

# **RUSSIA'S INVOLVEMENT OF NATO PARTNERSHIP**

## **ALLIANCES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**

**Submitted as Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Attainment  
Of the Degree of Sarjana Ilmu Politik (S.IP) in the  
International Relations Department, Social Political Science Faculty  
University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta**



**AN UNDERGRADUATE THESIS**

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**Russia's Involvement of NATO Partnership Alliances in the Post-Cold War Era**



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# Acknowledgment

The

Dedication

Of this thesis

Is split

Six ways:

To my mother Fatimah,

To my father Wasito,

To Sita,

To Sabda,

To Dila,

And to you,

If you have

Stuck

With my thesis

Until the

Very

End.

## Motto

"GOD NEVER FORGETS OUR DREAMS. HE  
CONTINUOUSLY WATCHES OUR PASSION FOR  
THAT DREAM"

(Arushi Chauhan)

*"A hopeless person feels difficulty in every chance,  
but a hopeful person feels a chance in every  
difficulty!!!"*

(Olanrewaju)

*"Once you've learned to overcome fear,  
overcoming everything else is easy"*

(Johnnie Ivery)

**"Persistence is the gas needed to drive your dreams**

(Janice Harris)

**"I don't want to be lucky; it makes me  
lazy and reduces my hard work"**

(Anil Chauhan)

**"My strength did not come from lifting weights. My  
strength came from lifting myself up when I was knocked  
down"**

(Bob Moore)

**Try not to become a man of success but a man of value**

(Albert Einstein)

## ABSTRACTION

This Undergraduate thesis tried to discuss about Russia's Involvement of NATO Partnership Alliances in the Post-Cold War Era. Russia relations with NATO encompassing many ups and downs that began in the Cold War era. Both of Soviet Union and NATO view each other as a common threat for national security, therefore they tried to get more political sphere of influences in Europe countries. Otherwise, after the Cold War era Russia as the successor of Soviet Union dissolution view NATO unlike his predecessor. The question is why? Based on the theory that used, there was a transformation of Russia's foreign policy orientation to responding NATO presence in Europe. Moreover, concerning Russia's declining in term of economic, demographic and military capability urged the state to apply Rational Choice Theory and rationally improve the cooperation with NATO in order to strengthen Diplomatic position and enhance Russia's roles in Europe. At last but not least, this Undergraduate thesis also written in order to fulfill one of the requirements of bachelor degree program in International Relations Department, Social and Political Sciences

## THANKS TO

Alhamdulillah hirabbil'alamin highest praise to my lord, Allah SWT who always listen to my praying along the waves of life therefore I can finish and pass the final duty which entitle "Russia's Involvement of NATO Partnership Alliances in the Post-Cold War Era". Shalawat and Salam,

My deepest appreciation goes to Ir. H. Dasron Hamid, M.Sc (The Rector of Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta), DR. H. Achmad Nurwandi, M.Sc (The Dean of Social Political Faculty of UMY) Mr. Ali Muhammad, M.A., Ph.D (The Head of International Relations Department), Mrs. Siti Muslikhati, S.IP, M.Si (The Secretary of International Relations Department), my greatest advisor Adde Marup., S.IP., M.A that support me in finishing this thesis until very the end, many advices academically as well as spiritually therefore I can stand up firmly to finish my study in the college. Thanks a lot for everything sir, I dedicated this thesis for you. My gratitude also goes to Ali Muhammad, M.A., Ph.D (Chief of Examiner), Mr. Adde Marup., S.IP., M.A (Examiner I), Mr. Takdir Ali Mukti, S.Sos., M.Si (Examiner II), Mr. Djumari and Mr. Waluyo (the student service in International Relations Department).

Much of gratitude goes to my beloved family my Father, my Sister, my Younger Brother and especially for my Mother that supported me behind. Much of gratitude to all of my ancestor and also great thanks to Bulek Sih and Om Idad that provide me facilities when I wrote my thesis. The one that I really love Dila Yunita Setyowati that always support me even though with her anger, instead that make me become diligent personality in finishing my study. Duda Dami, Duda Nisa, Mbak Dina and all of my family in Purwodadi that really

helpful whenever I need help, Mas Sumar and Mbak lastri that always welcome me when I come to their home, I really appreciate that.

At last but not least, much of gratitude goes to all of my friends encompassing from my best friends Hari, Aryanto, Tri Maryanto and Budi Solehudin. All of my friends in Chelyabinsk Russia, Alexander Podolsky, Oxana, Pavel Kirchanov, Lena Klimanova, Nastya, Slava, and all of my Bashkir friends especially for Timor I love you all. My friends from China, Queeny, Homing Lee, Linda and Isabel thanks for everything that we have spend together in Russia to do our Student Exchange, my friends from Brawijaya University of Malang, Nurbaety and Amanda that give funny moments when exchange in Russia. Much of thanks goes to my greatest friends in Muhammdiyah University of Yogyakarta, Hilal, Decha, Bastian, Maratus, Omi, Puput, Eka, Nanang, Azka (Brebes) and all my friends in IC that I can not mention one by one, thanks for everything.

Yogyakarta, May 2, 2012

Unggul Andrias Patma



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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### A. Problem Background

The hostility between Russia and NATO began in Cold War era which the conflicts caused by disparity of ideology, economic system, military possessed and the spread of Communism over Europe. By one reckoning, the Cold War began in the 1945-1948 timeframe, and ended in 1989, having been a dispute over the division of Europe.<sup>1</sup> The tension rose up over the division of Germany after declare surrendered. The Berlin blockade was the starting point of tension when Soviet Union tried to cut connection between West Germany that occupied by Great Britain, France, and United States with East Germany that occupied by Soviet Union. On 25<sup>th</sup> February 1948, a Communist-led coup toppled the democratically elected government of Czechoslovakia<sup>2</sup> and then followed by Soviet demand of Finland to sign "The Treaty of Friendship".

United States was respond that its need to deter Communist influence in Europe and gathering Great Britain, France, Canada, Belgium, Netherland, and Luxembourg in order fasten the security alliances in the form of North Atlantic Treaty. It was signed on April 4, 1949.<sup>3</sup> The members of NATO were as follows; United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Denmark, Portugal, Norway,

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<sup>1</sup> Global Security, "Military: Cold War", Available from [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cold\\_war.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cold_war.htm), Retrieved at June 11, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> David A. Lake, "Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in its Century", pp. 135.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

Iceland, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. The twelve states believed that must to resist the Soviet Union Communism that posed a threat for democratic countries in the Europe. Moreover, President Truman introduces the Truman Doctrine that the content was "it must be the policy of United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure" that clearly resist the communist presence. To realize the Truman Doctrine, United States was launched Marshal Plan in order to recover European economic.

On May 9, 1949, Stalin realized that he could not force the withdrawal of western nations from West Berlin and he admitted defeat by lifting the Berlin Blockade.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, in order to counterbalance and respond the formation NATO, Soviet Union and his satellites formulate the Warsaw Pact that were include all communist countries except Yugoslavia. The Warsaw Pact is the name commonly given to the treaty between Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union, which was signed in Poland in 1955 and was officially called 'The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance'.<sup>5</sup> Similarly with NATO, Warsaw Pact was the agreement that cooperated in military assistances to member states and use arm forces to conduct their actions.

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<sup>4</sup> TK Chung, "Cold war 1945-1960", Available from <http://www.funfront.net/hist/europe/coldwar.htm#top>, Retrieved 11 June 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Warsaw Life, "The Warsaw Pact", Available from <http://www.warsaw-life.com/poland/warsaw-pact>, Retrieved at 11 June 2011.

Similarly with Soviet Union, Russia view NATO as a threat for its national security. Moreover, under Russian strong objection for NATO expansion to the former of Warsaw Pact members (Poland, Czech and Hungary), criticized that it was too early to invite those countries and would create threat to its border in Russia with the presence of NATO. Otherwise, In 1999 Czech, Hungary, and Poland officially inducted to be members after their rebellion fight against Communism. It followed by other Eastern Europe countries in 2004 as follows: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Hereinafter, NATO expected progress of membership process with Albania, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the Framework of the Membership Plan.<sup>6</sup>

The strained relationship continued over disagreement over Kosovo war in 1999 and Georgia conflict in 2008. Russia protested the invading of NATO military in Kosovo, assume that the intervened was unilaterally and worsen the condition. Russia blamed NATO that supports the demand of Kosovo independent from Yugoslavia. In contrary, Russia sent its reinforcement troops to South Ossetia as well as Abkhazia to support the independency from Georgia that directly surrendered after five day war with Russia. NATO was did its role to oppose Russia and support Georgia with the formation of NATO-Georgia Commission moreover build missile defense in Kaliningrad. On 12 August Georgia and Russia agreed on cease-fire, the so-called 'six point peace plan' but

Russia remain keep the troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia moreover respond to deploy missiles to counter NATO.

NATO and Russia were signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations in May 1997 to repair the previous hostility and enhance the mutual understanding by cooperation. The signed indicate that Russia would allow participating in Permanent Joint Council, a forum that Russia and other members of NATO could discuss, consult and join action in certain security issues. When the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) created, there were three former Warsaw Pact inducted became members of NATO as follows; Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which means now Russia and NATO met “19+1”. Indeed, when the Founding Act stated that “NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries,”<sup>7</sup>.

