

The United States Rejection of Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum 2017

Magfirah Fitri Haren Mongilong
20140510016
fhiramongilong97@gmail.com

International Relations Department
Faculty of Social and Political Science
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
Jl. Brawijaya, Kasihan, Bantul, Yogyakarta, 55183

Abstract

The primary aim of this research is to analyze the cause underlying the United States foreign policy by rejecting the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum in 2017. The United States is widely known as a superpower country which commonly promotes in securing peace, uphold the value of human rights as well as freedom. A different statement made by the United States during the referendum, questions its well-known value which based on the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights. The policy made by the United States against the referendum aimed underlying its national interest in terms of military security and economic welfare, which not only considering the self-interest of the United States but also preserving relationships with other allies surround the Iraqi Kurdistan region in the Middle East.

Keywords: *United States, referendum, Iraqi Kurdistan, national interest, securitization*

INTRODUCTION

The United States of America is a superpower country that has strong political, military, economic power in the world. After the Soviet Union collapsed during the cold war, the United States became the world's only superpower with its democratic system. The United States' credibility is supported by US government control over domestic and overseas policies that are tightly regulated by the US system. Strong foreign policy has an impact on the United States that makes the United States able to be respected in the international world. The US foreign policy is supported by the national power owned by the United States.

The United States of America is widely known in strengthening its influence by leading a coalition of powerful and independent nations to promote security, prosperity and peace both inside the US and beyond. The United States has an ideological foundation of democracy that prioritizes the existence of a guarantee of the rights to individual freedom. Over time the United States is known as the mother of democracy in the world. With the nickname, the United States feels responsible for the spread of democracy in the world. One of the efforts of the United States in spreading the value of democracy in the world is by supporting countries in the world who want to get the sovereignty of their country through independence.

However, different thing occurred in the Iraqi Kurdistan's independence referendum on September 2017, implying the differentness of the US attitude to the principle and its commitment to promoting the value of democracy in this phenomena. Shown with US involvement that is more supportive of Iraq than Iraqi Kurdistan who has tried to achieve independence. The freedom that became one of the democratic values that should be defended by the Americans, this incident shows the peculiarities in the American attitude in promoting the value of democracy that is more supportive of Iraq. Iraq sees Iraqi Kurdistan as a region with rich natural resource potential that is vital to the Iraqi economy.

The region of Iraq in this case is divided into two; northern part and southern part. Iraqi Kurdistan possess the northern part while Iraq possess the southern part. Being inside of Iraq made Iraqi Kurdistan did not get the freedom they want. The conflict between Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan began from when Iraqi Kurdish tribes were under British colonial rule after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918.

The collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1918 brought hope for Kurds especially in Iraq to have their own nation-state. They began searching for the right homeland to establish a Kurdish state. However, British colonization in some areas of Mesopotamia including Iraq left the ethnic Kurds disappointed because it impeded their aspiration to live in a country of their own without becoming a second-class nation. Bitter reality when the country stood Iraq had to swallow them. The Kurdish people must be willing to share their place and enter the territory of Iraq. A similar fate is experienced by Kurds in Iran, Syria and Turkey. The Kurdish people in Iraq begin to take up arms against the British. The uprising of Mahmud Barzanji in the later year after the Ottoman collapse, in 1919 became a gong of Kurdish people's resistance in Iraq led by Syeh Mahmud

Barzanji. This resistance was successfully suppressed by British troops and Kurdish territory was incorporated into the 1926 Iraqi Mandate. Since then, Kurdish nationalist groups and parties have formed and colored the conflict between Iraqi Kurds and Iraqis.

Iraqi governments promised autonomy to the Kurds after the 1988 revolution, but nothing worked until the anti-Saddam international coalition established a partial no-fly zone in northern Iraq in 1991 after the first Gulf War. This allowed the Kurdish leaders and their Peshmerga armed forces to consolidate their grip in the north after the Iraqi forces withdrew, providing the basis for the 2005 constitution settlement. This later became the term of Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), has been recognized by Iraqi constitution as a region of official authority covering Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Halabja. They have their own parliament including the armed forces called Peshmerga. Erbil was appointed as the capital and headed by President Massoud Barzani and his deputy Kosrat Rasul Ali. The establishment of the autonomous region of Kurdistan Regional Government in 2005 has gone through decades of process. Through a referendum in 2005, 98.8 percent of the vote calls for a separate Kurdish region, although its status does not mean being completely separated from Iraq.

