

Title page
Undergraduate Thesis

TAIWAN – U.S Cooperation Facing China
Reunification Policy, 1981-2007



Written by

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**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH YOGYAKARTA
2016**

Undergraduate Thesis

**TAIWAN – U.S Cooperation Facing China
Reunification Policy, 1981-2007**

This Undergraduate Thesis is Proposed to complement and Fulfilling
The Requirements to Achieve Bachelor Degree (Strata 1) at
Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
By the specialization of International Relations Department

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Validation Page

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Policy, 1981-2007**

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It has been maintained in oral test and be vowed graduated and passed in front of the
examiner of undergraduate thesis of International Relations department Faculty of
Social and Political Sciences University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

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Statement of Originality

I hereby declare this undergraduate thesis as my own work to pass the bachelor degree (Strata 1) in department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of the undergraduate thesis is my own work. This undergraduate thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purpose.

I certify that the intellectual content of my undergraduate thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this undergraduate thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

Yogyakarta, September 2016

Muhammad Hielmy Zaenul Alam

Abstract

Name : Muhammad Hielmy Zaenul Alam
Study Program : International Relations
Title : Taiwan-U.S Cooperation Facing China Reunification Policy,
1981-2007

This paper will describe the transformation of the security strategy between Taiwan and the U.S in to face Chinese reunification policy. China has been trying to bring Taiwan under its sovereign territory. However, in fact, Taiwan has been able to survive until today with democracy and its presidential system without direct interference from China. As a small country with limited territory, power, and human resources, Taiwan is trying to sustain life and develop its state sustainability by maintaining its cooperation with the United States, especially in the field of security cooperation. Although during the first proposal of reunification, in 1981 the cross-strait relations in a tranquil situation, traditional threats in the form of military invasion could happen in the future. It was true happening that Chinese sent ballistic missile in 1995 and Taiwan saw it as a threat. So, Taiwan and the U.S are not only putting cooperation in the arms trade, but realized the need for more strategic cooperation. Therefore, this paper attempts to explain the transformation of defense ties between Taiwan and the United States to face possible threats from China's reunification policy.

Keywords: Taiwan, China, United States of America, Reunification, Security Cooperation

Acknowledgement

I would like to appreciate and express my gratitude to the people around me. The people who helped and supported me to finish this undergraduate thesis. I'd like to express my gratitude to:

1. The most Merciful and Graceful, Allah SWT. Prophet Muhammad SAW for being the role models, the guidance, the last Prophet of Allah SWT.
2. Special gratitude for my Parents Mr. Ajat Sudrajat and Mrs. Wartimah, my brother Muhammad Irfan Z. M. and my sister Fitri Tsalitsa F.R. who always support and encourage me finishing this undergraduate thesis.
3. Children Forum in Sleman Kaye (Rizky S.), Rizal, Aljabar, Ryan, Raga, Latif, Aris, Yovita, Nina, Nofi, Hestutyani Putri, Ayu, Children Forum Facilitator Mas Josuke, Mba Tata, Mba Aya etc.. All of Children Forum Member in Yogyakarta Erma, Tyas, Taufik, Akbar, Ipul, Anang. Thank you for all of experiences and team work to give support the Yogyakarta's Children. Thank you for your friendship and kindness, though sometimes I made a lot of trouble for you guys. This is the best forum I ever have. Mrs. Budi, Mrs. Marni as our mother in BKBPMPP Sleman.
4. Males Manja Group Linggar P, Ergi F, Abizar R, Rifka A, Nabila H, Rizki Ayu K. for being the reliable and kindness people who accompany my study in IPIREL.
5. Another bros Rangga K, Ghiffari Y (Mr. Lemot), Ilham, Sandy S (Mr. Selow), Theo (Mr. Oily), Areza P (Mr. Charming) the best and craziest team mates I ever have.
6. Thank you for Liaison Officer Team during KOMBAT and KOMURINDO, KRI Nasional, ROBOCON Competition, and Dr. Tun Mahathir Muhammad for giving new experiences in LO.

7. Best partner to finish Undergraduate Thesis Rangga Kharisma M. and H.I.C Team Asep, Nadya, Azzam, Annisa, Dwi, plus Dina as the strongest and toughest team to complete the undergraduate thesis revision and urge to graduate soon.
8. Mr. Bambang Wahyu Nugroho as undergraduate thesis adviser and also Mr. Husni and Mrs. Mutia as the examiner.
9. For all IPIREL 2011, 2012, 2013 students who can't be mentioned one by one. Thank you for all experiences that you have ever shared with me together in Study Hall or in another places.
10. For Mrs. Atik, Mba Arta, Mrs. Dian Azmawati thank you for the support from IPIREL Office and thank you for Mr. Ayub, Mr. Waluyo in International Relations administration office.

Writer,

Muhammad Hielmy Zaenul
Alam

Preface

Assalamualaikum Wr. Wb.

Alhamdulillah wa syukurillah, Thank you for Allah The Most Merciful and Graceful who let me finish this undergraduate thesis entitled, “**Taiwan-U.S. Cooperation Facing China Reunification Policy, 1981-2007**”. Without blessing from Allah, I cannot finish the research. Moreover, there are a lot of support from several people who let this undergraduate thesis can be done.

I want to say thank you to:

1. Mr. Prof. Dr. Bambang Cipto, M.A. as the rector of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
2. Mrs. Nur. Azizah, M.Si. as the head of International Relations Department University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.
3. Mrs. Dra. Mutia Hariati Hussein, M.Si. as the adviser of academic lecture.
4. Mr. Bambang Wahyu Nugroho, S.IP., M.A. as the adviser of undergraduate Thesis who supported me to finish the undergraduate thesis.
5. The support from IPIREL office, Mrs. Dian Azmawati, S.IP., M.A. and Mrs. Atik who support the student administration as IPIREL class student. Further, I also want to say thank you for International Relations administration Office.

6. For all lectures of International Relations department, Faculty of Social and Political Science University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta who teach me a lot of knowledge and social science to finish my study.
7. For all my friends of International Relations department Faculty of Social and Political Science and the other student from another department of University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta that I can't mention singly, who gave me a lot of experience, share the moment and happiness, and support my undergraduate thesis.

I realize that this undergraduate thesis has lack and weaknesses. However, I receive the critique and comments from the reader to accomplish this undergraduate thesis. Hopefully, this research can help the reader and International Relations student to understand **“Taiwan-U.S Cooperation Facing China Reunification Policy, 1981-2007”**. Thank you for all of your attention.

Wassalamualaikum, Wr. Wb.

Yogyakarta, September 2016

Muhammad Hielmy Zaenul Alam

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List of Abbreviations

U.S	United States of America
PRC	People's Republic of China
KMT	Kuomintang or Guomintang (Nationalist Party)
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
SEF	Strait Exchange Foundation
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act
AIT	American Institute of Taiwan
NSC	National Security Council
DoD	Department of Defense

Chapter I

Introduction

In this research, I would like to explain the importance of strategic security alignment between Taiwan and United States cooperation to face China policy of Reunification. Taiwan as known up until now yet debatable status whether it is a state or part of China by its status of “One China” policy. It is a historical result of political competition between two major political party Guomintang and People’s Republic of China (PRC) which scramble the legitimate ruler of China during the past time. Crisis in Taiwan Strait is still fragile since China proposed for Reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan has not directly accepted Chinese offer since 1981 until now. In that context, United States still maintains cooperation with Taiwan. Moreover, the security partnership which is also supported by arm sales to Taiwan. The asymmetrical relations between China-Taiwan-United States makes Taiwan has to consider the importance of their foreign policy management. Besides that, United States seems maintaining its hegemony over Asia through one of its “chain” in the East Asia Region.

A. Background

In 1949, Chiang Kai Shek had been defeated by Mao Zedong and fled into Formosa Island. Guomintang party which was led by Chiang Kai Shek moved with

its around 1.5 million people to the offshore of Taiwan and they hoped to counterattack the power of mainland China. Taiwanese people had to accept the political ideology of Nationalist Guomintang party because there were no other option. Even though the system which was built in the mainland by Nationalist Party before the clash of civil war consisted of corruption and incompetent official. Besides, the people disliked the idea of communism philosophically or the other thing about it. Moreover, Mao didn't have power over mainland China. Thus, Mao made legal claim as legitimate ruler of mainland China based on the successor of government of the Republic of China. He believed that Nationalist was pushed away from mainland and only ruled the Formosa Island which made Mao wanted to invade it by force.

A new home for Guomintang party as a leader of Republic of China. Chiang Kai Shek and Guomintang still believed that they will reconquer the mainland of China. It is a sign that Guomintang built political system in Taipei as permanent home. In 1950, Mao launched his strategy of small boat to invade Taiwan, but it was failed. During this time, Korean War also broke and dragged United States and China involved in Korean Peninsula. United States gave assistance in Taiwan Strait as a shield for Taiwan. Moreover, United States gave economic support which was used by Chiang to build economic development in Taiwan. Slowly in 1964, aid from United States were decreasing and Taiwan was ready to take off. The simultaneous

taking of economic progress brought Taiwan into industrial and become dependent on the prosperity of economic export.¹

While rebuilding its power in Taiwan, Chiang also tried to return its power in China. His attitude towards Taiwan Strait triggered two times crises on the strait. The First Strait Crises was Chiang's idea to interrupt China after the loss of cost in Korean War. Second, the crises were triggered by Mao by shelling the front gate of Taiwan in Jinmen, Mazu, and Fujian island. It automatically dragged United States to appear in both parties and eventually defend Taiwan as its allies. But United States unwillingly to fight against China or Russia.

During 1954-1955, Taiwan and China had their first strait Crisis. After North Korea gave up in 1953 Korean War, China sent its Envoy in Geneva and Bandung to resolve the war that they faced by peaceful means. China has to rebuild its internal economic development and to modernize its military. Mao had no interest to take over Taiwan with force. But, the problem laid on the China Coast which was blocked by Chiang Kai Shek. China and United States had similar interest not to trigger War in Taiwan Strait. But, Chiang insisted to maintain the legitimacy of civil war because he wanted to take over the mainland of China back in Nationalist power.

