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Indonesian Terrorism: Wahabism and the 'Imagined Caliphate'

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Some terrorist groups have joined ISIS (Islamic State of Syria and Iraq) and built regional power bases in Indonesia (Poso, Central Sulawesi) and the Philippines (Southern Mindanao) to struggle against the so-called thaghut regime ('evil' regime). ISIS was born as a result of the failure of Iraqi leaders, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, to build an inclusive Sunni/Shi'ite political system. This failure served to increase the number of militants across Iraq, including Sunnis. That in turn gave birth to ISIS amongst Sunni who protested their economic and political marginalization by the ruling Shi'ites. Support from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to radical Sunni revolutionary factions in Syria also contributed to the birth of ISIS. The rise of ISIS amongst the ranks of Sunni Muslims has shocked the Islamic World, including Indonesia. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which specifically has a different area of influence. Terrorism in Indonesia sends a clear message to not only the authorities, but also to the people. The message can have multiple meanings, but it is clear that acts of terror are extraordinary political crimes. Therefore, the state and people of Indonesia should be vigilant against terrorism, as militants are still moving to realize the caliphate of their dreams.

(final draft)

Indonesian Terrorism: From bombing to Wahabism and an “Imagined Caliphate”

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Abstract

Some terrorist groups have joined ISIS (Islamic State of Syria and Iraq) and built regional power bases in Indonesia (Poso, Central Sulawesi) and the Philippines (Southern Mindanao) to struggle against the so-called thaghut regime ('evil' regime). ISIS was born as a result of the failure of Iraqi leaders, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, to build an inclusive Sunni/Shi'ite political system. This failure served to increase the number of militants across Iraq, including Sunnis. That in turn gave birth to ISIS amongst Sunni who protested their economic and political marginalization by the ruling Shi'ites. Support from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to radical Sunni revolutionary factions in Syria also contributed to the birth of ISIS. The rise of ISIS amongst the ranks of Sunni Muslims has shocked the Islamic World, including Indonesia. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which specifically has a different area of influence. Terrorism in Indonesia sends a clear message to not only the authorities, but also to the people. The message can have multiple meanings, but it is clear that acts of terror are extraordinary political crimes. Therefore, the state and people of Indonesia should be vigilant against terrorism, as militants are still moving to realize the caliphate of their dreams.

Keywords: ISIS; khilafah; message; terrorist; caliphate Muslim, the West.

Introduction

After ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) was pushed, cornered and defeated in 2018, Abubakar Al-Baghdadi, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or Islamic State-IS) leader along with ISIS clerics called for all ISIS networks and cells, as well as every family of their supporters and sympathizers, to carry out acts of terror in their respective countries. The appeal was heard by Islamist families in Indonesia who were sympathetic or interested in supporting ISIS. The role of violent intellectuals (Hoffman, 2006) is obvious in these chained cases of terrors.

The Surabaya bombing May 13-14, 2018 was the fruit of pro-ISIS family terrorism which was lured by the calls of Al Baghdadi and his clerics to the corners of the world. The act of terrorism with suicide bombings in Surabaya involving the perpetrators of one family took place for the first time in Indonesia, even in the world. The family in this context consisting of father, mother and children (Saifuddin2006) terrorized and detonated bombs on their bodies.

The Surabaya bombing by family terrorism had affirmed and confirmed views of Morrison (2014), Bloom & Dyamond (2018) that ISIS network, cell and its supporters are very passionate in carrying out the call for attacks right now (*act now*), move quickly in an increasingly limited time, with exclusivity, limitations or even scarcity of resources, but with high demands which actually encourage terrorists to be even more enthusiastic and excited because the attacks are very desirable. For the terrorists, the premise of limited time or requirement to "act now" raises the supposed value of the good and creates a call to action. Thus, exclusivity, scarcity, and high demand make it more *desirable*.