The struggle for independence of Iraqi Kurdistan sparks again in 2017. Almost all the people of Kurdistan in Iraq who took part in the referendum decided to separate from Baghdad. 92.73 percent said 'Yes' in response to the question "Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistan region outside the regional administration to become an independent state?" The poll result on September 25, 2017 was announced two days after by election officials in Erbil, semi-autonomous capital of Kurdistan Regional Government. Unfortunately, not only is the Iraqi government angry over a referendum, the United States also did not acknowledge the outcome of the referendum as it is considered as unilateral.

The position of the United States on Kurdish aspirations for independence from Iraq has become contradictory. Historically, the United States has supported self-determination in places like South Sudan, Kosovo and East Timor as they seek independence. Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt make this value important to the war effort. The United Nations perpetuates the principle of "equal rights and self-determination of the people" in its charter.

As the main ally of the United States against Saddam Hussein in the 1990s and against the insurgency and Islamic state of Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds have been trying since to convince the United

States to apply this view to their territory. Hopes sped as the White House issued a statement on saying that the United States does not support the intentions of the Kurdistan Regional Government to hold a referendum. The United States' Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition To Counter ISIS, Brett McGurk went further in a press conference in Erbil, stating that there was no international support for the referendum. He described the referendum as "not timely" and "risky"

From what has been described, America has a strange attitude in the conflict of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan already has requirements to become a country with the existence of a leader, communities, languages, territories and recognition from other state or other parties. However, as a country that upholds the values of democracy and freedom, United States still shows an attitude of rejection of Iraqi Kurdistan's efforts in becoming a free country from Iraq.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theory of Securitisation

Securitization is overly focused in terms of the security of a state and considered to be a political act rather than neutral act. This tends to view the cause of why a state decides to make certain policy, particularly in the name of security. Securitization according to Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde is:

“Securitization is the process of state actors transforming subjects into matters of security: an extreme version of politicization that enables extraordinary means to be used in the name of security” (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998)

According to this theory of securitization, political issues constituted as extreme security issues when they have been labelled as ‘dangerous’, ‘menacing’, ‘threatening’, ‘alarming’ and so on by a ‘securitising actor’ who has the social and institutional power to move the issue ‘beyond politics’. A noticeable example for this case study, for instance, during several days before Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence referendum in 2017, Donald Trump decided to not to intervene or support the referendum as he implied that the referendum would hamper its goal of eliminating ISIS in the area of Iraqi Kurdistan

Concept of National Interest

In the sense of the national interest concept according to Jack C. Plano, there are elements of national interest which consist of:

- a) Self-preservation, namely that the state needs to defend itself against any potential threats that could disrupt the stability of the state;
- b) Independence, namely that a country has the right not to be colonized or subject to another country and disobey or be in the influence of another, this independence and sovereignty need to be achieved and maintained;
- c) Territorial integrity, namely the need of each country to maintain its territorial integrity;
- d) Military security, namely that states have an interest in safeguarding their country from interference or military threat from other countries;
- e) Economic welfare, in which the state must ensure economic stability to create prosperity.

Based on the above, it can be understood that the interests of the United States behind its policy toward the Iraqi Kurdistan's independence referendum in 2017 was not separated from the national interests of this country. Interventions that are carried out in principle become part of the implementation of foreign policy that has been arranged systematically, related to the existence of the United States as a country with a modern political-government system.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research used qualitative research method by data collecting. The method of data collecting is conducted through the library research and also through the media; printed and electronic media, internet, articles or journals and some reference books. After the data was collected, the research comes in to the data analysis. Here, the writer check for the relevancy in order to use as the sources in final paper arrangement. This thesis will use the descriptive analysis. After describing the main problem, we will go to the deeper analysis in order to prove the hypothesis.