Crisis was on going in 1958. During this time, Mao wanted to show the world that he was the biggest anti-imperialist in the world, not Moscow. He built the countryside by pressuring the villagers to make statist farm. It was his way to show the system of communism which is worked for the party. In August 1958, PRC began

¹ John F. Copper, 2009, Taiwan: nation-state or province 5th edition, pp. 46-49.

to shell on the island of Jinmen, Mazu, and Fujian. He wanted to trigger Russia and United States into war. Then, it got reaction from United States by sending military supply to Jinmen and Mazu. Those area was actually the chain supply for Taiwan. Mao thought that he could institutionalize the civil war by shelling those area. But, Taiwan was restrained by United States not to involve in it and focused to build up internal military in Taiwan.²

In 1971, Taiwan had lost its ties with most important nations on the world at that time. Taiwan had lost his seat in United Nations when China was visited by Henry Kissinger, National Security Adviser of United States. Moreover, the political ties between Taiwan and United States slowly loosen, but not disconnected. The power of Taipei to China is not a merely a threat because China already got legitimation of international community as a state. Beijing also blocked the membership of Taiwan in international stages which require statehood as a member of the organization. The effort of Chiang Kai Shek to snatch legitimation from United States and International community had to diminish. Thus, Taipei adopted “three no’s” (no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise) to show that they not gave up with China.

Later, China had to turn a new approach to deal with the closed stance of Taipei to reunify with China. Taipei leadership continued with Chiang Kai Shek Successor, he was Chiang Ching Kuo. During Chiang Ching Kuo administration in

² Edward Friedman, 2014, America’s Pivots to Asia and the Taiwan Strait Crises, In P. C. Chow, *The US Strategic Pivot to Asia and Cross-Strait Relations* (pp. 56-59). New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN.

1979, United States cut its diplomatic relations with Taipei and moved to Beijing. It became the worst situation where the legitimation of Guomintang to return Republic of China to mainland faded away. Moreover, the defense treaty between Republic of China and U.S were terminated. Thus, China wanted to open with Taiwan by “three links” as a soft policy to get closer. Three links of China policy were mail, trade, and transportation ties.³

China dare to propose reunification with Taiwan. As the power of China was already legitimated by International Community, China changed its strategy to hold its military power over Taiwan. United States had made “Join Communiqué” between China and United States which was represented by President Nixon not to support Taiwan independence. Position of Taiwan was fragile after United States had turned into Beijing. Thus, China dare to propose in 1981 by delivering 9 points of reunification by Ye Jianying.⁴ This kind of approach indirectly wanted Taiwan to give their sovereignty to China.

Taipei didn’t receive it directly. Reunification process is not easy because people in Taiwan have been divided into several group. There are three kinds of group of people which divided in terms of reunification. Those people are either supporting reunification, rejecting the reunification, or status quo. Most people are choosing status quo, but these status can’t be held longer. The process of cross strait

³ Copper, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

⁴ Shirley A. Kan, 2008, *China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei*. Congressional Research Service.

relations has been tried to be built since 1981. Then, for the first time it was opened in 1987 by Chiang Ching Kuo for Taiwanese to visit mainland.⁵

In 1954, the situation in western pacific remain unstable. These situation brought bad impact for several states such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. However, Taiwan remain its ties with United States under mutual defense treaty. Thus, by having a cooperation with U.S, Taiwan has defense power to maintain its political stability on the region. Although, the Taiwan has been included in the broader interest of United States on the western pacific. Mao Ze Tung became a threat for Taiwan stability and United States saw that Taiwan Strait was fragile to be invaded by Mao. Soon, U.S sent Seventh Fleet to patrol in Taiwan Strait.⁶ This was the first time of Taiwan as Republic of China building its security relations with the U.S on Taiwan.

Later, since the treaty was terminated, Taiwan and U.S rebuild its unofficial relations by Taiwan Relations ACT (TRA) to maintain the security in western pacific. Since the diplomatic ties with Republic of China was over, United States has been moved into Beijing. China proposed One China policy for all states to legitimate its appearance. Taiwan didn't lose hope because U.S return itself by TRA. At that time China had recognized as legitimate ruler and become the challenge of Taiwan political stability. The policy proposal has been securing Taiwan from "future threat"; to provide Taiwan with defensive character; and challenge any forms of coercion in

⁵ Copper, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

⁶ Nicole Jentzen, 2006, China and U.S Policy, In R. J. Samuel, *Encyclopedia of United States National Security*, pp. 119-121.

Taiwan. So, Taiwan can maintain its self-defense character and it has been supported by United States since 1982 as President Reagan offered “Six Assurances” to continue the arms sales.⁷ Later, in the research the TRA will be explained more related with Taiwan and United States in terms of security cooperation.

However, the reunification process isn't work easily as Chinese hope. Taiwan hasn't been approved directly and still maintain its sovereign democratic system without interfere from Chinese central government. Thus, it becomes interesting to see the strategy of Taiwan secure their territory from any coercion of China cooperate itself with United States in reunification policy.

B. Research Question

After the problem in the background, then the research question will be:
How does the strategy of Taiwan-U.S security cooperation facing China in reunification policy during 1981-2007?

C. Research Period

In this research I would like to limit my research period from 1981-2007. In 1981, it was the publication of China unification policy offered by Marhsal Ye Jianying, he was the highest sit in position in People's Liberation Army. The proposal was proposed to Taiwan during Chiang Ching Kuo administration concerning to

⁷ Kan, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

return into Motherland by peaceful way.⁸ The peaceful period (1981-1994) will become a comparison with the conflict period and post period of conflict, started from 1995-2007 that influence the security cooperation of Taiwan with United States of America. It passes through several administration of Taiwanese political experience such as Chiang Ching Kuo as the first leader who had been proposed by unification policy from China. Then, it was continued by Lee Teng Hui and the last is Chen Shui Bian. So, I would like to upraise how is the transformation of cooperation between Taiwan and United States of America during the period of 1981-2007.

D. Purpose of the Research

Research has been doing to simplifying a phenomenon or some kinds of phenomena. The purpose of research hopefully will shows the aim of the writer to deliver its research for the reader. More than that, hopefully it can explain to the reader the complexity of certain phenomenon and or phenomena which is happening. Meanwhile, I give some purposes which is hopefully be achieved by finishing this research, those are:

1. Reveals the strategy of Taiwan-U.S that has been done during the process of China reunification policy towards Taiwan along 1981-2007.

⁸ Kan, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 42-43.

E. Theoretical Framework

In explaining my hypothesis, I will use one concept and one theory in International relations study. First, is the Common Enemy concept and second is the Strategic Realism theory. I use these theories to explain the act of Taiwan and United States of America in maintaining its security cooperation to face china reunification policy.

D.1. Common Enemy Concept

Kenneth Waltz (1979) was a famous scholar who wrote about the alliance between states in political sciences.⁹ The structure of the states nowadays is the same as the past time when there was the absence of power or state to govern the community-state of nature. At the presence, this status is called as anarchy which is no above law that can enforce the state to force them. Kenneth Waltz put states as an acting unit that is assumed as a result of people's will to conduct the external activities. As a big community, states is acting to pursue their national interest and to secure their status and security. However, the state needs other supports to fulfill or secure their national interest in the realm of anarchy by building cooperation among them.

The alliance system occur when they meet their common enemy. As what Kris De Jaegher and Britta Hoyer wrote in their literature *Cooperation and the*

⁹ De Jaegher, K. J. M., & Hoyer, B, 2012, Cooperation and the common enemy effect. *Discussion Paper Series/Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute*, 12 (24).

common enemy effect.¹⁰ Common enemy can be found in every part of science such as Social Psychology, Economy, Political Sciences, even in Evolutionary Biology. One in political science which is wrote by Kenneth Waltz as a result of the state found their selves to be a part of alliance because of common enemy. Common enemy could be resulted from different kinds of background. It is a theoretical game which is assuming some parties might found the other party is threatening them, based on their perspective. Even both party who are hating each other could be friends when they have similar interest towards another state. Another example, theoretic game of common enemy is also interesting. There is a party who wants to disrupt a relation between two sides. For example, there is a cooperation between two parties (A and B) which is doing information sharing. Then, their information is unintentionally disrupted by outside party (C). C party, as I mention for disruptor, they could have interest to steal the information or break the information sharing between them. Thus, A and B see this as an enemy for this party.

This research is trying to show that both Taiwan and United States act based on this concept. The alignment of Taiwan and United States will be examined by the context of reunification. In this research, I try to show that the alignment only based on the context of China's reunification process with Taiwan. The security alignment between both parties is not merely securing the area or geopolitical interest of United States, but also the interest of Taiwan geopolitics in Taiwan Strait. It could be great explanation since the cooperation between Taiwan and United States is basically built

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

by similar interest in security alignment. Those kinds of interests will be explained in another chapter to support the concept of Common Enemy.

D.2. Strategic Realism Theory

One of the classical theories in international relations is Realism where by the time goes by it has developed itself and one of them is Strategic Realism. This idea is proposed by Thomas Schelling in 1980, 1996 which is similar to the idea of Machiavelli. I take Strategic Realism from the book of *Introduction to International Relations_ Theories and Approaches* which is written by George Sorensen and Robert Jackson. The idea is directly asking “What should we do to achieve our goal or national interest?” which emphasizes on ‘threat’. There is no place whether this decision is good or bad, as long as it achieves its national interest(s). Here is the idea of Schelling taken from the *Introduction to International Relations_ Theories and Approaches* book:

*“Diplomacy is bargaining: it seeks outcomes that, though not ideal for either party, are better for both than some of the alternatives . . . The bargaining can be polite or rude, entail threats as well as offers, assume a status quo or ignore all rights and privileges, and assume mistrust rather than trust. But . . . there must be some common interest, if only in the avoidance of mutual damage, and an awareness of the need to make the other party prefer an outcome acceptable to oneself. With enough military force a country may not need to bargain”.*¹¹

The Schelling’s idea shows that diplomacy can be done in polite way otherwise rude to achieve national interest(s) of a state as the ultimate goal. Within

¹¹ Robert Jackson, Georg Sørensen, 2013, *Introduction to International Relations_ Theories and Approaches-Oxford University Press*, p. 75.

this research this theory also emphasize the importance of force power which can be used as bargaining power. Like what he said “...*With enough military force a country may not need to bargain*”.¹² In this case, this theory emphasize the needs of security strategy to improve the bargaining power of Taiwan towards Chinese policy of reunification.

