

# **THE TRAJECTORY OF THE DISCOURSE OF JIHAD IN INDONESIA**

**RESEARCH REPORT FOR INTERNATIONALISATION PROGRAM**



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**2016**

### **Abstract**

*This research provides a historical analysis of the representation of the term jihad in the writing of Muslim scholars and organizations in Indonesia from the early arrival of Islam to the contemporary debate in the context of democratic transition after the collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime. This research employs discourse analytical tools to look at various interpretations of the concept of jihad in the global context and particularly in the Indonesian context, and how these global and local interpretations are interconnected. The research argues that the doctrine of jihad in the history of Islam has developed into a contested doctrine over a long period of time. The research suggests that there is a long history of substantial minorities promoting militaristic jihad in Indonesia against 'enemies' of Islam defined variously from colonial state to the Indonesian government. The promotion of militaristic jihad was undermined by the consensus of mainstream moderate and peaceful Islam developed in the middle to late years of the New Order regime. However, the promotion of militaristic jihad reappeared after the fall of the New Order authoritarian regime and was further reinforced by transnational influences.*

**Key Words:** *Jihad, Discourse, Indonesia*

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## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

This research looks at various interpretations of jihad, globally and in Indonesia, through a range of historic periods. The discussion is focused on the question of how the global discourse of jihad has developed historically and the implications of this development in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The polarised discourse of jihad is chosen in this research because the term jihad is central in the development of Islamic identity over many centuries. The term is commonly translated as ‘to strive’ or ‘to struggle’ but then interpreted differently by Muslim scholars. According to Cook (2005, pp. 1-2), ‘the term’s complexity is not surprising given the centrality of the concept of jihad for Islam and the length of time—fourteen centuries—that Muslims have had to work with it’. Furthermore, the political usage of the term has created many competing identities within Islamic communities especially in Indonesia, the biggest Muslim country in the world. On the one hand, the term jihad has been used by violent extremist groups to justify their actions and on the other hand, many so called moderate Muslim groups have actively promoted the concept of contextual and non-violent jihad to counter the extremist discourse. Therefore, the study of the construction of Indonesian Islamic identity through the discourse of jihad is an important step to understanding the position of Muslim groups in Indonesia in counter radicalization efforts.

The research specifically discusses how this trajectory has influenced the Indonesian interpretations of the doctrine of jihad. I start the research by outlining interpretations of the Qur’anic meaning of jihad, then review several works on the politicisation of jihad in the global context, followed by investigating the historical trajectory of the discourse of jihad in Indonesia. The research argues that (a) the meaning of jihad in the history of Islam is highly contested depending on the surrounding social and political context and (b) the contemporary Indonesian discourse of jihad is not autonomous, but rather that it is best understood in the global contest over the meaning of jihad.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Research Method**

This research employs critical discourse analysis as the research method. The socio-cognitive approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) developed by Teun van Dijk (2001) is utilized in this research. This approach focuses on the role of socio-cognitive structures in mediating texts and society, and the complexities of the relationship between discourse structure and social structures. Several elements of discourse are analyzed including semantic macrostructures and schematic structures of the text (topics, propositional structures), local meaning (choice of vocabulary, specific arguments), context and event models (the context and facts represented in the text) and the relationship between the text and its broader social context. Various researchs and books on jihad from prominent international and Indonesian authors are explored and analyzed in this research. The research combines both primary data and secondary data to provide a chronological account on how the doctrine of jihad is interpreted by Muslim groups in Indonesia in many different social and political contexts. The study complements previous studies which were mainly focused on a specific time frame (Ahmad, 2006; Anwar 2011; Solahudin, 2011).

### Chapter 3

#### The meaning of jihad in the Qur'an

Jihad is an important part of Islamic teaching. The word jihad is derived from the Arabic word *jahada* which literally meant to struggle, to strive or to put effort into achieving an objective and it did not have any direct relationship to war or violence (M.H. Hassan, 2006). According to Al-Qaradhawi (2011), the word jihad (noun) and its derivative forms are mentioned 34 times in the Qur'an and the words are derived from the singular verb *jahada*. According to Lane (1863, p. 473), in his work *An Arabic-English lexicon*, the verb *jahada* can be translated as 'He strove, laboured or toiled; exerted himself or his power or efforts or endeavours or ability; employed himself vigorously, strenuously, laboriously, diligently, studiously, sedulously, earnestly, or with energy; was diligent or studious; took pains or extraordinary pains'. In the English version of the Qur'an the word *jahada* is commonly translated as 'to strive'. One example of a verse which contains the word jihad is the Qur'an chapter 9: 20. In three examples of the English translation of this verse, the word *Jahadu* in this verse is translated as strive (Abdullah Yusuf Ali), striven (Muhammad MW Pickthall), and strove hard (Mohammed H Syakir). The complete translations of the verse from these three different translators can be observed in the table below.

**Table 1.** Translations of the Qur'an Chapter 9: 20

Translator	English translation of the Qur'an chapter 9: 20
Abdullah Yusuf Ali	Those who believe, and suffer exile and <b>strive</b> with might and main, in Allah's cause, with their goods and their persons, have the highest rank in the sight of Allah: they are the people who will achieve (salvation).
Muhammad Marmaduke William Pickthall	Those who believe, and have left their homes and <b>striven</b> with their wealth and their lives in Allah's

Translator	English translation of the Qur'an chapter 9: 20
	way are of much greater worth in Allah's sight. These are they who are triumphant.
Mohammed Habib Shakir	Those who believed and fled (their homes), and <b>strove hard</b> in Allah's way with their property and their souls, are much higher in rank with Allah; and those are they who are the achievers (of their objects).

Source: <http://www.alquran-english.com/9-at-taubah/>

There is no connection found, in the abovementioned verse, between the word *jahadu* as the verb form of the noun jihad (translated in the texts above as strive, striven or strove hard) and war or violent action. Further, the verse mentioned above indicates two different types of jihad; namely jihad through the use of wealth and jihad through the use of life force. The description of jihad in a more general meaning as the use of one's utmost power in any endeavour is also supported by the history or the revelation of the Qur'an.<sup>1</sup> According to Al-Qaradhawi (2011), some of the verses in the Qur'an which mention jihad have been revealed during the peaceful period in Mecca several years before the prophet Muhammad immigrated to Medina and started to wage the war against non-believers (Al-Qaradhawi, 2011). This historical analysis supports the opinion that jihad meant struggle before it became associated with war or violence (Romli & Sjadzili, 2004).