The Surabaya 2018 bombing was a series of bomb explosions in various places in Surabaya and Sidoarjo, East Java on 13-14 May 2018. Bombings in three churches in Surabaya and also in Mapolrestabes Surabaya and Sidoarjo were a ferocity of terrorism committed by three families with motives very strong theology: jihad and wanting to go to heaven as a family together. All actors from a series of bomb attacks in Surabaya were carried out by a family of six, including Dita Upriyanto (48), his wife Puji Kuswati (43) and invited four of his children, Yusuf Fadil (18), Firman Halim (16), Fadilah Sari (12), and Pamela Rizkika (9). They ride motorbikes and hold bombs to be blown up.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) through its news agency, *Amaq*, stated that they were responsible for this attack. There is one big circle that is not revealed from this family suicide bomb network. The large network consists of clerics who provide recitations containing orders and encouragement to carry out family suicide bombings. Not yet known how and what the contents of their communication. They communicate through games to avoid the monitoring of security forces. This communication technique is very creative and the results are truly undetectable, unexpected and very terrible. (Greg Fealy 2004, Mubarak M. Zaki 2015). A social network is embedded within the family network (Saifuddin1992, 8).

It is very likely that the Surabaya bombing was more advanced and dramatic than the fighters of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) in the Middle East and Africa who has involved usually children as executors of their opponents and suicide bombers. However, in the Middle East, South Asia, Europe and Africa, family terrorism has not been found as in the Surabaya bombing case.

After the Surabaya attacks, National Police Chief, Tito Karnavian, in his press conference stated that this family had just become back from Syria and was a sympathizer of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and was a network of the Daulah Ansharud Jamaah (JAD) and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT).

Based on report of The Soufan Center, a New York-based study institute, released in October 2017, there were around 600 ISIS fighters from Indonesia, and there are also around 113 women from Indonesia who are in areas that are controlled or have been controlled by the ISIS. Overall there are around 30,000 to 40,000 foreigners from 110

Al Qaeda, Jamaah Islamiyah, ISIS and their network that successfully increase the value of the activities, owing to election time and place to attract the target, although not issued a statement. Also do not claim to be responsible.

In the last ten years, based on experience in Indonesia , nearly no terrorist group that was responsible. So practical, suicide bombing in Solo July 2016, Bali bombing 2002, and in Jakarta July 17, 2009 that schocked the JW Marriot Hotel and the Ritz Carlton Hotel, in the heart of the security of Mega Kuningan, Jakarta, there is no surety answered. It is rather clear to us that the bombing bring this dangerous message that seems to be related to the victory Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Boediono presidential election in the new few days just passed. This bombs have strong relationship with the reaction among the radicals and fundamentalists against democracy.

In connection with terrorism, in the year 2007, in Islamabad , Pakistan bomb exploded in a presidential election campaign in that country on July 17. Target JW Marriot is a very soft target, the hotel is attacked twice before, but the explosion on Saturday night is the most formidable in the capital of Pakistan since the country joined the war against terror with the leaders of the United States at the end of 2001.

Terrorism in Indonesia is very strong relationship with the United States , anything that related to the capitalist countries will be targeted. Democracy ideology, for example, is a program the United States and allies anywhere, including in Indonesia. Of Presiden Susilo Bambang Yuhdoyono (SBY), the terrorists actually have a high resistance, not only because the issue of neo-liberalism, but this victory is seen as SBY victory of the United States in Indonesia where the institutions of democracy from the U.S. participated and intervenced to the presidential election in Indonesia, such as IFES (International Foundation for Electoral System) and others. Bomb explosion at hotel JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton as well as political explosion because the issue of security and peace not finished in this republic. The terrorists take advantage of easily from the elite political conflicts in presidential elections, movement between the two versus one lap lap, between the strength of nationalist versus IFES (United States) intervence the presidential election.

Many people ask whether you want a message delivered with the Bali Bom 2002, Jakarta bom 2009, Solo 2016 suicide bom July 17 bombing and so forth? This bomb is a clear reaction to the victory of SBY pro-US/West as President of Indonesia and he will rule this country until 2014. But, however, the terrorists do not desire to disrupt the vote counting results pilpres by KPU (General Elections Commission). Evidence, no one poll is bombed by terrorists. For them, timing is important, but it is just simply because of the ease of access to reach the target.

This bomb is also a reaction to the plan of the coming football team Manchester United to Indonesia, not because of their choice to dislike a particular sport, but because the target is used as a foreigner (England), which is considered U.S. ally. This will also make a terrorist attack is not interested in the building if the Jakarta-Senayan sports rivalry football progress. Even the terrorist leader Osama bin Laden is like the Arsenal football club from the UK .