Even before Founding Act was signed, Russia has greater contribution to NATO and led peacekeeping and work together in Balkans, specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even, Russian troops make up some 1,200 of the 20,000 peacekeepers in the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some 3,150 of the more than 40,000 deployed in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo and neighbouring countries.<sup>8</sup> Russian diplomacy also did to solve conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina which remained has a great role in peace settlement in these countries.

The new phase of relationship began concurrently when Russia became the successor of Soviet Union dissolution. There was transformation of foreign

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<sup>7</sup> Robert E. Hunter, Sergey M. Rogov, Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant: The Next Stage of NATO–Russia Relations, pp 1.

<sup>8</sup> Office of Information and Press NATO, “NATO and Russia: Partners in Peacekeeping”, <http://www.nato.int/docu/press/010310/bracheng.pdf>. Retrieved at 14 June 2011

policy inside Russia that makes it different with Soviet Union. Unlike Soviet Union that assumes The West as enemy; otherwise Russia stated that there is no enemy after Cold War. As Boris Yeltsin became the first president of Russia Federation with his foreign minister namely Andrei Kozyrev, there was emerged of optimism of post-Cold War era. Boris Yeltsin stated that the post-Cold War world was much safer, that Russia no longer had enemies, and that he saw the United States and the West as a whole as not only a potential partner, but a potential ally.<sup>9</sup> Foreign minister of Andrei Kozyrev also point out that there is neither potential adversaries nor military threat toward Russia. The Russia interest and other democratic countries were the same that should be builds up by enhancing cooperation among them.

Furthermore, following Vladimir Putin's election as President of Russia in the spring of 2000, he announced that he would work to rebuild relations with NATO in a spirit of pragmatism.<sup>10</sup> Following on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, the terrorist attack World Trade Center in United States made NATO and Russia have security challenges which possibly broken everything and this need kind of tight commitment to preserving peace among the alliances. As a result of the bombing in World Trade Center both of NATO and Russia agreed to build new forum to enhancing the cooperation namely NATO-Russia Council (NRC) which the meeting held in Rome on May 2002. In the NRC, NATO as well as Russia would work in equal partnership that upholding from outer threat.

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<sup>9</sup> Christian Thorun, "Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct towards the West", pp 29.

<sup>10</sup> *NATO Russia: Forging Deeper Relations* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division,



The NATO-Russia Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.<sup>11</sup> NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council would be replaced by NRC and continue to intensify their cooperation covering struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies.<sup>12</sup> Unlike the previous PJC in NRC Russia would involve directly in discussion among the allies and participate in actual actions as well as policies application.

As in 21<sup>th</sup> century relations between NATO and Russia, both of partners restated to engage deeper cooperation through the previous formulation of NRC. The result was Medvedev and Obama signed of a nuclear arms treaty namely New START in 2009. The treaty direct to the limitations of U.S and Russia nuclear weapon in order to secure Euro-Atlantic security further. The New START Treaty is an important bilateral arms control agreement that reduces the number of nuclear warheads in both the U.S. and Russian arsenals and provides for a verification regime of each other's nuclear warhead stockpiles and capabilities. More importantly, New START is part of the broader U.S. and NATO efforts aimed at developing better relations with Russia in order to enhance Eurasian

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<sup>11</sup> NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, "Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, NATO-Russia Council: Rome Summit 2002", Available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/press/020528a.htm>. Retrieved at 14 June 2011.

security for the 21st century.<sup>13</sup> The NRC meeting in Sochi at July 2011 formulate a commitment that agreed by Medvedev and NRC ambassador to enhance cooperation on missile defence as well as cooperation in other security areas of common interest. Russia involvement in NATO still step on further cooperation in Europe for future years that really interesting to discuss and examine.

## **B. Research Question**

Why did Russia decide to involve and join partnership with NATO?

## **C. Purpose of the Research**

1. To describe and explain the motives of Russia join partnership with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
2. To identify the evolution of Russia foreign policy toward NATO.
3. To apply the theory and concept of International Relations directly to explain the case that elaborates in this research.

## **D. Theoretical Framework**

### **• Foreign Policy Orientation Concept**

To understand the problem above the writer uses the concept of “Foreign Policy Orientation” in order to solve it. Foreign Policy is actions or ideas designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote some change in the environment that is, in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states.<sup>14</sup> Further, orientation means that the strategy of achieving domestic and external objectives

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<sup>13</sup> John d. Johnson, “Developing Better Relations”, Armed Forces Journal, Available from <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/04/5786296>, Retrieved at 06 November 2011.

<sup>14</sup> *Journal of International Politics*, Foreign Policy Orientation and International Politics, 107-127

to overcome outside threat. K.J. Holsti also note a nation's general strategy or orientation is seldom revealed in any one decision, but results from a series of cumulative decisions made in effort to adjust objectives, values, and interests to conditions and characteristics of domestic and external environments.

To identify the case these are three fundamental orientations that Russia might to respond. The first is isolation which indicated by low level of involvement in most issue areas of the system, a low number of diplomatic or commercial transactions with other countries. It based on assumptions that the state can gain security and independence by reducing contacts with outside. Russia will not adopt this strategy because the security and economic condition weaken by the demise of Soviet Union. Geographical area is also as a consideration after all. Russia will not succeed to isolate himself with NATO expansion because the area is near to Europe that logically contiguous border. Isolation used to succeed if the state is in remote area.

The second is that Non-alignment strategy. It definitely failed if Russia going to adopt this notion. It is because the strained relationship is between Russia and NATO or in other word they are the main actors of the case. Russia feel NATO expansion and military poses in the border threaten the stability of security and of course it is not suited with the notion of Non-alignment strategy. The distances from the conflict also decide the success of Non-alignment, so that Russia is not respond the NATO expansion by doing the strategy of Non-

The third is Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances. Countries that applied this strategy assume that they cannot achieve their objectives, defend their interests, or deter perceived threat by own capabilities. After the demise of Soviet Union, Russia face many problems both of economic and security. The collapse is hampering the economic stability that in turn exacerbates security and political condition. Russia betrayed by other Former Soviet Union countries to join with NATO that cause deep pain. The only choice is that to apply Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances with NATO that consider as enemy.

Russia is in the weak condition and NATO becomes the superpower alliance in Europe. How to recovery both of economic and security is that to participate in alliances. Give more spaces to breath and strengthen the domestic needs and diplomatic position in international stage. Both of Kautilya and Machiavelli advised their Princes to form alliances with their enemies' neighbors, and certainly the possibility that the target of an alliance may have to fight a two-front war is one consideration underlying some modern alliances<sup>15</sup>. In simple, the best way to undertake the strained relationship with NATO is that Russia follows to apply Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances with NATO.

- **Rational Choice Concept**


The next concept is Rational Choice concept which basically borrowed from economics but rapidly grew in political science. Rational choice theorists

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

argued that one could generally predict political behavior by knowing the interests of actors involved.<sup>16</sup> It is mean that the actor rationally chooses the best outcome that will give best result in the end. The writer borrows The Rational Model from Karen Mingst that conceived of as actions chosen by national government that maximize its strategic goals and objectives. To identify the problem here it is the model of Rational Choice<sup>17</sup>:

Table 1.1 The Rational Model of Decision-making (Karen Mingst)



Karen Mingst also notes the state is assumed to be unitary actor with established goals; a set of options, for deciding which option best meets its goals. In the time of conflict or crisis, Rational Choice is an appropriate concept because need short time to make decision while face threatening situation. After the demise of Soviet Union, Russia in the weak condition furthermore threat by the

<sup>16</sup> Michael G. Roskin et al, "Political Science: an Introduction", Seventh Edition, pp 34-35.

<sup>17</sup> Karen Mingst, "Essentials of International Relations", pp 131-133.

existence of NATO in Europe. The presence of NATO in East Europe indirectly is threat the security over the border because NATO expands its alliance with the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. Rationally, if Russia continues against NATO it will be dangerous and give disadvantage to the state. The only option is that Russia turn away from hostility into partnership with NATO in order to keep national security.

### **E. Hypothesis**

The motives that spur Russia to join partnership and form relationship with NATO involving in Permanent Join Council (PJC) recently NRC and the peacekeeping alliances as follows:

- There is a transformation of Russian foreign policy orientation that views NATO not as enemy.
- It is Russia's rational choice to let further NATO enlargement because lack of political influence sphere toward former Soviet countries.

### **F. Method of the Research**

Library Research will be applied in the way of collecting data, explaining the problems as well as analyzing the hypothesis. All the information that supports this research uses the secondary data, which are going from books, newspapers, journals, internet, and other literature sources.

### **G. Range of the Research**

Focusing on the topic, the writer elaborates the history of NATO-Russia relationship started Post Cold War Era until recently. The writer is going to

explain the up down of NATO-Russia relationship that earlier begin by hostility and recently form the partnership under NRC though there is still conflict between NATO and Russia that can erupt any time, moreover the writer also collects the data as long as it is relevant to be used in this research.

