CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Tunisia’s political system, was strongly authoritarian, even by regional standards. In the more than half century that elapsed between independence and the January 14th Revolution, only two presidents ruled Tunisia and the country had no real experience with competitive multiparty politics. Ben ‘Ali, who took power from Habib Bourguiba in a bloodless coup in 1987, undertook constitutional reforms that removed term limits and extended the maximum age for office holders. Although Tunisia had presidential elections that were theoretically open to other candidates, Ben ‘Ali won these contests by huge margins. Any pretense of competitiveness was undercut by revealing moments such as when an opposing candidate actually endorsed Ben ‘Ali in a presidential debate. Parliamentary elections were no better. Although nominal opposition parties were granted a fixed quota of seats, they were otherwise unable to compete with the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) that dominated the legislature and municipal councils.

Post independence politics in Tunisia adhered to a corporatist model in which the people’s demands were supposed to be channeled through institutions such as the ruling party or national labor union. Instead of Tunisians being offered a choice among political parties or labor organizations, the ostensible concept was that a single intermediary institution—the RCD—would reconcile the different views of its constituents so that the popular will could be aggregated and reflected in policy. The leadership of the RCD argued that there was nothing antidemocratic about this approach because the full range of views was represented. This reasoning is apparent in the leadership’s decision to name the RCD using the descriptor al-tajammu‘ (“rally”) rather than al-hizb (“party”) to connote a broader role for the RCD than that
typically associated with a political party. In reality, the ruling elite used this all-encompassing platform to close the door to any potential competitors for power.

Tunisians’ withdrawal from political life can be seen as a rational response to the political reality prior to the Revolution in which outcomes were largely preordained and many Tunisians were systematically disenfranchised. In fact, the only institution that incorporated forces from outside the ruling party was the parliament. But even there, the opposition’s representation was symbolic—a fixed quota—to say nothing of the fact that the authorities of the parliament were dwarfed by those of the executive. Even for Tunisians willing to take the leap of faith that legislative politics mattered, electoral rolls were manipulated to ensure RCD control.

A review of voter registration conducted by the Independent High Commission for Elections, the body tasked with preparing the country for voting in October 2011, found that only 2.5 million of the 4.5 million names on the voter rolls were accurate. Two million registered voters were actually deceased or double-counted but used by the prior regime to pad election results, and an additional 3 million Tunisians who met eligibility requirements were missing from the rolls. This blatant electoral manipulation led to a disaffection with politics that is likely to complicate the current political transition.

A second that will figure importantly in the transition process is the integration of opposition movements that operated in exile. Shortly after the Revolution, two important opposition figures—Moncef Marzouki and Rashid Ghannouchi—returned to Tunisia from exile in France and Britain, respectively. Despite sharing the common experience of exile, Marzouki and Ghannouchi represent very different political ideologies. Marzouki is most closely associated with the liberal democratic trend informed by his roots in human rights activism. Ghannouchi is the leader of the moderate Islamist trend that self-identifies with the experience of the
AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey. Specifically, Ghannouchi’s an-Nahda party does not seek to impose Islamic law and sees religion as just one aspect of many that shape Tunisia’s identity.

The Arab Spring erupted in Tunisia on December 17, 2010, when a policewoman confiscated the vegetable cart of a 26-year-old street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, in Sidi Buzid, 300 km south of Tunis. Bouazizi appealed to the provincial headquarters in Sidi Buzid, where his case was rejected. A few hours later Bouazizi doused himself with flammable liquid and set himself on fire. This incident sparked revolution in Tunisia and other Arab countries. Demonstrations and riots ignited throughout the country, and police and security forces took serious measures against the protesters. Images of protests and brutal police action were featured on, and circulated through social media (i.e., Facebook and YouTube).

The popular slogans of the demonstration across the country were “Jobs for all,” “Down with the bribes and favouritism,” “Tunisia free” and “Ben Ali get lost.”1 To restrain the rage of the youth protesters, and to maintain security and order in the country, President Ben Ali promised he would create 300,000 jobs in the next 2 years (al-Baik, 2011), albeit ironically shortly thereafter issuing a decision to close down schools and universities and branding the protesters as “terrorists.” This self-contradicting message provoked the protesters and drove them to further confrontations with the police and security forces.

