

Dr. Ali Muhammad

INDONESIA'S EXPERIENCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR



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The Phinisi Press Yogyakarta



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SUMMARY

This book investigates Indonesia's war on terror 2001—2009. It asks three interrelated questions. Firstly, according to the government's perspective, who was responsible for the major bomb attacks in Indonesia? Secondly, what sort of counterterrorism policies did the government adopt? Finally, what are the main factors that shaped the government's counterterrorism policy during that period? To explain the Indonesian government's counterterrorism policy, this study adopts "the logic of two-level games" (Putnam, 1988) as the theoretical framework. The model explains how domestic politics and international relations get entangled and influence the direction taken by the government's policy. Based on the theoretical framework, government policy is a function of incentives and constraints both on the international and on the domestic level. As "the gatekeeper" between the two levels game, the government simultaneously processes these interdependent incentives and constraints in its policy decision-making.

This book demonstrates that, although it never banned *Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah* (AJAI) because of domestic considerations, the government believes that the AJAI is a terrorist network mostly responsible for the consecutive bombings in Indonesia. Secondly, the present government has mostly relied on a "law-enforcement approach" in fighting the terrorist network which has been incrementally complemented with an "ideological approach" to fight religious extremism. Finally, the pathway of Indonesia's counterterrorism policy was shaped by contradictory pressures originating from the Muslim community and human rights groups in the domestic political environment, on one hand, as well as international pressures originating from the United States and its allies, on the other hand.

This book uses a qualitative research method. The data used in this research are mostly derived from official documents, direct interviews with government officials and the secondary sources (books and journals) on terrorism and counterterrorism.

This book is dedicated to:

Mrs.Hj. Suhaebah&Mr.H. Karnawan

Ferra,Alicia, Farel& Queen

In memory of

Mr.Slamet Abdullah Mrs.Hj. Subinah

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This book is dedicated to my beloved parents who have passed away—Mrs Hj. Subinah and Mr.Slamet Abdullah. It is also dedicates to my parents-in-law—Mrs Hj. Suhaebah and Mr. H. Karnawan. In particular, itis devoted to my wife, Ferra and my kids, Alicia, Farel, and Queen

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AJAI /JI	: Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah/JamaahIslamiyah
ATA	: Anti-Terrorism Assistance
BIN	: Badan Intelejen Negara (State Intelligence Agency)
CTCD	: Counterterrorism Coordinating Desk
DENSUS 88	: Detasemen Khusus 88 (Special anti-terror police unit)
DEPAG	: Departemen Agama (Department of Religious Affairs)
DI/NII	: Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia
DPR	: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Indonesian Parliament)
FPI	: Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front)
GRL	: Government Regulation in Lieu of Law
GWOT	: Global War on Terror
HTI	: HisbutTahrir Indonesia
ICG	: International Crisis Group
ISA	: Internal Security Acts
KONTRAS	:Komisiuntuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Kekerasan (The Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence).

MMI	: MajelisMujahiddin Indonesia (Indonesian Warrior Council)
MUI	: MajelisUlama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council)
NU	: NahdhatulUlama
PBB	: Partai Bulan Bintang (the Moon and Star Party)
PKS	: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Prosperous Justice Party)
PERPU	: Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang Undang (Government Regulation in Lieu of Law, GRL)
POLRI	: Polisi Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Police)
PPATK	: Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan (Financial Transaction and Report Analysis Centre)
PPP	: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party)
RUU	: Rancangan Undang-Undang (Law proposal, Bill)
TNI	: Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)
TPM	: Tim Pengacara Muslim (Muslim Lawyer Team)

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Problem: Terrorism

This book attempts to examine Indonesia's experience in the fight against terrorism during the 2001—2009 period. It asks several guiding questions: *Firstly*, according to the Indonesian government's perspective, who was responsible for the consecutive major bomb attacks in Indonesia? What was their motivation? *Secondly*, what sort of counterterrorism policies did the government take during the 2001—2009 period? *Finally*, what were the main determinants that shaped the direction of the government's counterterrorism policy during that period?

