again and again, there has not been any real public debate on Turkey, let alone an informed debate, in countries such as the Netherlands (Volten, 2009). What passes for a debate on Turkey is really a fracture line between the political elites — the policy makers and decision makers — and the general public. While the establishment of politics, academia and journalism is overall in favour of Turkish accession, the majority opinion in society is against (Volten, 2009). The clash over the Turkish question is thus by and large a clash between government reports, academic research and newspaper articles versus polls and statistics. So there is hardly any real debate about Turkey’s accession to the EU, and yet a majority of the French, Germans, Dutch, Italians and Austrians seem to oppose Turkish EU membership (Volten, 2009). Why so? What lies behind these sentiments? The two main reasons mentioned in opinion polls are that Turkey is not a European country, and that Turkey — being Islamic — does not fit within the EU (Volten, 2009). Although there is no concrete debate publicly shared into public, the political elites of each sides have delivered their comments regarding to Turkey’s accession into the EU. Both Germany and France leader have made bitter comments related to Turkey getting into EU such as d’Estaing and Juncker.

This is a variation of the remark made by French President Sarkozy: “If Turkey would have been a European country, we would have known before”. Research suggests that this attitude towards Turkey is fuelled by a number of basic fears (Volten, 2009). It is worth stressing again that this has little to do with Turkey itself; people in Europe don’t know much about Turkish history and Turkish politics (Volten, 2009). The fears and insecurities are all about issues of identity which are stirred up by the idea of Turkish membership of the EU. At the heart of the matter are insecurities about the direction, scope and boundaries of Europe, and insecurities about the future of the multi-ethnic
societies in Europe. Let us take a closer look at each of these, starting with unease over Europe (Volten, 2009). Disenchantment with the European Project or what I have called elsewhere “New Euroscepticism in Old Europe”, is one of the main ingredients of anti-Turkish public opinion (Volten, 2009). Turkey has always been approached by EU countries as a Muslim country including supporters and opponents of Turkish in getting EU membership. Thus, the main antagonism to Turkish membership stems from serious integration problems in European societies, and bears very little relation to developments in Turkey itself. Turkish minority groups in Germany, Austria, France and the Netherlands are perceived as representative of Turkey as a whole. Of course, this is not at all fair to Turkey, but this is the hard fact of popular perception and public opinion and should be the main focus for informed political debate in future to widely introduce the people regarding the process of accession Turkey in getting full membership from EU.

The criteria for EU membership require candidates to adopt political values and norms share by the Union by achieving stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (Mehmet & Tomasz, 2013). Norms and values mentioned above become the main concern for EU in considering whether a country deserves to obtain full membership in the EU. Turkey’s norms and values are clearly different compared to what EU has possessed. Turkey is still struggling on their effort to become democratic and secular countries since conservative and religious norms as well as its values still have huge influence upon the country. It requires a long process and change faced by the countries given the status how Europeans see Turkey as a country. Identity, cultures, norms, and values have become the biggest obstacles for Turkey to engage with European Union.