In Islamic scholarship, the doctrine of jihad can be implemented in many forms of actions. Ar-Raghib Al-Ashfahani (died 1108/1109), an early twelfth century classic Islamic scholar, classified three different forms of jihad, namely the struggle to fight against enemies, the struggle to fight against the devil and the struggle to fight against inappropriate desire. Another Islamic scholar, Ibnul Qayyim (1292-1350), classified the application of jihad into thirteen stages which

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<sup>1</sup> Muslims believe that the Qur'an was verbally revealed by God to Muhammad gradually over period of approximately 23 years.

includes different types of struggle such as the struggle against lust and devils, the struggle against destruction, wrong-doing and hypocrisy, the struggle in Islamic preaching and also physical struggle with weapons (Al-Qaradhawi, 2011). In addition, Moniruzzaman argues that

The main objective of Islam is to eradicate anti-social elements that are harmful to human society. Such elements could be of various natures such as political oppression or injustice, economic exploitation, moral decadence, social crimes, administrative discrimination and corruption, environmental degradation and threats, and military brutality and oppression. Islam uses the concept of jihad as a value-based “ultimate effort” (the literal meaning of jihad) to eliminate these harmful elements in order to make human society safer and more peaceful. Jihad provides moral sanction to fight against anything unjust and threatening for human society. This is the fundamental philosophical objective of the concept of jihad. However, during the early period of Islamic expansion (622--750 CE), the term gained extensive legitimacy in military use, which remains prevalent until today (Moniruzzaman, 2008, p. 2).

These various historical and etymological interpretations of jihad indicate that its contemporary use referring to religious violence and war reflects a partial reinterpretation of the meaning of jihad.

## Chapter 4

### Various interpretations of jihad in the global context

In the history of Islam, the interpretation of the Arabic word jihad has been politicised by many states and Muslim communities for many reasons. Esposito supports the opinion that the interpretation of jihad is highly politicised, he argues:

The doctrine of jihad is not the product of a single authoritative individual or organization's interpretation. It is rather the product of diverse individuals and authorities interpreting and applying the principles of sacred texts in specific historical and political contexts. (Esposito, 2002, p. 64)

Although the Qur'anic origins of the term jihad are not specifically related to war, classical Islamic legal texts developed by Muslim jurists in the post-prophetic period (especially in the seventh and eight centuries) played an important role in the association of the term jihad with war (Saeed, 2002). Saeed further argues that the 'classical doctrine of jihad thus became closely associated with the Islamic doctrine of war and peace' which is 'largely equivalent to the modern doctrine of defence of the homeland' (Saeed, 2002: 74, 79). In addition, jihad was also used for many reasons including the justification of early Arab conquests of non-Muslim lands and also the justification of Muslims' struggle against colonialism and communism in many parts of the world (R. Hassan, 2006).

More systematically, R. Hassan (2008) classifies the articulation of the term jihad as an armed struggle into several stages from the formative stage of jihad to the jihad in contemporary Muslim world. He argues that in the formative stage (7<sup>th</sup> century), the doctrine of jihad was constructed as an individual's duty to establish an Islamic identity, while in the empire stage (8<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> centuries), it was employed to motivate and mobilise Muslim communities to establish Islamic hegemony. During the colonization of Muslim countries (17<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> centuries), the doctrine of jihad was mainly used as an ideology of resistance against the colonialists and in the post-colonial and cold war period (mid to late 20<sup>th</sup> century), this doctrine was used to mobilise many different actions including the struggle for Islamic states in many parts of the world and the fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The uses of jihad since the post-cold war period (1990 to the present) in the context of military and political struggles have become far more diverse and include describing the struggle for Islamic states, offensive jihad against the west/US and current martyrdom operations in several predominantly Muslim countries (R. Hassan, 2008). The continuous use of the doctrine of jihad to justify armed struggle in the post- cold war period is mainly promoted by the contemporary global and transnational *Salafi Jihadi* group, an armed movement which started in Afghanistan during the fight against the Soviet Union and has since developed in many parts of the world.

During the colonial period, many Muslim scholars started to restrict the use of jihad as a militaristic struggle. According to them, jihad as an armed struggle could only be undertaken to liberate Muslims from religious oppression (Peters, 1979). Peters further argues that this restricted interpretation in the colonial period was first introduced in India in the 1870s by leaders who wanted to contain the conflict between Indian Muslims and the British colonialists. A prominent representative of Indian Muslims during this period, Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), promoted this interpretation:

by restricting the scope of jihad-obligation to wars for religious reasons, i.e. armed struggle in order to defend Moslems (*sic*) against religious oppression, and excluding from it wars for temporal reasons like e.g. (*sic*) wars for territorial conquest or armed resistance against civil oppression (Peters, 1979, p. 160).

Indian Muslim scholar Maulana Wahiduddin Khan (born 1925) argues that the ‘armed struggle’ perspective of jihad was historically used to defend the freedom of belief and worship. Khan (as cited in Omar, 2008) specifically argues that in the situation when Muslims are free to practice their religion, there is no Qur’anic justification for the use of violence or waging a war to defend this freedom. More recently, this pacifist interpretation of jihad is also found in a textbook of the Al-Azhar University Cairo published in 1984, written by a later sheikh Jadul Haq Ali Jadulhaq (1917-1996). He writes:

In earlier ages the sword was necessary for securing the path of the *da’wa* [propagation]. In our age, however, the sword has lost its importance, although the resort to it is still important for the case of defense against

those who wish to do evil to Islam and its people. However, for the dissemination of the *da'wa* there are now a variety of ways...Those who focus on arms in our times are preoccupied with weak instruments (Jadulhaq as cited in Tibi, 2007, p. 57).

Many other Muslims believe that jihad as an internal struggle is more important than armed struggle. This perspective is mainly promoted by the ascetic movement in Islam which started in first half of the ninth century (Cook, 2001). The promoters of this perspective usually refer to a popular *hadith* (prophetic tradition) which distinguishes the greater jihad (spiritual struggle) and the smaller jihad (physical struggle). However, the justification for the distinction between the greater and the smaller jihad is weak because the quoted *hadith* is not included in one of the authoritative compilations of the prophetic traditions (Peters, 1979).