Implications of the Marriot bomb is a terrorist nation that makes this hotel as a permanent target. JW Marriot Islamabad has also twice bombed, so also in Jakarta . This means, the hotel will continue to be the terrorist attacks remain. This hotel may need to

change the name to the names of other, more local or names of the other level of small resistance. If it does not change the name, the hotel will continue to be a terror bomb target. This hotel is the symbol of the presence of capitalism and liberalism in the United States anywhere in Pakistan and in Indonesia. What the terrorist attacked the symbols is capitalism, democracy, neo-liberalism and the United States wherever it is located.

Indonesia is a soft target for the terrorists and their presence in Indonesia to be very comfortable because this country is a fertile ground for radical movements and fundamentalists. Recognition of the crime of terrorism suspects Bom Bali 12 October 2002, a clearly visible expression of religious emotions. Ali Gufron, one of the Bom Bali terror suspects, even states with emphatic:

“... reply to tyranny and arbitrary rule of the US and allies against the Muslims with the intention that they will stop the oppression”.

There is a value that work and dictate the way they thought. Ali Ghufron, for example, states that the bombardment was the “action devoted to God”. Then Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and the group felt a *delusion of grandeur*, represent or have any feelings or decree and be part of the elements of greatness that assure themselves have special mission from God. The terrorist always feel themselves as a “warrior of God” is one with a call to act in the name of God and religion, to “hand of God” on earth to realize “his wrath” of the same shape in the resistance on, bombardment (Sahasrad & Al Chaidar 2013).

In fact, the terrorist group is not new in the world of movement and the radical fundamentalists of Indonesia. The terrorist is the combination of the core teachings of radical fundamentalists and that meet in one point of planning the war against tyranny. (Mohammad ZakiArrobi, 2018). In Indonesia, this terrorist group was small: (1) Jamaah Islamiyyah, (2) Mujahidin Indonesia Timur led Santoso (East Indonesia Mujahidden) and (3) Darul Islam (limited to follow a course faction a hard line). However, as some found enclave terrorists in cities such as Palembang, Cilacap, and Semarang (Central Java), shows that the proliferation of this group with a wide and fast.

With anxious hope, we feel that under SBY and even Joko Widodo presidency, it is very probably the state and society would continue to face this terror situation in Indonesia led to the terrorist front. For civil society, the business community and the state, the shadow of terrorism will still be a source of fear in the middle of vigilance. Many people considered that terrorism in Indonesia was carried out by hard-line Wahabi groups, radical salafis who experienced radicalization.

Wahabism

Recently, in Madura there is a song called “Wahabi” that very straight forward describe what the flow is considered as the Islam scripturalist /radicalist/ fundamentalist by many. The song describes the Wahabi does not like birthday of the prophet, does not want *tahlilan*, disagree grave pilgrimage, does not recognize *qunut*, and assume all Muslims outside the group as heretical, heretic and infidel. Stigma often attributed to the extreme Wahabi and labels are often directed to this group. In many ways this song is true, but not all Wahabi behave that way.

In the midst of accusations against the Wahabi thought has humiliated Islam, it must be recognized that there are many services of Wahabi groups in defense of the oppressed,

Typology of Wahabism

Wahabism are not monolithic, meaning that this group is also split into several variants of each other unfriendly or even hostile sometimes can also lead to bloody conflicts. Wahabism is actually a generic term to describe or refer to the Salafi groups. However, due to the traditional Islam also claims itself as Salafis (who carry out the tradition *Salafussholeh*), then the label Wahabi been so easily distinguish theologically with groups that are not Wahabi. The Wahabi terminology was used as a euphemism because there are certain groups who are very sensitive to the Salafi name (Sahrasad & Al Chaidar 2016). Anthropologically, there are at least three types of Wahabism in Indonesia that the writers can observe.

First, The Wahabi *Shururi* considered anti birthday, anti adzan twice, anti tahlil, anti pilgrimage grave and anti jihad and often assume the public against the government *asbughot* (rebels).