This approach will be used to understand the strategy of a State to decide their foreign policy. As what George Sorensen said, “*When state leaders confront basic diplomatic and military issues, they are obliged to think strategically—i.e., instrumentally—if they hope to be successful.*”¹³ In relation with the reunification proposal from China, Taiwan has to think its security strategically. They are facing the dilemma whether they would enjoy independence in the future, back to the Chinese authority, or peacefully would have similar status of China without statehood legitimation. This approach is going to explain whether the strategic cooperation between Taiwan and U.S-i.e. instrumentally-will influence the bargaining of Chinese reunification policy.

F. Hypothesis

After offering research question, strategic realism theory, common enemy concept, I would like to deliver some hypothesis to answer that question. First

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

hypothesis will answer the common enemy concept. The second hypothesis will answer the strategic realism theory:

- a. Taiwan has no other choice to maintain security alignment with U.S to determine its political interest from China policy of reunification since Taiwan has historical agreement with U.S.
- b. As the pressure of China reunification policy, Taiwan and U.S transform the security cooperation to face the possibility of military pressure from China as a form of bargaining position, in the period of 1981-2007.

G. Research Methodology

I will use qualitative method by doing library research. The source of the research will be collected from book, articles, journal, magazines, and online articles. The source will become a reading material to collect the data for the research. Besides that, the writer will use inductive method by collecting the facts by doing library research and adding the conclusion by verifying the theories applied in this research.

Chapter II

Proposal of China Reunification

Within this chapter, I will explain the effort of reunification which proposed by China. Mainland China has been conquered by PRC's power and the next step is occupy Taiwan which is overpowered by Guomintang since 1949. In the beginning of separation, both sides were trying to dominate each other by force. It can be seen on their efforts of using force by Taiwan Strait conflict. Thus, when PRC realized that it is useless, new approached by peaceful way was used in the process of reunification. So, this chapter will explain the option which China's took to choose reunification, the context of reunification, and the ongoing process of cross strait talk to pursue reunification by China.

A. Switching Policy from Coercion into Peaceful Approach

In 1949, Guomintang brought its idealism into Taiwan under the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek and 1.5 million people with him. Then, this party was growing and led Taiwan by holding dr. Sun's ideology on nationalism, democracy, and people livelihood which will influence the Taiwanese democracy. At the very beginning, when Guomintang came to Taiwan, the local people did not like it because they the infamous corruption government of the Republic of China which led by Guomintang.

In the other side, they can't reject it because Taiwanese also disagree with the ideology of Communism philosophically and the other thing related with it. Even the possibility of CCP to use force will brought more cost and property destruction. In 1950, Taipei became the base of Guomintang and Republic of China to reform its governmental form.¹⁴ Because of the oppression from red army, Guomintang hadn't choice to turn over the political condition in a short time. Then he tried to rebuilt Guomintang power in Taipei and develop the existence of democracy with Taiwanese.

After Guomintang built its center of government in Taipei, confrontation in the Taiwan Strait can't be avoided. The confrontation happened during 1952-1962. During this period, there are three times of conflicts which the first time in 1954-1955, second in 1958, and third in 1962.¹⁵ However, the effort of both parties to dominate each other by force was useless. The means of Mao to take over Taiwan was failed although he shielded Fujian by military base. In 1962, Chiang also failed to take over mainland China was failed. Then, United States pursue peace talk between both parties in 1969. But later, The United States approach was also used by China to get legitimation of the Chinese authority.

The means of Confrontation was failed, then China urged its position in International community to be recognized as legitimate ruler. In the book of S.L Roy, he mentioned that "*diplomacy, which is very close to nation-state relations, is an art*

¹⁴ Copper, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

¹⁵ I Gede Candra Prayogi, 2014, Upaya Reunifikasi Taiwan Ditinjau Dari Perkembangan Konflik Selat Taiwan Periode 1981-1991, *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional Universitas Udayana, Vol 1, No 2.*

*to set out state's national interests by negotiation through peaceful way if it's possible, in interaction with another state. If the tranquility approach fail to achieve the interest(s), diplomacy allows the use of coercion or force as a means".*¹⁶ This style of politics which was used by China to gain International attraction in terms of peaceful approach. By building diplomatic ties with United States, It symbolically moved the diplomatic office from Taipei to Beijing to get attention and support from other nations. Moreover, Chinese strategy was aiming to reduce Taiwan participation in international activities and organization. In the next step, China will be recognized as one Chinese legitimate ruler by international community.

One of factor that China dare to propose peaceful means was also influenced by support of United States. During 70s, there was cold war between Soviet Union and United States which creates two blocs. United States was pursuing its interest in East Asia by approaching China to apply its Containment policy. After diplomatic ties between China and United States were opened, President Nixon made a policy regarded China-Taiwan relations. Those policy were poured in Nixon five Point. There are some points which is very important that could change the behavior of China towards Taiwan by Nixon five points. China and Taiwan has a middle party (United States of America) neither to support Taiwan independence nor the attempt by military return into the Mainland. The presence of United States on Japan will also discourage towards Taiwan independence.¹⁷ Moreover, the recognition and support of

¹⁶ S.L Roy, 1995, *Diplomacy*, Translated by Harwanto and Mirsawati in Indonesian version, p. 5.

¹⁷ Kan, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

United States to bring normalization for Taiwan and China tends to reduce the conflict between Taiwan and China. It gave more chance to China to apply new approach to return Taiwan into Mainland territory.

By Nixon Five Point policy, it showed that United States by *de jure* and *de facto* admitted the legitimate of Chinese Communist Party as Chinese ruler over mainland China. It was supported by assignation of China in United Nations by People's Republic of China and stepped down Republic of China from its seat in 1971. Thus, periodically by declaring One China policy, China got 111 states and only left 23 states that support Taiwan.¹⁸ By doing so, indirectly the legitimation power of Republic of China pressured by the decreasing support from other states. Thus, it's weaken the power of Republic of China in international community and isolated by China.

B. Proposal for Reunification

To rebuild CCP and Guomintang relations, China avoid to use force like what ever happened in strait Conflict by creating trade link. In 1979, China through peoples of Congress sent a letter to establish direct trade link between two nations. This letter represent the openness of relations from Chinese Communist Party to Guomintang (Nationalist Party) after the isolation of relations between both parties. Then in 1980, Ministry of Commerce uphold the issue to buy product from Taiwan

¹⁸ Copper, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

by releasing “supplementary measures on the purchase of Taiwanese products”.¹⁹ This was one of beginning step of Beijing strategy to attract Taiwanese as to achieve Beijing’s political objectives. Opening trade as a modal to rebuilt the loosen bond.

In September 1981, China through Ye Jianying proposed peaceful unification. It had spread through newspaper which was written by *Xinhua* (*New China News Agency*). Ye Jianying was the highest sit in People’s Liberation Army. Then he got a position as a Chairman of Standing Committee of the National Peoples of Congress. So, he could declared the 9 points of reunification to Taiwan which be included in attachment 1.²⁰ These nine points become the attempt of Chinese to offer the unification by emphasizing three kind of aspects. Those aspects are politics, economics, and socio-cultural relation which Chinese hope that could attract Taiwan. In political sides, China offered peace talk between Communist Party of China and Guomintang as nationalist party who led Taiwan at that time. China also gave the special autonomy for Taiwan to control over the Taiwan affairs without any interfere from central government. In economic side, China pursue the trade relations and industrial investment option for Taiwanese. Since China had diplomatic ties with U.S, Taiwan had closed the relations with China. So, the communication between relatives from China and Taiwan were disconnected. It also closed the direct trade relations between China and Taiwan. Thus, China pursue to open postal communication and

¹⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 56-57.

²⁰ Ye Jianying’s Unification Proposal for Taiwan, The proposal was taken from Kan, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

relatives visits. In socio-cultural side, China offered the option of the exchange between academic and sport exchange to recover the untied bond. Chinese central government would also not interfere the property rights over Taiwan.²¹

The proposal which Ye Jianying offered to Taiwan was indirectly tried to take over the sovereignty of Taiwan by unification. At the beginning, it was not easy step for Taiwan to accept this proposal. Then China made further step by offering three policy to increase the relations for both sides. China offered to open direct postal, transport, and trade links. This process was emphasized to build trade links and created peaceful area around Chinese territory, especially cross Taiwan Strait relations.²² However, this proposal is still debatable within the Taiwanese to choose reunification, but status quo has been chosen by Taiwanese as a response not to give their sovereignty over this proposal. Although they agree to open relation with mainland in economic, and social activities like the proposal offered.

C. Ongoing Process for Reunification

Chinese efforts to maintain Taiwan as a part of China keeps going on. China believe that Taiwan geographically, ethnically, culturally, historically is part of China. Its effort to attract Taiwan by political strategy and economic attraction such as leniency of investment has been done. The process is not easy, because Taiwan has divided into groups who support independence and reunification. Moreover, the most

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid*, p. 19.

famous stand point for Taiwanese is to choose status quo. It makes PRC has to do something to embrace Taiwan to unify with mainland China.

After Ye Jianying proposed the proposal, it is not directly opened the relations between PRC and KMT which led by Chiang Ching Kuo. 1982, Deng Xiaoping released a new constitution up to status of by special administrative region Taiwan with different economic and political system. PRC keep pursuing their effort to bind Taiwan by the idea of “One Country, Two System”. But Taiwan was still closed it relations with Taiwan three no’s (no contact, no negotiation, no compromise) after China admitted by United States in 1979. The first step up which is done by Taiwan to open up in 1987. It was the first step of China by reforming its economic to attract Taiwanese to invest and trade in mainland by third party, Hong Kong.

