

CHAPTER II
THE KINGDOM OF JAVA DELIVERED YOGYAKARTA SULTANATE
WITH CULTURAL LEGITIMATION

A. The History Yogyakarta Government

1. The Beginning of Java Authority

It is stated that in the beginning of the human civilization, absolute monarchy is a common form of political system in Indonesia (Linz, 2000, p. 49). The formation of the civilization can be described with hydraulic theory. This theory describes the development of civilization in Asian societies by highlighting the idea of ‘irrigation agriculture as a fundamental aspect of the creation of social stratification, state hierarchy and control (Wittfogel, 1957, pp. 363-368). In the early agricultural community, the access to water provided the basis for strength and accumulation of wealth. Groups or individuals who regulate the irrigation’s bureaucracy have a higher class in social strata (Harsono, 2018, p. 15). This results in an advantage in the form of more authority and wealth accumulated by specific people or groups. They got more power from the community. As the community developed, these people in power maintained their strength by using a complex kinship system (Abell & Stevenson, 2011).

Power in a centralized monarchy system is represented by an individual, usually the King, as the highest member of the society. The understanding of that kind of strength is originated from the early

European conception which is correlated with the form of power, its source, concentration, and its wider implications (Anderson, 1990, p. 2123). The form of modern power is abstract and appears in the social interaction. Since power is generated from social interaction, the relation of the monarch with the society brings an unclear power based on the influence of the authorities that comes from the accumulation of their wealth. In other words, the resources provided by the authorities are related to the social status and broader inheritance context. The ability of rulers to exercise power to maintain their status by increasing authority and prosperity for the people (Harsono, 2018, p. 16). However, this must be done under moral constraints and without ethical problems. If not, the regime loses its legitimacy, and its strength will eventually be challenged and questioned.

Traditional Javanese society with modern concepts uses various criteria. First, in traditional conception, the power exists and is manifested in the universe as divine energy adheres to it. Second, the energy that sustains power comes from the Divine, making all sources of power homogeneous. Third, this view believes that power is constant because it radiates from the Divine. With this, the strength is the number of zero games where increasing the power for one person or group would mean reducing the power from another. Fourth, the question of legitimacy does not arise, because it derives from the Divine energy (Anderson, 1990, pp. 21-23). Compared to the modern

concepts, those perspectives provide the roots of different understandings of the power because it depends on the beliefs of those people in the society in which The Ruler is a representation of the Divine.

Javanese culture believe that 'power is invalid or illegitimate' and modern Javanese rulers including Indonesian Presidents have been forced to develop different legitimacy bases (Anderson, 1990, p. 23). Meanwhile, in the other parts of the world where absolute monarchy continues to survive, the power of the monarch is often associated with the questions of both authority and legitimacy. Commonly, the legitimacy in the modern monarchy systems comes from the traditional cultural factors and charisma, while rational-law authorities are usually absent (Harsono, 2018, p. 16). Thus, the ruler enjoys the legitimacy based on the tradition and charisma.

2. Ancient of Javanese Kingdom

Based on the inscriptions found in Java, the first ancient Javanese kingdom was thought to have emerged in the eighth century. Many experts believe that Chinese civilization influenced this early kingdom because they brought Hinduism/Sivaism, Buddhism and finally Islam to Southeast Asia (Harsono, 2018, p. 41). As the external religions came to the region, they changed the ancient Javanese society to develop unique cultural traditions that combined local and external influences (Rahardjo, 2011, p. 34).

In the eighth to tenth centuries, there were two Javanese kingdoms in Bali and Central Java. The first monarchy was the Javanese Mataram kingdom ruled by the Sanjaya dynasty from 732 to 929 AD in which he practiced Hinduism. The second is the Sailendra Buddhist dynasty which ruled from 754 to 856 AD (Harsono, 2018, p. 42). During this period, two dynasties were built along with spectacular Hindu and Buddhist temples that still survive today. That the construction of these temples by the rulers of Mataram was not only a form of religious practice indicated the importance of the new religion introduced in that time (Reid, 2015, p. 72). In contrast, the construction of monumental temples such as Borobudur or Prambanan was an attempt by ancient rulers to ensure social cohesion and a measure of loyalty from royal officials because many people had to be mobilized by these officials to build large religious sites.

After the collapse of Mataram, the center of Javanese rule was to move to East Java with the emergence of the Kingdom of Tamwlang-Kahuripan in 929 AD and lived there until the end of the Majapahit kingdom in 1486 (Reid, 2015, p. 76). There are several reasons for the relocation of the capital (Rahardjo, 2011, p. 41). First, people in the Central Java region bear a heavy burden because they had to build various religious monuments in a relatively short time. Second, the Solo and the Brantas river deltas attracted people because they were economically advantageous as the gateways to the

international trade. Third, severe natural disasters caused by the eruption of Mount Merapi damaged rice fields and settlements in the former capital of the kingdom. Fourth, the Srivijaya kingdom of Sumatra attacked the Mataram kingdom in Central Java.

Overall, there were four kingdoms in East Java: Tamwlang-Kahuripan, Janggala-Kadiri, Singhasari and Majapahit. The later reached its golden age during the reign of Hayam Wuruk, king of Majapahit from 1350 to 1389 (Harsono, 2018, p. 42). Compared to the previous Javanese kingdom, Majapahit had a much greater territory and lasted from 1293 to 1486 (Sievers, 1974, p. 43). Majapahit's first ruler, Kertarajasa, gained his legitimacy to rise to the throne after marrying the fourth daughter of the last ruler of Singhasari, Kertanegara (Rahardjo, 2011, p. 99). Significantly, the Majapahit kingdom was also recognized by several queens who ruled as the rulers of the kingdom and had well-developed political institutions reflected in its military organization, the legal system, noble traditions, literature and language style (Rahardjo, 2011, p. 401).