Under this snowballing pressure, Ben Ali fired part of his ministerial cabinet, called for early parliamentary elections within six months, and promised the protesters that he would step down by the end of his presidential term in 2014. These promises did not calm down the protestors, who instead targeted replacing the incumbent regime with a democratic one. When Ben Ali realized that he had no more choices, he fled to Saudi Arabia along, with his family on January 14, 2011, marking the end of his 24 years of authoritarian rule in Tunisia. Against this backdrop, Bouazizi was portrayed as a
champion who had galvanized the frustrations of the region’s youth against their dictatorial regimes into mass demonstrations, revolt, and revolution, all of which became known collectively as the “Arab Spring.”

The self-immolation of street vendor Mohammed al-Bou‘azizi in Tunisia set off the wave of protests that led to the fall of President Zine El Abidine Ben ‘Ali and catalyzed the Arab Spring. Although some analysts had long questioned the stability of Arab regimes given their reliance on repression, the January 14th Revolution was surprising both in the speed with which it unfolded and in that Tunisia was the first domino to fall. The patronage networks, internal security forces, and democratic façade Ben ‘Ali spent 23 years constructing took just 29 days to collapse. Given Tunisia’s positive economic performance, large middle class, and secular values, it appeared to be one of the more unlikely candidates in the region for a mass protest movement.

As should have been expected, the Tunisian transition has not been entirely smooth. It had a rocky start that included a delay in holding the country’s first free and fair elections and disputes over the limits of the transitional government’s authorities.

The transition began to find its footing in October 2011 when elections did take place, resulting in the seating of a Constituent Assembly in January 2012. The successful integration of Islamists into the political system and their partnering with secular parties to form a government provided further reason for optimism. But the assassination of the secular activist, Chokri Belaid, in February 2013, introduced new uncertainty into the political process and led to the collapse of the government. Despite the fact that very real political, practical, and economic challenges.
B. Research Question

The research question regarding the preface above is “How does the Replacement of Democratization transition Tunisia in the Era of Arab Spring 2011-2016?”

C. Theoretical Framework

In theory and concepts will help explain the problem above. The concept is an abstraction that present object, a character of a particular phenomenon or object. One function of the idea is putting together ideas, perceptions, and symbols in the form of classification and generalization (Mas’oed, 1990).

As the problem which is described above, the author refers to concept of democracy to analyze the phenomena or process of democratization in other terms, transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

Before a state becomes democratic, it has to pass through a democratization or transition process. It means a transformation of the political system from non-democracy or authoritarian towards accountable and representative government (Grugel, 2003: 3). Rustow provides model to explain the process of transition to democracy. Several phases are involved in this complex process, and there is no certainty where it begins and ends. Democratic transition is sustainable process and it also has many possibilities to emerge new regimes which will often restrict democracy—more democratic than the previous one but not yet fully democratic (Sørensen, 1993: 46). Furthermore, Sorensen emphasis on the phases that the result of regime change need not necessarily be democracy, especially in developing countries which well-off between a more or less authoritarian system and frail democracy.
Democratization waves

The countries were authoritarian became democratic in a particular period of time. The focus is on regime change, not regime existence. Almost all wealthy countries are democratic and almost all democracies are wealthy. That correlation alone says nothing about causation, and if the democracies were wealthy for a considerable length of time before they became democratic (as, relatively speaking, most northern European countries were), then wealth, by itself, is probably not a sufficient explanation of their transition from nondemocratic to democratic politics.

Similarly, historically a high correlation has existed between Protestantism and democracy, yet many countries were Protestant and nondemocratic for two or more centuries before they became democratic. People sometimes assume that doing away with a dictatorship leads to the inauguration of a democracy. In fact, however, nondemocratic regimes are more likely to be replaced by other nondemocratic regimes than by democratic ones. In addition, the factors responsible for the end of a nondemocratic regime may differ significantly from those that lead to the creation of a democratic one.