Since economic reform brought positive impact for Taiwan and PRC, they begun to open up cross strait relations. Both parties were enjoying growth of trade and economic relations though unofficial way. After China reforms its economic policy, Taiwan begun to invest, trade in mainland and enjoyed \$459 million in 1981 to \$1.1 billion in 1985. In 16 December 1991, CCP established Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). This is the continuance of China in political way to establish the terms for both side. While China has ARATS, Taiwan has built Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF). National Unification Council was set up by Lee Teng Hui in 1990 and set up the cabinet to handle cross strait relations by Mainland Affairs Commission. Then, this commission set up the SEF by guideline which is proposed by National Unification Council. ARATS and SEF had met up in


Hong Kong in 1992 to define the term “One China” but it hasn’t gave satisfaction for both side.²³ The key of communication has been opened between Taiwan and mainland through third party to discuss the economic and “One China” term. However, it is still get many rejection about the meaning of “One China” whether represent one nation or one state of China in international stage.

There has been the upsides down of relations in cross strait affairs. After both parties build cross strait talk, the tension is still heat up. In 1995, when Lee Teng Hui visited United States it made the Chinese extremist dare to threaten Taiwan. During July-August 1995 China sent its missile 100km from north of Taiwan. In the other side, it also made Taiwan prepare for military exercises in October. But, this tension can be reduced when China had got support from United States not to support Taiwan independence in 1998 after President Jiang visited President Clinton.²⁴ It has been proved that United States of America fulfill its intention to cover its ally-in this case is Taiwan-in western pacific if they get a threat. Although China and Taiwan had created mutual organization to conduct direct relation, the tension is possibly occur. China had to play its role to restrain Taiwan from separating or the possibility of declaring independence by getting support from international community such as peoples in United States.

²³ Zhengyuan Fu, 2006, Taiwan Issue and Sino-US Relations, The. *Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs.*, 16, 253.


²⁴ Albert Chang, *Managing Peace across the Strait: The Impact of United States and Chinese Actions on Contemporary Taiwanese Nationalism, 1995–2005.*

Graphic 2.1 Number of ARATS-SEF meetings



Source: Provided by Strait Exchange Foundation (www.sef.org.tw)²⁵

Graphic 2.2 Number of ARATS-SEF Agreements and Documents²⁶



Source: Provided by Strait Exchange Foundation (www.sef.org.tw)

The relation between ARATS-SEF meetings after 21st century was not too significant. President Hu Jintao has proposed four points related cross strait relations

²⁵ This table had been proceed by Zhengyuan Fu, The author of The Taiwan issue and Sino-U.S. Relations, *Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems*.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

in 2005. The for points are persuade the insistence of One China principle; no compromise to fight the action of separation Taiwan from China; not giving up on the effort of peaceful unification; and never giving up hope on the Taiwan people.²⁷ After that, the level of meeting doesn't grow significantly in the side of political relations. Mostly, the relations talks about the management of economic and trade relations from China.

However, China and Taiwan have yet to find an agreement on the political relationship between the two. It has been more than 35 years of cross-strait relations have not to find common ground. Despite in practice between mainland China and Taiwan have established economic and social relations. The relationship was not fully prepared, as seen from the development of the meeting between ARATS-SEF. The intensity of communication did not go well for formulating the legality of the existence of Taiwan. Taiwan still maintains its status at the time of the early 21st century, namely the status quo. In addition, there has been a surprising phenomenon, namely the meeting between the two heads of state met for the first time. Although the meeting did not directly produce a consensus regarding the position of Taiwan into China. Thus, the process is referred to as the context of China's reunification efforts within the above time period 1981 to persuade Taiwan's unification with China.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

Chapter III

The Domestic Dynamic in Taiwan Politics towards China Reunification Policy

When China proposed reunification, Taiwan responded dynamically within its politic and society. After Nationalist party came to Taiwan, Chiang Kai Shek began Taiwan democratization although it needed a process in order to be accepted by Taiwanese. Later, the result of democratization by Chiang Ching Kuo made Taiwan have two major political parties, Guomintang and Democratic Progressive Party. Guomintang is a party which was brought by Chiang Kai Shek from mainland while Democratic Progressive Party was the result of reformulate the martial law in Taiwan. During the process of reunification, there were different views regarding its issue in Taiwan. These point of view are represented by its political party which represent whether to support the reunification or reject the reunification. Indeed, there is a perspective which supports the independence of Taiwan or separation from mainland China. This chapter will discuss the dynamic of the perspective towards China proposal for reunification by its political party and the perspective of the president since Chiang Ching Kuo until Chen Shui Bian.

A. Two Major Political Parties in Taiwan

There are two major political power in Taiwan, those are Guomintang and Democratic Progressive Party. Nationalist party which introduces the idea of democracy in China brought the idea to Taiwan and developed it in 1950. However, the process of democratization needs 4 decades for local peoples to participate in politics. These political parties were representing major voters during the presidential and legislative elections. So, this part will explain the two major political parties Guomintang and Democratic Progressive Party which influence the perspective of cross strait relations.

Guomintang is the one party created based on Dr. Sun Yat Sen idea in establishing Nationalism in China. Guomintang party was an alliance between Revolutionary and Guomintang established in 1912. Revolutionary Alliance was the party which Dr. Sun established in Japan in 1905. The activities of Guomintang in Chinese mainland began when it won parliamentary in the election 1913. When Guomintang were enjoying the parliament, Yuan Shih Kai (former of imperial government) threatened the supporters of Sun in southern Chinese. Guomintang party still survived but Dr. Sun failed to create democratic state.

After Dr. Sun Yat Sen died, the leadership of Guomintang was succeeded by Chiang Kai Shek. The power of Guomintang in Mainland China did not last long, because He had to fled due to defeat against the Red Army (the troops that will be called as People's Liberation Army, this party will be led by Chinese Communist

Party) in 1949.²⁸ It seems Taiwanese didn't have any chance except to accept Nationalist movement and the low response of Taiwanese because the low credibility of Chiang Kai Shek in international arena. Furthermore, Taiwanese didn't like the Mainland China because of its corruption²⁹. Then, the Guomintang reformed itself during in Taiwan by Chiang Kai Shek and continued by Chiang Ching Kuo.

The domination of Guomintang party in Taiwan which created authoritarian system made Taiwanese want to create its own party. During the period of Chiang Kai Shek and Chiang Ching Kuo constituted the authoritarian government in 4 decade, the domination of Guomintang made the democracy in the state became weak and the people couldn't accommodate its interests. In 1983, the new process of national election were established and became the first time of election in the country. There was a party *tangwai*-a loose political organization-which will become a new form of DPP party. The failure of *tangwai* in national election 1983 was the consequence of the immaturity of the political party competed with Guomintang which still dominate the power. Thus, in 1986 Chiang Ching Kuo reformed the martial law and opened the freedom to create their own political party for the people. In September, *tangwai* politicians gathered and announced themselves as Democratic Progressive Party. Chiang Ching Kuo asked the government not to prohibit the establishment of its party. DPP party became bigger because the support from *tangwai* and independent groups.

²⁸ Copper, 2009, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-132.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 46.

After self campaign as a political party in 1986, the DPP gain massive public support but the internal condition of the party were clashing because of different purposes. Community group that supports the DPP was people who fed up with the authoritarian rule of the Gomintang and the lower class society. Many Taiwanese people living in rural areas to support the existence of this party were workers, city dwellers, the poor, people who against the KMT, Taiwanese had gained the support of between 10% -20% of the population at that time. However, the party itself was experienced internal turmoil with the face of one of the prominent issues, namely independence. In the body of the DPP party, there were options whether option to choose independence or not to do so because it's too dangerous or Taiwan was still premature. Moreover, in the DPP's body, there were those who assume that the DPP with the KMT ties should be maintained for a while, but some choose to fight against the KMT. The third issue was to accept the presence of mainlanders.³⁰ This sharpens the issue of the relationship between Taiwan and China mainland who filed reunification.

B. The Dynamic of Political Leadership in Taiwan towards Cross-Strait Relations

China since it offered reunification, Taiwan has responded differently towards its proposal. In this section, I will describe the President's policy related to the issue

³⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 133-135.

of reunification. Reunification efforts undertaken by China have been and continuing to be done since the bid in 1981 until 2007. At that time, Taiwan experienced a 3 times changes of the head of government. The leaders came from the two dominant parties, namely the KMT's Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng Hui, and one representative of the DPP party is Chen Shui-bian.

Chiang Ching Kuo had done led Taiwan since 1978 until 1988. His political career began and initiated from 1949 to 1978 as a premiere. In the history of leadership in Taiwan, Chiang Ching Kuo reminds the end of the democratic authoritarian system which was hold by Gomintang party.

He reformed the policy especially to change the martial law by giving bigger chance for the people to create an organization or political party and to open the relations with mainland. Chiang Ching Kuo preferred not to free Taiwan to be independence and this view was same with its father Chiang Kai Shek. In this moment, Chiang Ching Kuo opened the indirect trade relations in 1987 with China. Besides that, he also opened the registration of Taiwanese to see its family relations from mainland China through Hong Kong.³¹ It's indicated that the policy of Chiang Ching Kuo wanted to maintain the stability of cross strait relations and to look for peaceful future reunification.

During 1988-2000, Lee Theng Hui became generalissimo or the highest position such as President of the state. Lee Teng Hui as representative from

³¹ Winberg Chai, 2009, Chiang Ching Kuo, In L. Cheng, *Berkshire Encyclopaedia of China*, pp. 318-319.

Guomintang party decided to support the relationship between China and Taiwan. Quoting from his words, “.....*If the two sides can recognize and appreciate this special relationship, they can transcend political differences and jointly develop a relationship conducive to the peaceful and democratic reunification of the Chinese nation one day.*”³² From his words, Lee Teng Hui hopes that there will be future reunification between China and Taiwan solving the problem peacefully and suitably with the political process of democratic Taiwanese. Building relationship after 4 decades dismissed, it will influence the local politics and responds from the Taiwanese people. According to Lee Teng Hui this process cannot be monopolized by Taiwanese government in deciding Taiwanese future because they also need an input from its people.