There has been no empirical research conducted about the number of Muslims who hold each different perspective of jihad. Several studies show partial information related to this issue. Sofjan (2006) conducted a survey about the attitude towards armed jihad in Indonesia and Iran in the early 2000s. The research shows that 46.7% of the Muslim respondents in Indonesia stated their willingness to participate in armed jihad and 61.2% of the Muslim respondents in Iran said yes when they asked about the willingness to participate in armed jihad. Although the willingness to participate in armed jihad does not necessarily lead to actual participation, these numbers show a relatively high support for the implementation of armed jihad in response to the current world political order. Another survey conducted by R. Hassan shows a range of different attitudes of Muslims in predominantly Muslim countries towards the place of war in conflict resolution. In this survey more than 6300 Muslim respondents were asked the question: is war justified when other ways of settling international disputes fail? The agreement rates in response to this question in the Middle East and South Asian countries were higher (ranging from 58% in Iran, 63% in Egypt, to 66% in Turkey and Pakistan) than the rates for the respondents in Southeast Asian Muslim countries and Kazakhstan (ranging from 11% in Kazakhstan, 33% in Indonesia, to 37% in Malaysia) (R. Hassan, 2008). Both surveys indicate Muslims in different parts of the world express different attitudes towards armed jihad and

war in contemporary world order. Based on his study on the historical trajectory of the doctrine of jihad, Hassan concludes that

the nature of the jihad doctrine and its expression have been profoundly shaped by historical and material conditions prevailing in Muslim societies (R. Hassan, 2008, p. 126).

## Chapter 5

### Jihad in Indonesia

Historically, Islam in Indonesia has been widely regarded as a variant of moderate and tolerant Islam (See for instance Pringle, 2010; Feillard and Madinier, 2011). The arrival of Islam in Indonesia was generally described as a peaceful process through many generations of trade and the dissemination of Islamic mysticism by foreign Sufi leaders. However, the spread of Islam across the archipelago was not entirely a peaceful process, especially after the establishment of Islamic states in several parts of Indonesia. The wars between states in the early history of Indonesia were often influenced by religious causes apart from dynastic, strategic or economic causes (Ricklefs, 2008).

#### *Armed jihad in nineteenth century Indonesia*

In the early history of Indonesia, the interpretation of jihad as a defensive armed struggle was promoted by resistance movements against the colonial occupation. Many Muslim fighters who have participated in the war against the colonial occupation, including the leaders of Islamic kingdoms in Aceh, Java, Sulawesi and Moluccas, used the doctrine of jihad to mobilize people to fight against the colonialists. For instance, in the early 1820s the leaders of Padri movement in West Sumatra declared 'jihad' to mobilise their followers in the fight against the Dutch and the perceived corrupt local rulers (Ileto, 1994). Ileto (1994) argues that:

The Padri war illustrates how a religious impulse from the outside-reform Islam- was able to radicalize existing *tarekat* (sufi order or brotherhood) and *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school), thus transforming groups of teachers and pupils into insurgent armies that fought the 'corrupt' Islam of the villages as well as the expanding colonial state (pp. 210-211).

During the Java war against the Dutch in 1825-1830, Diponegoro, a Javanese Muslim hero and an iconic figure of Indonesian nationhood, used the term *sabil* as an abbreviation of the term *jihad fi sabilillah* (struggling in the way of God) to motivate his followers to fight against the Dutch (Anwar, 2011). In research on *Babad Diponegoro*, a book written by Diponegoro, Anwar (2011) argues:

In *Babad Diponegoro* jihad is interpreted as war against non-believers who have attacked, displaced and robbed Muslims. Jihad is also interpreted as war against the apostates or Muslims who have helped the non-believers in the aggression against Muslims. [Di dalam Babad Diponegoro, jihad dimaknai dengan perang melawan orang kafir yang telah melakukan penyerangan, pengusiran dan perampasan terhadap umat Islam. Jihad juga diartikan berperang melawan orang-orang Islam yang membantu orang kafir dalam memusuhi dan melakukan agresi terhadap umat Islam yang dianggap sebagai orang-orang yang telah keluar dari agama (murtad)]. (p. 127).

The doctrine of '*Perang Sabil* (holy war)' was also found in the Aceh war (1873-1912). This doctrine was written in a literary work titled *Hikayat Perang Sabil/Prang Sabil* (Epic of the Holy War) which has been used to motivate the Acehnese fighters in the war against the Dutch (Ahmad, 2006). These historical studies suggest that in the early colonial occupation of Indonesia, the doctrine of jihad has been used by Muslim leaders as a justification to motivate and mobilize their followers in the fight against the colonial rulers and their supporters.

#### *A turn towards peaceful jihad*

During the twentieth century Dutch colonial rule, Islamic movements in Indonesia generally held accommodating attitudes towards the colonial authorities. This attitude was particularly shown by the traditionalist *Nahdhatul Ulama* (established in 1926) and the reformist counterparts such as *Al-Irsyad* (established in 1913), *Muhammadiyah* (established in 1912) and *Persatuan Islam* (established in 1923) (van Bruinessen, 2008). These organizations have focused on the dissemination of Islamic teaching through the establishment of various educational institutions and charitable activities. The Dutch agricultural policy during this period also played a significant role in the growth of Islamic culture, especially in East Java. The sugar cultivation areas developed by the Dutch colonial government gave rise to many *pesantren* (traditional Islamic boarding schools) which eventually became the institutional basis of traditionalist Islam (Pringle, 2010). The teaching of Islam in various Islamic educational institutions in this period was primarily focused on the understanding and the implementation of Islamic law and traditions in day-to-

day life; as opposed to the political orientation of emerging contemporary Islamist groups in Indonesia. Arguably, as a consequence of this pacifist and accommodating attitude towards the Dutch, the discourse of armed jihad was not commonly found and employed in this period.

The emphasis on the pacifist interpretation of jihad can be found in the publication of an Indonesian Islamic party before Indonesian independence, *Sarekat Islam Party* (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia--PSII). In a pamphlet signed by Kartosuwiryo in 1936, the author explained that ‘the “positive” struggle is the *jihad* of the tongue and the heart (the *jihad al-akbar* led by *imam*), and not that of sword—the *jihad al-asghar*, defined instead as negative and destructive’ (Formichi, 2012, p. 63). The thinking of Kartosuwiryo was dramatically changed in 1947, triggered by Indonesian politics after the Independence in 1945, when he called the *ummat* to undertake armed jihad against the colonialists and subsequently established the *Darul Islam* or the Indonesian Islamic State in 1949 (Formichi, 2012). The adoption of the pacifist interpretation of the doctrine of jihad during twentieth century Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia shows a pragmatic approach of Muslim groups in Indonesia in response to colonial occupation and echoes the attitude of Muslims in India during British colonial rule in the nineteenth century as discussed earlier in this chapter.