After the downfall of "New Order" regime in 1998, the repressive capacities of the state weakened significantly. The world's biggest Muslim country slowly moved towards a consolidated democratic regime.¹ During the critical phase, however, a variety of internal security problems in the peripheral regions emerged such as, the increasing separatist movements in East Timor, Aceh, and West Papua² as well as the protracted communal conflict in West

¹ "New Oder" is an authoritarian, military dominated regime during Suharto's rule, 1961—1998. Rizal Sukma, "Democratic governance and security in Indonesia," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 4, 2, (2003): 241–55.

² East Timor ceded from Indonesia after a Referendum in 1999. The Aceh problem was solved after the agreement between the government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) had been signed in Helsinki. The government agrees to give Aceh province a special autonomy status and GAM agrees to stop their armed struggle and aspiration for independence. However, the problem of separatism in West Papua has yet to be solved up to the present time. See, Andrew T.H. Tan, *Security Perspective of the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism*, (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2004), 175-90.

Kalimantan, Ambon and Poso.³ However, the new democratic governments also had to respond to terrorist threats which had adversely affected the national stability and security since 2000.⁴

On Christmas Eve, 24 December 2000, a clandestine network launched coordinated bombing attacks against churches in eleven cities across Indonesia.⁵ The coordinated bomb attack used low-explosive materials and killed 9 and wounded 120 people. With a few exceptions, such as the attack on the residence of the Philippine ambassador in Jakarta in August 2000, the targets were mostly churches and priests. A report states that the motivation for the church bombing was revenge for massacres of Muslims by Christians in the conflict areas: Maluku, North Maluku, and Poso (Central Sulawesi) in 1999 and 2000.⁶

Since then, deadly bombings have become regular in Indonesia: the Bali Bombings killed mostly foreign tourists on October 12th 2002; the J.W. Marriot Hotel was bombed on 5 August 2003; there was a suicide bomb attack at the Australian Embassy on 9 September 2004, and suicide bombings in Bali on 1 October 2005. On July 17th, 2009, after Indonesia successfully has held a peaceful parliamentary and presidential election, two suicide bombers

³ An excellent analysis on communal violence in the outer islands since the downfall of the New Order, see Gerry Van Klinken, *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

⁴ Analysis on instability faced by Indonesia since the downfall of Suharto, see, Bilveer Singh, *Indonesia and the Arch of Instability*,” in *Australia's Arc of Instability: The Political and Cultural Dynamics of Regional Security*, edited by D. Rumley, Vivian. L. Forbes and C. Griffin, (The Netherlands: Springer, 2006), 83-100.

⁵ “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the *Jemaah Islamiyah* Terrorist Network Operates,” *ICG Asia Report* no 43, (11 December 2002).

⁶ “Indonesia Backgrounder...” : i-ii.

suddenly attacked the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels, Jakarta. The consecutive terror attacks have damaged political stability, national security and the fragile economy of the world's biggest Muslim nation on earth. Table 1 lists the major bomb attacks since 2000.

Table 1.1
Major Terror Attacks, 2000 – 2009⁷

Date	Main Target	Victims	Methods
30/ Dec/2000	Churches, priests, the residence of the Philippine Ambassador (11 cities across Indonesia)	9 dead, 120 wounded	Bombs attacks
12/ Oct/2002	Foreign Tourists at Paddy's Bar and Sari's Club and the US Consulate (Bali)	202 dead, 300 wounded	Car Bombs
05/ Aug/2003	Foreigners in the J.W. Marriott Hotel (Jakarta)	13 dead, 149 wounded	Suicide Car Bomb
09/ Sep/2004	The Australian High Commission (Jakarta)	10 dead, 182 wounded	Suicide Car Bomb
01/ Oct/2005	Foreign Tourists at Raja's Restaurant and Jimbaran Beach (Bali)	22 dead, 135 wounded	Suicide Bomb
17/ Jul/2009	Foreigners at the J.W. Marriott & Ritz Carlton Hotels (Jakarta)	9 dead, 53 wounded	S u i c i d e Bomb

⁷ Various sources: Kompas, Detik.com, Jawa pos. This table does not include a series of attacks and counterattacks in the sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Poso.