There were three problems why the process of reunification between China and Taiwan was so hard according to Lee Teng Hui. First, the trust between Taiwan and China has not been created. Taiwanese sees that the Chinese Communist leadership has threatened the Taiwanese and they are suspicious with Chinese Communist Party. Second, there has been intimidation from mainland by military force. Before the proposal of reunification, Chinese Communist Party had once wanted to free Taiwan by using force by conflict in Taiwan Strait. Besides that, in 1995 China used missile test in Taiwan Strait and made Taiwanese become stronger to be united to declare independence. Third, there are differences of political system between democracy and authoritarian. Taiwan has been democratic after the

³² Lee Teng Hui, 1999, Understanding Taiwan, *Foreign Affairs*, 78(6), pp. 9-14.

reformation of martial law policy. However, the authoritarian system applied by mainlanders worried that they will curb socio-economically and influence the political system.³³ These kinds of problem was dodged by the mainland China and increases the identity of Taiwanese over Taiwan Island.

Then Taiwanese leadership of Lee Teng Hui changed into Chen Shui Bian. It was the first time where the president came from DPP. The challenge during Chen Shui Bian administration was that the Legislative Yuan were not overpowered by DPP. The dominance of Legislative Yuan was managed by KMT. DPP was known as the party that raises up independence movement. However, it influenced the cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China.

In its declaration in January 2000, Chen stated "*no Taiwan independence if no mainland invasion*". The President who served in the 2000-2008 year believed that basically the people of Taiwan is already independent. At the time of the 1999 presidential campaign, Chen supported the people of Taiwan to hold a referendum and change the views of the community to get out of the position of the status quo. At that moment, Jiang as the president of PRC stated the formula of 'one country, two systems'. However, Chen chose not to approve this formula.

There are a lot of different perspectives which is poured by several medias related the Chen Shui-Bian leadership and opposition party from Guomintang and People First Party in terms of cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China. In The

³³ *Ibid.*

official English-language newspaper China Daily entitled "New Thinking Guides Cross-Straits Relations" commented that Chen and DPP rejected what Mainland had offered for Taiwan and also criticize the visits of the opposition party by Soong and Lien towards Mainland China. It means Chen and DPP were taking critical situation and influence the unstable tension on the cross strait relations. The other respond from China Radio International which was sponsored by newspaper World News Journal Lin Hai stated that the stance of Chen and DPP was provocative when Chen talks about Mainland and cross strait relations. Moreover, in this report stated that cross strait relations was reimagined as 'one step forward, two steps back' in the political structure of Taiwan and China. Some parties were insisted that Chen and DPP had to change its policy towards cross-strait relations. The opposite party from Lien as Guomintang representative and Soong as representative of People First Party made a close approach with China over cross-strait relations which divided the supporter from Taiwanese. Since the act of Chen was very strict at the beginning towards the independence 'ideology', step by step his supporters were decreasing.³⁴

Along with the measures taken during the tenure of his presidency, Chen Shui-bian chose to take middle course. The purpose of creating Taiwan independence, not too obtrusive as it campaigned. The desire platform as pro-

³⁴ CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: MAINLAND VISITS CREATE DILEMMA FOR CHEN, (2005, Jun 13), *US Fed News Service, Including US State News* Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/470681857?accountid=38628>.

independence of DPP became merely tactical.³⁵ After the election of Chen as president, there was no significant change in the substance of cross-strait relations. The measures taken by Chen were more focusing on economic relations than on policy.

However, although Taiwan has been passing several different types of leaders, cross strait relations remain uncertain. Originated from the reign of Chiang Ching-kuo opening trade opportunities, communication, and postal to meet the needs of Taiwan in developing markets and also some family reunion. In addition, the changed in martial law also had a big influence because it encourages the opposition party to emerge, DPP. Lee Teng Hui possess its willingness to have mutual political relations with mainland China whereas the two leader hadn't met to talk about this. At the time of Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan was tested the ballistic missile threat from China in 1995. Even so, indirectly foster a sense of nationalism and patriotic people of Taiwan. Thus at the next election, president of the DPP get the most votes. However, the process did not go smoothly. Later, the leadership had to change into Chen Shui Bian which led Taiwan in two periods since 2000 until 2008. He was appointed by DPP but he ran the cross strait relations with low contacts from ARATS-SEF relations.³⁶ Taiwan has different leadership and different approaches towards cross strait relations and it influence the foreign policy that they form.

³⁵ Yu-Kang Lee, 2005, *New Government, New Language? The Third Way Discourse in Taiwan. Modern Asian Studies* 39, 3, pp. 631–660.

³⁶ Zhengyuan Fu, 2006, The author of The Taiwan issue and Sino-U.S. Relations, *Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems*.

Chapter IV

Taiwan-U.S Security Cooperation Strategy to Face China Reunification Policy

This chapter is going to discuss Taiwan and U.S cooperation in the security sector during the process of China reunification offers to Taiwan. Taiwan-U.S security alignment became an important strategic movement towards the political interest of both parties. In the past, during 1954 they made mutual defense treaty as a means to secure the stability in Taiwan Strait and to secure the trade of U.S in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. However, Chiang Kai Shek had a strategy to liberate Chinese by abusing the position of U.S in Taiwan Strait. It resulted in 1954-1955 and 1958 Strait Conflict that made U.S stance not support either China or Taipei.³⁷ Later, the 1954 defense mutual treaty had to change into Taiwan Relations Act in 10 April 1979.³⁸ This is the signs that Taiwan become as a strategic security allies with United States of America towards its interest in western pacific security. Taiwan also takes this chance as strategic purposes to increase political bargaining against China. This chapter will discuss the strategy of the Taiwan-U.S. alignment to face the similar threat, China reunification.

³⁷ Copper, 2009, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-191.

³⁸ Kan, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

The key of alliance is important for the state to maintain its power, either for their national power or foreign action. This is like what Taiwan and U.S have been doing for more than 35 years. Although Taiwan and U.S had disconnected its diplomatic ties, U.S Congress insisted that they had to maintain its part of allies in western pacific and one of option, they have to align themselves with Taiwan. This is like what Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan discuss regarding the strategy of alliance:

“An agreement between two or more states to work together on mutual security issue. States enter into cooperative security arrangements in order to protect themselves against a common (or perceived) threat. By pooling their resources and acting in concert, the alliance partners believe that they can improve their overall power position within the international system and their security relative to states outside the alliance.”³⁹

However, Taiwan has strategic reason to be maintained as its ally by United States. It constitutes the strategic game of common enemy concept. In this condition, Taiwan and U.S have mutual enemy, which is China. The similarity of opinion at that time occurred because when TRA was established, China was still strongly in Communism ideology and was aligned with USSR which was opposed by U.S. Although U.S moved its diplomatic relation to Beijing and took advantage of this condition, Taiwan as a part of U.S alignment cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, Taiwan could use this alignment as a tool for bargaining its position for securing the relation from China.

³⁹ Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan, 2002, Alliance. *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, p. 1.

Strategically, Taiwan needs support in the field of security. Taiwan cannot stand alone by the fact that it is surrounded by asymmetrical power, China and United State. Taiwan has to think strategically to find an ally to fulfill it needs to defend the land. Such as the strategic realism theory which emphasize that a state which have enough military force tends to avoid mutual damage if they have similar interest.⁴⁰ In this case, China and Taiwan has similar interest in economy, but not in political relations. Since Lee Teng Hui from Guomintang party established the relation with United States, China aggressively responded it by giving threat over north shore of Taiwan the ballistic missile. During Chen Shui Bian administration, he tends not to respond the political cross strait relations from China to pursue its Chinese policy of reunification. At those time, Taiwan was in endanger situation that can disrupt the stability of Taiwan. So, Taiwan do the improvement of transformation the security cooperation to upgrade it with United States of America in terms of facing Chinese threat by pressuring Taiwan on reunification policy.

A. Taiwan Relations Act as Policy to Strengthen Taiwan Power in Cooperation with U.S

The key of Taiwan-U.S security alignment is based on TRA. Taiwan is promised in Taiwan Relations Act that U.S by the approval of Congress and President will conduct the protection in western pacific. This part will discuss the establishment

⁴⁰ Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, 2013, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

of TRA as the substitute of mutual defense treaty with Taipei; how the bilateral cooperation is conducted; and the Taiwan proposal by U.S under TRA.

Taiwan and United States has been building its security cooperation by its mutual defense treaty. At 1950-1953, there was a break of Korean War which destabilized the situation on the western pacific, especially disrupt the stability of China and Taiwan over Taiwan Strait. Mutual Defense Treaty was very useful when Republic of China pressed Taiwan. Taiwan got protection from U.S to restrain PRC's under Mao Ze Tung force to set Taiwan free.⁴¹ However, after the shifting of diplomatic relations between U.S and Beijing, Taiwan also had to change its strategy to keep aligning with U.S. Later, U.S had to stop mutual defense treaty and changed it to TRA (Taiwan Relations Act) which signed by Congress and Taiwan approve it as a form of the continuance bilateral absence, especially in the security cooperation.

Taiwan almost lost the cooperation with U.S because at the beginning of act approval, there was different perspective between the views of Congress and the White House on foreign policy for China and Taiwan. When President Jimmy Carter in 1978 moved its diplomatic relations to Beijing, Senator Goldwater stated that the President must consult with Congress before abrogating the treaty.⁴² The Removals of diplomacy from Taipei to Beijing happened because U.S tried to prevent the growing strength of the USSR. U.S realized at that time that they were not able to

⁴¹ Nicole Jentzen, 2006, China and U.S policy, *Encyclopaedia of United States National Security*, pp. 119-121.

⁴² John F. Copper, 1996, The Taiwan Relations Act the Sixteen years Record, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, p. 221.

compete in the arms race because they lack of domestic support for military spending.