Despite continuing the Hindu-Buddhist tradition of the Javanese kingdom existed before, religious institutions of Majapahit were less dominant than in the previous kingdoms, of which the people had considered their kings as a representation of the Divine. Although this idea was returned during Hayam Wuruk's period, legitimacy was then more directly related to his achievements as the greatest king of

Majapahit (Harsono, 2018, p. 43). In addition, other religions were tolerated, including the spread of Islam at the end of the kingdom. Religious monuments depicting the conception of mandalas, which had been seen in the early Javanese kingdom during the Sailendra Dynasty, reappeared during the Majapahit period as the kingdom often built them. In fact, religious organizations flourished in the society. The mandala requirement derives from Indian political discourse in which 'designates concentric, hierarchical power structures centered on the figure of a king (Gray, 2006, p. 300). Buddhists then redefined the term, placing the Buddha as Raj of Kings in the central palace of the figurative gods. From the center, power radiates to the layers of the surrounding elements which at the beginning of the Buddhist civilization symbolized people or regions (Rahardjo, 2011, pp. 184-193). However, based on the discovery of Buddha statues in Javanese temples in that period, the structure of Javanese mandala was somewhat different from the Indian concept of mandala.

These differences have supported the argument that Javanese culture is not passive in absorbing external influences. On the contrary, it has been active in 'establishing external traditions' and forming mixed indigenous cultures (Rahardjo, 2011, p. 47). Local culture can filter external values without losing its own character, and finally to combine various elements into different Javanese cultures that unite local and external influences. Similar processes of acculturation

occurred when Islamic values begin to spread in Java at the end of the Majapahit period. It should be noted, however, that when the coming of Islam coincided with the decline of Majapahit, it was not the cause of the decline; on the contrary, the end of the ancient Javanese empire was caused by a combination of some factors including the attacks from the kingdoms of Demak, Kadiri and Dahanapura, the conflicts in the Majapahit royal family and the volcanic disasters that destroyed the capital of Majapahit (Harsono, 2018, p. 44).

The early Javanese kingdom was an agrarian society characterized by a hydraulic system and ruled by a ruling elite whose power was spread but gradually diminished from the capital to the rural periphery (Harsono, 2018, p. 44). The kingdoms had a politically, economically, and relatively organized political religious institution run by bureaucratic aristocrats who used these institutions to name the royal elite to control society. This system is supported by religious values that guarantee the surrender of people to their rulers (Harsono, 2018, p. 44). However, since then people have believed that their charismatic rulers were the incarnation of God, the rulers of these early kingdoms were also similar to traditional European monarchies whose legitimacy rested on their status as Divine (Rahardjo, 2011, p. 79). The ruling legitimacy is based on charisma, especially where the ruler can overcome the critical situation faced by the dynasty.

3. Modern of Javanese Kingdom

The earliest tomb found in present-day Indonesia, which contains a Javanese Muslim, dates to 1368 (Ricklefs, 2008, hal. 5). This confirms that Islam was in the region during the peak period of the Majapahit kingdom. Other tombstones found near the site of the former Majapahit capital were also decorated with Al-Qur'an epigraphs, indicating that they were respected, maybe even kingdoms, Javanese people had embraced Islam in the period between 1376 and 1611. According to Javanese legend, Islam later spread in Java by the so-called Nine Saints (Wali Sanga) whose activities also facilitated the emergence of Demak kingdom in Central Java in 1505 (Harsono, 2018, p. 44). A note about the fall of Majapahit and the rise of Demak said that Raden Patah, the first king of Demak, was the direct successor to the Majapahit throne because he was the son of the Majapahit ruler.

The central court of the Demak kingdom was diverted to Pajang and immediately followed by the last Islamic Mataram Kingdom (not to be confused with the previous Mataram kingdom) founded by Panembahan Senapati. Mataram became the direct successor of the Majapahit dynasty (Harsono, 2018, p. 44). This Javanese tradition under the Islamic dynasty is an amalgamation of Islamic mysticism and earlier traditions originating from indigenous cultures as well as Hindu and Buddhist religions (Sievers, 1974, p. 47).

Unlike the Indian religions that worship gods through sculpture, the Islamic faith does not permit the use of intermediaries in worshipping God. However, by applying Islamic mysticism (Sufism) in Indonesia to spread religion, Nine Saints are believed to have created syncretism of Javanese mysticism, so that gradually changing local customs and beliefs violated Islamic doctrine (Woodward, 2011, pp. 178-181). One such change was the prohibition of the belief that the ruler was the incarnation of gods. Gradually, Javanese religious practices shifted from the use of the medium, such as sculpture, to pantheism, a doctrine that refers to the understanding of the universe as a manifestation of God (Moedjanto, 1993, pp. 103-106). However, significantly, pantheism accommodates the concept of the mandala the power from the Divine, which attaches strength to a ruler who holds heirlooms and exudes extraordinary power not only to people but also to enemies.

The arrival of Islam on Java, therefore, did not replace the conception that a king was a divine ruler with direct relations to the supernatural world. On the contrary, during the Mataram period, rulers such as the founders of the Panembahan Senapati kingdom secured their right to ascend to the throne of Mataram by increasing their power through rituals related to asceticism, heirlooms, and spirits. Sacred heritage in Javanese culture is the media through which supernatural powers from the Divine become attached to the ruler and give legitimacy or 'royal authority' to the holder (Sievers, 1974, p. 26).

By gathering heirlooms and performing rituals, the Mataram rulers intended to show that they had a blessing from the God and that this blessing would be projected onto their offspring after death. Endowed with this blessing and the power contained in it, Senapati and his successors developed Mataram's military power and began to expand the kingdom until it reached its largest territorial expansion under Sultan Agung, the grandson of Panembahan Senapati (Harsono, 2018, p. 46).

The emergence of the Islamic empire on Java took place at the same time Europeans began to arrive in the region in search of spices. The Portuguese who first came to West Java were followed by Spain, the Netherlands and England (Harsono, 2018, p. 46). In the end, it was true that the Netherlands through their foreign trade company, the United East India Company (VOC), conquered Java even though they had several clashes with Portuguese and English. Using a combination of diplomacy and military power, the VOC gradually expanded its power on Java during the Sultan Agung period. However, Sultan Agung was the last strong enemy of Mataram for the VOC (Harsono, 2018, p. 46). His successors continued to get weaker because they became increasingly involved in fierce internal conflicts in the palace. One of these conflicts eventually led to the Dutch Intervention and the formation of Yogyakarta.