Second, The *Jihadi* Wahabi, namely Wahabis groups that focus on jihad and tried to resist any government policy, also has a similar rejection in the first group. Wahabi Jihadists in Indonesia has appeared with the name of Darul Islam (DI) in West Java in 1949 [with the character Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo], Central Java in 1950 [Amir Fatah Widjaja Kusuma], South Sulawesi in 1951 [Kahar Muzakkar], South Kalimantan 1952 [Ibn Hajar] and Aceh in 1953 [Daud Beureu'eh], then *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) 1992 through 2010, which accused Ustadz Abdullah Sungkar and Abubakar Ba'asyir, Dr Azahari, Noordin Mat Top, Amrozi, Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron, and Ali Imron. Lastly, the groups that appears in the *Jihadi* Wahabi 'Al Qaeda' that formed Tanzhim Veranda of Mecca (TQSM) and many of its activists were arrested after the discovery of *i'dad* activities (war preparation/war games) in Bukit Jalin, Aceh Besar in 2010. The *Jihadi* Wahabi group is now more calm and choose the path of missionary endeavor with wisdom, peace and sage (*dakwah bil hikmah*) in their daily activities.

Third, the *Takfiri* Wahabi that so often accusing others outside the group as heretics or even pagan. This group is in Aceh, Java, Sulawesi, and other region today, and still faithful to his pledge of allegiance to support the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or better known as ISIS. This group is radical in word and deed, This *Takfiri* Wahabi group appear more frightening, could be more desperated and awful, will not easily be killed, let alone embryos of ISIS (Islamic State of Syria and Iraq) in Indonesia has been growing with its global network, where the paradigm of ISIS is that the Muslims who disagree with them as the unbelievers, deserve to be killed, while they are ready to attack the government of a state at any time.

Because of the conflict of interest, in their own internal Wahabi circles also occurs mutual accusations and recriminations, in which many groups of Wahabi involved in action such as blasphemous and heretical among themselves. *Shururi* Wahabi circles have often accused the Wahabi Jihadists as the rebels, betrayers (*bughot*). *Jihadi* Wahabi more passive and did not react socially and politically. The *Jihadi* Wahabi prefer the worship *mahdhoh* (ritual) and avoid friction with any party, is active in various community events monotheism awareness.

While the *Takfiri* Wahabi very hyperactive in his message and accused many *Jihadi* Wahabi circles as heretical, heretic or infidel to many groups because they do not want to accept the caliphate of Al-Baghdadi in Syria and Iraq. Through social media *Takfiri*

Wahabi groups is indulgence call-call noisy and full of threats and accusations while showing intolerant attitude assertively.

In the middle of Wahabi gait in communal conflict in events Cumbok in Aceh (1946), Ambon (1999) Poso (2001) and other places, there is also a gait and movement of Wahabi groups in political violence in South Sulawesi and gait of Wahabi terrorism, played by Jemaah Islamiyyah, Darul Islam, and so forth from 2000 to 2014.

In public perception, this then makes Wahabi became the paragon of ugly irrefutable. Here, Wahabi supposed to be performed as a paragon of beauty and scent of Islam in the eyes of the world. Incidents of violence in Iraq and Syria where ISIS shows the terrible cruelty has made Wahabi as the party deemed theologically responsible for violence and barbarity.

The Khilafah of ISIS

In search of a solution to many complex problems in the archipelago, many Indonesians are in the peak of getting tired with the government's less effort towards combating poverty. Not to mention other issues like injustice, tyranny, corruption, lack of education and significant number of human rights violations. It is quite understood that the prolonged transition in Indonesia has not only given birth but also led to more loud voices of Islamic parties, calling for establishing *Khilafah* (imagined Islamic state) as a way of building a better moral and prosperous nation. (Hwang, Julie Chernov. and Kirsten E. Schulze, 2018. Samuel Helfont, Tally Helfont 2018)

Sounds like a promise, but for the pluralistic country like Indonesia this is not at all a good idea. *Khilafah*(imagined Islamic state) means combining Islam and politics in governance, and applying it in the archipelago having high diversities in religions, ethnics, cultures and economic disparity, khilafah can be very dangerous.