⁴³ Later, Congress sought to pacify relations with Taiwan by emphasizing the application of TRA. The results of the voting to determine the policy were obtained by the sound of 90 to 6 in the Senate and 345 to 55 in the House. ⁴⁴ This result was also signed by President Carter and became law on 10th April 1979. This act means that the Taiwan is recognized as nation-state according to U.S law. The alliance strategy was insisted although there was different perspective to determine the relations with Taiwan. Therefore, there are two perspectives of U.S against the sole discretion to China. First, The White House and State are more inclined towards China. Second, Taiwan was supported by Congress to continue Taiwan-U.S relationship with TRA. However, the treaty is still important as the relations have been conducted.

The idea of Taiwan Relations Act shows that Taiwan as a part of U.S interest in East Asia. Taiwan Relations Act based on Public Law 96-8 96th Congress is, “*An Act To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other purposes*”⁴⁵. However, Taiwan had to lose its diplomatic ties because U.S realized that it needed to maintain the strength of its allies although they had moved the diplomatic relations into Beijing in 1978. This is

⁴³ Copper, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

⁴⁴ Copper, 1996, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

⁴⁵ U.S Public Law 96-8 96th Congress, 1979, *TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT*, p. 1.

the way of Taiwan is supported by United States of America less with explicit in military as they did in Mutual Defense Treaty.⁴⁶ Non-official relations became the key to maintain the relations between Taiwan and United States of America in maintaining the “chain” alignment in western pacific.

To keep the bilateral status, Taiwan obtain the American Institute of Taiwan as official form to conduct bilateral relations with U.S. This institute is a non-profit corporation under the law of the District of Columbia. Otherwise, the relation will be conducted by the president with similar nonprofit corporation which was designated by president itself.⁴⁷ Although Taiwan and U.S doesn't have official diplomatic relations, the institute is running as a subsidiary of the absence of diplomatic with U.S.

Taiwan has special privilege to conduct the bilateral relations with U.S as AIT shown in its purpose of the establishment of AIT. Within the task of AIT is conducting “*any programs, transactions, or other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any Agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through the American Institute in Taiwan.*”⁴⁸ The task of AIT is to set up a program which is focused on direct relationship between heads of state. Taiwan president is able to contact directly with the U.S president. It was once

⁴⁶ Cal Clark, 2010, The Taiwan Relations Act and the U.S. balancing role in cross-strait relations, *American Journal of Chinese Studies*, 17.1, p. 3.

⁴⁷ U.S Public Law 96-8 96th Congress, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴⁸ AIT Introduction. <http://www.ait.org.tw/en/ait-introduction.html>

undertaken by Lee Teng-hui in 1994 to visit his alma mater Cornell University which was in the framework of a reunion. Indirectly, this alludes to China and encourages the Department of State to refuse the visa for President Lee Teng-hui. However, President Clinton opened access to allow the visit of President Lee Teng Hui.⁴⁹ By doing so, access of the Taiwan president through the AIT will facilitate direct bilateral diplomacy, despite having the term non-official diplomacy. Moreover, the top official level such as ministerial level can have an access to top officials meeting between Taiwan and U.S.

John F. Copper stated that the TRA in the future will be upgraded rather than downgraded, within his paper during explaining the sixteen years of relation between Taiwan and U.S.⁵⁰ The paper was written during 90s in which the relation between China and Taiwan had been stubborn. The upgrade of TRA such as Clinton Administration could have a top officials meeting between Taiwan and U.S. Thus, it is implemented in the security and arm sales cooperation.

B. The Taiwan-U.S Arms Sales and Security Cooperation Transformation

Within the TRA, Taiwan has opportunity to protect their territory by U.S act to maintain the security. There is a specific part which mentions the willingness of U.S to provide security for the safety of Taiwanese without harming their human rights. The following are mentioned in TRA, in the *Implementation of United States*

⁴⁹ Copper, 1996, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

*Policy with Regard to Taiwan, Section 3.*⁵¹ In this section, Taiwan will get defense articles and defense services from U.S. However, the arms that Taiwan will receive has a limit and shall pass the approval of President and Congress. Directly, Taiwan already get protection from the U.S President itself. Because, the U.S President is directed to tell the Congress if Taiwan is in danger situation or any kinds of threat that will endanger the interests of United States in western pacific.

Although mutual defense treaty had terminated, Taiwan still get arms support from U.S by the agreement of third join Communiqué. President Ronald Reagan in 1982 had released the third join Communiqué with PRC about Taiwan-U.S relations. The United States declared has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; Has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan; Will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; Has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; Has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; Will not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC.⁵² In the Third Join Communiqué between U.S and China, Taiwan get more support from United States as its stance for not to negotiate with China to provide arms sales to Taiwan. It means, since 1982 Taiwan has more negotiate power with China because of U.S back up in security support and reduce the arms conflict over cross-strait relations.


⁵¹ Public Law 96-8 96th Congress, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁵² Kan, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

As the results of the third U.S joint Communique, Taiwan received a support from the United States to gain access to get the arms. This security strategy is required by Taiwan because the prediction of possible threat in the future. The fear really happens when China threatened by sending a ballistic missile in 1996. Thus, security in Taiwan has also been enhanced by the transformation of the trade of arsenal that will be described in trading charts received by Taiwan. In the graphic 4.1, it shows the change of weapon which received by Taiwan. Thus, the threat of which had been rising, were able to be tempered by the influence of the United States and the third joint Communique was used to increase the arms support without any interfere from China.

The security relationship with Taiwan, U.S provides arm sales and enhanced capabilities. If Taiwan Needs arms sales, it requires the approval of Congress. Thus, the position of Taiwan is not completely free to get arm's needs. In addition, there is also increasing capability or the so-called "software" to complement the needs of self-defense.

Graphic 4.1 The Total Arms Sales Delivery to Taiwan (1979-2012)



Source: U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, fiscal year series, 2012. Was taken from *Policy Brief Series, Taiwan Relations Act: Time for Change?*⁵³

The arms trade had arranged by both parties which the graphic shows the amount of arms delivery to Taiwan has been increasing in the supply of weapons. As stated in the TRA that the terms of trade quantity should refer to the decision of Congress. Taiwan has no other rights to influence the quantity of the arms that they need. However, during 1995-1996, conflict in Taiwan Strait was upraised when China tried its ballistic missiles to the northern coast of Taiwan. This moment became a momentum of Taiwan that could get more support in the arms trade. Thus, there was an increase of U.S arms shipments to Taiwan. It is followed by the next trend, which there was still arms trade with the U.S for increasing the modernization of weaponry for Taiwan self-defense ability.

Apart from the defense weaponry, Taiwan also increased the military field along with US. Military improvement responded to the efforts of China which eventually threat the Taiwan Strait in 1995. This activity is likely to lead to the strengthening of bilateral Taiwan-U.S in the context of discussions on the security within the Taiwan Strait, strategic policy to be taken by the two countries, and the strengthening of human resources to carry out the defense. As noted by Dr. Huang,

⁵³ Yeh Chung Lu, 2014, Policy Brief Series, Taiwan Relations Act: Time for Change? *Policy Brief III*, p. 5.

there are several points of security transformation in terms of cooperation between Taiwan and U.S, those are:⁵⁴

B.1. High Level Visits Exchange

When a country has diplomatic relations with other countries, the two countries have the opportunity to conduct cooperation in various fields. One of them is a meeting between heads of state to visit each other, as a recognition step of the sovereignty of the countries visited. It happens as the Taiwan U.S bilateral relations. This relationship does not get the status of *de jure* in international stage. However, Taiwan is legally recognized by United States of America in Taiwan Relations Act. However, Taiwan get a *de facto* recognition by U.S.

When China implemented the One China policy, Taiwanese top official were isolated by Chinese political action which made unrecognized by international community. However, U.S makes a new approach for Taiwan to have an occasion to visit U.S for its top officials such as president or ministerial level. More than that, the top level minister could have access to U.S top officials to have dialogue or meeting. Such as Lee Teng Hui, the president of Taiwan during 1994 visited Cornell University to come in reunion, as his alma mater. China was anger by the visit of Lee Teng Hui to U.S which made them had to push U.S through department of defense for

⁵⁴ Dr. Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, (2010, February), *Taiwan-U.S Quarterly Analysis*, Retrieved 2016 from Brookings: <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/02/taiwan-defense-huang>.

restricting Lee's visit. President Clinton thus got a highest vote in Congress to permit the visiting visa for Lee Teng Hui.

B.2. Strategic-Level Meetings

After China sent its ballistic missile on northern shore of Taiwan, the intention to increase the strategy of defense was getting stronger. Post 1997, when the tension between both China and Taiwan were reducing, Taiwan and U.S held a meeting between its ministries of national defense to make a dialogue. This kinds of meeting was the first time between Taiwan and U.S talks about strategy which held in U.S. 'Monterey Talks', which held in 1997 in Monterey, California, U.S is a closed discussion between Taiwan and U.S to discuss about strategy for Taiwan defense system. The progress is still on going up until 2015 in Pentagon. Last year, Taiwan had sent several delegation such as Andrew Yang, which come from National Security Council (NSC) Deputy Secretary General along with officials from Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry and Mainland Affairs Council. It discussed about the arms sales, regional stability, and threat perceptions.⁵⁵ This meeting shows the transformation of sharing information about the stability of the region in bilateral discussion. The discussion has top secret level and closed from media. It is explained by Joseph Bookbinder, "Our robust unofficial relations

⁵⁵ William Lowther, (2015, July 17), '*Monterey Talks*' slated next week. Retrieved 2016 from Taipei Times: <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/07/17/2003623240>.

are based on the Taiwan Relations Act. We don't discuss specific details of our interaction” from The China Post.⁵⁶ However, the result of this meeting could be seen by the behavior of both state from their policy to apply its strategy which has been discussed in the meeting.