4. Division of Yogyakarta Region

On February 13, 1755, an agreement between the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Mataram was signed in the village of Giyanti, which is not far east of Surakarta. Based on this agreement, the Mataram region is divided into two. The area east of the Opak River is part of the Susuhunan PB III which remains domiciled in Surakarta. The area west of the Opak River was handed over to Prince Mangkubumi who was later appointed as Sultan Hamengkubuwon I and based in Yogyakarta (Hidayah, 2017, p. 23).

From 1812 to 1816, Governor Thomas Stamford Raffles presented a small part of the Yogyakarta area to Prince Notokusumo who was the brother of Sultan HB II who ruled at that time. He was later recognized as an independent prince and separated from the Sultan with the title Paku Alam I. The agreement was made between Paku Alam I and England on March 17, 1813 (Hidayah, 2017, p. 23). Since then the Yogyakarta region has been divided into two namely the Sultanate and the Pakualaman.

After the Diponegoro War in 1830, the Dutch again reduced the area of the Sultanate and Kasunanan. The area is Banyumas, Bagelan Kediri, and Madiun. The boundary between the Sultanate and Kasunanan was reaffirmed by the Klaten agreement signed on September 27, 1830. Both parties were represented by Papatih Dalem and witnessed by the Dutch. This agreement was signed by Susuhunan

PB VII on October 1 and on October 24, 1830 by Sri Sultan HB V. The Kasultanan region was originally divided into six districts consisting of: Kulonprogo, Yogyakarta, Bantul, Sleman, Kalasan, and Gunungkidul. In 1927, the districts were reduced to four, namely: Yogyakarta, Bantul, Gunungkidul, and Kulonprogo (Hidayah, 2017, hal. 23). It is stated that the territory in Yogyakarta Province was obtained through a long and struggling history.

5. The system of the Kraton Yogyakarta Government during the Dutch Occupation

The kings who ruled in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta must be bound by a political contract with the Dutch government. This was done to control the Sultanate in order to not carrying out resistance which could threaten the position of the Dutch. The Sultan who occupied the throne as the king in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta still held the government over his area, but the one who ran the day-to-day government was Papatih Dalem (Rijksbestuurder). The position of Papatih Dalem is appointed and dismissed by the Governor General by firstly negotiating with the Sultan. Papatih Dalem is also responsible to the Governor and to the Sultan, and therefore gets a salary from the Netherlands and the Sultanate (Hidayah, 2017, p. 24). Although, the role of the Sultan was very limited as a King, he was still able to maintain his position and was recognized by the Dutch because of cultural legitimacy.

The administration of the Yogyakarta Sultanate was initially composed of two Nayaka/Kanayakan (a kind of ministry), namely Nayaka internal affairs and Nayaka external affairs, chaired by Papatih Dalem. Nayaka's internal affairs consist of: Kanayakan Keparak Kiwo and Kanayakan Keparak Tengen, which were in charge for managing the problems of foundations and public works and Kanayakan Gedong Kiwa and Kanayakan Gedong Tengen which were in charge for managing financial matters. Kanayakan business is responsible for handling issues related to the Yogyakarta area and Kraton (Mochtar, 1982, p. 24). According to Dwi Harsono, in his dissertation. Kanayakan outside affairs was responsible for running the government outside the city of Yogyakarta. Kanayakan external affairs consist of: Kanayakan Siti Sewu, which was in charge for handling land and civil matters, Kanayakan Penumping and Kanayakan Numbakanyar, which were in charge for the defense matters, and Kanayakan Bumijo which is in charge for handling problems such as Siti Sewu. However, the Yogyakarta Sultanate was able to relax in studying the bureaucratic system in this era and could find many gaps in it.

6. The system of Government of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta During the War of Independence

The Sultan also realized that in order to maintain security in his area, he needed to strengthen the military sector. The Sultan then issued the declaration number 5 on October 26, 1945, in which contained the formation of the People's Army as an effort to assist the TKR (People's Security Army). This People's Army so called Laskar Rakyat was formed in each village. The armies were tasked with maintaining the security of their respective regions to avoid enemy attacks. The Laskar Rakyat was also prepared to help all the interests of the people when they need any. Members of the People's Army were made up of male Indonesian residents who had not yet become members of the TKR (Mochtar, 1982, p. 28).

There was also a concern about the establishment of a House of Representatives for each region. At the city level, a City Representative Council was formed. While at the District level, a District Representative Council was formed, and at the Kelurahan level, a Village Representative Council was formed. Each council cooperated with the head of the local area and was given the right to make regulations provided that it was not permissible to deal with laws or regulations issued by higher institutions (Hidayah, 2017, p. 29). The House of Representatives then formed a Government Council or

Executive Board that had several members chaired by the head of the region and jointly runs the daily government.

7. Struggle for the Yogyakarta Special Law

Regulations concerning regional government in the Republic of Indonesia are regulated in the Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution. The article explains that regions that have their own traditional government will continue to be recognized as special regions from the 11th, 12th, and 13th of January 1946. The Yogyakarta Indonesia National Committee of Regional (BPKNID) convened a session which produced the basic law of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Sultanate) and Praja Paku Alaman (Hidayah, 2017, p. 33). The Act above explains that Sri Sultan HB IX and Paku Alam VIII from the beginning had tried to lay the foundations on the system of governance in Yogyakarta as a special region.

On March 3, 1950 the Central Government re-issued Law No. 3 of 1950 which began to be promulgated on March 4, 1950 and concerning with General Regulations, Article 1 of this law states that: "The area which covers the Jogjakarta Sultanate Region and the Paku Alaman area is set to become the Yogyakarta Special Region". Meanwhile Article 2 reads: "Special Region of Jogjakarta is level with Province" (Hidayah, 2017, p. 34). Based on the Law, it is clear how the formation and area of administration of the Special Region of Yogyakarta is.

