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Red Tape and Bureaucracy



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Synonyms

Dependency power; Fragmented bureaucracy; High costs; Leveling bureaucratic inertia; Resistance to change; Uncertainty

Definition

Leveling bureaucratic inertia occurs at the individual, group, organization, and inter-organizational level. In this leveling bureaucratic inertia, organizations perpetuate the establishment of the path dependence rules and procedures, regardless of whether they are counterproductive or potentially specifically inverse built-up hierarchical objectives. In all these levels, bureaucratic inertia occurs when bureaucracy resistance to change, wherein individuals have no willingness to learn and the ability to make any organizational

improvement. History, culture, and tradition are among the factors, which influenced bureaucratic inertia not only at the individual level, but also at the level of organizational networks. Bureaucratic inertia causes high costs, dependency in power, and uncertainty, which ultimately leads to a fragmented bureaucracy.

Introduction

The terms “inertia” and “resist to change” – used sometimes interchangeably – are used primarily to refer to the physical phenomenon first described by Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, the tendency for a body to persist in a state of motion or rest unless there are forces acting upon it which have three kinds of inertia: inertia in individuals, inertia in social and political structures, and inertia in the development of knowledge and concepts (Zantvoort 2015). Individuals do not want to change because they have “safe zone.” At the level of organization, members of organization try to delay from innovation in order to protect their interest borne out of their habits and old rules.

Bureaucratic inertia is an older and larger bureau and becomes subject to inertia because of “sunk cost” represented by its established rules, habits, procedures, and interpersonal network of communication and authority (Downs 1967). Due to established rules and procedures, bureaucracy resist to change from what is originally mandated

by the policy and/or only partially absorb change at one bureau level and may be completely absorbed by the other (Congleton 1982). Those old ideas on bureaucratic inertia clearly affect how the current institutionalism scholars define it. North (1984, 1990, 1991) and Williamson (2000), stated that bureaucratic inertia is mainly affected by the outcome of a complex process of playing the economic game according to formal and informal rules that provide incentive structures and channel innovative activities in a certain direction. It means that stakeholders can be successful in using and managing their resources if they can meet their institutions with its contexts (Ostrom 2008), in which the different contexts and cultures can create different institutions because the same rule cannot be executed in different social contexts (Agrawal 2001).

Bureaucrats

Therefore, the development of effective local institutions should rely on the local contexts and cultures. A specific institution with a defined context is the best way to deal with resources and environmental issues. Colloquially speaking, bureaucracy means red tape, overcontrolling bosses, and apathetic employees (Adler 1999). What is the bureaucracy profile? To understand how local officials as units perform their tasks, the analysis takes a system views of local agency, by controlling multiple internal and external circumstances known to be associated with organizational performance (Gazley 2014). Bureaucracy agencies are the government's means of carrying out public policy, and their capacity for effective performance is clearly central to how any rational politician, interest group, or citizen would go about in understanding them or assessing their value (Moe 2012). Internally, Wilson (1989) divides officials in bureaucracy into operators, managers, and executives. Operators placed at the front line have different behaviors in facing field problems.

In other words, the performance of their (frontline workers) task depends on circumstances, beliefs, interests, and culture. The

frontline workers define the organizational task to vary depending on whether they are supervised and the imperatives of the situation they confront daily (Wilson 1989). The imperatives of the situation, more than the attitude of the front workers, shape the way tasks are performed (Wilson 1989). What is the real task of the frontline worker? Their tasks depend how the frontline workers define the task based on their prior experiences, professional norms, and bureaucratic personality.

Operator tasks are shaped by the pressure of external interests and vary depending on which of the four political environments surround the agency: the extent to which the legislature wants and expectations has an impact, the degree of discretionary authority, the array of interest in the agency's environment, and the relationship between desired behavior and client incentives (Wilson 1989). The last important factor affecting the frontline worker is organizational culture. Culture is the central task of human relationships within an organization (Wilson 1989).