#### *National armed jihad after Indonesian independence (1945-2000)*

In the early years after Indonesian independence, mainstream Indonesian Muslims justified the fight against foreign troops as a defensive armed jihad to defend independence. In October 1945, hundreds of respected Muslim scholars from *Nahdlatul Ulama* declared the so called *Resolusi Jihad* (Jihad Resolution) to motivate their followers to defend Indonesian independence (Solahudin, 2011). This resolution was strengthened in the National Congress of *Nahdlatul Ulama* in March 1946 by the statement that participating in armed jihad against colonialists

and their allies is *fardhu'ain* (an individual obligation) for all Muslims, especially for those who live within 94 km of the enemy's location.<sup>2</sup>

Waging war to reject and to fight against the colonialist is an individual obligation (Which has to be undertaken by every Muslim, man, woman, children, armed or unarmed) for those who live within 94 km of the enemy's position [Berperang menolak dan melawan pendjajah itoe fardloe 'ain (jang harus dikerdjakan oleh tiap-tiap orang Islam, laki-laki, perempuan, anak-anak, bersendjata atau tidak) bagi orang jang berada dalam djarak lingkungan 94 km. dari tempat masoek dan kedoedoekan moesoeh] (El-Guyanie, 2010, p. 79-80).

The discourse of armed jihad during the struggle to defend Indonesian independence was also supported by the publication of several books on jihad in Indonesian language. For instance, two books titled *Penuntun perang sabil* (A guide for a holy war) written by M Arsjad Th Lubis and *Ilmu pertahanan negara dan kemiliteran dalam Islam* (A study of national defence and military in Islam) written by Muhammad Hasbi Ash Shiddiqiy were published in early 1946 and these books had been used as a guide by Islamic troops such as *Hizbullah* [the party of Allah] and *Sabilillah* [the way of Allah] (Solahudin, 2011). During this struggle, the term *perang sabil* which had been used during the Java war (1825-1830) and the Aceh war (1873-1912) was also contextualised in the fight against colonialists. For instance, in a study of the role of Kartosuwiryo, the founder of the *Darul Islam* (Indonesian Islamic State--NII), in the development of political Islam in Indonesia, Chiara Formichi quoted a statement of Kartosuwiryo's that the term *perang sabil* can be interpreted as 'a war for the defence of the sovereignty of the state, and the purity of religion, a war to fight any attempt to colonization from any nation in any way' (Kartosuwiryo as cited in Formichi, 2012, p. 104).

In Indonesian history, Local armed jihad was not only directed at the colonialists but also against the perceived un-Islamic government established after Indonesian independence. In August 1949, Kartosuwiryo proclaimed the *Darul*

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<sup>2</sup> The distance of 94 km is derived from the minimum distance by which a traveller may shorten his prayer or combine two prayers into one prayer. There are many different opinions of Muslim scholars concerning the distance that constitute 'travel', some of them consider one, two or three days travel on a camel on average speed as the minimum distance and some of them argue that the travel is not defined by 'how much one has travelled but by what one does and how one prepares for it' (Qadhi, 2011).

*Islam*, the first rebellion after Indonesian became independent. Before establishing the *Darul Islam* movement, Kartosuwiryo was a prominent member of the anti-colonial *Sarekat Islam* party (Formichi, 2012). Kartosuwiryo cited his disappointment with the early form of the Indonesian secular government and the result of the so called Roem-van Royen Agreement between Indonesian government and the Dutch as justifications for starting the rebellion by proclaiming an Indonesian Islamic state (*Darul Islam*) (van Dijk, 1981).<sup>3</sup> The *Darul Islam* rebellion started in West Java and then spread to parts of Central Java, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi and Aceh. Van Dijk argues that the *Darul Islam* movement was ‘the result of a combination of conflicts of interests and outlooks within the Armed Forces, resistance to an increasingly pervasive central authority, gradual changes in the agrarian structure, and Islamic views and ideals’ (van Dijk, 1981, p. 9). The Islamic views of Kartosuwiryo were particularly influential in the establishment of the *Darul Islam* in East Java. While van Dijk mainly frames the *Darul Islam* as a rebellion using Islam as the justification, Formichi argues that in the establishment of the *Darul Islam*, Islam was not ‘just a means for rallying popular support or as a rhetorical exercise for gaining legitimacy, but rather as the ideological foundation of Kartosuwiryo’s activities’ (Formichi, 2012, p. 6). In addition to the basic constitution, the *Darul Islam* established a criminal law which contained the justification for an armed jihad against anyone who disobeyed the Islamic state’s government. Kartosuwiryo’s rebellion was ended after his arrest and the defeat of his troops in 1962. He was sentenced to death and executed by the Indonesian military on one of the islands in the Thousand Islands (*Pulau Seribu*) off the coast of Jakarta in September 1962. Kartosuwiryo’s idea of armed jihad or *perang sabil* through the establishment of *Darul Islam* was sustained by a small number of his followers in Tasikmalaya, West Java, but *Darul Islam* never again became a serious threat to the Indonesian government (Solahudin, 2011). Nevertheless, during the first years

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<sup>3</sup> Roem-van Royen agreement was an agreement between the Indonesian government and the Dutch to cease the war. The agreement was signed on May 7 1949. Many educated Indonesians at that time criticised that ‘the terms of the agreement called for a surrender of Indonesian interests’ (Kahin, 2003, p. 426).

of the Indonesian republic, *Darul Islam* propagated an interpretation of jihad as armed struggle for the political consolidation of Islam.

During the transition from the Old Order to the New Order, the doctrine of armed jihad was used to mobilize the fight against Indonesian communists. The clash between the Indonesian Communist Party and Muslim groups in Indonesia started in 1948 after the growing influence of the communist party with its ‘secularist doctrine’ and its strong link with the Eastern block in the Cold War. The first violent confrontation erupted in September 1948 when a communist-led uprising erupted in the city of Madiun East Java (Feillard and Madinier, 2011, p. 19). Then, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was blamed for the attempted military coup of 30 September/1 October 1965 after Soeharto took power defeating the coup. At least half a million so called Communist Party members were killed by the military, supported by Muslim and nationalist militias (Ricklefs, 2008). The former members of *Darul Islam*, who had surrendered and pledged loyalty to the Indonesian government, were mobilised by the Indonesian Intelligence Agency to support the fight against the members of Indonesian Communist Party (Solahudin, 2011). *Nahdhatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*, the two biggest Muslim organisations in Indonesia, supported this fight by declaring a *fatwa* that the fight against communists was a legitimate jihad. *Nahdlatul Ulama* declared the jihad *fatwa* in its publication *Duta Masyarakat* and *Muhammadiyah* published the *fatwa* in its weekly magazine *Suara Muhammadiyah* no. 9 November 1965 (see Boland: 1982; Hefner, 2000). For instance, *Muhammadiyah*’s statement clearly mentioned that

the extermination of the GESTAPU/PKI [30 September affair/Indonesian Communist Party] and the NEKOLIM [abbreviation for ‘neo-colonialist imperialists’] is a religious duty...And because this action and this struggle must be carried out by consolidating all our strength—mental, physical and material—therefore this action and this struggle are nothing less than a Holy War (*Djihad*) (Boland, 1982, p. 146).