In 2002, the regional government appointed a team to draft a new special law for Yogyakarta. The aim is to secure similar privileges as given to Papua and Aceh in their respective autonomy laws (Harsono, 2018, p. 85). However, during the discussion about the design, some problems quickly arose (Wahyukismoyo, 2004, p. 3). First, the people of Yogyakarta seem to be divided between those supporting the election and those supporting appointment mechanism for the governor. Second, the draft shifts the focus of Yogyakarta's privileges to the provincial level and the interests are directly related to the sultan. In contrast, in the 1950 law on Yogyakarta's special status, Hamengkubuwono IX had emphasized that the privilege of Yogyakarta is at the district level. Thus, the draft critic accused the sultan for a conflict of interest. Third, there is a debate about the level of privilege that will be extended to the royal family. Fourth, there are differing views to how precisely the privilege of Yogyakarta must be interpreted. Fifth, the discussion of the draft encourages a discourse about the constitutional rights of monarchy as an alternative to hybrid systems that have embedded certain privileges of the kingdom in a broader system of democratic governance.

In the end, the drafting team ignored most critical questions. That last draft of a special law for Yogyakarta as submitted to the House of Representatives in Jakarta in 2003 only mentioned that the specialty of Yogyakarta is about the appointment of the sultan as

governor (Harsono, 2018, p. 85). Thus, this concept was accepted by harsh criticism because of its narrow focus on the status of Sultan Hamengkubuwono and Pakualam. Basically, the draft only channeled the interest from the sultan to strengthen his power in a new democratic environment. The Yogyakarta NGO Forum said that the design is elitist and limited to the leadership of the sultan as governor. There is no real benefit for people who support the sultanate (Harsono, 2018, p. 86). The draft encourages pro-democracy NGOs not to support the sultan and focus their aspirations on advocacy and empowering the people. In addition, the academics in Yogyakarta also rejected the appointment mechanism in the design and proposed the selection as the opposite mechanism (Wahyukismoyo, 2004, p. 8). In the process of deliberation, the Sultan's supporters encouraged his ongoing appointment to be increasingly provocative, intimidating those who supported the free and competitive election of the governor.

Wahyukismoyo (2004), state that the characteristics of appointment and pro-election groups can be distinguished based on their different aspirations and backgrounds. On the one hand, there were aristocratic groups who demanded the legal designation of the sultan's privilege as governor, while on the other hand there were pro-democracy groups who proposed elections to elect the governor. The first group consisted mostly of traditional people from rural areas who lived and cultivated land owned by the sultan. The protection based on

the land tenure made the people show gratitude towards the sultan by supporting him. Indeed, village and hamlets officials from these areas including the sultan's main supporters attends any events related to the privilege of Yogyakarta (Harsono, 2018, p. 86). Hamengkubuwono himself and his family also supported the appointment mechanism, but they kept their distance from the rural people and delegated the coordination of those groups to the sultan's crony. On the other hand, liberal groups supported the free and competitive elections mostly based in urban areas, especially at various campuses and universities around Yogyakarta. They are "rational" people who are well informed about politics through the mass media, and their livelihoods are not dependent on the Sultanate. Compared to the aristocratic side, the second group was far less influential in the discussion of the law of specialty and their views were only sporadically heard in public debates (Harsono, 2018, p. 86). Thus, the media were less likely to report the votes of this group because most people in Yogyakarta supported the appointment of the Sultan as governor.

When the draft was finally ready and submitted to the national parliament in 2003, it was suggested that Yogyakarta's main privileges should be the appointment of the Sultan as provincial governor (Wahyukismoyo, 2004, p. 40). The 'Special Law' was expected to reduce political tensions related to the end of the sultan's term as governor in 2003. But the nation's central of government did not

respond to the proposals before the sultan's term as the governor ended. With the bill still stalled in Jakarta, regional parliaments began to examine existing regulations to elect Sultan Hamengkubuwono X as governor for a second term (Wahyukismoyo, 2004, p. 3). Given the success of the 2001 election of the deputy governor and the absence of a binding mechanism for the election of the next governor, the provincial parliament in Yogyakarta formed a special committee led by members of the PDIP faction to regulate the election rules for the next governor's election. Although the committee was divided between some who wanted the governor to be elected and those who wanted the position to be filled with appointments, the committee was finally agreed to adopt the same rules that had been applied to elect the deputy governor in 2001, in which that was indirect election rules as mandated by Law 22/1999 concerning regional autonomy (Harsono, 2018, p. 87). However, on that day a plenary session in which the committee was scheduled to report the procedure for the election of the Sultan, demonstrators surrounded the parliament building, demanding the cancellation of the election and requesting the appointment of the sultan as governor instead.

When the deadlock was being continued, parliamentarians faced the pressure from the sultan to reject the election process. Disagreements between the factions were immediately deepened, thus weakening the power of decision made by the DPRD. Finally, the

PDIP and Golkar factions, which have the largest number of parliamentarians, asked to cancel the process of electing governors and deputy governors (Harsono, 2018, p. 88). This step gave the parliament no choice but to accommodate the demands of the protesters. In the end, the election was held but there were no other candidates unless the Sultan and his chosen representative can register because the time for the registration has been passed. Under pressure, the parliamentary factions agreed to only have one pair of candidates, Sultan Hamengkubuwono X and Pakualam IX. The Elections was held and based on results, the central government inaugurated the sultan as governor of Yogyakarta for the second term, from 2003 to 2008 (Harsono, 2018, p. 89). However, some were remained unresolved because there were still no clear rules for the governor's position in Yogyakarta.

In 2008, the central government finally offered the Sultan an administrative extension for a period of three years from 2008 to 2010 under the President's decision, and Hamengkubuwono accepted that offer, but at the time this extension ended. There still was not any solution, so the other President's decision was to necessarily extend his term in office (Harsono, 2018, p. 179). In other words, institutional uncertainty continued to exist, leaving the Sultan in a precarious situation where he did not know whether his position as governor could be guaranteed permanently.

President Yudhoyono won the 2009 election on a platform which, among other things, emphasized his democratic governance. Increasingly, later, public debate has shifted to the question of whether traditional monarchies can be left out within the framework of democratic governance. At a cabinet meeting in November 2010, President Yudhoyono explained that according to him, that was impossible. In his often-quoted statement to his ministers, SBY said: "It is impossible to have a monarchical system that collides with the constitution and the values of democracy." Two months later, the Interior Minister reaffirmed this point at a meeting with responsible MPs for the discussion of the draft law of specificity (Harsono, 2018, p. 180).