B.3. Policy-Level Discussion

The policy of Taiwan has been influenced by the security partnership with U.S, directly or indirectly. Taiwan in their current position still hanged himself to a security system that had been woven together with the U.S indirectly. Arms Sales is an advantage for the Taiwan in terms of security-politics as a support for Taiwan sustainability running the governmental system. Thus, the position of Taiwan in determining the needs of national security depends on the desirability of U.S. In addition, there has been an annual meeting to discuss policy and planning issues between the Pentagon and Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense. Highest meeting is organized by the Pentagon to bring the U.S Department of Defense (DoD) and the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense.⁵⁷ This meeting is confidential, so it will only be seen from the results of policies to be taken by Taiwan in implementing the outcome of this meeting. As the results seen in the exchange of experts for

⁵⁶ Joseph Yeh, (2015, July 21), *Monterey Talks held at Pentagon: report*. Retrieved 2016 from The China Post: <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/07/21/441238/Monterey-Talks.htm>

⁵⁷ William Lowther, (2011, September 4), *'Secret' cable details US talks*. Retrieved 2016 from Taipei Times: <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/09/04/2003512424>

training or experts to do a review of the security plan for the needs of Taiwan. As assessment ever conducted in 1997-2001 by the Pentagon to conduct research.

B.4. Professional-Level Security Exchange

To fulfill the needs of human resources, Taiwan and U.S boost cooperation relations in the exchange of experts. One was sending experts to conduct a review of Taiwan's defense requirements. This team of experts commissioned by the U.S Department of Defense (DoD). Since 1997-2001 the Pentagon sent a team of experts to conduct a study on the security situation in Taiwan. In 1999, Taiwan received a team to check the air security system from U.S and it's reported in 2000. Thereafter, in 2001-2002 Taiwan got more visits which was done by the U.S from of Pentagon to examine the air control system, the Defense department of U.S to assess Taiwan's army, U.S military studied about Po Sheng's command and control programs, another team in November came to assess the Marine Corps about its harbor and ports.⁵⁸ Professional exchanges represent an attempted overhaul and revamping Taiwan's defense system. Results from the analysis of the security of Taiwan and then report to Congress. U.S thus able to measure the possibility of an attack which will be launched by China and then anticipated through joint operations exercise or observations.

⁵⁸ Shirley A. Kan., 2014, *Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990*, pp. 6-7.

B.5. Training Observations

Other than sending some experts, military cooperation in the form of joint exercises between the two countries also conducted. As conducted in the Han Kuang Exercise annually. Han Kuang Exercise is a military training activities for a possible invasion of China. This exercise is done entirely by the Taiwan military in preparing for the possibility of cross-strait conflict. This activity has been going on since 2008.⁵⁹ U.S has a role in the training as an observer, examine operational concepts, and evaluate the performance of war fighting. Thus, Han Kuang Exercise is a joint operations conducted annual.

B.6. Military Representation

Military Liaison is a form of cooperation between Taiwan and U.S to exchange the military representative. Taiwan has sent attaché to be assigned as a military mission in 1997. U.S also retaliated to send personnel to Taiwan. However, the delivery is done in secret even though Congress explicitly approve sending military personnel to Taiwan. Since 2002 there was an exchange of active-duty military personnel with licenses issued by Congress. Bush Administration appealed to Congress to legalize and give authority to

⁵⁹ Lauren Dickey, 2015, Taiwan Han Kuang's Exercises: Training for a Chinese Invasion one Drill at a Time, *China Brief Volume 15*, 18.

assign personnel from U.S departments to AIT. This task then in effect since August 2005 in the form of civilian disguise costumes in the area of Taipei, Hong Kong is different from that using the official uniform when necessary.⁶⁰

B.7. Transformation of Arms Sales Procedures

Nowadays, Taiwan has new process to order the arms package since 2001 with United States of America. In 2001 the Bush Administration easing the process to make a reservation arms sales for Taiwan. Although mutual defense treaty has expired, but the sale of weapons to Taiwan continued. At first, if Taiwan wants to book the arms, it must go through Hwa-Mei Arms Sales Talks to conduct an annual review to determine the necessary weapons. By getting a new status in 2001, Taipei can order a weapon anytime.⁶¹

B.8. Providing Arms Sales Packages

As the discussion at previous paragraph, that the U.S provide Arms sales as a means that Taiwan can provide self-defense ability. Detail for armaments sent to Taiwan by United States listed in the attachment of this research. Taiwan mostly provided by defense system which the data is provided in attachment 2.⁶² The List of Arms Sales Package for Taiwan.

⁶⁰ Kan, 2014, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

⁶¹ Dr. Alexander, 2010, *op. cit.*

⁶² It contains the list of arms sales package to Taiwan from 1990-2007, the data was taken from Kan, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 56-59.

Within the trade in 2004-2007, Taiwan and U.S made an agreement to buy the arms in \$1.0 billion but U.S delivered \$4.3 billion as a support to Taiwan arsenal.⁶³

Taiwan and U.S has changed its pattern in security cooperation during Lee Teng Hui and Chen Shui Bian administration. Patterns that change is an increase or intensity of meetings between state agencies to discuss security issues since 1997. The raising level of meetings which then produces a program called the "software". In addition to fulfill the needs of Taiwan's arms, Taiwan also supported by U.S on the role of human resources training for Taiwan security needs. Then, the human resources will be placed to anticipate the war, strategize, and has the ability to regulate the national security system of Taiwan. Although Taiwan is promised by U.S to be protected from any threat but Taiwan need to be independent on the ability of securing their own territory. It is true because U.S interest is more general to protect its interest in western pacific. Thus, the fulfillment of security for Taiwan still have the limits in the reservation of the arms and a technical strategy which is the result of a meeting between the defense agencies of Taiwan and the U.S.

⁶³ Kan, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

Chapter V

Conclusion

PRC has been never giving up returning Taiwan into the part of mainland of China by asking for unification. Mao had tried to conquer Taiwan which already occupied by Guomintang power by military deployment. But it was failed and he did a new strategy. Mao made a liberating policy for Taiwan by using coercion in 1950s by shelling the island and conflict in cross strait relations. However, it was prevented by U.S because Taiwan had been aligned under mutual defense treaty. Thus, PRC turns into peaceful approach by rebuilding the unbound ties with trade and communication. In 1981, PRC asked for unification to Taiwan, but it wasn't responded directly until 1987 Chiang Ching Kuo open the trade between China and Taiwan. But still, Taiwan remain status quo for Chinese unification proposal.

These kinds of political conflict is still happening, but seems unseen because both of parties are managing strategy in cross strait relations. PRC was the first party that offered reunification proposal, but Taiwan which was led by Guomintang rejected it. They claimed that the legitimate ruler of China (mainland include Taiwan) was Guomintang Party. This idea was rejected and couldn't be applied because the red army already occupy the mainland of China territory. Thus, the people in Taiwan choose to be status quo. It becomes hard for China and dilemma for Taiwan because both of parties have their own political ideology and both of them don't want to be ruled by one another. Then both party are building national defense system and

managing cross-strait relation to reduce the conflict. China keep pursuing the Taiwan to return into mainland, but Taiwan slowly respond it and managing its strategy to face China's unification.

The slow respond of Taiwan because of its separation within domestic interest towards cross-strait relations. The two dominance parties have different perspective and interests which is contradicting for the continuity of Taiwanese political independence. One is Nationalist party or well known as Guomintang which has close relation with mainland China politics, because of their historical ties with mainland China. The other party is Democratic Progressive Party which support the independence of Taiwan. In fact that China has never been ruling Taiwan because it has been running with their own democratic state-system and it has a president. Most of the president like Chiang Ching Kuo, Lee Teng Hui, and Chen Shui bian have their own policy towards cross strait relations. Most of them did slow respond towards cross-strait political interest, but they had applied economic and trade policy with China in cross strait relations.

The fear of threat from China can't be avoided since it has big growth in economic and military modernization. In the early 21st century, China shows the great development within their GDP as 2nd largest growth on the world. The perspective of Taiwan people with the growth of China makes their sense to defend themselves as important policy. Taiwanese already enjoy their democracy and their living style which is not influenced by mainland communism ideology. Moreover, most of the Taiwanese president had to choose the policy to maintain the stability of domestic

condition. Thus, it makes them have to maintain security alignment with the ally which has similar ideology and similar interest, United States.

Taiwan has no other choice to align itself with United States. The great power of U.S military is the one in the world who can challenge Chinese military power. Besides that, U.S has more ally in East Asia such as Japan, South Korea, which is close with Taiwan. There are more benefit for Taiwan to align itself with U.S to maintain its existence from the coercion of Chinese military.

Taiwan has strengthen its position to protect the island with U.S since the early 1954. U.S and Taiwan align itself with mutual defense system. This policy focus to secure the track of U.S trading system in East Asia. But then, since the diplomatic relations turned from Taipei to Beijing, Taiwan had new bilateral security alignment with U.S under Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). TRA had approved by U.S Congress as a treaty to maintain the security in western pacific. It helps Taiwan to have self-defense system and protection from any kinds of possible threat and coercion which disturb the stability of Taiwan.

TRA promises to provide arms sales to Taiwan without any interfere from China. After TRA established in 1979, it continued by emphasizing the arm sales from U.S to Taiwan. It declared by President Ronald Reagan in joint Communique 1982 with PRC that U.S will not to limit the time of arm sales and it doesn't need consultation with Beijing. It stances that U.S holds the prerogative to do arms sales to Taiwan. However, the arms sales also not free for Taiwan, but it still need to be approved by Congress. Taiwan has wider opportunity to ask for arsenal from U.S, but it is limited.

The strategy to provide self-defense security by doing arms sales is not enough. The peak of modern conflict for the first time was happening in cross strait relation, after reunification proposal, around 1995-1996. The ballistic missile test from China to northern shore of Taiwan triggered the tension of military use and the possibility of war, but it was abated by the influence of U.S sending two aircraft carrier on the Taiwan Strait. Thus, it makes Taiwan and U.S had to turn new strategy to face PRC's in cross strait relations.

Taiwan and U.S modernize security alignment through TRA in two ways that are maintaining arms sales package and increasing 'software' capability. As aiming to defend the territory, Taiwan and U.S has been modernizing the security alignment since 1997. They have traded the arms sales and keep doing it by modernizing the arsenal. Taiwan and U.S also increasing bilateral security alignment by having top official meetings to decide the strategy, policy, military training, and experts exchange which is mostly called as improving the 'software'. First, there are several top officials meetings such as the visit of Taiwan President to U.S and meetings between Taiwan National Security and Pentagon such as Monterey Talks and Review Talks to discuss the strategy for Taiwan to face PRC. Second, the top level exchange such as sending top military attaché; U.S sends the experts from Pentagon to review the Taiwan security and the China's threat; and joint military exercise such as Han Kuang's training which is observed by active and non-active military personnel from U.S. Third, U.S open the direct access for Taiwan to submit the arsenal needs since 2001 during Bush administration.