In addition, Hefner (2000) argues that the dispute over the land reform policy had strengthened the conflict between Indonesian Communist Party members and Muslim leaders in rural areas of Central and East Java. However, according to Boland, the group’s attitude toward religion was the main reason behind the

conflict between Indonesian Muslims and the members of Indonesian Communist Party. He argues:

Whatever the proper explanation may be of the events of September 30<sup>th</sup>, 1965 and thereafter, to the Muslim way of thinking it was a “holy war” against atheistic Communism, the archenemy of religion (Boland, 1982, p. 147).

Therefore, during the fight against communism, the doctrine of jihad was politicised by the Indonesian government and mainstream Muslim organisations to justify the eradication of communism and the killing of Indonesian Communist Party members.

After Kartosuwiryo was sentenced to death in 1962, his idea was sustained by his followers in 1970’s clandestine armed jihad’s organizations commonly known as the *Komando Jihad* (the command of jihad) in Java and Sumatra and transformed into the Aceh Independent Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*-GAM) in Aceh. The *Komando Jihad* organisation was responsible for several armed robberies and several bombing actions mainly targeting Christian facilities in Sumatra (Solahudin, 2011). Many prominent members of the *Komando Jihad* were arrested and taken into custody in 1977. Several other prominent members continued to operate the *Darul Islam* as a clandestine organisation and recruited new followers. In the early 1980s the *Darul Islam* members strengthened their opposition to Soeharto and planned a revolution against the New Order government inspired by the revolution in Iran. The New Order government was seen by the remaining followers of *Darul Islam* as increasingly developing anti-Islamic policies especially by the declaration of *Pancasila* as the sole organising principle (*asas tunggal*) for the states, political parties and mass organisations. The Islamic revolutionary plan which included the plan to assassinate Soeharto and bombing plans targeting Borobudur temple in Central Java and a temple in Bali, ended in failure (Solahudin, 2011). In the case of GAM, Islam was seen as an element of Aceh’s national identity. Therefore, the doctrine of jihad was used mainly to motivate individual fighters and not a central ideology of the organisation. According to Aspinall (2009),

Acehnese nationalism built on a substratum of religion. Islamic vocabulary provided nationalist discourse with much of its affective power, conferring a transcendent quality on the nation and on those who sacrificed themselves for it. But Islam was not central to GAM's political program. Instead it had become a source of individual moral motivation for those who fought in the nation's name, and a feature of the Acehnese identity the sought to defend (p. 216).

These clandestine organisations were almost eradicated by the New Order regime and several prominent members of the *Darul Islam* went into exile in Malaysia or joined military training in Afghanistan to avoid prosecution from the Indonesian government (Solahudin, 2011). After the fall of Soeharto, these *jihadi* groups which previously promoted local struggles than become a 'major recruiting ground' for the contemporary transnational *jihadi* movement in Indonesia (Bubalo and Fealy, 2005, p. 16).<sup>4</sup>

The idea of armed jihad re-emerged after the collapse of the New Order. Another local armed jihad movement emerged through the establishment of the *Laskar Jihad* (the soldiers of jihad) in response to the conflict between Muslims and Christians in the Moluccas archipelago in eastern Indonesia. *Laskar Jihad* was created in 2000 as a military wing of FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah) which was established by a Salafi's Muslim leader, Ja'far Umar Thalib, in 1998. Thalib framed the conflict as the fight of Indonesian Muslims against the perceived Christian rebellion. He argued that:

The Moluccan conflict is a rebellion launched by Christians in the Moluccas under the operation code "Troops of Christ, God of Love and Affection." It is a Crusade whose aim is to expel all Muslims from the islands, on which a Christian State of Alifuru (which includes Papua, the Moluccas, Eastern Nusa Tenggara, and East Timor) will be established, separated from the Republic of Indonesia (Thalib in Hasan 2006, p. 115).

The existence of *Laskar Jihad* generated special attention from many people worldwide because of the movement's use of the internet to disseminate the information about the conflict from FKAWJ's perspective. FKAWJ maintained a

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<sup>4</sup> More detailed information about the transformation from the *Darul Islam* to *Jemaah Islamiyah* can be found in a book written by Solahudin titled *NII sampai Ji: Salafi Jihadisme di Indonesia* published by Komunitas Bambu in 2011. This book was translated in English by Dave McRave under the title *The root of terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah* and published by NewSouth Publishing with a support from Lowy Institute for International Policy in 2013.

website [www.Laskarjihad.or.id](http://www.Laskarjihad.or.id) which provided daily updates from the conflict site (Brauchler, 2004).

As these examples show, the doctrine of jihad has been used by various Muslim groups in Indonesia from the early years of Indonesian independence to the early 2000s to justify fights against different types of perceived enemies. These perceived enemies include colonial troops, un-Islamic Indonesian government, the followers of the Indonesian Communist Party and also the perceived Christian rebellion in the Moluccas. These struggles were generally situated in the context of national struggles, where the grievances to be addressed were specifically Indonesian issues. This changed under the influence of the transnational *Salafi Jihadi* movement in early 2000s.

#### *The Influence of Salafi Jihadi's transnational jihad*

From the start of this century, a more transnational outlook has been imported in to Indonesia. The *Salafi Jihadi* movement gained momentum in Afghanistan from the early 1980s. This ideology developed as a combination of the ideology of *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (Islamic Brotherhood) introduced by Sayyid Quthb in Egypt and Abul A'la Al-Maududi in Pakistan, and the *Salafi* ideology that drew upon the ideas presented by Ibn Taimiyya and Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (As-Suri, 2009). The development and the expansion of *Salafi Jihadism* was supported by the arrival of mujahid (holy fighters) from many parts of the world in Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight against the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The ideology of *Salafi Jihadism* was brought to Indonesia by some prominent members of *Darul Islam* who went to Afghanistan during their exile in Malaysia, such as Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'syir and Abu Rusdan. After returning from Malaysia they rebelled from *Darul Islam* and established a new organisation known as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (Solahudin, 2011). *Salafi Jihadi* groups are

regarded as a rebel group or *Kharijite*<sup>5</sup> by the dominant *Salafi* movement in Indonesia, because the mainstream *Salafi* movement focuses on moral and ritual issues rather than political issues. The mainstream *Salafi* movement also disagrees with *jihadis*' tendency to delegitimise the governments which are regarded as un-Islamic, including the Indonesian government (International Crisis Group, 2004).