While the parliamentarians were tasked with submitting the Privilege Bill into a new law, the tension between the central government and the Sultan's team made it very difficult to consider. Moreover, although the process received relatively little attention in the national media due to the nature of its local contents, the stalled negotiations were intensely followed in Yogyakarta. Hamengkubuwono himself often commented on the ongoing drafting process in the local media, while the central government's official statement on the law of specialization was always critically examined. Indeed, many Yogyakarta-based media outlets changed the issue of privileges to daily news. Between 2007 and 2011, (Efendi, 2012, p.

129) it was noted that there was a significant increase in the scope of the questions regarding with the specificity. Outside Yogyakarta, in the meantime, other regions in Indonesia with a monarchy tradition like Yogyakarta also noted the protracted consideration. Some saw it as an opportunity to demand special status for their own regions as well. For example, in December 2010, a group of traditional supporters from the old Sultanate of Surakarta stated that the modern city of Solo must also be given special status because it has a history similar to Yogyakarta (Harsono, 2018, p. 183). However, the government quickly rejected this ambition and attention, so that the issue remained firmly in Yogyakarta.

When negotiations dragged on without much progress, the atmosphere in Yogyakarta became increasingly tense when people began to see the central government as an antagonist to the cultural traditions of Yogyakarta. The Sultan then played a very active role in mobilizing the public against the people in Jakarta because he was trying to increase the pressure on the central government. As the Sultan and his property Supporters gradually increased the pressure of their struggle to achieve some results, several events and progresses were finally asked by the central government to reconsider their position and agree to the main demands of the Sultan.

In 2011 and 2012, several events took place in Yogyakarta which aimed to give a pressure to the DPR to support the original draft

submitted by Sultan Hamengkubuwono's team. At one of the major events in 2012, the Sultan stated a royal statement (Sabdatama) that Yogyakarta is an independent sultanate ruled by himself and Pakualam as the governor and the deputy (Harsono, 2018, p. 185). Although this decision was not formally a legal basis and was directed primarily for the people of Yogyakarta, it also sent a strong message to the central government about the historical importance of Yogyakarta and the intention of the Sultan for himself and for the province within the modern Indonesian nation-state.

Mass demonstrations held to support the Sultan in 2011 and 2012 reflected increasing anger at the central government's plans. For many residents of Yogyakarta, proposing the selection to overthrow the proposed governor is a violation of their cultural beliefs and values. The institutional arrangements in Yogyakarta with the sultan as the Governor are a kind of 'everyday politics' and part of the people's ordinary lives (Efendi, 2012, p. 104). The introduction of direct elections to elect a governor will disrupt this ordinary life because as their traditional ruler, the sultan occupies a special position in their tradition. Many believe that forcing the sultan to run in the gubernatorial election does not respect him as a traditional leader who does not need public legitimacy through an election. The longer the deadlock between Yogyakarta and the central government took place,

the more impatient and provocative protests on the streets of Yogyakarta has become (Harsono, 2018, p. 185).

In the end, the passing of Law 13/2012 on the special status for the province of Yogyakarta was a victory for Sultan Hamengkubuwono X. His uncompromising attitude about the key contents of the law discouraged President Yudhoyono and finally left the President no options but to surrender to the demands of Hamengkubuwono. After years of futile negotiations, the only solution had to be found because the president had already extended the Sultan's term as the governor twice through a presidential decree if there was no agreement by 2012 (Harsono, 2018, p. 187). If this happens, Yogyakarta will be forced to have another governor besides the sultan and the prospect is clearly not in the interest of President Yudhoyono.

Based on the DIY Specialty Law, which consists of 16 Chapters and 51 Articles, the substance of privilege authority is divided into 5 aspects. As regulated Article 7 paragraph (2) of Law Number 13 of 2012 concerning with the DIY Privileges, the five authorities include (Paryanto, 2016, p. 6):

1. Procedures for filling in positions, duties and authorities of Governor and Deputy Governor;
2. DIY Regional Government Institutions;
3. Culture;

4. Land;
5. Spatial planning.

B. The succession of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta

The Sultanate of Yogyakarta has been proven to remain solid from every momentum which can make the Sultanate of Yogyakarta collapse. The hegemony studied here is the way the Sultanate of Yogyakarta gains and maintains its power. The Sultanate of Yogyakarta's hegemony makes the people of Yogyakarta submit and obey the Sultanate of Yogyakarta without any coercion but with voluntary acts, which shows that they are very loyal to the Sultanate of Yogyakarta.

In order to see the hegemony of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta, it can be seen from its long last succession. Succession in Yogyakarta is influenced by many factors which are the presence of external influences, the political choice of the sultans, and the recognition of the established order of cultural values (Harjono S. , 2012, pp. 56-61). In 1940 when appointed to be the future ruler of Yogyakarta after studying Indology at Leiden University, the young crown prince Dorajatun was familiar with the notion of Ideology and Western values and he had a very critical view on colonialism. Before his coronation as Hamengkubuwono IX, Dorajatun had to face Lucien Adam, the Kedaton or the Dutch Governor of Yogyakarta, and this negotiation took more than four months. The main point of the dispute was the position of Papatih Dalem, the advisor of the council, and the role of the army which enabled the Dutch to control the

kingdom (Mochtar, 1982, hal. 42-43). Sultan intended to dissolve the position of Papatih Dalem who had greater control over his kingdom, including his troops and palace fees.

After months of tense negotiations, Dorajatun finally signed a contract, but only after he claimed to have received a wisik, a mystical whisper, from a voice that sounded like his father or other ancestors. Wisik is one of the supernatural abilities of a Javanese ruler who practices Javanese mysticism: a syncretic tradition derived from a mixed influence of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and indigenous traditions (Harsono, 2018, p. 54). Based on that, a ruler believes that as a person destined for supernatural powers from the Divine, he can use ascetic rituals and heirlooms to communicate with spirits which will then help him to solve problems faced by the kingdom (Monfries, 2015, p. 65). Javanese cultural traditions demand that the decisions made by rulers on a policy must be accepted, even admired, by ordinary people as opposing them means to oppose the Divine (Woodward, 2011, p. 175).