As can we see here, the mainland China still become a threat although they propose the reunification to ask Taiwan return with China and Taiwan wants to maintain its political democratic environment over the Pescadores Islands by aligning itself with U.S. The growth of China cannot be avoided and Taiwan realize that it needs to improve the defense system to face the possible 'threat' from China. Taiwan and U.S have been improving post 1997 after the conflict in Taiwan Strait. They're transforming the security cooperation from arms trade only into arms trade and increasing the capability of human resources to manage Taiwan's defense system-usually simplified by improving the 'software'. Taiwan and U.S has an improvement within their bilateral security alignment and transform the security alignment from arms trade and increasing the 'software' compare to deal with the growth of China.

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Attachment

Attachment 1. Ye Jianying's Unification Proposal for Taiwan

PRC Leader Ye Jianying's Nine-Point Proposal

September 30, 1981

Now, I would take this opportunity to elaborate on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of peaceful unification [proclaimed on New Year's Day 1979]:

1. In order to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of the Chinese nation as early as

] possible, we propose that talks be held between the Communist Party of China and the

Kuomintang [Nationalist Party] of China on a reciprocal basis so that the two parties will cooperate for the third time to accomplish the great cause of national unification. The two sides may first send people to meet for an exhaustive exchange of views.

2. It is the urgent desire of the people of all nationalities on both sides of the strait to communicate with each other, reunite with their relatives, develop trade and increase mutual understanding. We propose that the two sides make arrangements to facilitate the exchange of mail, trade, air and shipping services, and visits by relatives and tourists as well as academic, cultural, and sports exchanges, and reach an agreement thereupon.

3. After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administration region, and it can retain its armed forces. The central government will not interfere with local affairs in Taiwan.

4. Taiwan's current socio-economic system will remain unchanged, so will its way of life and its economic and cultural relations with foreign countries. There will be no encroachment on the proprietary rights and lawful right of inheritance over private property, houses, land and enterprises, or on foreign investments.

5. People in authority and representative personages of various circles in Taiwan may take up posts of leadership in national political bodies and participate in running the state.

6. When Taiwan's local finance is in difficulty, the central government may subsidize it as is fit for the circumstances.

7. *For people of all nationalities and public figures of various circles in Taiwan who wish to come and settle on the mainland, it is guaranteed that proper arrangements will be made for them, that there will be no discrimination against them, and that they will have the freedom of entry and exit.*

8. *Industrialists and businessmen in Taiwan are welcome to invest and engage in various economic undertakings on the mainland, and their legal rights, interests, and profits are guaranteed.*

9. *The unification of the motherland is the responsibility of all Chinese. We sincerely welcome people of all nationalities, public figures of all circles, and all mass organizations in Taiwan to make proposals and suggestions regarding affairs of state through various channels and in various ways.*

Taiwan's return to the embrace of the motherland and the accomplishment of the great cause of national unification is a great and glorious mission history has bequeathed on our generation....

We hope that the Kuomintang authorities will stick to their one-China position and their opposition to "two Chinas" and that they will put national interests above everything else, forget previous ill will and join hands with us in accomplishing the great cause of national unification and the great goal of making China prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for our ancestors, bring benefit to our posterity, and write a new and glorious page in the history of the Chinese nation!

This Nine-Point Proposal was taken from *China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy*

Congressional Research Service 43. The research was accomplished by Shirley A. Kan-Specialist in Asian Security Affairs. This policy was proposed by Ye Jianying as the National People's Congress Standing Committee. Then, this policy was spread by *Xinhua (New China News Agency)* as a means to return Taiwan into Motherland through peaceful way.

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Attachment 2. The list of Arms Sales Package for Taiwan, 1990-2007

Table 2. Major U.S.Arms Sales as Notified to Congress

Date of notification	Major item or service as proposed (usually part of a program with related support)	Value of program (\$ million)
1990		
07/26	Cooperative Logistics Supply Support	\$108
09/06	(1) C-130H transport aircraft	\$45
1991		
01/07	(100) MK-46 torpedoes	\$28
07/24	(97) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles	\$55
09/13	(110) M60A3 tanks	\$119
11/18	Phase III PIP Mod Kits for HAWK air defense systems	\$170
1992		
05/27	Weapons, ammunition, support for 3 leased ships	\$212
05/27	Supply support arrangement	\$107
08/04	(207) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles	\$126
09/14	(3) Patriot-derived Modified Air Defense System (MADS) fire units ²⁴³	\$1,300
09/18	(12) SH-2F LAMPS anti-submarine helicopters	\$161
1993		
06/17	(12) C-130H transport aircraft	\$620
06/25	Supply support arrangement	\$156
07/29	(38) Harpoon anti-ship missiles	\$68
07/30	Logistics support services for 40 leased T-38 trainers	\$70
08/	(4) E-2T Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft ²⁴⁴	\$700
09/08	Logistics support services for MADS	\$175
11/04	(150) MK-46 Mod 5 torpedoes	\$54
11/09	Weapons, ammunition, and support for 3 leased frigates	\$238
11/23	MK-41 Mod Vertical Launch Systems for ship-based air defense missiles	\$103
1994		
08/01	(80) AN/ALQ-184 electronic counter measure (ECM) pods	\$150
09/12	MK-45 Mod 2 gun system	\$21
1995		
03/24	(6) MK-75 shipboard gun systems, (6) Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems	\$75
06/07	Supply support arrangement	\$192
1996		
05/10	Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment communications system	\$188
05/10	(30) TH-67 training helicopters, (30) sets of AN/AVS-6 night vision goggles	\$53
05/23	(465) Stinger missiles, (55) dual-mounted Stinger launcher systems	\$84
06/24	(300) M60A3TTTS tanks	\$223
08/23	(1,299) Stinger surface-to-air missiles, (74) Avenger vehicle mounted guided missile launchers, (96) HMMWVs (high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled	\$420

Date of notification	Major item or service as proposed (usually part of a program with related support)	Value of program (\$ million)
	vehicle)	
09/05	(110) MK-46 MOD 5 anti-submarine torpedoes	\$66
1997		
02/14	(54) Harpoon anti-ship missiles	\$95
05/23	(1,786) TOW 2A anti-armor guided missiles, (114) TOW launchers, (100) HMMWVs	\$81
07/24	(21) AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters ²⁴⁵	\$479
09/03	(13) OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Armed Scout helicopters	\$172
11/09	Pilot training and logistics support for F-16 fighters	\$280
11/09	Spare parts for various aircraft	\$140
1998		
01/28	(3) Knox-class frigates, ²⁴⁶ (1) MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System	\$300
06/01	(28) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and targeting pods for F-16 fighters ²⁴⁷	\$160
08/27	(58) Harpoon anti-ship missiles	\$101
08/27	(61) Dual-mount Stinger surface-to-air missiles	\$180
08/27	(131) MK 46 Mod 5(A)S anti-submarine torpedoes	\$69
10/09	(9) CH-47SD Chinook helicopters	\$486
1999		
05/26	(240) AGM-114KS Hellfire II air-to-surface missiles	\$23
05/26	(5) AN/VRC-92E SINGARS radio systems, (5) Intelligence Electronic Warfare systems, (5) HMMWVs	\$64
07/30	Spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, and IDF aircraft	\$150
07/30	(2) E-2T Hawkeye 2000E airborne early warning aircraft	\$400
2000		
03/02	Modernization of the TPS-43F air defense radar to TPS-75V configuration	\$96
03/02	(162) HAWK Intercept guided air defense missiles	\$106
06/07	(39) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and targeting pods for F-16 fighters	\$234
06/07	(48) AN/ALQ-184 ECM pods for F-16s	\$122
09/28	(146) M109A5 howitzers, 152 SINGARS radio systems	\$405
09/28	(200) AIM-120C AMRAAMs for F-16 fighters	\$150
09/28	(71) RGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship missiles	\$240
09/28	Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE) communication system	\$513

Date of notification	Major item or service as proposed (usually part of a program with related support)	Value of program (\$ million)
2001		
07/18	(50) Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems (JTIDS) terminals (a version of Link 16) for data links between aircraft, ships, and ground stations	\$725
09/05	(40) AGM-65G Maverick air-to-ground missiles for F-16s	\$18
10/26	(40) Javelin anti-tank missile systems and (360) Javelin missiles	\$51
10/30	Logistical support/spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, and IDF aircraft	\$288
2002		
06/04	(3) AN/MPN-14 air traffic control radars	\$108
09/04	(54) AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles	\$250
09/04	Maintenance and spare parts for aircraft, radars, AMRAAMS, other systems	\$174
09/04	(182) AIM-9M-1/2 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles	\$36
09/04	(449) AGM-114M3 Hellfire II anti-armor missiles to equip AH-1W and OH-58D helicopters	\$60
10/11	(290) TOW-2B anti-tank missiles	\$18
11/21	(4) Kidd-class destroyers	\$875
2003		
09/24	Multi-functional Information Distribution Systems (MIDS) (for Po Sheng)	\$775
2004		
03/30	(2) Ultra High Frequency Long Range Early Warning Radars	\$1,776
2005		
10/25	(10) AIM-9M Sidewinder and (5) AIM-7M Sparrow air-to-air missiles; continued pilot training and logistical support for F-16 fighters at Luke AFB	\$280
2007		
02/28	(218) AMRAAMs and (235) Maverick air-to-ground missiles for F-16 fighters	\$421
08/08	(60) AGM-84L Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles	\$125
09/12	(144) SM-2 Block IIIA Standard air-defense missiles for Kidd-class destroyers	\$272
09/12	(12) P-3C maritime patrol/ASW aircraft	\$1,960
11/09	Patriot configuration 2 ground systems upgrade	\$939