“Terrorism” Defined

The word “terrorism” is derived from the Latin word *terrere*, meaning to frighten, to terrify, to scare away, or to deter. “Terrorism” has no precise or widely accepted definition and is one of the most controversial concepts in social sciences.⁸ To define it is intricate because the meaning has changed so frequently within social and historical contexts over the past two hundred years.⁹ The definition of the term depends on political power, that is to say, government can increase their power when they label opponents as “terrorists.”¹⁰ From a critical perspective, the way the term is selectively applied is only to serve the interests of the powerful.¹¹ Furthermore, to define it is very complicated since a well-known adage says, “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.”¹²

It is noteworthy that most of the definitions agree that acts of terrorism are “immoral and abhorred.” However, the controversies have emerged on this point since the definers seek to exclude groups that they wish to support or to include groups that they wish to denounce. Central to the disagreement is the categorization of

⁸ Charles W. Kegley, Jr. *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 16.

⁹ David J. Whittaker, *The Terrorism Reader*, (London and Now York: Routledge, 2001), 5.

¹⁰ Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*, 3rd Edition, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2002). 6. See also, Walter Laqueur. *Terrorism*, (Boston: Little Brown and Co, 1977).

¹¹ From critical perspective, see for instance, Edward Said, ‘The essential terrorist’, in *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*, edited by Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens (London: Verso, 2001), 147–57.

¹² James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 8. In Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for instance, Israeli government and the Western governments label HAMAS as “a terrorist organisation.” On the contrary, Palestinian resistance groups who live under the Israelis’ brutal occupation and the sympathisers of the Palestinian cause categorize the Israeli government as “the real terrorist.”

whether political violence is “lawful” and “legitimate” or “unlawful” and “illegitimate.”¹³ Some define terrorism if the perpetrator is only a sub-national group, but others define it more broadly to include state actors as well. For instance, the US Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.”¹⁴ Meanwhile, the US State Department defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”¹⁵ By using the US State Department’s definition, political violence can be categorized as acts of terrorism if they are “unlawful” or perpetrated by “sub-national groups.”¹⁶

In contrast, Ayatullah Syaikh Muhammad Ali Tashkiri formulated a broader definition at the international conference on terrorism called by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Geneva in June 1987. He said that “Terrorism is an act carried out to achieve an inhuman and corrupt objective, and involving threat to security of any kind, and violation of rights acknowledged by

¹³ Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4.

¹⁴ Gus Martin, *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies*, (Los Angeles: Sage Publication, 2008), 8.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 9.

¹⁶ This definition creates controversies because the attacks of the Israeli army against Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories and the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be categorized as “terrorism” because it is “lawful” and “legitimate” since it is perpetrated by the state.

religion and mankind.”¹⁷ Using his definition, Tashkiri intended to include “state terrorism,” in particular, the United States being “the mother of international terrorism.” Tashkiri writes:

It is indeed comical that the United States of America, which is the mother of international terrorism, and the author of all the circumstances of oppression and subjection of people, by strengthening dictatorial regimes and supporting occupation of territories and savage attacks on civilian areas, etc. should seek to convene symposia on combating ‘terrorism, i.e., any act that conflicts with its imperialist interests...’¹⁸

It seems obvious that there is an incompatible perspective on terrorism between “the West” and “the Muslim world.” However, controversies have also emerged within the Muslim world itself. For instance, the Muslim world represented “formally” by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) also failed excruciatingly to formulate an agreed definition of terrorism. In the extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference of foreign ministers on terrorism in Kuala Lumpur in April 2002, OIC foreign