## **H. System of Writing**

The outline of the research will be as follows:

CHAPTER I will be explain about the Problem Background, Research Question, Purpose of the Research, Theoretical Framework, Hypothesis, Method of the Research, Range of the Research, and System of Writing.

CHAPTER II will discuss about the history as well as the beginning of Russia and NATO relationship under the formulation of NATO-Russia Council (NRC). In turn, will explaining about NATO-Russia cooperation in Military-to-military ties to preserving Europe security.


CHAPTER III will be emphasizing of the transformation and evolution of Russia foreign policies toward NATO. In this chapter will contain of the leaders foreign policy started from Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin and current president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev. It will prove the changing of Russia's orientation that seeks close partnership with NATO. In addition, chapter three will examine the general differences between Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia that shape the outcomes of foreign policy.

CHAPTER IV will elaborate about NATO enlargement and Russia responds as well as rational choice to the enlargement. This chapter contain the myth of NATO pledge toward Russia to not move eastward except only East

Germany, however NATO and United States denied and broke the pledge itself. In turn, the chapter will examine the mechanisms of enlargement by several steps of partnership before become full-fledge membership in NATO. The next, will elaborate NATO enlargement to the Central and Eastern Europe of former Soviet Union. The last but not least, will discuss about the rational choice inside Russia concerning NATO enlargement by the facts of Russia declining political influence in Europe.

CHAPTER V contains of conclusion from the entire chapter and also answers the question of research.





## CHAPTER II

### RUSSIA KEYS OF COOPERATION WITH NATO IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

In this chapter the writer will elaborate the phase of cooperation between Russia and NATO from the beginning of their relationships. There were many ups and downs between Russia and NATO relationship in the post-Cold War era. However, it created closer contribution toward security in Europe with the formulation of PJC (Permanent Joint Council) that developed more intense in NRC (NATO-Russia Council) as a forum of dialogue and practical peacekeeping security. Moreover, the tragedy of terrorist attack on World Trade Center in United States was tightening the military cooperation between NATO and Russia in order to counter terrorism.

#### A. **General View of Russia Involvement in NRC (NATO-Russia Council)**

The relationship between Russia and NATO intentionally began after Cold War era in 1991. NATO created a forum namely NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) that change into Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as a medium for East-West normalizing relationship in the Post Cold War era. NATO leaders created the council after the end of the Cold War as a forum for political dialogue, consultation, and cooperation in an attempt to foster a new relationship with Central and Eastern European countries.<sup>18</sup>

Russian president Boris Yeltsin was promise that Russia would contribute and participate in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, moreover, offer to

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<sup>18</sup> Gordon B. Hendrickson, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled", Available from [http://www.acus.org/files/publication\\_pdfs/82/0512-Future\\_NATO\\_Russian\\_Relations\\_Gordon\\_Hendrickson.pdf](http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/82/0512-Future_NATO_Russian_Relations_Gordon_Hendrickson.pdf), Retrieved at 14 June 2011, pp-10.

become NATO member in the future. This intention to build good relationship with NATO which have declare by Yeltsin faced cons in the government especially both of military and parliament officer that finally grudgingly accepted what the Yeltsin announce. Both of groups that disagree with Yeltsin argued that NATO was the biggest military organization that seen as the biggest threat as well. The Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that the cooperation with NATO became starting point of wider policy and for the sake of European security. Hereinafter, Yeltsin and Kozyrev confused to get closer to the alliance, limited the influence with alliance or turn away and ignore the alliance while believe that Russia would still isolated though propose to join with NATO.

In order to attract the attention from former Soviet Union the president of United States at that time Bill Clinton announced Partnership for Peace (PfP) that remain as the program that direct to establish the military security alongside the NATO and Partner countries. Russia accepted to participate in Partnership for Peace with certain condition. In a June 1994 meeting between Kozyrev and his NATO counterparts, Russia agreed to participate in PfP but only in exchange for a "far-reaching, cooperative NATO-Russia relationship both inside and outside PfP".<sup>19</sup> It means that Russia would not fully serve as NATO member but still remain the partner of alliances. Certainly, some members of NATO felt uncomfortable with Russia bargaining and it take times to discuss whether would agree or not, but Russia finally got special position with "16+1" status in North Atlantic Council by 1995.

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<sup>19</sup> Smith and Timmins, "Russia, NATO and the EU in an Era of Enlargement," 76.

Moreover, Russia has greater contribution to NATO and led peacekeeping and work together in Balkans, specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even, Russian troops make up some 1,200 of the 20,000 peacekeepers in the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some 3,150 of the more than 40,000 deployed in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo and neighbouring countries.<sup>20</sup> Russian diplomacy also did to solve conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina which remained has a great role in peace settlement in these countries.

NATO and Russia were signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations in May 1997 to normalize the previous hostility and enhance the mutual understanding by cooperation. The signed indicate that Russia would allow participating in Permanent Joint Council, a forum that Russia and other members of NATO could discuss and consult certain security issues.

In the end of 1999 in October when Lord Robertson became NATO Secretary General, the hope to reform relationship with Russia started again. Furthermore, following Vladimir Putin's election as President of Russia in the spring of 2000, he announced that he would work to rebuild relations with NATO in a spirit of pragmatism.<sup>21</sup> The terrorist attack in World Trade Center made NATO and Russia have security challenges which possibly broken every time and this need kind of tight commitment to preserving peace among the alliances. As

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<sup>20</sup> Office of Information and Press NATO. "NATO and Russia: Partners in Peacekeeping". Available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/presskit/010219/brocheng.pdf>. Retrieved at 14 June 2011.

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/presskit/010219/brocheng.pdf>. Retrieved at 14 June 2011.

terrorism rise and became the new threat for all nations it needs the cooperation among states to handle it as Willem Matser<sup>22</sup> said as follows:

“...Few events bring people together more effectively than a tragedy and few tragedies have been greater or their consequences more wide-reaching than that of 11 September. In addition to the several thousand Americans who lost their lives, close to 800 citizens of other NATO countries and nearly 100 Russians died as the twin towers of the World Trade Center collapsed, watched live on television by millions around the world. In the wake of this shared disaster, the unity of purpose of Allies and Russia in the face of a common threat has been a key feature of the international coalition’s war on terrorism. Moreover, the shuttle diplomacy, summits and flurry of new proposals of recent months have clearly opened up great opportunities for closer cooperation and a deeper relationship between NATO and Russia...”

As a result of the bombing in World Trade Center both of NATO and Russia agreed to build new forum to enhancing the cooperation namely NATO-Russia Council (NRC). In the NRC, NATO as well as Russia would work in equal partnership that upholding from outer threat. The NATO-Russia Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide

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<sup>22</sup> Willem Matser works in NATO’s Office of the Special Adviser for Central and Eastern Europe. Willem Matser . *Towards a new strategic partnership: NATO-Russia relations in the wake of 11 September and the prospects for improved cooperation*, NATO Review, Winter 2001/2002 (pdf). Available from <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/NATORReviewMatser.pdf>. Retrieved at 12 June 2011 at 01.22 AM.

spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.<sup>23</sup> NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council would be replaced by NRC and continue to intensify their cooperation covering struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies.<sup>24</sup>

Unlike the previous PJC in NRC Russia would involve directly in discussion among the allies and participate in actual actions as well as policies application that according to Rome declaration: "The NATO-Russia Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. The NATO-Russia Council will serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. It will operate on the principle of consensus. NATO member states and Russia will continue to intensify their cooperation in areas including the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theater missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies".<sup>25</sup> Russia has advantages to take a part in discussion or even reject

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<sup>23</sup> NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality. Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation. NATO-Russia Council: Rome Summit 2002. Available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b020528e.htm>. Retrieved at 14 June 2011

<sup>24</sup> Ibid

<sup>25</sup> Gordon B. Hendrickson, "The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance With a Bear and Not Get Mauled", Available from [http://www.acus.org/files/publication\\_pdfs/82/0512-Future-NATO-Russia-Relations-Gordon-Hendrickson.pdf](http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/82/0512-Future-NATO-Russia-Relations-Gordon-Hendrickson.pdf). Retrieved at 14 June 2011, pp 14

the agreement among NATO allies in NRC. Further, Russia has greater contribution within joint actions in the key areas of cooperation.

As a result of Lisbon summit in November 2010, both of Medvedev administration and his NATO's counterparts pledge to work towards achieving a true strategic and modernized partnership based on the principles of reciprocal confidence, transparency, and predicatability, with the aim of contributing to the creation of a common space of peace, security and stability. The summit was emphasizing on the importance to the Allies of developing "a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia" and their determination to "enhance political consultation and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests" and to "use the full potential of the NRC for dialogue and joint action".<sup>26</sup> Even though the relations between Russia and NATO many ups and downs but at least they succeeded to recover the hostility in the Cold War era become strategic partnership and will continue to the better result in the next future. The writer will elaborate the key areas of cooperation in NRC that encompass many areas.