CONTENT

Military Security to Protect from the External Threats

The United States has warned the Iraqi Kurdistan to not to deliver their independence as their main focus is to diminish the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) and implies that their referendum will only cause adversities than benefits. The decision start to obvious ever since the Iraqi Kurdistan pre-referendum as they made a statement as follows:

“The United States strongly opposes the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government’s referendum on independence, planned for September 25. All of Iraq’s neighbors, and virtually the entire international community, also oppose this referendum. The United States urges Iraqi Kurdish leaders to accept the alternative, which is a serious and sustained dialogue with the central government, facilitated by the United States and United Nations, and other partners, on all matters of concern, including the future of the Baghdad-Erbil relationship. If this referendum is conducted, it is highly unlikely that there will be negotiations with Baghdad, and the above international offer of support for negotiations will be foreclosed. The costs of proceeding with the referendum are high for all Iraqis, including Kurds. Already the referendum has negatively affected Defeat-ISIS coordination to dislodge ISIS from its remaining areas of control in Iraq. The decision to hold the referendum in disputed areas is especially de-stabilizing, raising tensions which ISIS and other extremist groups are now seeking to exploit. The status of disputed areas and their boundaries must be resolved through dialogue, in accordance with Iraq’s constitution, not by unilateral action or force. Finally, the referendum may jeopardize Iraqi Kurdistan’s regional trade relations, and international assistance of all kinds, even though none of Iraq’s partners wish this to be the case. This is simply the reality of this very serious situation. In contrast, genuine dialogue, the alternative, which we urge Kurdish leaders to embrace, holds the promise of resolving a great many of Iraqi Kurds’ legitimate grievances, and establishing a new and constructive course for Baghdad-Erbil relations that benefit all the people of Iraq. The Kurds can be proud already of what the referendum process has produced, including more Kurdish unity, reviving the Kurdish parliament for the first time in nearly two years, and placing important issues on the international stage, with partners and friends prepared to build on the spirit of cooperation seen between Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish Peshmerga in the campaign against ISIS to help resolve outstanding

issues. Unfortunately, the referendum next week will jeopardize all of this momentum and more. The referendum itself is now all the more unnecessary given the alternative path that has been prepared and endorsed by the United States and the international community.” (USAGOV, 2017)

The US implies that the primary subject of Trump’s proposed overseas counter terrorism design is the IS, which he presents as the single greatest threat to the US. He proposes neutralising the group through aggressive “joint and coalition military operations” and degrading its networks of mobilisation, including its cyber channels, through greater international cooperation and intelligence sharing. By this means, the US government has strongly opposed the Kurdish referendum during the buildup to the vote, hailing the unity of Iraq as a greater source of peace and stability than the creation of an independent Kurdish state in the north of Iraq.

More than sixteen years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US forces are still deployed in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq and, in smaller contingents, they are trained and supported local forces combating terrorists across Africa and Asia. Whether one chooses to call it a "global war on terror," "countering violent extremism," or stopping "radical Islamic terrorism," it has been a very long campaign and it appears far from over. As the commanders-in-chief, three presidents have now supervised this campaign. George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump have exhibited dramatic differences in rhetoric and style and some real changes in policy, but overall, there has been remarkable continuity in their efforts. Instead of sharp reversals, policy has evolved as circumstances have changed and as each administration has learned lessons from previous experience and has tried to avoid or correct what it viewed as mistakes. It is not the right time for a referendum, say the Kurds’ dishonest friends. It is never the right time, say the Kurds’ candid enemies. Massoud Barzani, the president of the Iraqi Kurds, knows that this is the best of all possible times. The rest of Iraq is a theocratic shambles, ISIS has been beaten back, and the collapse of Syria has thrown the entire post-Ottoman settlement into play.

The United States, whose interests are not directly affected by the fate of Kurdistan, has been equally vociferous in its condemnation, predicting it will create instability and undermine the fight against ISIS, now in its final and crucial phase. US rejection has encouraged many other countries to join in a veritable chorus of condemnation, with only Israel, always seeking regional, non-arab allies, supporting the Kurds’ decision to hold the referendum.