The economic failure of an authoritarian regime may undermine that regime but the economic success of an authoritarian regime may be more likely to create the basis for a democratic regime. Circumstances that contribute to the initial establishment of a democratic regime also may not contribute to its consolidation and long-term stability. At the simplest level, democratization involves:

- the end of an authoritarian regime
- the installation of a democratic regime; and
- the consolidation of the democratic regime.

Different and contradictory causes may be responsible for each of these three developments. The possible causes of democratization, also poses problems. At one extreme is the danger of tautology. Political elites alter or overthrow
authoritarian regimes and install and consolidate democratic ones. The political elites do are, presumably, acting in terms of their interests, values, and goals as they see them. If they want democracy, they will produce and get democracy.

1. Concept of democratization

A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave also usually involves liberalization or partial democratization in political systems that do not become fully democratic. Three waves of democratization have occurred in the modern world (Huntington, 1991).

Transition Process

The third wave transitions were complex political processes involving a variety of groups struggling for power and for and against democracy and other goals. In terms of their attitudes toward democratization, the crucial participants in the processes were the standpatters, liberal reformers, and democratic reformers in the governing coalition, and democratic moderates and revolutionary extremists in the opposition.

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Within the governing coalition some groups often came to favor democratization, while others opposed it, and others supported limited reform or liberalization. Opposition attitudes toward democracy were also usually divided. Supporters of the existing dictatorship always opposed democracy; opponents of
the existing dictatorship often opposed democracy. Almost invariably, however, they used the rhetoric of democracy in their efforts to replace the existing authoritarian regime with one of their own.

The groups involved in the politics of democratization thus had both conflicting and common objectives. Reformers and standpatters divided over liberalization and democratization but presumably had a common interest in constraining the power of opposition groups. Moderates and radicals had a common interest in bringing down the existing regime and getting into power but disagreed about what sort of new regime should be created. Reformers and moderates had a common interest in creating democracy but often divided over how the costs of creating it should be borne and how power within it should be apportioned. Standpatters and radicals were totally opposed on the issue of who should rule but had a common interest in weakening the democratic groups in the center and in polarizing politics in the society.

Transition to democracy was, of course, facilitated if prodemocratic groups were dominant in both the government and opposition. If democratic groups were strong in the opposition but not in the government, democratization depended on events undermining the government and bringing the opposition to power. If democratic groups were dominant in the governing coalition, but not in the opposition, the effort at democratization could be threatened by insurgent violence and by a backlash increase in power of standpatter groups possibly leading to a coup d'etat.

Replacements

The interactions between government and opposition and between moderates and extremists were important; the opposition eventually had to be stronger than the government, and the moderates had to be stronger than the extremists. A successive defection of groups often led to the downfall of the regime and inauguration of the democratic system. Replacements involve a very different process from
transformations. Reformers within the regime are weak or nonexistent. The dominant elements in government are standpatters staunchly opposed to regime change. Democratization consequently results from the opposition gaining strength and the government losing strength until the government collapses or is overthrown. The former opposition groups come to power and the conflict then often enters a new phase as groups in the new government struggle among themselves over the nature of the regime they should institute.

Replacement, in short, involves three distinct phases:

- The Struggle To Produce The Fall,
- The Fall Of Regime,
- The Struggle After The Fall.

Democratization can be seen if in a non-democratic country have started capilation and highly industrialized economic system (market economy). Other characteristics of an attempt to democratize it is an attempt to change the State-centered power into power based on civil society. This makes the State does not have the right of "supernatural" because there is sovereignty in the hands of the people.

Ben Ali continued their predecessors’ authoritarian policies and were not ready to take serious measures that would lead to the democratization of postindependence dictatorial systems in their countries. In fact, the modest reformist attempts initiated by them were highly cosmetic in nature and did not make a genuine move from authoritarianism to democracy. the liberalization movement did not lead to democratization, because the stand of the authoritarian regimes usually proposed reforms that would serve their own political agendas rather than democratizing the system in which they had built their political images.