Manager or the middle-range worker in bureaucracy is shaped not by the tasks the operators are performing or the goals the agency is serving but by the constraints placed on that agency by its political environment (Wilson 1989). The constraints of government agency (1) cannot lawfully retain and devote to the private benefit of their members the earnings of the organization, (2) cannot allocate the factors of production in accordance with the preferences of the organization's administrators, and (3) must serve goals not of the organization's own choosing. Managers in craft agency have core activities as a compliance officer who has an investigative function. Their service relies on the ethos and sense of duty of its operators to control behavior (Wilson 1989). At the higher level of government agencies is the place of executives. The main tasks of executives are to maintain their agency autonomy (Wilson 1989). Maintenance means assuring the necessary flow of resources to the organization through political support and high budget (Wilson 1989).

Leveling Bureaucratic Inertia

Bureaucratic inertia has five main mechanisms: (1) cost, (2) uncertainty, (3) path dependence, (4) power, and (5) legitimacy. Costs can be divided within the literature into two main sub-groups: costs of “free-ridership” and “transaction costs.” Rules, norms, routines, cognitive scripts, and standards for behavior existing institutional structures support incumbent actors; in subordinate groups are hindered to exert pressure.

Organization culture emphatically impacts the part of conduct. This impact can separate one organization from others. It likewise can make association personality and part character, association duty above individual responsibility, and the soundness of social framework solidarity. It likewise works significantly in creating instrument of conduct controlling images of individual relations in achieving organizational goals and satisfaction.

Organization culture is an arrangement of framework containing image, esteem introduction, conviction, learning, and beneficial experience embedded at the individual’s mind. Hence, it contained: Artifacts, which refers to obvious and unmistakable conduct example such: language, oral discourse, composed discourse, bureaucracy plan, bureaucratic structures, dress and custom; (b) conviction and esteem as seen from the individual’s communication style. Noticeable conduct of individual behavior and governmental support to the public at large, is also shown as one of the forms of organizational culture. Great dialect, neighborly and justifiable, is an immediate correspondence between the authority and society. Embraced an incentive in a general public is an arrangement of shared standards that ought to be actualized by all gatherings. Organizational strategies are made by the organization to maximize the benefits. Whereas, it should be obeyed by all staff in directing their works. Along this line, the organization keeps the conduct of staff in leading predominant control.


On the other hand, bureaucracy issues are influenced by universal standards, guidelines, and administrations that direct residential administration in different territories of economy, governmental issues, society, culture, and organization. Numerous issues are currently ending up

all-around concerned issues which request aggregate innovation and aptitudes, for instance, urban administration conveyance, crisis and security issues, destitution and lodging issues, air and water contamination, and wrongdoing and different issues.

Bureaucracy inertia is the resistance of any adjustment in its condition of movement; this incorporates changes to its speed, bearing, or condition of rest. It is the inclination of items to continue moving in a straight line at consistent speed. Bureaucratic inertia portrays the propensity of managerial organizations to confuse their operations to the detriment of achieving their unique objectives. The more complex procedural systems in an organization, the additional time it will take to arrange those techniques, which implies that it will be more troublesome for the staff to accomplish the task or assignment intended to be completed. In doing so, bureaucratic development is hindered.

Furthermore, the tendency of bureaucratic organizations to perpetuate themselves is inevitable. The perpetuation of bureaucratic organizations is done through procedures and modes, even if they are counterproductive and/or diametrically opposed to established organizational goals. Organizational practices are constructed around the belief that bureaucrats know best how to translate broad legislative mandates into specific regulatory decisions for the public interest. In governance, the preferred institution is best entrusted to a bureaucracy operating the procedures and system to implement governmental mandate and services. Hence, bureaucracy must be on one hand, remained neutral against the pressure of electoral politics and the caprices of the public-at-large on another.

Bureaucratic inertia mechanisms occur starting from the individual level due to the unwillingness and the ability to learn. In the organization, there are individuals who are categorized as free riders who benefit from the organization but do not contribute to the organization. These individuals have no willingness to learn and the ability to make any organizational improvement. In turn, the greater the number of free rider individuals, the more troublesome the team or working group



in the organization to make changes since they tend to oppose improvement. Their cultures, habits, and norms are preventing individuals from learning. Organizational structure's objective is mainly to make more efficient transaction cost. However, under this condition, the costs of governing will increase such as information costs, bargaining costs, and cost of enforcing transactional agreement uncertainty and frequency, and the persons involved in the transactions, such as being bounded rationality and potentially opportunistic (Williamson 1989).