In the Dorajatun case, the wisik he heard during negotiations with Lucien Adam seemed to tell him that 'the Netherlands will not be here much longer (Harsono, 2018, p. 54). Dorajatun fully believed in that 'message' and used it to justify his decision to approve the contract. However, some scholars have denied that it was the wisik which brought Dorajatun to sign the contract, for example, arguing that Dorajatun's decision to sign a contract originated from a deep helplessness and a

distress due to long negotiations with Lucien Adam (Monfries, 2015, p. 75). However, for legitimate purposes, it does not matter whether the sultan accepts the poetry and whether it influences his decision. On the contrary, what is more important here is that Dorojatun used it to support his claim to the throne, despite his Western education, his legitimacy as a Javanese ruler still rested at a significant level especially on the connection to the supernatural and thus, to the Javanese traditional culture.

In 1942 after the Dutch occupation ended and were replaced by Japan's, there was a renegotiation regarding with the army. This negotiation ended with a decision to dissolve the royal army under the Japanese military rule. The Japanese again confirmed the Sultan as the ruler of the territory with a direct control of his kingdom while limiting the role of Papatih Dalem under the authority of the sultan (Harsono, 2018, p. 55). In the later stages of the Japanese occupation, Hamengkubuwono received a slight increase in daily authority and was able to institutionalize some substantive reforms (Monfries, 2015, p. 119). These include several administrative reforms such as opening public services for non-nobles, providing training for young bureaucrats, and eliminating districts as administrative entities. Those initiatives were the first clear signal that Hamengkubuwono IX was determined to reclaim the political authority for the sultan (Harsono, 2018, p. 55). Nearly two centuries after the traditional Javanese rulers were relegated as official puppets of the Dutch, this Sultan had made it clear that he wanted to rule again.

In July 1945, that Papatih Dalem resigned because of an illness became an opportunity for Hamengku Buwono (Monfries, 2015, p. 119). Hamengku Buwono made use of the moment and announced the abolition of the position of Papatih Dalem. Not only that, he also made himself the 'Sultan Executive', a title he had imagined for himself during negotiations with Lucien Adam (Hadiwijoyo, 2013, hal. 115-117). The Sultan's initiative did not receive a response from Japan and he chose to listen to the people of Yogyakarta. Thus, using the turmoil of the last days of war, the Sultan swiftly managed to get himself to a formidable political position for the coming era of Indonesian independence.

As an Executive Sultan, he regained the role of a true ruler who is directly involved in everyday politics. Previously considered as the administration domain of Papatih Dalem, the Sultan could then play an active role in inciting institutional reform in his sultanate (Monfries, 2015, pp. 119-120). However, the decision to declare himself as the 'Executive Sultan' did not bear no risk. By transforming himself from a largely ceremonial leader to an executive leader involved in politics, he exposed himself to the potential impact of wrong political decisions which he might make. In the worst-case scenario, such a bad judgment can endanger his dynasty (Harsono, 2018, p. 56). If he succeeded in playing the card properly, he could use his newly appointed position as a bargaining chip along with the consideration of the status of Yogyakarta in the Republic of Indonesia which would soon be announced.

On August 17 of, 1945, Hamengkubuwono IX made an important political decision for Yogyakarta. In the morning, the proclamation of independence was announced in Jakarta by Indonesia's founding fathers. At this point the Sultan had to decide whether Yogyakarta is a part of Indonesia or whether he had to declare Yogyakarta as an independent state itself. As a self-governing kingdom under the indirect rule of the Dutch and Japan colonizers which has created a strong bureaucratic apparatus, Yogyakarta will be in a position to become its own independent state (Harsono, 2018, p. 56). However, on September 5, 1945, the Sultan of Yogyakarta and the King of Surakarta declared their loyalty to the newly independent state of Indonesia.

The Indonesian Declaration of Independence marked a critical point in the history of Yogyakarta. Since the rules of the game are completely rewritten by Jakarta, the Sultan had decided whether he wanted to submit to these new rules or seized the opportunity to write his own rules. The other option was to wait and see. After all, even though Japan had surrendered to the Allies, the Japanese army still managed a strong influence in Yogyakarta. The Netherlands and their Western allies could also come at any time (Harsono, 2018, p. 56). In the end, Hamengkubuwono's decision to integrate Yogyakarta into Indonesia was an acknowledgment of the power of new social forces that had been assembled under the banner of nationalism.

Indeed, the notion of nationalism and self-determination had forcibly been spread in the period of the Japanese interregnum in which nationalism was then by far was the dominant narrative in the former Dutch colony, including the Sultanate (Harsono, 2018, p. 56). Initially, the Sultan, as the ruler of a subordinate state, was rather reluctant to embrace nationalist ideas and he was not too involved in the formative years of independence movement. It changed during the Japanese rule and especially when Japan established a preparatory committee for independence. Significantly, the Sultan became directly involved in the committee, and this involvement helped him gather important information about the possibility of the future trajectory of the new nation of Indonesia. It also allowed him to measure the strength of the movement and assessed its implications to Yogyakarta (Harsono, 2018, p. 57).

Since the Sultan changed his stance on the future independence, the idea of nationalism became a 'significant factor' in Yogyakarta to support the new state after its independence (Woodward, 2011, p. 11). Increasingly aware of the risks of the 'social revolution', the Sultan acknowledged that his feudal monarchy was truly in danger if he did not align Yogyakarta firmly with an independent Indonesia. The Riots that took place in other parts of the country, where several kingdoms were swept away by revolutionary forces (Reid, 2015, p. 384), further had reaffirmed the need for the Sultan to make decisive choices to save the monarchy and to adapt to the new political situation. He then knew that

trying to join forces with the first colonizer or to establish an independent kingdom of Yogyakarta would expose him and his sultanate to possible attacks from the new national government, and with a small number of relatively unskilled soldiers, Yogyakarta would struggle to defeat the new Indonesian forces. Instead, joining the republic was expected to provide protection from the more radical anti-feudal forces of the nationalist movement (Reid, 2015, p. 384).