#### **B. Military-to-Military Cooperation**

The establishment of North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) on 1991 in the Post-Cold War era brought a new relationship between the East and West Europe. The creation of NACC by NATO was open to all of Europe countries and former Warsaw Pact to involve in preserving security in the Post-

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<sup>26</sup> NATO, "NATO's Relations with Russia", Available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B6C63430-5971463F/natolive/topics\\_50090.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B6C63430-5971463F/natolive/topics_50090.htm)?, Retrieved at 27 November 2011.

Cold War era. NACC launched Partnership for Peace (pfp) at January 1994 Summit in Brussels provided military-to-military cooperation for peacekeeping and other joint security missions. The key requirements for membership included (1) preserving democratic control of defense forces; (2) agreeing to ensure the accessibility of national defense planning and budgetary processes to the Alliance; (3) committing to develop the capability to contribute to peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations under the authority of the UN and/or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and (4) developing the capacity to carry out military missions more effectively in concert with NATO members.<sup>27</sup>

Russia and NATO cooperation in military were begun practically in 1995. In that time Russia agreed and prepare for participation in Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR). In total, 1,500 Russian troops with 300 pieces of heavy weaponry went on duty in early February 1996, officially under the command of American General George Joulwan, who also happened to be NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).<sup>28</sup>

In June of 2005, the NRC Defense Ministers adopted "Political-Military Guidance towards Enhanced Interoperability between Forces of Russia and NATO Nations", that the aims was to enhance the military cooperation through three levels of military command and operation as follows: Strategic, Operational and tactical. It required high commitment of military transparency by both side in

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<sup>27</sup> Sharyl Cross, "Russia and NATO toward 21th Century: Conflicts and Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo", pp-3.....

<sup>28</sup> Vincent Pouliot, "International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy", Cambridge Studies in International Relations, pp-123.



practical term. In addition, NRC held various seminars including of fuels interoperability, terrorist tactics, defense reform and peacekeeping, logistics, defense budgeting, area surveillance and maritime support. Moreover, the military staff exchanges were also organized by NRC that held in NATO Defense College of Rome, where a group of Russian military staffs got chance of the teaching in the first time. In 2006, Russia and NATO continue to joint exercises that held both of in Russia and NATO countries. The exercises were including of consequence management exercises, joint responses to terrorist attacks, missile defense command post exercises and nuclear weapons accident response.

Common threat of terrorisms over the world brought Russia and NATO under the formulation of NRC strengthening their ties in order to fight against it especially in Euro-Atlantic area. The cooperation include of exchanges of information, in-depth consultation, joint threat assessments, civil emergency planning for terrorist attacks, high-level dialogue on the role of the military in combating terrorism and on the lessons learned from recent terrorist attacks, and scientific and technical cooperation. NATO Allies and Russia also cooperate in areas related to terrorism such as border control, non proliferation, airspace management, and nuclear safety.

Indirect disagreement between Russia and United States over Afghanistan war turn away became partnership in the form of NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Through NRC the peace settlement would be uphold as David C. Sneedie stated:

“...The United States/NATO and Russia have clear and urgent common interests in promoting long-term stability in Afghanistan. These include containing and defeating "radical extremist" forces, reversing the noxious effects of the opium trade from that country, and preventing instability in Afghanistan from impacting an extended region. Despite these shared interests, cooperation between Russia and the West is "episodic," rather than strategic or systematic...”<sup>29</sup>

Russia and other Central Asian countries used as the basis and transit route to supply aid and non-lethal logistics such as food and fuel to supply their operation in Afghanistan. The transit could tighten the relations between Russia and NATO especially with United States that considered as former Cold War adversaries. Both of NATO and Russia fear with the expansion of Islamic extremism in southern borders of Russia and pledge to overcome it by sustainable development assistances. Russia has also cooperated with NATO to train Afghan forces to counter narcotics operation and rebuild infrastructure in Afghanistan. NRC and its member states can make to complement national and international efforts to address threats posed by illegal trafficking in Afghan narcotics, taking into account commitments undertaken in the framework of the Berlin Declaration on Counter-Narcotics, such as<sup>30</sup>:

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<sup>29</sup> David C. Speedie. *U.S./NATO-Russia Cooperation on Afghanistan and Central Asia*. August 17, 2009. Available from [http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/articles\\_papers\\_reports/0028.html](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0028.html). Retrieved at 14 June 2011.

<sup>30</sup> NATO, “NATO Action Plan on Terrorism”, Available from

- enhanced information exchange among NRC member states on the threats posed by the Afghan narcotics industry and trade, and on national and multilateral efforts aimed at addressing those threats;
- consideration of joint training initiatives in NRC member states, aimed, inter alia, at strengthening the capabilities of Afghan and transit route states' counter narcotics units and border guards, subject to the request of these states; and
- organisation of conferences and workshops to explore possible additional cooperative initiatives;

From the geography side, Russia is in crucial regional place that lies near to Central Asia and Middle East presumably as a basis of terrorisms. Therefore, Russia has a significance role in preventing and combating terrorisms in those regions one of that by cutting the possibility of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As we know that Russia is nuclear country, therefore Russia's commitment in Non-Proliferation Treaty should be maintain to preserve the security in cooperation with NATO. Russia combating terrorism was visibly when Chechen rebels that labeled as terrorists came to terror. It is support by US and NATO in fighting the Islamist rebellion and preventing the terrorist connection of Taliban Afghanistan presence in Eastern Europe.

Moreover in 2006, Russia and NATO under the NRC command were participating in Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) in Mediterranean. The naval

operation was aimed to counter terrorists over the region which continues in 2007 and 2008. The other counter terrorism exercise was held in June 2011 in Kaliningrad which called by Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) of “Vigilant Skies 2011”. The exercise was intended to prevent terrorist’s attacks like in the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 by sharing information of plane movements in NATO and Russian airspace. As what Major General Yevgeni Potapov, the Russian Exercise Director stated that this exercise will contribute to developing standards of communication between our Russian military and civil experts and their colleagues from NATO, [...] raising the possibilities of protecting citizens from terrorist acts. A total of around 10 millions euros have been invested in the CAI project. Nations that have contributed financially include Canada, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>31</sup>

Russia expressed its deep commitment with multilateral cooperation in Nuclear Non-Proliferation issue. Perceive that Nuclear Non-Proliferation should be achieved multilaterally and became one of the major foreign policy in Russia. Nuclear Non-Proliferation issue was important in Russia’s policies which according to the National Security Concept, was approved by Presidential Decree 24 on 10 January 2000, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is considered to be amongst the main threats in

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<sup>31</sup> NATO, “First live NATO-Russia counter-terrorism exercise in the skies”, Available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B6C63430-5971463F/natolive/news\\_75376.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B6C63430-5971463F/natolive/news_75376.htm), Retrieved at 28 November 2011.

international relations. Here it is some of Russia commitments in strengthening the WMD Non-Proliferation regime:

- fulfilling mutual obligations to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction;
- maintaining international export controls on goods and technologies;
- adapting existing arms control and disarmament agreements to new conditions of international relations, and
- facilitating the establishment of zones free from weapons of mass destruction.<sup>32</sup>

Russia's Foreign Policy Concept, which was approved a few months after the National Security Concept on 20 June 2000, further develops and clarifies some provisions of the National Security Concept.<sup>33</sup> In this policy document, the Russian Federation confirms its commitment to working with other states in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, as well as related material and the associated technologies. Russia also firmly supports to strengthen and cooperate with international communities and invite other states in the world to join.

Concerning the international commitment toward Nuclear Non-Proliferation issue Russia was not like United States and NATO that really worried about the threat of Nuclear WMD and maintains military deployments abroad. Russia simply created multilateral cooperation with other countries in the

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<sup>32</sup> Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen, "The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy", Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, pp-70.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid

world and did not conduct military deployments as what United States and NATO did. It means that the military deployment deteriorated the relationship among countries. While United States and NATO worried about new nations in gaining Nuclear Weapon by military deployments, in other side Russia strengthen in world arena by diplomacy and cooperation including with United States and NATO. Moreover, Russia is much more concern worrying about non-state actors in gaining nuclear proliferation. It would be very dangerous if the terrorists have Nuclear Weapons that can cause the real threat in the world society.

Russia commitment was seen of the prevention of nuclear proliferation among non-state actors by demonstrating and promoting the Convention against Nuclear Terrorism that became the first international convention and approved UN General Assembly in September 2005. Russia proposal contained specific international and national aimed to prevent nuclear terrorism by effort at improving cooperation among states in fighting it. Therefore, United States and Russia as the biggest states that owned huge nuclear weapons agreed to adopt the Global Initiative on Countering Nuclear Terrorism. Moreover, the two partners invite IAEA as the observer including as many states as possible to participate in the event to broadly strengthen national responsibility in nuclear terrorism worldwide. They agreed the formulation of convention to achieve the implementation action including of:

- improving protection, control and accounting of nuclear material and radioactive substances, as well as physical security of nuclear installations.