At interorganizational level, unorganized and fragmented bureaucracies will increase the transaction cost, because these mechanisms involve a collective decision process encompassing multiple policies and actors and delegated authority (Feiock 2013). Multiple government units consequently create multiple policies, and preferences for cooperation are not homogeneous in which they vary according to a country's history, culture, and traditions in which they are embedded (Tavares and Feiock 2014). History, culture, and tradition will certainly affect not only to individual level or team but also the model of organizational network. Untrustworthy individual

relationship will extend untrustworthy group relationship also. In other words, social embeddedness helps to mitigate opportunism because long-term interaction builds reputation among potential partners and prevents untrustworthy behavior.

Inertia bureaucracy point out that bureaucracy resistance to change will cause the uncertainty. Without bureaucracy capability to accommodating the change and uncertainty to where it is needed most, any goals and policies they are implementing will not impose significant impact on society. In a bureaucratic organization, external factors such as changes in technology applications, regulatory inventive administration, and more innovative service demands are challenges that require rapid bureaucratic response. But this rapid response should frequently not be done by the bureaucracy on the grounds that the position of inertia of organizational units prompts to uncertainty situations occurring within the work unit level.

Since individuals in organizational units frequently decline to react to changes that require the ability to learn ceaselessly, what happens is vulnerability in the organization. For instance, when

society demands a public service innovation to enhance the advantages of services, at that point what happens is organizational units sit tight with each other to make advancement to create innovation in public service, resulting in a situation of high uncertainty.

Bureaucratic inertia is also seen as the tendency of bureaucratic organizations to perpetuate the established path dependence rules and procedures, regardless of whether they are counterproductive or potentially specifically inverse built-up hierarchical objectives. As a matter of first importance, this is identified with the development which if unchecked proceeds with the organization success or failure. Furthermore, after experiencing such uncertainty, organizations encounter what is referred to as process dependency and performance of each other or path dependency. Bureaucratic inertia usually leads to low performance due to the high process dependency and interunit performance. When a unit in a bureaucratic organization is not able to complete its target objectives in an auspicious manner, at that point what happens is delaying the process on the other unit or postponing the procedure on the other unit. In this case, examples of cases of electronic single identity number administrations, integrated licensing administrations, tax collection administrations, and health insurance services are cases of high path dependence among hierarchical organizational units within each service provider. Notwithstanding a process that needs to depend on one unit with another, it will likewise have implications for organizational performance. Ultimately, in this path dependence, it can be seen that the process in a single unit of the organization that goes well will create good performance for the bureaucratic organization overall.

At the organizational level, bureaucratic inertia is caused by the power possessed by powerful officials. In the bureaucratic structure, the hierarchy determines the authority of officials according to the position held. Officials who are at lower levels are not conceivable to carry out operational exercises of the organization without direction and orders from authorities above. For this situation, the number of layers of hierarchy

prompts a long bureaucratic structure and permits the execution of projects and exercises to be longer, because lower authorities are waiting directions and orders from upper authorities. The length of the bureaucratic chain and the level of oversight are likewise the motivation behind why bureaucratic inertia happens. The moderate instance of open government, for example, school operational aid, rice distribution for the poor, and the development of low-rise apartments indicate bureaucratic inertia occurring because of the moderate decision-making. Furthermore, it shows the process bearing the mandates and directions from higher authorities to lower authorities in the bureaucracy. In the case of overcoming the bureaucratic inertia caused by the abuse of authority of some officials, the discretionary mechanisms in developing countries are less well undertaken. The discretionary power frequently creates inter-organizational conflict. The discretionary power of governmental officials are also with certain limitations. The power dynamics and limitations of governmental authority in terms of their discretionary powers are among the bottlenecks in the implementation of public programs, projects and activities, thus manifesting bureaucratic inertia.

Bureaucratic inertia will cause crisis of legitimacy. This is because the impact of bureaucratic inertia drives individuals to end up trust in bureaucracy and causing weak legitimation because public trust is declining sharply. The case of land titling, building rights certificates, and import-export management sometimes fall into a corruption where clients want the process to be faster. In these cases, the probability of bribery opportunities is considered to happen. As a result, public trust in the bureaucracy is decreasing, and the legitimacy of the bureaucracy fall into a low legitimate public servant.

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