Several studies suggest that the *Salafi Jihadi* interpretation of jihad entered the Indonesian public sphere in the early 2000s, partly through the publication of numerous books written by the *Salafi Jihadis* from Indonesia and overseas, in addition to the outbreak of terrorist actions in New York in September 2001 and the massive media coverage following the actions (See for instance International Crisis Group, 2008; Zada et al, 2010). Many books written by prominent global *Salafi Jihadi* such as Abdullah Azzam, Usamah bin Ladin and Aiman Azh-Zhawahiri have been translated into the Indonesian language and many of the publishers have a connection with Jemaah Islamiyah (International Crisis Group, 2008). In addition, Bali bombing detainees known as the 'Bali bombers', Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron and Amrozi, wrote and published several books to justify their action during their imprisonment. Imam Samudra wrote three books titled *Aku melawan teroris* [I fight the terrorists] (Solo: Jazera, 2004), *Sekuntum rosela pelipur lara: Catatan dan renungan dari penjara* [A solace rosella: A note and reflection from the prison] (Jakarta: Arrahmah, 2009), and *Jika masih ada yang mempertanyakan jihadku: Sebuah catatan terakhir dari Nusakambangan* [If anyone is still questioning my jihad: A final note from Nusakambangan] (Surabaya: Kafilah Syuhada Media Center, 2009). Ali Ghufron wrote two books titled *Mimpi suci dari balik jeruji besi: Hikmah mimpi yang benar dan baik* [A holy dream behind the bars: Wisdom of the true and good dream] (Jakarta: Arrahmah, 2009), and *Risalah iman dari balik terali: Sebuah rahasia keteguhan hati seorang mukmin dan wasiat untuk kaum Muslimin* [A faith treatise behind the bars: A secret of the determination of a believer and a testament for Muslims]. Amrozi wrote a book titled *Senyum terakhir sang mujahid: Catatan kehidupan*

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<sup>5</sup> The Kharijites (Arabic, Khawarij) is the earliest Islamic sect known for their puritanism and fanaticism. This group rebelled against the fourth caliph, Ali bin Abi Thalib, and openly disobeyed and conspired against him.

*seorang Amrozi* [The last smile of a fighter: A life record of Amrozi] (Jakarta: Ar Rahmah, 2009). Ali Ghufron stated explicitly in one of his books that the only *jama'ah* (Islamic group) which has been guaranteed freedom from hell is *Al-jama'ah Al-jihadiyah As-salafiyah* (the *Salafi Jihadi* group). The publication of these books and other books with similar themes indicates a trend toward radical jihad becoming increasingly acceptable as part of public discourse and in quantitative terms more prominent in Indonesian Islamic publications in the period of 1999-2009 (Zada, 2011).

The ideological position of these books is further supported by the establishment of many websites which are dedicated to promote the perspective of jihad as fundamentally an armed struggle. Many of these websites are anonymous but some have clear ownership and authorship such as *Arrahmah* (arrahmah.com) and *Voice of Al-Islam* (voa-islam.com). Both of these websites identify themselves as Islamic online news services and have created a special section on jihad and promote jihad as primarily an armed struggle.

Indonesian *Salafi Jihadi* groups replicate the ideas of transnational *Salafi Jihadis*. According to Solahudin (2011), there are several characteristics of *Salafi Jihadi's* doctrine that are different from the mainstream *Salafi* movement. First, *Salafi Jihadis* hold the opinion that there is no other legitimate meaning of jihad except war or physical struggle. The followers of this movement reject the interpretation that the greater jihad is a struggle against oneself. According to Abu Muhammad Jibriel, a prominent *Salafi Jihadi* leader, the *hadith* which distinguishes the greater and the lesser jihad is a false *hadith* and therefore could not be used as a reference. He further asserts that the greater jihad is not the struggle against desire but fighting against non-believers who have fought Muslims (Jibriel, 2009). Second, *Salafi Jihadis* regard jihad in the form of armed struggle as a *fardhu 'ain* (an individual obligation) for all Muslims today and terrorising enemies is allowed in jihad. A specific example can be found in the book written by Imam Samudra, one of the masterminds of the first Bali Bombing, as the justification for his participation in the first Bali bombing in 2002. He wrote confidently in his book that the obligation to participate in armed

jihad has become an individual responsibility for Muslims all over the world and his action was a manifestation of *jihad fi sabilillah* (struggle in the way of God) (Samudra cited in MH Hassan, 2006). Another mastermind of the Bali bombing, Ali Ghufron, contends that armed jihad has become obligatory because many Muslim countries are occupied by non-believers; many Muslim authorities have become apostates because they have rejected the implementation of Islamic law; the Islamic caliphate has disappeared; and the jails in many places are full of Muslim fighters (Ghufron, 2009). This distinct perspective on jihad is strongly influenced by the thinking of Abdullah Azzam the mentor of the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. In his book *Signs of ar-Rahman in the jihad of Afghan*, he argues:

If the citizens of the Islamic state are unable to repel the enemy, or due to some reason do not engage in the Jihaad (*sic*), the duty then devolves on all those Muslims who are closest to the Muslims under attack. The Jihaad (*sic*) becomes Fardh-e-Ain (an individual obligation) upon them (Azzam, n.d., p. 60).

In addition, *Salafi Jihadis* also believe that political sovereignty is in the hand of God, therefore there is no accepted social and political regulation except Islamic law (Solahudin, 2011).