- detecting and intercepting illegal trafficking and other illegal activities involving nuclear and radioactive material and above all, implementing measures aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring and using such material;
- responding to acts of nuclear terrorism and neutralizing their consequences;
- developing technical means to contribute towards countering nuclear terrorism;
- ensuring that law enforcement agencies undertake all possible measures to avoid sheltering terrorists who seek to acquire and use nuclear material;
- strengthening national laws in order to ensure efficient prosecution and punishment of terrorists and those assisting them.<sup>34</sup>

Like the other countries that perceives terrorist and proliferation threats, Russia assumes that the threat coming from the South, Middle East and Islam extremist. Russia and some Western countries have agreed to permit an operation in addressing controversial issues like in Afghanistan war, Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and peace-building settlement in Iraq and Iranian nuclear programmed. Indeed, it has created in easing Western criticism toward Russian operations in Chechnya.

### **C. Civil Emergency Cooperation**

NATO and Russia has cooperated in civil emergency intensively after the creation of NRC. For its part, the Alliance has long had its Senior Civil

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid

Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC), which is also part of the broader European Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordinating Committee (EADRCC).<sup>35</sup>

This area of cooperation for civil emergency preparedness has succeeded because of lack political interest involve in its participations. NATO and Russia altogether hand in hand cooperated in Europe and beyond to rescue the risks terrorisms, natural disasters including the possible use of chemical, biological, radiological weapons and man-made disasters that pose serious threats to the civilian community.

The aim of Civil Emergency Preparedness is to collect, analyze and share information on national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources for use during emergency situations, in accordance with Alliance objectives that enables Allies and Partner nations to assist each other in preparing for and dealing with the consequences of crisis, disaster or conflict.<sup>36</sup> In the early beginning of Civil Emergency creation, NATO and the partner countries have give assistance to protect population merely from man-made disaster or in the conflict situation. Otherwise, natural disaster and terrorism have threatened the civilian lately. Therefore, NATO and partner countries especially Russia in this stand agreed to cooperate each other because countries can no longer rely on merely national solutions for large scale civil emergencies. Emergencies have transnational dimensions that became a global awareness, therefore the creation of Civil Emergency between NATO and partner countries especially Russia provides

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<sup>35</sup> Robert E. Hunter, Sergey M. Rogov, Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant: The Next Stage of NATO-Russia Relations, pp 12.

<sup>36</sup> NATO, Backgrounder: NATO's Role in Civil Emergency Planning, available from [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_publications/20120116\\_cep-e.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120116_cep-e.pdf), retrieve at 23 April 2012.



a good forum to handle the emergency whether individually or collectively operations.

Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) is a committee to guide Civil Emergency Planning which compose of national representatives from partner countries who work together under the authority of NATO. Under SCEPC's direction, 8 technical Planning Boards and Committees (PB&Cs) bring together national government experts, industry experts and military representatives to coordinate planning in various areas of civil activity. These areas are:<sup>37</sup>

- Civil aviation
- Civil protection
- Food and agriculture
- Industrial production and supply
- Inland surface transport
- Medical matters
- Ocean shipping
- Civil electronic and postal communications

Civil Emergency is a multi-dimensional and transnational effort; therefore the management requires extensive cooperation with other NATO committees, partner countries and coordination from international organizations particularly the United Nations. Civil Emergency Planning and Preparedness give advantages toward NATO allies as well as Partner countries that involve within the

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid

cooperation and handle the emergency situations in Euro-Atlantic regions and beyond. Through the exchange of information and best practices, and through participation in international training and exercises, nations at local, regional and national levels are better equipped to respond to protection of civilian populations in crisis situations. For example, NATO and partner countries contribution for assisting emergency beyond Euro-Atlantic regions is earthquake in Pakistan. NATO and Russia give humanitarian assistance in the form of medical and engineering units to Pakistan.

Russia has a contribution for Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) establishment because it was based on a proposal made by Russian Federation. It created under the framework of Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to coordinate and response toward natural and man-made disasters in Euro-Atlantic region. After the terrorist attack at World Trade Centre in United States EADRCC also has a role in coordinating nations' responses following a terrorist act involving chemical, biological or radiological agents, as well as consequence management actions.

EADRCC is operational roles therefore also organize all of international field of exercises to practice response of natural and man-made disasters situations and the management of emergency. EADRCC is close linking with UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance and other international organisations (International Atomic Energy Agency, World Health Organization, World Food Programme, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Since its launch, the EADRCC has been involved in more than 30 operations

around the world ranging from coordination of relief supplies to refugees, aid to flood, hurricane and earthquake victims, fighting forest fires, assistance to Greece during the Olympic Games (2004), operations of hurricane Katrina disaster in the US (2005) and the earthquake in Pakistan (2005-2006).

#### **D. Conventional Arms Forces (CFE) Treaty Cooperation**

Conventional Arms Forces Treaty (CFE Treaty) originally negotiated among NATO member states and former Soviet countries as a replacement from hostility and military confrontation into a new pattern of security relations. The treaty established limits on the numbers of combat aircraft, tanks, attack helicopters, armored combat vehicles and artillery pieces that could be held within Europe by NATO and the states of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact).<sup>38</sup> In order to reach the goals of the Treaty an obligation to fulfil of conventional armaments reduction within States parties. The treaty has been succeeded in achieving the goals and maintaining the arms forces reduction since 1992 although the Treaty was signed in November 1990. It has become and remains the cornerstone of security and stability in Europe, both in terms of the reduction of tensions relating to accumulated weapons through arms control at the regional level, and of greater stability through confidence building, transparency and information exchange among States Parties to the Treaty.

The Treaty, regarded as the most comprehensive arms control agreement in history, provided a means of establishing a military balance between the two

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<sup>38</sup> The full text of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and related Protocols is available on the OSCE web site at: <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/cfe/cfetreat.htm>, retrived at 23 April 2012.

groups of states and served two main purposes. Firstly, it was an arms reduction treaty, which mandated States Parties collectively to decommission more than 50,000 items of heavy weaponry and equipment. Secondly, it served as a conflict prevention treaty aimed at increasing transparency, building confidence, and reducing tension by preventing potentially provocative and destabilizing concentrations of military forces.<sup>39</sup>

The treaty organize the limitation on holding of major weapons as follows; armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Moreover, the CFE Treaty has provided for a detailed information exchange and verification regime. Encompassing the member states from Atlantic to the Urals it has destroyed of about 60,000 pieces of equipment of types limited by the Treaty since 1992. The member states has voluntary give the arm forces to be destroyed after the completion. Indeed, the arm forces that possessed by member states of CFE Treaty are largely below the ceilings authorized by the Treaty.

The current levels of holdings of the principal CFE-Treaty Limited Equipment have confirmed this success: under 25,000 battle tanks for a limit set at 40,000; under 45,000 armored combat vehicles as against the authorized capacity of 60,000; under 29,000 artillery pieces whereas 40,000 are possible; under 2,000 attack helicopters and well under 8,000 combat aircraft for respective authorized

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<sup>39</sup> Joseph Harahan and John Kuhn, *On-site Inspections under the CFE Treaty*, 24 July 1996, Chapter I, from the Federation of American Scientists web site at: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/cfebook/ch1.html>, retrived at 23 April 2012.

ceilings of 4,000 helicopters and 13,600 aircraft.<sup>40</sup> The reductions in major weapons systems have virtually eliminated structural offensive capabilities that had previously existed and created a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe.

The Treaty also established transparency and cooperation concerning conventional heavy weapons on an unprecedented scale. This includes a mechanism in which CFE States Parties could gather information by on-site inspections in order to assist in verifying compliance with Treaty provisions. Close to 1000 inspections among States Parties have been conducted since the Treaty's second Review Conference, over 3500 intrusive inspections have been conducted overall.<sup>41</sup> The CFE Treaty has proven to be an essential contributor to the establishment of mutually-beneficial and cooperative military relationships among the States Parties. It has also demonstrated its ability to be an important tool for security dialogue and confidence building which has contributed to greater Euro-Atlantic security and stability, helping to establish a new culture of mutually cooperative restraints in Europe. The Treaty is a notable example for security and military cooperation in other fields and for other regions and an important contribution to arms control efforts that cumulatively enhance transparency, confidence and trust.

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<sup>40</sup> NATO, *CFE Treaty's Contribution to Euro-Atlantic Security*, available from the partnership [russia and nato/CFE.htm](http://russia.and.nato/CFE.htm), retrieved at 23 April 2012.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

## **CHAPTER III**

### **THE TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIA FOREIGN POLICY**

After discussing Russia keys of cooperation with NATO in the chapter II, in this chapter the writer tries to elaborate the transformation of Russia foreign policy orientation. The writer will explain the shifting of foreign policy orientation in the Soviet era and contemporary Russia, which is Soviet Union adopt Isolationist and hostile attitude with NATO but Russia use Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances with NATO. The writer will trace Russia's foreign policy started from the first president Boris Yeltsin up to current president Dmitry Medvedev that explains the attitude toward NATO. In addition, the writer will elaborate the differences of Soviet Union and Russia foreign policy orientation and why they differ.