Nonetheless, some Islamic parties and organizations have been inspired by transnational Middle East version of Islam. Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). This party is a real example of an Islamic political party that follows, to some extent, the teaching of *Ikhwanul Muslimin*(Muslim brotherhood)of Egypt .

Having motivated by the al-Qaeda, a notorious terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden, Jemaah Islamiyah has been modeled by the style of al-Qaeda's Islamic Arabism. In addition, both Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia also take that Islamic Arabism as their teaching direction. The Islamic Arabism also seems to have been the cloak of Islamic teaching in many *pesantren*(Islamic boarding), though not all, students at the *pesantren* are potential to breeding radicals.

And with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's having International khilafah Conference in Jakarta this month, it is no more than an evidence that the teaching of religions in developing countries like Indonesia can be potential tool to reach a political gain by building practical relationship between individuals and groups. It is a transformation of religious political system, also known as *religio-political system*. This is also what Clifford Geertz claimed to be "religions mindedness", a process of how the religion ideology comes into existence (Geertz 1966, Geertz 1973).

In this context, the religion ideology has potential power to ignite fanaticism and radicalization that unquestionably can erupt violence and destruction. Any religion in this position will have two functions; building better integrity among its followers while creating conflict and violation.

The tragedy of Bali bombs in 2002, Australian Embassy bomb in Jakarta 2004, suicide bom in Solo and other brutal acts done by anarchists like those from Islamic Defender Front (FPI) -where they use violence and destructive acts to close down businesses that they think is not in accordance of *sharia* like bar and café since they sell alcoholic beverages- are examples where fundamentalists have shown intolerant exclusiveness and belligerent sense of supremacy in facing minority communities.

While such brutality to some people is no less than a destruction by anarchists, many perceives that the stark terror attitude is a pure motivation by a number of Islamic extremist groups having their hidden agenda.

Facing this worrisome development in a pluralistic country, which the country itself indeed still struggle with many internal affairs, we really think that all Islamic groups should stop using violence in dealing with any contention or disagreement. They should not monopolize the truth of what they believe to indoctrinate others.

The debate upon *khilafah* is of a great relevance today, particularly with Hizbut Tahir is preparing an international conference to be held on August 12. The conference has definitely focused on building an Islamic state. However, whether an Islamic state is relevant to the Indonesia's pluralistic communities should be taken in wise consensus. Therefore, an open dialog or interfaith discussion between Islam and other religions, whether they are from upper class or middle class of society, or even among grass roots should be what Indonesian government look for and we believe that promoting pluralism will guarantee better harmonious living, togetherness in addition to maintaining the nation sovereignty in the country where pluralistic melting pot has prevailed

Toward cultural and civilizational dialogues?

The terrorist attacks of Surabaya bombing (May 2018), Solo last July 2016, in WTC, New York September 11, 2001, Bali Bombing 2002, JW Marriot bombing 2004 and soon, has encouraged the need for the significance of cultural and civilizational dialogues between Islam and theWest. The cultural-civilizational dialogues between the West and Islamic societies has gained growing importance after the tragedy of Black September in 2001.

In this regard, development cooperation is imperative for theWest and Islamic World. It is largely equal to politics beyond cultural borders and depends upon building bridges between cultures-civilizations of the West and Islamic world, and finding ways of cultural and civilizational understanding in order to enter into a dialogue about ethical, religious, and political differences and similarites with others cultures-civilizations and in response to the criticism which since then has been expressed in islamic societies about Western politics towards developing countries.

The relationship between the West and Islam has been suffering from mutual wrong perception of each other which support anti western and anti Islamic feelings and attitudes. Each others cultures are predominantly interpreted as a monolithihic enemy and not, as it should be, an area of cultural deversity. For a long time, said Norbert Eschborn, the neighbor like relationship between Western and Islamic countries has not been maintained resulting in increasing tension on religious and cultural issues, such as the discussion about the ability of Islam to adjust its value system to the modern world. On the other hand, Islamic extremist could be observed for more than a decade doing everything

to pursue a course of action of politicizing culture and religion in accordance with their belief that *Islam is the solution to everything*, therefore, this long running process support the creation of a non-reflected paradigmâ Islam versus the West.