¹⁷ Ayatullah S.M.A.Tashkiri, “Toward a definition of terrorism,” *Al-Tauhid*, vol. V, no. 1 (Muharram 1408 AH/1987CE), <<http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/definition-terrorism.html>> (accessed on 26 October, 2009). Other Muslim intellectuals have also tried to define terrorism broadly: “An outrageous attack carried out either by individuals, groups or states against the human being (his religion, life, intellect, property and honour). It includes all forms of intimidation, harm, threatening, killing without just cause and everything connected with any form of armed robbery, hence making pathways insecure, banditry, every act of violence or threatening intended to fulfil a criminal scheme individually or collectively, so as to terrify and horrify people by hurting them or by exposing their lives, liberty, security or conditions to danger; it can also take the form of inflicting damage on the environment or on a public or a private utility or exposing a national or natural resource to danger.” See, “Terrorism: Islam’s Viewpoint,” *The Muslim World League Journal*, (July 2002), <<http://muslim-canada.org/fiqhcouncil.html>> (Accessed on 28 January, 2008).

¹⁸ Ibid.

ministers were divided over whether or not Palestinian suicide bombers can be categorized as “terrorists.”¹⁹

Another prominent scholar who studied terrorism is Alex P. Schmidt. He has also examined 109 definitions of “terrorism” from leading academic researchers from the field. From these definitions, he identifies the following definition elements: violence and force—appeared in 83.5% of the definitions; political goal—65%; spreading fear and dread—51%; threat of violence—47%; psychological impact of terrorism—41%; discrepancy between target and victims—37.5%; degree of consistency, planning, and organization of terrorism—32%; terrorism as a method of warfare, strategy and tactics—30.5%.²⁰

Apart from those controversies and variety of meanings, however, a clear definition of the term is required not only for academic purposes but also for practical purposes. To fight against a terrorist group, for instance, we must first of all be very clear whether the organization we are fighting against is “a terrorist group.” Boaz Ganor’s definition of terrorism is useful here. He proposed a simple definition of terrorism as follows, “terrorism is a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians in order to achieve political goals.”²¹ The definition is based on three central elements: First, the essence of the action—the form of violent

¹⁹ “OIC Leaves It to UN to Define “Terrorism,” *Asian Political News*, 8 April 2002. <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2002_April_8/ai_84640350> (accessed on 27 January, 2009).

²⁰ Alex P. Schmidt, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature*, (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1983).

²¹ Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: Guide for Decision Makers*, (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publisher, 2005), 17.

struggle.²² According to this definition, any action which does not involve violence is not defined as terrorism.

Second, the goal underlying terrorism, which is always political, that is a goal aimed at achieving something in the political arena: overthrowing a regime, changing the form of governance, replacing those in power, revising economic, social and other policies, dominating and disseminating ideologies. With no political agenda, the action in question is not considered as terrorism.²³ Violent action against civilians without a political goal is, at most, a purely criminal act, a felony, or simply an act of insanity that has nothing to do with terrorism.

Third, the target of the damage is civilians.²⁴ In this way, “terrorism” can be distinguished from other forms of political violence, such as guerrilla warfare, popular insurrection, and so on. From the definition of terrorism elucidated above, it is obvious that the consecutive bombing attacks against civilians mentioned above can be categorized as acts of terrorism. Using the simple definition elaborated above, we can argue that the Bali Bombing and other consecutive bombings in Indonesia can be categorized as acts of terrorism.