The decision for the integration with Indonesia was announced after the Sultan had received assurances that Yogyakarta's status as an empire would be securely accommodated in the new republic. This certainty firstly came from BPUPKI, the Investigation Committee for Preparation of Indonesian Independence, which had been established by Japan in April 1945 (Harsono, 2018, p. 57). In this committee, the format of the new Indonesian state was decided, and the idea of constitutional monarchy at the national level, where Hamengkubuwono could become the Head of the State, was rejected for the sake of the republic (Feith & Castle, 1970, hal. 31). The committee decided to defend the government like Yogyakarta. Significantly, it was the Sultan's brother, Puruboyo, who assured the members of the committee such as the influential future vice president, Mohammad Hatta, that it was best to defend the Yogyakarta Monarchy to 'avoid disturbing the population (Monfries, 2015, p. 118). Then, the Indonesian government declared this clause in the 1945

Constitution, article 18, that the state recognized the Yogyakarta as a special region or could be called having special autonomy.

After the declaration of the independence, the guarantee of this support for Yogyakarta was reaffirmed by the newly formed Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence, PPKI) which was established to prepare the transfer of authority to the new Indonesian government. In a committee meeting held two days after the declaration of the independence, the members once again agreed to keep the sultanate of Yogyakarta intact (Harsono, 2018, p. 58). Although there were strong concerns about what some members of the Remnants of the Remedial Feudal considered, the committee hoped that Yogyakarta with its relatively well-established government apparatus could help the new republic in its broader development efforts. (Reid, 2015, p. 65). Overall, then, Yogyakarta's integration into the new Indonesian state was mutually beneficial for both the new national government and Sultan Hamengkubuwono (Ratnawati, 2011).

Thus, the Sultan's decision to integrate Yogyakarta into a new republic was taken with the consideration that his power could be maintained after the independence. However, the integration into the modern nation-state which was ruled from Jakarta challenge the basics of the Sultan's power. Hamengkubuwono IX felt this paradox when deciding whether he ought to renounce his royal status and become an ordinary

citizen or maintained his status and found a 'meaningful role under an independent state after the declaration of independence (Monfries, 2015, p. 136). More importantly, the Sultan was a staunch supporter of the republic and a strong supporter of independent Indonesia. Furthermore, the Sultan was a progressive reformer who had pioneered an institutional development which was then awaiting a new country (Kahin, 1982, p. 172).

As mentioned earlier, the Sultan, for example, carried out various administrative reforms in the region after his coronation by the Dutch and he also instructed business officials in Yogyakarta to communicate using Indonesian rather than Dutch Javanese (Harsono, 2018, p. 59). After the declaration of independence, he and the Sultan of Surakarta jointly issued a Decree 18/1946 to form executive and legislative councils as new government institutions. The decree provided the newly created territory of Yogyakarta with the local parliament, thus creating a system of checks and balances where the sultan took executive power and was responsible directly to the new Ministry of Home Affairs. (Monfries, 2015, p. 138). At the village level, he introduced direct elections for village heads, with voting rights granted to all adults over the age of eighteen. Furthermore, he initiated a redistributive policy of subsidizing poor villages, for example by collecting taxes from wealthier citizens or by combining rural facilities of education and irrigation to them (Harsono, 2018, p. 59). The

reformation had the effect that the Sultan was able to rediscover himself as a modern ruler, thus adjusting the basis for his legitimacy in the new age.

Thus, when Indonesia entered a new era, the Sultan had emerged as a highly respected figure far beyond the boundaries of Yogyakarta. Despite the dramatic political events that resulted in the end of colonial rule and the declaration of the Republic of Indonesia's independence, he was able to maintain the special status of the Yogyakarta Sultanate. Although previously the Sultan played a puppet role for the Dutch during the colonial era, Hamengkubuwono IX was able to maintain political stability, economic prosperity and cultural identity which was immersed in the Javanese tradition for Yogyakarta (Reid, 2015, p. 288). When a new modern Indonesian state emerged, the Sultan made his kingdom commit to the new country in order to secure the future of his sultanate within the borders of the new nation-state.

In 1950, Hamengkubuwono IX started to manage a position as Minister of Defense (Critchley, 1985). In 1952, he tried to launch reforms to have a more professional army. However, he faced fierce opposition from local politicians and army leaders supported by President Soekarno. The turmoil led to the resignation of the Sultan from his position in January 1953 (Ricklefs, 2008, hal. 282). It highlights the fact that even though he was increasingly and widely famous, the Sultan's influence in Jakarta is far more limited than in Yogyakarta. While in Yogyakarta he enjoyed enormous political, economic, and social power because of his

mixture of traditional and charismatic legitimacy, it is different in Jakarta where he was much more limited by the competing interests of politicians, the army, and the bureaucracy.

Indeed, in all of his time as a member of the central government, Hamengkubuwono IX had received much respect from other politicians, including both President Sukarno and Soeharto who admired him for his power of legitimacy as the Javanese ruler (Ricklefs, 2008, hal. 325). Being Javanese themselves, both Sukarno and Soeharto were closely attached to the Javanese culture and often used Javanese symbols in the Indonesian government (Harsono, 2018, p. 65). Thus, given that the two presidents had direct connections to the Javanese culture, Hamengkubuwono had little difficulty in ensuring that Yogyakarta's special status would be enforced throughout the Sukarno and Suharto regimes. In fact, the New Order regime actively supported the development of Yogyakarta as the heart of Javanese culture by promoting it as a major tourist destination. With reference to Tsuchiya's work, Dahles's business and tourism experts correctly summarized Yogyakarta's creations as what he called the center of Pancasila tourism:

...kebijakan pariwisata Orde Baru sangat mendukung Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta dan ibukotanya, kota Yogyakarta, sejak akhir 1960-an. Mendefinisikan Yogyakarta sebagai kawasan inti pengembangan pariwisata kedua - kedua ke Bali - pemerintah pusat membuat upaya mencolok untuk diperluas sistem komunikasi dan transportasi kota, untuk membangun hotel dan meningkatkan fasilitas belanja, untuk mengembalikan peninggalan bersejarah, membangun monumen 'periode revolusioner' dan

melestarikan artefak budaya dan bentuk-bentuk kesenian yang diliputi oleh kualitas tradisional Jawa (Tsuchiya, 1984).