The replacement process is different from the transformation because the role of democratic reformers within the regime is either weak or nonexistent. In such a situation, as Huntington argues, the regime’s will be not be interested in any form of democratization that might
undermine their control over the apparatus of their authoritarian rule. If the democratic reformers of the opposition coalition succeeded in overthrowing the dictatorial regime, they would enter a new phase of internal struggle among themselves over “the distribution of power and the nature of the regime that must be established”. The transplacement process is the third phase of transition in Huntington’s third wave of democratization, and it combines government and opposition actions that lead to regime change. Transplacement occurs when the balance of power between standpatters and reformers within a governing coalition is relatively equal or uncertain.

The three crucial interactions in democratization processes were those between government and opposition, between reformers and standpatters in the governing coalition, and between moderates and extremists in the opposition. In all transitions these three central interactions played some role. The relative importance and the conflictual or cooperative character of these interactions, however, varied with the overall nature of the transition process.

At the same time, the leaders of the opposition are divided between hardliners and democratic moderates who are strong enough to prevail over their radical fellows, but they are not quite strong enough to overthrow the regime. The above statement that those transitions that occurred in the Arab Spring countries shared similarities with those that took place in different countries in the third wave of democratization. The situation today as a whole is very alarming and post-Arab Spring leaders face a series of challenges to establish democratic governments.

D. Hypothesis

Based on the problem and the framework concept above, the hypothesis is drawn as follows. After Arab Spring in 2011, Tunisia makes efforts to build a stable democratic system, indicators i.e:
• The Struggle After The Fall Ben Ali and Replacement leader in the transition towards democracy through the Tunisian turnover leader forming a democratic Government from the previous.
• Economic stability which the average during the process of Democratization and the Arab Spring in Tunisia.

E. Scope of Research
To facilitate research, the author will limit the length of time between the years 2011-2016. The time is 2011 because selected as the initial research because in the year that the phenomenon of Arab Spring began which then overthrew the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia. In addition, at the start of a growing momentum will hope the presence of democracy as a system of alternative replacement for authoritarianism. Whereas in 2016, the author chose the end of the year 2016 research because as the evaluation five years after the events of the Arab Spring occurs and also two years after general elections were held in Tunisia.

F. Method of Research
• Type of Research, This research type is qualitative descriptive
• Type of Data, This research using secondary data from books, magazines, newspaper, journal, report of many sources and also electronic media, especially internet.
• Data Collecting Method, The method of collecting the data is library research with the help of printed media like books references, magazines, newspaper, journal, report of many sources and also electronic media. Those data will be analyzed with the theory that is determined before. It is to prove that the hypothesis is accurate and finally answer the core problem. Although this paper uses a secondary data, the writer selects accurate data and check the reliability of the data to accomplish the trustworthy research. The
methods of writing to address the matter in the paper. This paper uses the deductive method (general to specific). It based on the theoretical framework that pulled to a hypothetical conclusion which proven through empirical available data.

G. Purpose of Research

The main purpose of this research is to describe the successful of democratization in Tunisia after Arab spring 2011-2016. This including the act by Tunisia government for political development especially in democracy, and also adds objectivity in the course Introduction to Political Science, International Relations in The Middle East, Problems in Islamic World, Problems in Developing Countries, The International Relation in Islamic Perspective, Conflict Resolution in The Islamic World.

H. Organisation of Writing

Chapter I discusses the background of the problem purpose of Writing for describing the purpose of the study, research, theoretical framework, hypothesis, research method, research area and systematic of writing.

Chapter IIdiscussed the Tunisia Political System before Arab Spring, when Tunisia led by Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali. The differentiation political system implementation of Democracy between both of them when they were be President of Tunisia.

Chapter III discusses the Phenomena of Arab Spring In Tunisia, processing protest begins in Tunisia. As the first country starting Arab Spring, Tunisia has many problems with the economic, social and political condition. Also what occurs in Tunisia during Arab Spring.
Chapter IV discussed Tunisia Democratisation's after Arab Spring with the research, that is condition after Arab Spring when Democratization is implemented in Tunisia includes General election, The new draft of constitutions and The transition process.

Chapter V Conclusion all of written