The United States has backed these particular autonomous areas because of strong support and assistance it has received from Kurdish communities as US forces face threats to the US interests. United States also opposed after the referendum and emphasize its interest in military security with a statement:

“The United States is deeply disappointed that the Kurdistan Regional Government decided to conduct today a unilateral referendum on independence, including in areas outside of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The United States' historic relationship with the people of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region will not change in light of today's non-binding referendum, but we believe this step will increase instability and hardships for the Kurdistan region and its people. The unilateral referendum will greatly complicate the Kurdistan Regional Government's relationship with both the Government of Iraq and neighboring states. The fight against ISIS is not over, and extremist groups are seeking to exploit instability and discord. We believe all sides should engage constructively in a dialogue to improve the future of all Iraqis. The United States opposes violence and unilateral moves by any party to alter boundaries. The United States supports a united, federal, democratic and prosperous Iraq and will continue to seek opportunities to assist Iraqis to fulfill their aspirations within the framework of the constitution.” (USAGOV, 2017)

Trump's commitment to preserving American leadership and international action is particularly clear in the wording that the National Security strategy uses in explaining the First Pillar, and explaining what it means to *"protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life, means the US should pursue threats to their source."* President Trump implied in the strategy to prevent terrorists from reaching United States that the US commit to deter, disrupt, and defeat potential threats before they reach the United States.

President Trump makes it all out for its country for military security in combatting terrorism. Under President Trump's leadership, the United States is defeating the terrorists who threaten its homeland and citizens. By working with local forces and giving commanders on the ground increased flexibility, implying that they have almost completely defeated ISIS. Since President Trump took office, ISIS has lost nearly 100 percent of the territory it once controlled in Iraq and Syria. Along with their partners, they will continue to pursue the thousands of ISIS fighters who remain at large, and will not rest until they have achieved the enduring defeat of ISIS and decimated global jihadists and their networks. In this term, the United States sees that this

referendum is a complete distraction for them to achieve its national interest in defeating ISIS, as it means a lot for the US to feel secure from any global threat such as terrorism.

Stabilizing Economy to Achieve Economic Welfare

The interests of the United States further relate to economic interests and security, namely the effort to secure exports from Iraq to the United States. Securing exports in this term is the quantity or amount of goods production from Iraq to the United States. When viewed from the economic factors of Iraq after the invasion of 2003, Iraq is a country that experiencing an interesting economic development. In 2004, the growth rate of domestic gross product (GDP) reached as highest in history with 54.16 percent (Economics, 2018). The development of Iraq's economy is supported by mainly oil production. This economic achievement will be disrupted if the internal security of Iraq and the Middle East region is not conducive. Recognizing that the independence referendum of Iraqi Kurdistan will cause instability within the region become the main point for the decision of the United States in the referendum of Iraqi Kurdistan in 2017.

The United States' top import categories with Iraq in 2017 were mineral fuels/oil for about \$6.0 billion (USTR, 2017). It's all about the oil, and Kirkuk, which is located within the Iraqi Kurdistan territory, is home to about 10 percent of Iraq's total reserves of 140 billion barrels (Kennedy, 2016). The oil production of Iraq will got distracted as both Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan are over the oilfield in the Kirkuk region and also will considered impacted to the Iraq exports as well thus will threatened United States' national interest of economy welfare by receiving the export goods in stable condition.

During this stage, the US pursued a new and more flexible policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan, but it was always limited by the US' position on maintaining Iraq as a unitary state. In this regards, the US sought to make Iraq a strategic partner, maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq, and secure the flow of Iraqi oil. These factors influenced US policy towards the Iraqi Kurdistan's demands as discussed in the study. Within this context, the US attempted to transform Iraq into a strategic partner to strengthen the US's hegemony in the region. In particular, during this stage, the US exclusively stressed the importance of maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq. A strong and stable Iraq would block the Kurds attempts at hegemony and secure the flow of Iraqi oil without disruption. Therefore, US policy was to keep the Kurds inside Iraq and put pressure on the Iraqi Kurdistan to achieve this aim. In addition, the US was worried that the partition of Iraq would lead

to instability and the expansion of terrorist groups inside Iraq, and would thus pose a threat to US interests (Byman, 2017). In this regard, the US was concerned that any partition of the country could lead to a further partition and to an endless war among different groups, leaving Iraq and the region in deep crisis and threatening its regional policy. Therefore, the US administrations rejected partition of Iraq and even all suggestions for the disintegration of Iraq into three distinct federal regions.