....The New Order's tourism policy strongly supported the Yogyakarta Special Region and its capital city, Yogyakarta, since the late 1960s. Defining Yogyakarta as the core area of the second - second tourism development to Bali - the central government made striking efforts to expand the city communication and transportation system, to build hotels and improve shopping facilities, to restore historic heritage, build 'revolutionary period' monuments and preserve cultural artifacts and art forms covered by traditional Javanese qualities (Tsuchiya, 1984).

Because Yogyakarta had emerged as the main pillar of the central government for tourism strategy, President Suharto and Hamengkubuwono IX entered a mutually beneficial relationship. Although the influence of the Sultan on national politics was declined, he still received great assistance from Jakarta in strengthening his headquarters. In that way, Suharto retained the Sultan under his hands but at the same time, calmed him with valuable facilities. Therefore, during the New Order regime, Yogyakarta was able to further consolidate the benefits of its development from other parts of Indonesia which had been inherited from the colonial period (Harsono, 2018, p. 66). Yogyakarta was developed and the Sultan was interpreted as a manifestation of the life of Javanese culture. This not only helped him to claim a cultural legitimacy, but also reinforced the idea that only the Sultan could be justified to claim the right to govern the province.

Looking from its history, it is shown that Yogyakarta's traditional culture comes from a mixture of internal and external influences which

blend into what it is now called Javanese culture. As a traditional leader of one of the most influential kingdoms in the region, the Sultan of Yogyakarta has played an important part in shaping this culture and the political environment in which it is embedded (Harsono, 2018, p. 69).

Successive sultans placed significant emphasis on Western harmonization and Eastern values and obliged themselves to not only preserve the region's traditional culture but also to introduce the elements of modern political culture. When Hamengkubuwono IX was crowned in 1940, he gradually launched an administrative reform that brought new public institutions to the kingdom. However, the reform barely touched the internal rules of the palace (Harsono, 2018, p. 69). The mixture produced by traditional and modern institutions has prepared Yogyakarta local government apparatus and communities for the post-colonial era.

Due to its special contributions for Indonesian nationalist struggles, Yogyakarta was given the special status in the new republic. Compared to other traditional chiefs who removed the rise of the nationalist revolution, the Sultan of Yogyakarta retained respect from his people, at least because he himself contributed significantly to the nationalist struggle. Such respect was not seen among people in other traditional rulers in Indonesia, and most of these rulers preferred to abdicate after the independence (Harsono, 2018, p. 69). Furthermore, the multiple contributions of the Sultan to the central government has made the government hesitate to

question the status of Yogyakarta and so that the region could maintain its special status within the Republic.

1755 and 1945 paved the way, first, for the actual formation of Yogyakarta in 1755 and, later, to defend the kingdom after independence and its transformation into special territory with the sultan as the appointed governor. Legitimacy arose because of its connection with the traditional Javanese culture. In the twentieth century, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX increasingly complemented this tradition with the foundation of legitimacy with charisma and the legitimacy of performance when he began the local reform and contributed to the national politics.

The end of the New Order was a result of personal struggle between Sultan Hamengkubuwono X and President Suharto. While this interpretation exaggerated the Sultan's influence on the situation in Jakarta, the events of 1998 did reaffirm Yogyakarta's reputation as a national significance hotspot politics (Woodward, 2011, p. 253). Just like in the days of the struggle for independence, Yogyakarta had defended the interests of the nation. Hamengkubuwono X who supported the 'reform movement' and thus helped to guide Indonesia towards a new era of democracy. It is important to note that during the critical point, each sultan had made his decision regardless the inherent risk of uncertain future, so Yogyakarta as sultanate had considerable risks. It should also be noted that during that critical point, the sultan used traditional resources to make their decisions.

In 1998, Sultan Hamengkubuwono X was said to have drawn an inspiration and strength from an entire fasting month. After completing the fasting, he felt that he had a spiritual foundation to face the challenges of the 'movement'. Sultan's fasting was done to get a cultural legitimacy as his later actions were said to be blessed by the God. Furthermore, people accepted the act as a tradition in Javanese culture (Harsono, 2018, p. 75). His final decision to join the movement was also influenced by the realization that Suharto himself was also firmly rooted to the Javanese tradition and regarded himself as the king of Java. Thus, for the Sultan, Soeharto's various moral and political failures made the president vulnerable because he had lost the divine's grace (Harsono, 2018, p. 76). As hundreds of thousands of people gathered in the North Square of the Palace, it became a clear sign for the Sultan that Suharto had lost his legitimacy as a Javanese leader.

At the same time, the Sultan also arranged a counter-discourse about Yogyakarta's local politics to preserve the monarchy beyond the fall of Suharto. While he described himself as a reformist figure, he began a cultural movement to save his sultanate and traditional institutions. Then, the Sultan utilized the cultural links of the people to the sultanate when he demanded to be appointed as the Governor of Yogyakarta (Harsono, 2018, p. 77). From a historical institutionalism perspective, the Sultan's actions can be explained as a combination of calculus and cultural

methods as he sought to maintain his feudal monarchy in democratic euphoria.

In the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) there was a referendum happened regarding with the Monarchy in the Government of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY). This invited a controversy which was enough to heat up the temperature of the domestic politics. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had rushed to launch a hot ball by throwing the term monarchy to the public. Previously, several Yogyakarta societies hoped that the monarchical system adopted by the Yogyakarta Palace would be continued to be preserved. The matter got more intense attention when the Sultan handed over the decision to the people of Yogyakarta so that there was a Referendum in which the Community wanted a determination. It can be said that the Sultanate of Yogyakarta succeeded in hegemonizing the people of Yogyakarta without orders or coercion even with voluntary decision to choose the stipulation of the Law.

The matter above is a succession of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. After the Act 13 of 2012 was issued, the Sultanate of Yogyakarta was still struggling to maintain power through hegemony. These practices of hegemony may consider the culture, the tradition, and the religion. This will be explained in the discussion in the next chapter about the practice of the Yogyakarta Sultanate's hegemony in maintaining its power after the stipulation of Law 13 of 2012.