With regard to the position of jihad in Islamic piety, *Salafi Jihadi* consider armed jihad as the best form of Islamic pieties. The prioritisation of armed jihad above other forms of Islamic pieties is a common feature of global *Salafi Jihadism*. This interpretation is particularly influenced by the thinking of a classic Islamic scholar Imam Ibn Nuhas, an Islamic scholar who died during the war against the Roman army in the year 814 Hijri in Egypt. In a book titled *Mashari al-ashwaq ila masari al-ushaq*, which was used as part of the syllabus of study for the members of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the 1940s, Nuhas strongly argues in that book that armed struggle jihad ‘is the greatest deed of all’ and ‘mujahid (the fighter) is the greatest of all people’ (Nuhas, n.d., p. 29). Several prominent *Salafi Jihadi* in Indonesia echo this opinion. For instance, Ali Ghufron, in one of his books, states that jihad is the most preferred deed by the prophet Muhammad, his companions and those who follow the prophet’s

companions (Ghufron, 2009). Abu Muhammad Jibriel, a prominent leader of Indonesian Mujahidin Council *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*-MMI, also holds a similar opinion, he contends

...jihad is a noble deed and it has positioned in the highest degree compared to other deeds. jihad is the only piety which has become the defence and the salvation of all Islamic teaching and its position could not be replaced by other deeds. [...jihad merupakan amalan mulia dan paling tinggi derajatnya berbanding dengan amalan-amalan lain, bahkan jihad *fi sabilillah* merupakan satu-satunya amal shalih yang menjadi benteng dan penyelamat seluruh ajaran Islam, dan kedudukannya tidak bisa digantikan dengan amalan yang lain.] (Jibriel, 2009, p. 7).

Despite their similar interpretation of jihad, there are also rivalries among *Salafi Jihadi* groups in Indonesia. After the collapse of *Jemaah Islamiyah*, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and his followers founded the Indonesian Mujahidin Council in 2000. However, in 2008 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir resigned from MMI because of a dispute over the organisation's leadership structure and established a new organisation named *Jamah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT) (International Crisis Group, 2010). Abu Bakar Ba'asyir declared JAT as a non-violence organization, but not long after its establishment, several members of JAT were arrested and accused for their involvement in terrorist actions and an illegal military training in Aceh 2010 (International Crisis Group, 2012). Another split occurred after the declaration of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in 2014. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir decided to pledge loyalty to the Islamic State, but many prominent members of JAT opposed this decision and established a new organization named *Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah* (JAS) in August 2014 (*Arrahmah*, 11 August 2014).

It is difficult to identify the precise vehicles by which the ideology of *Salafi Jihadism* first spread in Indonesia. The activities of *Salafi Jihadi* groups are mostly conducted underground. In early 2010, a training camp which was established by an alliance of major *Jihadi* groups in Indonesia was found in Aceh and approximately 200 members were arrested by Indonesian authorities. In addition to this training camp, other smaller activities were noticeable in Medan, North Sumatra; Poso, Central Sulawesi; Solo, Central Java; Bima, West Nusatenggara; and part of East Kalimantan (International Crisis Group, 2012).

### *Contextual jihad in contemporary Indonesia*

Despite the use of jihad to justify militaristic struggle, there is still a moderate majority who considered jihad to be a peaceful struggle. Van Bruinessen's research shows that only a very small number of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) in Indonesia have a connection with Islamic political oriented organisations such as the transnational Islamic Brotherhood or the local *Darul Islam* movement (van Bruinessen, 2008). In his research about *pesantren* in Indonesia, Lukens-Bull (2005) suggests that the mainstream *pesantren* in Indonesia tend to develop a distinct identity of 'Islamic modernity' by emphasising the teaching of 'peaceful jihad' within their education system (p. 129). The interpretation of jihad as necessarily an armed struggle against non-believers is rejected by the mainstream Muslim organisations in the twenty-first century Indonesian context especially the state-sponsored Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia-MUI) and the two biggest non-government organisations *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama*. They argue that jihad can take place through non-violent struggle for the development of Islamic communities. In a *fatwa* in 2004, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), the official Muslim clerical body in Indonesia, contends that jihad can be interpreted in two different forms; namely jihad as a struggle to fight and defend Islam from the aggression of the enemies and jihad as any serious and sustainable endeavour to protect and uphold the religion of Allah (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, 2004). This opinion is also supported by the two biggest Muslim organisations in Indonesia, *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama*. In the official document of the latest national congress in 2010, *Muhammadiyah* states:

In the enlightenment movement, *Muhammadiyah* interprets and implements jihad as an endeavour to mobilise all abilities in manifesting the advancement, justice, prosperity, dignity and sovereignty of human life. Jihad in *Muhammadiyah's* perspective is not a struggle with violence, conflict and hostility. In response to the complex problems and challenges, Muslims should reconsider their strategy from the struggle against something to the struggle to face something by providing the best alternative answers for a better life. [Dalam gerakan pencerahan, Muhammadiyah memaknai dan

mengaktualisasikan jihad sebagai ikhtiar mengerahkan segala kemampuan (*badlul-juhdi*) untuk mewujudkan kehidupan seluruh umat manusia yang maju, adil, makmur, bermartabat, dan berdaulat. Jihad dalam pandangan Muhammadiyah bukanlah perjuangan dengan kekerasan, konflik, dan permusuhan. Umat Islam dalam berhadapan dengan berbagai permasalahan dan tantangan kehidupan yang kompleks dituntut untuk melakukan perubahan strategi dari perjuangan melawan sesuatu (*al-jihad li-al-muaradhah*) kepada perjuangan menghadapi sesuatu (*al-jihad li-al-muwajahah*) dalam wujud memberikan jawaban-jawaban alternatif yang terbaik untuk mewujudkan kehidupan yang lebih utama.] (*Muhammadiyah*, 2010, p. 20).

Similar statements can also be found in the official website of *Nahdlatul Ulama*. In an research titled ‘Jihad from the perspective of Islamic law [Jihad menurut syariat Islam]’, the author argues:

The term jihad can be interpreted as struggle, but not all struggles are necessarily identical with physical struggle. In Islam, jihad can be classified into three different forms. First, physical struggle such as the battle of Badr, the Indonesian’s war against the Dutch colonization, the war in Iran and Iraq against the US and its allies etc.<sup>6</sup> This jihad can be categorized as the small jihad. Second, spiritual jihad, namely the war against desire such as purifying the heart from the doubt of the God, arrogance, jealousy, despotism, vanity and so on. This jihad can be categorized as the great jihad. Third, the biggest jihad (the biggest struggle or the ultimate jihad), namely the combination of physical and spiritual struggle such as teaching, building Islamic schools and prayer facilities and so on. [Jihad secara istilah memang dapat diartikan sebagai perjuangan. Tetapi tidak selamanya perjuangan itu identik dengan fisik. Karena dalam Islam jihad dapat dikelompokkan menjadi tiga macam. Pertama jihad jasmani yaitu perjuangan fisik, seperti perang badar, perang Indonesia melawan penjajahan Belanda, perang Irak-Iran melawan Sekutu, dan lain-lain. Jihad ini dikategorikan sebagai jihad ashghar (jihad kecil). Kedua jihad ruhani yaitu yaitu memerangi hawa nafsu, seperti membersihkan hati dari syak atau keraguan kepada Allah, sombong, iri hati, zholim, ujub dan lain-lainnya yang termasuk sifat-sifat tercela. jihad ini dikategorikan sebagai jihad akbar (jihad besar). Ketiga “jihad akbarul akbar” atau jihad “ghayatul Akbar” (perjuangan yang paling besar atau puncak jihad) yaitu perpaduan antara perjuangan jasmani dan ruhani, seperti: mengajar, membangun madrasah, tempat-tempat ibadah dan lain-lain.] (NU Online, 2012).