The Indonesian government has also formulated its own definition of “terrorism.” According to Law No. 15/2003 (Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Laws), the basic definition of the criminal act of “terrorism” is,

Any person who intentionally uses violence or the threat of violence to create a widespread atmosphere of terror or fear in the general population or to create

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid, 18

mass casualties, by forcibly taking the freedom, life or property of others or causing damage or destruction to vital strategic installations or the environment or public facilities or international facilities.²⁵

Counterterrorism Policy

Before elucidating the concept of “counterterrorism policy” it is crucial first to define the concept of “policy” in the first place. “Policy” can be defined as a “set of interrelated decisions concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation.”²⁶ Policy may also be considered as a course of [government’s] action or inaction rather than specific decisions or actions.²⁷ Smith suggests that the concept of policy denotes a “deliberate choice of action or inaction, rather than the effects of interrelating forces.”²⁸ It should be emphasized here that inaction as well as action and attention should not focus exclusively on decisions which produce change, but must also be sensitive to those which resist change.

More specifically, “public policy” can be defined as “anything a government chooses to do or not to do.”²⁹ This simple definition is not without merit. Firstly, it means that the agent of public policy-making is a government. When we talk about public policies, we speak of the actions of government. Secondly, public policy involves a fundamental choice on the part of governments to do something

²⁵ Law No. 15/2003, Section 6 [basic definition of criminal act of terrorism]

²⁶ Jenkin W. I. *Policy Analysis*, (London: Martison Roberson, 1978), 17

²⁷ Heclo, H, “Review Articles: Policy Analysis,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 2. (1972): 85

²⁸ Smith, *Policy Making in British Government*, (London: Martin Roberson, 1978), 13

²⁹ Thomas Dye, quoted by Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycle and Policy Subsystem*, 2nd Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 5.

or to do nothing and the decision is made by individuals staffing the state and its agency. Public policy is a choice made by a government to undertake some course of action.³⁰ The government's policy to fight terrorism is definitely part of "public policy."

Gus Martin refers to "counterterrorism policy" as "proactive [government's] policies that specifically seek to eliminate terrorist environments and groups."³¹ Because "terrorism occurs when opportunity, motivation, and capability meet,"³² a multi-pronged counterterrorism policy approach is required not only to destroy terrorist networks, infrastructure and operational capability but also to curb, suppress, and refute their ideological motivation. Regardless of which policy is selected, the ultimate goal of counterterrorism policy is to save lives by proactively preventing or decreasing the number of terrorist attacks.³³

Boaz Ganor points out a number of specific goals that might underlie a nation's counterterrorism policy. Firstly, eliminating terrorism is likely to be expressed as eradicating the enemy (destroying the terrorist organization itself), removing the enemy's incentive to commit terrorist attacks and use violence against the state and its citizens, or resolving the controversial issues (since the motive behind terrorism is a political one, the solution is also to be found in the political sphere). Secondly, minimizing the damage caused by terrorism may include sub-goals such as reducing the number of attacks and/or the number of victims, preventing certain type

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Gus Martin, *Understanding Terrorism: Challenge, Perspective, and Issues*, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication, 2003), 345.

³² Muhammad H. Hasan, "Countering-Ideological Work: Singapore Experience" in *The Ideological War on Terrorism: Worldwide Strategies for Counter-Terrorism*," edited by Anne Aldis and Graeme P. Herd (London: Routledge, 2007), 143.

³³ Martin, 346

of attacks (suicide bombing, mass killing, etc) lessening property damage etc. Thirdly, preventing the escalation of terrorism is based on two sub-goals: (1) ensuring that the conflict does not spread—stopping the terrorist organization's growth and development through enlistment of new activists to its ranks, preventing the organization from gaining political ground in the international arena, blocking or neutralizing support from their country, impeding the intensification of the organizations' political objectives and effort (2) making certain the scope of attacks does not escalate.³⁴

Art and Richardson also demonstrate that government can use a range of counterterrorism policies to combat groups resorting to terror. These measures can be grouped into three categories: political measures, legislative and judicial measures, and security measures.³⁵ Firstly, political measures include negotiations with groups (in which the government makes compromises and concessions) to bring about the end of resistance; socio-economic and political reforms to win the "hearts and minds" of the people from whom the terrorists draw both armed adherents and more general support; and international cooperation to cut off funds to terrorists, extradite terrorists, police borders, and provide intelligence to the state under siege.³⁶

Secondly, legislative and judicial measures include emergency and other special legislation to expand the government's powers to arrest, detain, and incarcerate suspects and to gain intelligence about them in ways that involve infringements on citizen's privacy; use of the courts to empower the state and special magistrates and prosecutors to undertake broad investigative actions; legislation to

³⁴ Ganor, 25-6.