Given this background the approach of cultural difference must be supplemented with the perspective of cooperative coexistence. Mutual interest in and understanding of each others culture, history, and social relations are a necessary condition for the dialogue of the West with Islamic states and societies. Such a dialogue should not only underline similarities between both cultures but also identify possible areas of conflict in order to mark the positive potential of religious, cultural and political exchange between both regions which are very heterogeneous within the mand, at the sametime, share a common history. (Norbert Eschborn, 2004).

As tension in the relationship between Western and Islamic cultures-civilizations have been growing, any kind of dialogue, therefore, has not only to be intensified but must take into consideration the changing situation of world politics.

Indonesian muslim: In search of justice and prosperity

When in power, President Barack Obama (USA), who spent four years of his childhood in Indonesia - stressed that Indonesia is not an Islamic country, because in fact Indonesia is a secular country that has more than 200 million Muslims. The majority of Indonesians enthusiastically reject most of the remnants of the Soeharto dictatorship, and they have maintained the Pancasila ideology, a nationalist ideology that mandates equal treatment of all religions in the country and all social groups while embracing democracy has nothing to do with religion.

As a biggest muslim country in the World, Indonesia can be regarded as a champion of democracy or at least democratic transition for Muslim nation, although this must still be tested by the passage of time. It is natural that the West has viewed Indonesian Islam, at least before the Bali bombing 2002, as being Islam with a new face. In 1996, *Newsweek*, an international media called Islam in Indonesia modernist, progressive, and a friend of the West and other cultures-civilizations and perceived it as an example of succesful harmony between muslim and modernity.

Tolerance is very important in a country with 260 million people, of which at least 24 million Christians and Hindus are spread across 17,000 islands, with more than 300 different ethnic groups, and around 800 dialects. Islam is only one of five officially recognized religions. Most Indonesians do not define themselves with their faith but by nationalism and regional pride. Religion is second or third, one reason why Muslim-based parties are consistently defeated in elections, including during the 2019 presidential and legislative elections.

However, to borrow Anthony Reid's perspective, that Indonesian Islam still remains a *grossly under studied world* appears to be true today ever more than before. So, it is very timely to the West societies for research and study on Indonesian Islam that actually is very pluralistic and complicated, so often misunderstood by the Westerners. Of course, issue of terrorism is a real matter, especially after Bali bombing 2002 that has schocked Indonesian state and society (Sahasrad & Al Chaidar 2015).

In this context, to eradicate terrorism and Islam fundamentalism, there is no way out to solve the issues, except with cultural and civilizational dialogues and economic

development cooperation between the West and Indonesia. These dialogues and cooperation are very contextual and pivotal to eradicate poverty, social unjust, backwardness, and multidimensional crises in Indonesian society, beside to improve mutual understanding. The ulamas (Islamic scholars), leaders and muslim intelligentsia must control the situation so that it does not plunge the ummah (Muslims) into disappointment, frustration and violence.

So far, Indonesian society has fallen into *debt trap* amounted to about US\$350 billions (state and private loans, according to Bank Indonesia data). That foreign debt, mostly the *odious debt*, has depleted economic resources of the people. Meanwhile imposition of *Washington Consensus* to Indonesia in conformity with IMF, World Bank and WTO guidelines, has burdened the people economy in which most of them are the poor muslim (Sahasrad & Al Chaidar 2015).

From this sensitive point, Islam has been *rallying point* to youth, students, ulamas and scholars as a basic ideology *vis-à-vis* the West hegemony that they blame the West as the new imperialists in Indonesia under global capitalism. So it is imperative for ulamas (Islamic scholars), leaders and muslim intelligentsia to make their *ummah* be aware and conscious that radicalism and violence is wrong answer in the wrong time to crackdown poverty, social unjust and multi dimensional crises in Indonesia recent years (Sahasrad & Al Chaidar 2015, Sahasrad & Al Chaidar 2016).

In Indonesia, democracy can grow and develop if law enforcement, social justice, economic equality, stability and security are enjoyed by many people. Equitable prosperity and equality among the people greatly determine people's support for the ruling government. If sharp gaps and injustices are very severe, then the people will find their own way to overcome this problem, and that can lead to destabilization which disrupts the course of development and democracy these days and in the future.

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