Thus, Kirkuk and the disputed territories became the great challenges confronting US policy in Iraq. During this period, the US perceived the implementation of Article 140 to be a major threat to the security of Iraq, its territorial integrity, and to the US hegemonic ambition in Iraq and the region (Katzman, 2015). Article 140 in the 2005 The Iraqi Constitution required that before the referendum, several measure have to be taken to reverse the Arabization policy by the previous president of Saddam Hussein. This made by a constitution of The Law of the Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. They included specific clauses providing compensation for the forced migrants during Saddam Hussein presidential period and resolution of disputed territories including Kirkuk of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution stated:

“The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.” (Constitution of Iraq, 2005)

The US believed that the best way to keep the Kurds inside Iraq was to prevent the incorporation of these areas into the Kurdistan region, particularly those rich in oil and gas such as Kirkuk. Therefore, the US took a different approach in an attempt to prevent the realisation of Article 140 related to Kirkuk and the disputed areas, and in this regard it played the key role of postponing a referendum in these areas in 2007. Further, the US never put pressure or took action to solve fundamentally the problem of Kirkuk and the disputed areas, and this was even clearer when they withdrew from the country without tackling it.

On the same note, in the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil, the US policy was in favor of Baghdad, since the US administrations were concerned that the expansion of the Kurdish autonomous region would encourage the Iraqi Kurdistan to move towards independence.

Therefore, during this stage the US was in support of creating a strong central government in Baghdad with the vast authorities, putting pressure mostly on the KRG to remain part of Iraq and ignored the Kurdish perspective, which demanded weak central authorities within a strong federal region.

However, despite the US policy to create a strong, stable, and strategic partner in a post-invasion Iraq, the US administration showed some flexibility towards Kurdish demands for autonomy and a federal region with limited authorities and in this regards there has been a change in the US perspective towards the Iraqi Kurdistan. The key reason behind this relative and limited change was linked to the rise of the important role of Iraqi Kurdistan for the US strategy to tackle the eruption of insurgency and the deterioration of security in Iraq, particularly from 2004 onwards, which created a serious threat to US policy in Iraq and the region (Cordesman, 2012). The US feared losing control of Iraq, perceiving that the state would become a 'safe haven' for terrorist groups. Hence, the US observed security and stability in the Iraqi Kurdistan and perceived the Kurds as reliable partners who would be influential for backing the US policy of keeping Iraq stable and secure. Further the US saw Kurds as a key US democratic and secular partners to confront the influence of Shia religious groups backed by Iran. In this regard the KRG interests became aligned with the US interests and strategy in Iraq and region. Therefore, in 2004 the US started revising its policy towards the Kurds and began supporting their struggle to establish Kurdistan as a federal region in Iraq, albeit with a limited authority (Hiltermann & Fantappie, 2018). This was the first political change in US policy towards the Iraqi Kurdistan.

Additionally, such steps could spread instability throughout the Middle East and affect the security of oil. Further, during this period, to some extent the US position in Iraq and the region was strong due to its military presence. Therefore, in this regard the Kurds had limited space to increase their power or challenge US pressure. Further, the US was aware that pursuing a policy in support of any border change or of any separatist movement would create a hostile alliance and coalitions against its policy in the Middle East from both its allies and regional states, which could undermine its hegemony in the region and increase anti-US sentiments in the area. In particular, the US has relied on ensuring secure allies including Turkey and the Arab Gulf States (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman) in order to enhance and maintain its hegemony. These states are considered central to containing Iranian and Russian expansion

policies in the region, supplying oil to the global market, and providing the US with military bases. All these states opposed the partition and federalization of Iraq, arguing that an independent Kurdish state would threaten their territorial integrity. Therefore, they played a role in postponing the realization of Article 140 in which related to Kirkuk and other disputed areas and publicly supported a strong Iraqi central government in Baghdad.

CONCLUSION

As one of the superpower country in the world, the United States tend to be seen as the most reliable aid moreover in terms of obtaining power. There are countless of aid given by the United States as their diplomacy to obtain the attention from another country. The aid given is usually useful for a country to gain their power and thus the outcome received by the United States is can be seen aligned with its national interest.

Success will require an honest and influential broker. It is a role uniquely positioned by the United States, as long as it retains enough troops in Iraq to remain credible (five thousand or more US military personnel in Iraq is minimal) and so long as it remains diplomatically involved. The current crisis has occurred in size is not small because Washington has been disrupted by the battle against the Islamic State. When the Trump government finally focused on KRG, Foreign Minister Rex Tillerson failed to convince the Kurds to cancel their independence referendum.