³⁵ Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lesson from the Past*, (New York: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 17.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 17.

disrupt the finances of groups employing terrorism; and amnesty and repentance measures designed to wean active armed members away from such groups and to reintegrate them into society.³⁷ Finally, security measures could include military deployment to protect the population and to seek out and destroy terrorist groups; intelligence operations, especially the use of counterterrorist units to penetrate terrorist networks and disrupt their logistics and support networks; new organizational machinery to coordinate the security instruments and disparate units of governments dealing with terrorism; and preventive actions for defence, such as, the hardening of facilities, control of access, and the like. Of course, not all governments employ every one of the above measures, and each government has its own particular way of utilizing the measures depending on the nature of the threat as well as the political context.³⁸

This study will classify Indonesia's counterterrorism policy into two main approaches. The first is a legal or "law-enforcement" approach. The objective of this approach is to promote the rule of law and regular legal proceedings. It can be conducted by the creation of counterterrorist laws which criminalize terrorist behaviour. This approach includes the use of law-enforcement agencies, such as empowering the police, the intelligence as well as criminal investigative techniques in the prosecution of suspected terrorists. The second is an "ideological" approach based on the belief that terrorism is the product of an "evil ideology." Fighting terrorism, therefore, should include the fight against the extremist ideologies which are conducive to terrorism. In broad terms, this sort of approach involves government policy to curb, refute, neutralize, or suppress the ideological factor which is supposed to be implicated in terrorist

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

acts. Failure to neutralize the ideological motivation would mean that terrorist networks could suffer losses at the hands of security forces, but still replenish their ranks with ideologically committed fresh recruits from the wider constituency.³⁹

Because the ultimate goal of counterterrorism policy is to save lives by proactively preventing or decreasing the number of terrorist attacks,⁴⁰ the effectiveness of the policy can be observed from the two main criteria: first, the reduction or disappearance of terror attacks. The significant decrease or disappearance of terror attacks means that the government's counterterrorism policy is effective. Second, the neutralization or suppression of "violent ideology," i.e. to what extent the spread of "violent ideology" into the wider community has been prevented and stopped by the government.

Organization of this book

The organization of this book is as follows; the first chapter is an introductory chapter consisting of the research problems and elaboration of two key concepts: *terrorism* and *counterterrorism policy*. The second chapter scrutinizes the government's perceptions of the nature of the terrorist threat. The guiding question here is: who was responsible for the repeated bomb attacks in Indonesia according to the government's perspective? What were the ideological motivations for their violent actions?

The third chapter examines the ways in which the Indonesian government responded towards the terrorism problem. The guiding question is: what sort of policies did the Indonesian government take to respond to terrorism during the 2001—2009 period? The fourth

³⁹ Kumar Ramakrishna, "It's the Story, Stupid: Neutralizing Radical Islamism in the Southeast Asia Theatre" in Anne Aldis and Graeme P. Herd, (eds.), 128.

⁴⁰ Martin, 346.

chapter investigates the societal pressures originating from the domestic environment and their implications for the government's counter-terrorism policy. How and to what extent did societal pressures shape the government's counterterrorism policy? The fifth chapter examines the opposing pressures originating from the international political environment. How and to what extent did pressures originating from the international environment shape the direction of the government's counter-terrorism policy? The final chapter is concluding remarks.



INDONESIA'S EXPERIENCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR

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