#### **A. Russia and NATO Relationship after the Breakup of Soviet Union**

As a result of Soviet Union dissolution, Russia and other former Soviet countries became independent. Russia that previously became the center for Soviet Union Empire now inherited the legacy as one of superpower in Europe. Otherwise, Russia is not the same with Soviet Union that view himself as superpower country in the world. Russia in this stand has different attitude and respond toward NATO present in Europe. Russia has shifted its foreign policy orientation to strengthen Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances with NATO. Russia foreign policy toward NATO has been transformed from hostility and competition to cooperation with them. As Russia Defense Ministry stated

that; "Russia closely follows the process of NATO transformation and counts on the complete removal of direct and indirect components of its anti-Russian orientation from military planning and the political declarations of the member countries of the alliance".

In the Cold War Era Soviet Union set up an Isolation foreign policy that rejects to relate with Western countries. According to K.J. Holsti Isolationist orientations are often based on the assumptions that the state can best gain security and independence by reducing transactions with other units in the systems, or by maintaining diplomatic and commercial contacts abroad while handling all perceived or potential threats by building administrative walls around the home base. Soviet Union and NATO were seen as adversaries in the Cold War Era, while Soviet Union tried to spread Communism ideology in Europe. They were always contending each other in all aspects of international relations. Soviet Union was very powerful in military, therefore Soviet bravely challenge the Western countries in the Cold War Era.

Otherwise, in recent time after the dissolution of Soviet Union, Russia was no longer driven by the desire to spread an ideology, even with coercive means as it was in Soviet times. Russia foreign policy now driven by the perception of multilateralism that set up as a value, a concept, a strategy or a general phenomenon in that country. Therefore, Russia in this stand involve in various international cooperation and agenda for example in cooperation with NATO in peacekeeping forces and permanent member in the UN Security Council. Russia foreign policy orientation shift from hostility in the Cold War Era became adopt

and strengthen Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances with many actors of international relations especially with former enemy NATO.

It showed by Russia active involvement in NRC (NATO-Russia Council) in order to strengthen the foreign policy orientation of Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances with the spirit of multilateralism. Multilateralism is referring to the states involvement (three or more) in various institutions and issue areas. Multilateralism must be distinguished from integration, which involves pooling certain aspects of state sovereignty and authority to a supra-national governmental body (such as the European Commission in the European Union).<sup>42</sup> Russia has described that multilateralism as a foundation and key role of foreign policy. Moreover, Russia said that struggle for “democratization” in international relations based on the principle of multilateralism and respect for international law. In addition, multilateralism could be the strategy in addressing and problem solving of peace and security including as best response to challenges with globalization to enhancing the society welfare.

The highlight of Russia Foreign Policy toward NATO is the purpose of this chapter that exposes the evolution in Russia attitude toward the alliances. How the actors now meets since 1997 under the formulation of NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relation, Cooperation and Security, which provide the basis of NATO-Russia relations in the next phase. Russia has decision to improve the status from a partner in the bilateral framework of Permanent Joint Council

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<sup>42</sup> E. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social forces, 1950–1957*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.



(PJC) established in May 1997 become the ordinary member of new formulation NATO-Russia Council (NRC), founded in May 2002 which Russia has same privileges and responsibilities with other NRC members.

NRC is described as the main mechanism for consultation, consensus building, co-operation, joint decision and joint action between the two partners. Issues that now highlight and discussed in NRC are including the situation in Afghanistan, Serbia (Kosovo) and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Middle East. Practical co-operation, directed by the NRC and developed through various subordinate working groups and committees, is regarded to have generated benefits for all participant countries in several important areas. These include the fight against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defence, logistics, military-to-military co-operation, defence reform and civil emergencies. After the foundation of the NRC in 2002, there were hopes at NATO that co-operation would produce spillover effects to the domestic political realm in Russia, strengthen military reform efforts, enhance transparency in defence decision-making, contribute to the creation of a civil society, and internationally help to solve conflicts.

The hostility between NATO versus Russia in the Cold war era is not appear in contemporary Russian foreign policy, even though sometimes they stand in such disagreements. Contemporary Russia is seeks to enhance Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances and marked by the increasing of many agreements and how to dealing with NATO. In this chapter, the writer will

examines the transformation as well as the evolution of foreign policy during Boris Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev presidency in dealing with especially NATO and the world.

## **B. Russia Foreign policy under Boris Yeltsin Presidency**

A few days before the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union and the first-ever meeting between NATO foreign ministers and those of the former Warsaw Pact, President Yeltsin of Russia wrote a letter to the Secretary General of NATO. Russia, he wrote, wished to develop a dialogue between former adversaries 'both on the political and military levels', and continued: 'Today, we are raising the question of Russia's membership in NATO regarding it, however, as a long-term political aim'.<sup>43</sup> Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev explained in a radio interview that Russia no longer regarded NATO 'as an aggressive military bloc' but viewed it 'as one of the mechanisms of stability in Europe and in the world as a whole. Our desire to co-operate with this mechanism and to join it is therefore natural'. He advocated the creation of a 'zone of security and co-operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok' in which NATO would 'play a role that is positive and by no means insignificant'.<sup>44</sup>

The first Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev after the dissolution of Soviet Union stated that, there was a good deal of optimism about the prospects of the post-confrontational era. He justified this assessment by referring to the fact

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<sup>43</sup> Yeltsin's letter of 20 December 1991, in *Pravda*, 23 December 1991. At the Brussels meeting, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) was created, later renamed Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

<sup>44</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, on Radio Mayak (Moscow), in Russian, on 23 December 1991, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report Soviet Union*, FBIS-SOV-91-247, 24 December

that there were 'neither potential adversaries nor military threats to Russian interests', and that the world was going through a 'transition from the former global division and confrontation to a system of relations of global cooperation'. Moreover, post-confrontational era should be build common interests and shared values between East and West which the interest of Russian diplomacy is just the same with other democracy states. President Boris Yeltsin in turn added that the post-Cold War world was much safer, that Russia no longer had enemies, and that he saw the United States and the West as a whole as not only a potential partner, but a potential ally.<sup>45</sup>

The shift of Russia foreign policy began in Yeltsin presidency era which adopts Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances toward NATO that created great impact for its relationship. In Yeltsin presidency, Russia and NATO reach a deal to enhance their relations by formulate Permanent Joint Council (PJC) that now change into NRC. Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances foreign policy orientation results Liberal views in Russia elite politics that desire to set up democracy systems inside of the state. Liberal ideas was dominated the Russian foreign policy in Yeltsin era which assumptions shared interests and greater cooperation between East and west. In the Soviet era, capitalist of the West as the main enemy as was stated by Lenin that made such tensions and hostile attitude with Western Europe and North America. Otherwise, in Gorbachev era it was replaced by the idea that Russia was remain one of the part of Europe and isolation from Europe and North America was harmful for Russia. In the early

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<sup>45</sup> Christian Thorun, "Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct towards the West", pp 29.

1990s, this approach was enthusiastically taken up by Yeltsin and members of his government, who viewed Russia's integration into Western political, security, and economic structures as their primary goal. Andrei Kozyrev in turn stated that Russia should "return to the civilization":

our active foreign policy, our diplomacy, are necessary to guarantee the entry into the world community [...] and thereby to help meet the internal needs of Russia. [...] The developed countries of the West are Russia's natural allies. It is time finally to say firmly that we are neither adversaries nor poor little brothers who are following the orders of a rich and malevolent West intending to buy up Russia. (*Izvestiya*, 2 January 1992).

As the impact of Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances foreign policy orientation that adopt by Russia, Kozyrev immediately rose to the challenge, insisting that Russia should not aspire to be a military superpower, but 'a normal great power'. Having named some of the obstacles to Russian foreign policy abroad, Russia's independent foreign policy started with the West. It started with the United States, and we feel that this was justified. We had to lay the main foundation—that is, to prepare a detailed treaty on the global reduction and elimination of strategic nuclear weapons, on the basis of which it would be easier, afterward, to build relations with any country, be it from the West or East, Europe, or Asia.<sup>46</sup>

How to adopt the 'a normal great power' is that to increase the relationship with Euro-Atlantic states that assume as the centre of power. The aim is that to

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<sup>46</sup> Iver B. Neumann, "RUSSIA AND THE IDEA OF EUROPE: A study in identity and international Relations", pp-182.

strengthen Russian position and economic recovery that hampering after the dissolution of Soviet Union. The United States's possibilities and role as partner will decrease, while Western Europe's has the potential to increase. However, this does not spell a 'Euro-centric' model for foreign policy. Cooperating with the United States in as high a degree as possible will strengthen Russia's position in Europe, a position which has grown weaker and will grow weaker still over the next decade. Russia's interest lies with a permanent balancing between an American and a European orientation. Russia's longterm interest is to draw as closely as possible to the EC, with the aim of stepping into the European economic and political space of which the EC is the centre. Yet this does not imply the total identification of Russian interests with those of the Community. Russia will maintain political room for manoeuvre and a multi-polar European politics, and she will limit the military-political functions of the EC. Therefore, there is also a long-term interest in maintaining NATO and developing a partnership with this organisation. (*Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 19 August 1992)<sup>47</sup>.