*Nahdlatul Ulama’s* opinion is also strengthened by the statement of several individual prominent leaders of *Nahdhatul Ulama* such as Said Agil Siradj, the general chairman of *Nahdlatul Ulama* and Salahudin Wahid (the younger brother

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<sup>6</sup> The battle of Badr was one of the most famous battles in the early days of Islam.

of the former general chairman of *Nahdhatul Ulama* and former Indonesian president from 1999 to 2001, Abdurrahman Wahid). In a meeting with Indonesian Muslim farmers, Siradj stated that Muslims should perform the correct jihad by improving economic conditions, improving the quality of life and defending the nation's security. According to him, this contextual interpretation will help Muslims in Indonesia to gain a prosperous life (NU Online, 2010). In addition, Salahudin Wahid argues that the biggest jihad in the context of the Indonesian nation state is to fight against corruption and injustice (NU Online, 2013).

According to the mainstream moderate groups, the term *perjuangan* (struggle) is regarded as the most appropriate translation of the term jihad in Indonesian language. The term *perjuangan* in Indonesian language can be used more broadly and includes any kind of physical, intellectual or spiritual struggle. The struggle can be understood as war or battle if the term *qital* (fight) or *harb* (war) is specifically used in the Qur'an or *hadith* (prophetic traditions). The use of the term *perjuangan* can cover a broader meaning according to the social condition and the capabilities of Muslims in a particular time. The adaptation of the meaning of jihad with the social condition is a process of contextualisation and not a process of constriction of the doctrine of jihad (Romli & Sjadzili, 2004). Quraish Shihab, a prominent Indonesian scholar in the study of the Qur'an, supports this broad meaning of jihad. He says

...eradicating illiteracy, poverty and diseases are types of jihad that are not less important than armed struggle. Scientists do their jihad by applying their knowledge, employees do their jihad with their best work, teachers with their excellent education, leaders with their justice, entrepreneurs with their honesty and so forth [...memberantas kebodohan, kemiskinan, dan penyakit adalah jihad yang tidak kurang pentingnya daripada mengangkat senjata. Ilmuwan berjihad dengan memanfaatkan ilmunya, karyawan bekerja dengan karya yang baik, guru dengan pendidikannya yang sempurna, pemimpin dengan keadilannya, pengusaha dengan kejujurannya, demikian seterusnya] (Shihab, 1996, p. 685).

This broad interpretation legitimises the use of jihad in every struggle in the context of development and social change in Indonesia.

In addition to the printed publications, several self-professed moderate Muslim groups have also published researchs related to the broad meaning of

jihad in their websites. For instance, The Center for Moderate Muslim (CMM) published numerous researchs about jihad in response to the glorification of armed jihad by *Salafi Jihadi* leaders and their supporters.<sup>7</sup> Islamlib.com, the website of the Islamic Liberal Network (*Jaringan Islam Liberal-JIL*) established in 2001 has also published several researchs related to the contextual interpretation of jihad. In 2009, an NGO called *Lazuardi Birru* (literally sky blue) initiated a website which has published researchs and e-books promoting the ‘contextual’ meaning of jihad in response to the use of jihad to justify terrorist actions in Indonesia. *Republika*, the most popular Islamic newspaper in Indonesia, has also supported the interpretation of jihad in a more general meaning. In the online version of the newspaper ([www.republika.co.id](http://www.republika.co.id)), *Republika* has also published news items and opinions articulating the broad meaning of jihad.

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<sup>7</sup> Unfortunately, the CMM website cannot be accessed anymore because the publisher stopped the operation of the website in 2011 due to financial reason.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Conclusion**

Jihad has been a contested doctrine across the world and through most periods of history. Arguably, the term jihad--which in Qur'an has a general meaning related to any exertion of strength--has been used by Muslim leaders to justify wars and interpreted by classical Muslim jurists as a doctrine of war and peace. On the other hand, the non-violent interpretation of jihad has also been promoted by moderate Muslim scholars to justify less antagonistic attitude towards colonial rulers during the colonial period and maintaining a peaceful relationship with un-Islamic authorities and non-Muslims in general. This pacifist interpretation has also been promoted by contemporary moderate Muslims to denounce the use of jihad as the justification for many recent terrorist actions.

A similar pattern to the global trajectory of the interpretation of jihad can also be found in Indonesia. Islam arrived in Indonesia through a peaceful process, therefore the doctrine of armed jihad was largely absent in early Islamization of Indonesia. However, since the establishment of Islamic states/kingdoms in several parts of Indonesia, the doctrine of armed jihad started to be used to justify the wars between the states and the fight against colonialists. Since the nineteenth century, mainstream Islamic movements in Indonesia have started to build an accommodating relationship with the colonial rulers. This moderate approach emphasized the pacifist interpretation of jihad and this interpretation has become a dominant attitude of the majority of Muslims in Indonesia.

The militaristic jihad tradition is generally a minority tradition in Indonesia. However, the idea has secured substantial following in particular periods of Indonesian history. In the early years of Indonesian independence, the doctrine of militaristic jihad was used by Islamic organizations to motivate Indonesian Muslims in the fight to defend independence and this justification was repeated in the fight against Indonesian communists in 1965--1966. During the New Order era the idea of militaristic jihad was used by small clandestine organizations to foment rebellion against the perceived anti-Islamic government.

After the fall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime the doctrine of militaristic jihad was used to mobilize a paramilitary Islamic group during the conflict between Muslims and Christians in Ambon in 1999--2004. The doctrine of armed jihad has also been used by several non-mainstream Muslim groups to argue for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and the attack on non-Muslims and westerners. Former members of the *Darul Islam* returning from their exile have also introduced the ideology of transnational *Salafi Jihadi* movement into Indonesia. In contrast, the mainstream organizations especially *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah* reject this transnational ideology and tend to promote the pacifist interpretation of jihad as a nationalist struggle in education, welfare and economic development. The media have been used by all groups to articulate different interpretations of jihad.

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