Going forward, the US armed forces need to facilitate cooperation between peshmerga and Iraqi military commanders to ease tensions, while US diplomats lead in forging a big deal between Erbil and Baghdad. The United States may use its military aid as an influence, threatening to decide on one side if it refuses to compromise, insisting it will help the Kurds militarily if Iraqi forces try to push into the core provinces of KRG, Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniya. The worst option for the United States is to continue to disrupt, work to ensure Kurdish autonomy while maintaining the fiction that Iraq remains a unitary state. It offers a way to write over difficult disputes, such as between Baghdad and Erbil, which would otherwise result in unnecessary bloodbaths.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- BBC. (2017, October 31). *Iraqi Kurdistan profile*. Retrieved from BBC News: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28147263>
- BBC. (2017, September 27). *Iraqi Kurds decisively back independence in referendum*. Retrieved from BBC News: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41419633>
- Bivens, J. (2004). *Debt and the Dollar*. Retrieved from Economy Policy Institute: <http://www.epinet.org/Issuebriefs/203/ib203.pdf>
- Boeckelman, K. (1995). The American States in the Postindustrial Economy. *State & Local Government Review Vol. 27, No. 3*, 182-187.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Byman, D. (2017, June 28). *Beyond Iraq and Syria: ISIS' ability to conduct attacks abroad*. Retrieved from The Brookings Institution: <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/beyond-iraq-and-syria-isis-ability-to-conduct-attacks-abroad/>
- CIA. (2012). The Kurdish Minority Problem. *Central Intelligence Agency Archived Copy*, 11.
- Cordesman, A. H. (2012, March 2012). *The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq*. Retrieved from Center for Strategic and International Studies: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/real-outcome-iraq-war-us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-iraq>
- Economics, T. (2018). *Iraq GDP Annual Growth Rate (1991-2018)*. Retrieved from Trading Economics: <https://tradingeconomics.com/iraq/gdp-growth-annual?continent=europe>
- Eroukhmanoff, C. (2017). Securitisation Theory. *The International Relations Theory*, 104.
- Galbraith, P. W. (2005, February 01). *As Iraqis Celebrate, the Kurds Hesitate*. Retrieved from The New York Times: <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/01/opinion/as-iraqis-celebrate-the-kurds-hesitate.html>
- Gilford, J. I. (2007). American Foreign Policy Theoretical Essay 4th Edition. In J. I. G, *American Foreign Policy Theoretical Essay 4th Edition* (pp. 9-15). New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
- GPF. (2011). *War on Terrorism*. Retrieved from Global Policy Forum: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/war-on-terrorism.html>
- Green, D. (2017, September 25). *A Kurdish State is in America's Interest—and the Region's, Too*. Retrieved from The Weekly Standard: <https://www.weeklystandard.com/dominic-green/a-kurdish-state-is-in-americas-interest-mdash-and-the-regions-too>
- Heo, U., & Jr., K. D. (2007). Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II. In U. Heo, & K. D. Jr., *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II* (p. 445). ABC-CLIO.