Instead, Russia perceive that after the dissolution of Soviet Union while defining the identity of the state, the Russian leader emphasized that post-Soviet Russia was a democratic and anti-Communist country. Arguing that all of former Soviet countries were became the victims of Soviet tyranny and now they can decide the destiny by themselves. This anti Communist interpretation of post-Soviet Russia's identity had an impact on the perception of Russia's international status and role. Russian status as great power in Soviet times because of its

capacity of military and the size of the empire has different interpreted in post-Cold War era. In the post-Cold War era Kozyrev stated that the greatness of the state is determine by level of people welfare. Russia was no longer driven by the desire to spread an ideology, even with coercive means as it was in Soviet times. Otherwise, reflected to use the term of Normal State that define as the way of Russia to establish cooperation and interaction relationship with all of democratic countries is not by political and military confrontation. In turn, Yeltsin shared his view in 1994 through *The View from the Kremlin*; the first chapter is titled 'A Normal Country'. He explains that *normal* means that post-Soviet Russia was to follow a democratic path of development and no longer regarded itself as having a special international mission.<sup>48</sup>

The conception of Normal State had significant impact and consequences for Russia foreign policy. First of all, Russia under President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev should overcome the legacy of Soviet Union in order to seek partnership even alliances with the West that will recognize Russia status and position in international relations. In turn, Russia should adopt democratize the system of government that could support to seek the partnership with the West. Instead, Kozyrev argued that the fast recognition of Russia as the successor of Soviet Union was due to Russia has adopt democracy after the dissolution of USSR and poses no threat to any countries or citizens. Liberal views was very deep influence the foreign policy decision making in Yeltsin era

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<sup>48</sup> Yeltsin, *The View from the Kremlin*, pp. 7–8.

in order to define Russian identity, international role and status, Normal State and Russia interest in fostering cooperation and democracy.

In the earliest of 1993, Russia optimism to gain international recognition of Normal but great power emerged. Even though, Russia not get the significant role in international world community yet but there emerge of assumption that Russia is unique. in his 1996 Address to the Federal Assembly, rather than arguing that Russia was a member of the democratic or Western community of states, Yeltsin said: 'Russia is a unique country with its own interests and its own logic of development. From the historical point of view, Russia is a successor to the Rus, Moscow's Czarism, the Russian Empire and of the USSR. From the geopolitical perspective, Russia is in the unique position of being in Eurasia. Russia emphasize on equal partnership that eventually give benefits for both sides. Furthermore, Russia's identity as Eurasian power implied that Russia not only should build the relationship with the West but also USA, East Asia, Asia Pacific, Latin America and Africa.

Furthermore, the optimism continued by more assertive foreign policy in Russia to view the relationship with the West and international world community. Russian leader expect to get support from Western countries in order help Russia's transition toward democracy and a market economy. Russia is really need external aids with the assumption if the Western countries do not give such assistance it could be very dangerous for the emerging of extremist rebellion that oppose Western countries to take over the government in Russia and it would become negative impact for East-West relations. Although there was agreement

throughout this period that Russian foreign policy had to become more assertive, there was a difference in the assessment of the viability of using the threat of the rise to power of communist and revisionist forces. From 1993/94 to 1996 the Russian leadership continued to argue that there was a close relationship between Western policies and the danger of the rise of nationalist and conservative forces in Russia that could also pose a threat to the West if they came to power. Kozyrev argued in 1994, 'the policies of Russian reformers and their friends abroad must be pursued taking into account how these policies are perceived inside Russia. [...] Russian foreign policy inevitably has to be of an independent and assertive nature. If Russian democrats fail to achieve it, they will be swept away by a wave of aggressive nationalism, which is now exploiting the need for national and state self-assertion'.<sup>49</sup> In practice, this assertion meant that Russian diplomacy was tasked with ensuring that the country was involved in international decision-making, preserving the status quo by upholding norms of non-intervention and peaceful conflict resolutions, and defending the role of the United Nations as the main arbiter of international conflicts.<sup>50</sup>

According to K.J. Holsti the conception of Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances are closely linked to domestic needs. It means that countries that seek to reform economic problems and enhance state roles in international relations. Moreover, Both of Kautilya and Machiavelli advised their Princes to form alliances with their enemies' neighbors, and certainly the possibility that the

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<sup>49</sup> Kozyrev, 'The Lagging Partnership', p. 61. For a similar argument, see Kozyrev, 'Partnership is not Premature', p. 1.

<sup>50</sup> Yeltsin, 'Russia at the Turn of a New Era: Annual State of the Nation Address - 1999', p. 1.



target of an alliance may have to fight a two-front war is one consideration underlying some modern alliances. So, in the beginning of Russia independent from Soviet dissolution, the state adopts the notions of Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances foreign policy toward NATO in order to get back Russia on feet. It is means that to make Russia has voices and roles in international relations to gain more strategic positions in Europe. The tangible example of Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances foreign policy that adopt by Russia in Yeltsin Era was Russia and NATO signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations in May 1997 in order to reform the previous hostility and enhance the mutual understanding by cooperation. The signed indicate that Russia would allow participating in Permanent Joint Council as other members of NATO to discuss and consult certain issues regarding to security and others.

### **C. Russia Foreign Policy under Vladimir Putin Presidency**

In the year of 1999, President Boris Yeltsin resigned and replaced by Vladimir Putin that previously acting as prime minister. The period of Putin era is the continuation of Boris Yeltsin in adopting Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances foreign policy toward NATO. Russia continued to seek role in international relations through strengthen cooperation with the idea of multilateralism or multipolar system. Russia emphasized on economic sector and argued that NATO enlargement no longer played dominant role in foreign policy agenda. It was the continuation of Yeltsin era that also fostering the economic sector, otherwise in Putin era went deeper than it was. Putin believed that

... and strengthen the economic sector could be enhance the role of Russia

foreign policy in the world community. In turn, Russia sees NATO not as a hostile organization, as what Putin stated with the possibility to enhance cooperation with NATO. Is it possible that Russia will ever join NATO?' Putin: 'Why not? I do not rule out such a possibility. I repeat, on condition that Russia's interests are going to be taken into account, if Russia becomes a full-fledged partner.'<sup>51</sup>

The talks about Russia joining NATO had become popular again after the presidential election in Russia which is Vladimir Putin acting as the winner. When Putin asked by BBC on the interview of Russia possibility to join NATO, Putin said that "why not" under the condition Russia get status as equal in the alliance. It is making such opinion that Russia move 180 degrees after the policy of anti-NATO and then become friendlier. Moreover, Putin stated that Russia is part of European culture and I cannot imagine that Russia outside of Europe and it is harmful to assume NATO as enemy. Talking about NATO expansion toward Eastern part of Europe, Putin emphasize that there is special interest that being affected here that we think about our stand in the world right now but it does not mean that we are ready to receive isolationism from NATO Europe countries.

The talking about Russia's greatness was also still one of the major discourses in its foreign policy. The sources of greatness do not imply on the possession of geography, nuclear arsenal or cultural heritage otherwise the leader believe the greater economic self sufficient could be a determinant factor to gain the greatness itself. Consequently, in a 2002 address to Russian diplomats, Putin claimed that 'it is perfectly clear now that Russia has emerged from a period of

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<sup>51</sup> President Putin on 13 March 2000, in an interview with the BBC. Online. Available from [http://www.gazeta.ru/2001/02/28/putin\\_i\\_bbc.shtml](http://www.gazeta.ru/2001/02/28/putin_i_bbc.shtml), retrieved at 15 December 2011.

prolonged confrontation in international relations. It is no longer seen as an enemy or adversary, but increasingly as a predictable, reliable, business-like, and equal partner. As a matter of fact, this is all we need from the outside world. Russia does not need any preferences in international affairs'.<sup>52</sup> The change of Russia's primary goals and interpretation in international status brought the different national interests. Russia has chosen to further cooperate and close partnership with the West and United States rather than gaining the state's status by assertive and ambitious foreign policy. Moreover, Putin argued that a close relationship and partnership both of Russia and United States is not only affect in the interest of our nations but also has positive impact in entire of international relations system.

In Vladimir Putin Era, Russia emphasizing Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances foreign policy by cooperate in fighting terrorism as an impact of the bombing in World Trade Center by the terrorists. Vladimir Putin seek for the benefits of the cooperation with Western countries especially include of fighting international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons mass destruction and regional or territorial conflicts. The Russian leadership was especially concerned about international terrorism and argued that it was the most imminent threat to international stability and that the 'civilized world' should unite in the fight against it.<sup>53</sup> Foreign Minister Ivanov argued in 2002, 'today again, like during the Second World War, Russia and the US became allies, allies in the war with this

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<sup>52</sup> V. Putin, 'Key Tasks of Russian Diplomacy: Statement by RF President V. Putin at an Enlarged Conference with the Participation of RF Ambassadors, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia', *International Affairs (Moscow)*, vol. 48, no. 4 (2002) 1-7, p. 2.