- Hiltermann, J., & Fantappie, M. (2018, January 16). *Twilight of the Kurds*. Retrieved from Foreign Policy: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/twilight-of-the-kurds-iraq-syria-kurdistan/>
- Holsti, K. (1992). Politik International: Suatu Kerangka Analisis. In K. Holsti, *Politik International: Suatu Kerangka Analisis* (p. 21). Bandung: Bina Cipta.
- HRW. (2003). *GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds*. Retrieved from Human Rights Watch: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFALINT.htm>
- IPCS. (2017, January 19). *Donald Trump's Counter-Terrorism Policy – Analysis*. Retrieved from Eurasia: <https://www.eurasiareview.com/19012017-donald-trumps-counter-terrorism-policy-analysis/>
- Jacinto, L. (2017, September 5). 'Kexit' woes: Why a Kurdish independence referendum has few backers. Retrieved from France 24: <http://www.france24.com/en/20170905-iraq-kurdish-independence-referendum-stakes>
- Jenkins, B. (2017, September 24). *Bush, Obama, And Trump: The Evolution Of U.S. Counterterrorist Policy Since 9/11*. Retrieved from International Institute for Counter-Terrorism: <https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2079/BUSH-OBAMA-AND-TRUMP#gsc.tab=0>
- Jenkins, B. M., Willis, H. H., & Han, B. (2016). Do Significant Terrorist Attacks Increase the Risk of Further Attacks? *RAND Corporation*, 2-12.
- Katzman, K. (2015). Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy. *Congressional Research Service Report*, 45-47.
- Kennedy, C. (2016, April 10). *Battle is on over Iraq's oil-rich Kirkuk region*. Retrieved from USATODAY: <https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2016/04/10/battle-over-iraqs-oil-rich-kirkuk-region/82726530/>
- Knickmeyer, E. (2005, July 23). *Iraqi Kurds Call for Referendum*. Retrieved from Washington Post Foreign Service: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/22/AR2005072201969.html>
- KurdMedia. (2005, February 9). *98 percent of the people of South Kurdistan vote for independence*. Retrieved from San Francisco Bay Area Independent Media Center: <https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2005/02/09/17205061.php>
- McKernan, B. (2017, September 27). *Kurdistan referendum results: 93% of Iraqi Kurds vote for independence, say reports*. Retrieved from Independent: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/kurdistan-referendum-results-vote-yes-iraqi-kurds-independence-iran-syria-a7970241.html>
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1962). The Impasse of American Foreign Policy. In H. J. Morgenthau, *The Impasse of American Foreign Policy* (p. 191). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Morgenthau, H. J. (1978). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th Edition, Revised. In H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th Edition, Revised (pp. 4-15). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Noack, R. (2017, October 17). *The long, winding history of American dealings with Iraq's Kurds*. Retrieved from The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/17/the-long-winding-history-of-american-dealings-with-iraqs-kurds-2/?utm_term=.a2c28fcc01ae
- NSD. (2018). *President Donald J. Trump's Foreign Policy Puts America First*. Washington, DC: The White House.
- Ottaway, M. (2017, September 28). *United States Policy and the Kurdistan Referendum: Compounding the Problem*. Retrieved from WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/united-states-policy-and-the-kurdistan-referendum-compounding-the-problem>
- Plano, J. C., & Olton, R. (1969). International Relations Dictionary. In J. C. Plano, & R. Olton, *International Relations Dictionary* (p. 128). USA: Rinehart and Wingston, Inc.
- Plano, J. C., & Olton, R. (1969). International Relations Dictionary. In J. C. Plano, & R. Olton, *International Relations Dictionary* (p. 127). USA: Rinehart and Wingston, Inc.
- Roskin, M. G. (1994). National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy. In M. G. Roskin, *National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy* (p. 5).
- Rugh, W. A. (2006). *American Encounters with Arabs: The Soft Power of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East*. Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Sluglett, P. (1976). Britain in Iraq: 1914-1932. In P. Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq: 1914-1932* (pp. 182-194). London: Ithaca Press. Retrieved from Global Policy Forum: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/169/36382.html>
- Straus, I. (2014, August 24). *How Obama Caused ISIS*. Retrieved from National Review: <https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/08/how-obama-caused-isis-ira-straus/>
- Thrall, T. A., & Goepner, E. (2017, June 16). *Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror*. Retrieved from Cato Institute: <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/step-back-lessons-us-foreign-policy-failed-war-terror>
- USAGOV. (2017, September 20). *Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government's Planned Referendum*. Retrieved from U.S. Department of State: <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/09/274324.htm>
- USAGOV. (2017, September 29). *Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government's Referendum*. Retrieved from U.S. State Department: <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/09/274522.htm>

- USAGOV. (2017). *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House.
- USAGOV. (2017, September 14). *Press Conference by Special Presidential Envoy McGurk in Erbil, Iraq*. Retrieved from U.S. State Department Website: <https://www.state.gov/s/seci/2017remarks/274148.htm>
- USAGOV. (2017, May 3). *Remarks to U.S. Department of State Employees*. Retrieved from U.S. State Department Website: <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/05/270620.htm>
- USTR. (2017, April 28). *U.S-Iraq Trade Facts*. Retrieved from Office of the United States Trade Representative: <https://ustr.gov/Iraq>
- Wittkopf, E. R., Jones, C. M., & Kegley Jr., C. W. (2003). *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*. In E. R. Wittkopf, C. M. Jones, & C. W. Kegley Jr., *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* (p. 18). Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Yildiz, K. (2004). *The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present, and Future*. In K. Yildiz, *The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present, and Future* (p. 9). London: Pluto Press.