<sup>53</sup> I. Ivanov, 'Mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost' v epokhu globalizatsii', *Global'noi politike*, vol. 1, no. 1 (January-March 2003) 36-47, p. 36. Putin, 'A State of the Nation Address - 2003', pp. 12-13.

dangerous threat [that is international terrorism] to the international community'. By closer toward Western states Putin hope to minimize the possibility of difficult choices of foreign policy outcomes. Russian foreign policy should be Pragmatic and it will give flexibility of state orientation. Not only, enhancing economic sector but also Putin emphasize on importance of political influence in world community. He urged the Russian diplomats to more active in shaping the image of Russia abroad and to take more proactive in dealing with foreign mass media.

As a respond toward terrorist attacks in United States on 11 September 2001 Presidents Putin and Bush held a meeting in Slovenia to discuss it. They were pledge to deepen Russia and United States relationship. Moreover, Russia decide to assist United States and NATO operation in Afghanistan even Putin set of policies to close military bases in Cuba and Vietnam. President Putin has such motives with the policies that he just addressed. First of all, Russia believed of the common threats that persist right now was real with the existence of terrorisms. Second, Putin want to get closer with Western countries that hopefully create such benefits for Russia. In turn, Putin expected to get support and legitimacy to categorize the Chechen rebels as terrorists and hoping the West might ease its criticism toward Russian military operation there. Finally, Putin viewed that there was nothing more urgently invite Russia to integrate with Europe as well as United States than terrorist attacks incident in United States.

Moreover, in Vladimir Putin Era was result on the formulation of NRC (NATO-Russia Council). Russia Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances with NATO in Putin Era cause greater contribution for intimate cooperation

between two of parties. How Putin conduct his foreign policy orientation is that with the spirit of pragmatism and view terrorism as the common threats for human being that needs cooperation with NATO especially United States. Russia gets closer relationship with the Western countries in Putin Era to define the significant roles of Russia in international relations.

In the 2000 to 2004 the foreign policy became more cautious with regarding on diversification of relations, the assessment of the potential merits of cooperation with the West, and the importance to increase the economic sector. Putin argued that diversifying relationship was not something which can end up Russia to looking for allies and partnership everywhere. The diversification was to increase Russia's power and position while believing that Russia look for partners and allies everywhere such in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America but the interaction should be build on equal relationship with real advantages to Russia. Along with main foreign policy to involve in preserving international security toward terrorisms, Russia has declared that terrorist could gather all nations to diminish it.

In the years 2004 to 2007 Putin emphasize on country's identity with Russia distinctiveness and continued to answer the question whether Russia was a Western, Eastern or Eurasian state. Putin stated that Russia was unique and blindly copying the foreign models could lead us to lose national identity. Regarding to Russia's international status and role, Russian leader continued to assume that Russia was a great power and the greatness comprises of military and

economic well being. Putin's first term of office very stressful on economic

recovery and during second term he more optimistic toward Russia position and economic power. In his 2004 State of the Nation Address, Putin concluded: 'Now for the first time in a long time, Russia is politically and economically stable. It is also independent, both financially and in international affairs. Such an assessment resembled the 2003 Military Doctrine's assessment that 'Russia's recent emergence from a state of political and economic crisis and the substantial strengthening of its positions in the world arena [ . . . ] is a most important trend in the world'.<sup>54</sup>

Moreover, Putin re-emphasize on how to strengthen the military capability along with the possession of nuclear weapons that Russia now become one of the major nuclear powers. Russia diplomacy was become more independent and assertive to define the sources of Russia greatness by looking for opportunities in the world arena, even by little bit reducing relationship with the Western countries. Putin argued, 'there is growing demand from our partners abroad for Russia to play a more active role in world politics'.<sup>55</sup> Therefore, Russian foreign policy should be based on more independent in an attempt to seek alternative partnership with non-Western states. A more assertive and opportunistic Russian foreign policy did not imply with such many disagreements with the Western countries in post-Cold War era, but to deliver a tangible results for the sake of Russia. In the previous period Russia seeks for partnership with the Western countries because

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<sup>54</sup> 'Urgent Tasks of the Development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces', *Ria-Novosti*, 3 October 2003.

<sup>55</sup> Putin, "Address at the Plenary Session of the Russian Federation Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives Meeting", available from <http://www.pircenter.org/data/npr/1323-74425.pdf>, retrieved at 15 December 2011

of to increase Russia's international position but Putin emphasize that in contemporary era Western countries should understand if only by cooperating with Russia they can achieve their goals.

Along the Putin presidency, Russia foreign policy orientation of Diplomatic Coalitions and Military alliances has contribute a great roles in fighting global terrorism accompany by United States and NATO. Moreover, from 2004 to 2007, the Russian foreign policy thinking about the country's identity, status, role, and primary interests became much more self-confident: Russia was a unique country, its great power status was based on a strong economy and military might, and given its improved power position, the country should pursue a more independent, assertive, and opportunistic foreign policy to defend Russian interests and to establish Russia as an independent great power that offers an alternative to the West.<sup>56</sup> In addition, Russia believes on common threat of terrorisms made its foreign policy more bravely traces in international world arena.

#### **D. Russia Foreign Policy under Dmitry Medvedev Presidency**

President Dmitry Medvedev came to power in year of 2008 and replacing Vladimir Putin to lead Russia. The accession of Medvedev has indirectly brought to the question related NATO-Russia relationship in his foreign policy. Medvedev tries to modernize all of the sectors including political relationship with the West. "Russia must become an attractive country to which people from all over the

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<sup>56</sup> Christian Thorun, "Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct towards the West", pp 38.

world want to come in search of their special desires” (Medvedev 2010). As the result over the disagreement of NATO led missile deployment over Europe, Russia have agreed to discuss cooperation in the missile defense area and NATO has officially invited Russia to join the European missile defense shield.

The continuation of Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances foreign policy toward NATO in Medvedev Era is more optimistic. President Medvedev viewed more optimistic toward NATO-Russia relationship in the future even though there were disagreement over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. According to Medvedev it should be discuss further to ensure the European security. When Medvedev attend the Russia-NATO summit in Lisbon, he state that there are not so many issues on which Russia and NATO have different views, and they “*should not tear our relations apart,*” the president stressed. This summit was an important step in strengthening ties and a historic event,” he noted. Currently, Medvedev does not see conditions for Russia’s joining NATO. But “everything is changing,” and if the alliance will offer a closer cooperation in the future, Moscow will be ready to discuss different variants. “The potential of these relations has not been exhausted,” the Russian president stressed. According to Medvedev, he is now even “*more optimistic*” than he was before the summit.<sup>57</sup>

The Obama Administration called for starting a dialogue with Russia from a fresh slate. A February 2009 speech in Munich by Vice President Biden to “re-set” U.S.-Russian relations was an early sign of the President’s intentions. At their

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<sup>57</sup> “Medvedev is “more optimistic” about Russia-NATO relations after summit”, Available from <http://www.russia.com/medvedev-summit-medvedev/> retrieved at 14 December 2011.



first “get acquainted” meeting on April 1, 2009, in London, Presidents Obama and Medvedev issued two joint statements on opening nuclear weapons talks and on U.S.-Russia relations.<sup>58</sup> Both of presidents agreed to foster and deepen cooperation in combating nuclear terrorism and support international negotiations to prevent nuclear proliferation. They continue to cooperate in bilateral Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy which suspended in Bush administration responding Russia-Georgia conflict. Moreover, Russia agreed to assist and further cooperation responding international terrorism and peacekeeping building in both of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, they pledged to strengthen their ties in European-Atlantic security through NATO-Russia Council and OSCE.

Russia under the leadership of Medvedev seeks to gain an equal strategic partnership with United States that Russia claims the two countries are the major key of influence in the world and should work together including of arms control, on confidence-building measures, on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on counterterrorism, and on the settlement of regional conflicts. President Obama stated that in recent years there was misunderstanding relationship between United States and Russia that cause such tensions. He stressed once again at July 2009 summit that both of partners should deal as equals, since the two countries were gain as nuclear superpowers. Obama and Medvedev signed six accords and issued three joints statements. The Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs on the National Security Council

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<sup>58</sup> Jim Nichol, “Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests”, available [http://www.fas.org/irp/cfr/article\\_01\\_22\\_107.pdf](#), retrieved at 14 December 2011.

Michael Mcfaul, the main topics at the summit the deployment of United States missile defense in Europe as the major concern of Russia and Russia involvement in Iran nuclear proliferation as the major concern of United States. One achievement of the summit was the establishment of a U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission intended to strengthen consultations and diplomacy. Obama stated that the commission could be the foundation for “re-setting relations” and improve the communications between two countries.

The tangible example of Russia Diplomatic Coalitions and Military alliances is that at 8 April 2011 US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a landmark nuclear arms control deal in Prague. The new START treaty, which took nearly a year to negotiate, will reduce the two countries’ nuclear arsenals by roughly 30 percent more than the previous deal. Both leaders also said they hoped the treaty would pave the way for further weapons cuts.<sup>59</sup>

After the signing of New START, both of leaders discuss on the nuclear program in Iran and the outbreak violence in Kyrgyzstan. Obama stated that country like Iran will get increasing isolation and more sanctions to be imposed on Tehran over its refusal to give up its nuclear ambitions, a commitment shared by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Moreover, they also discuss for further debate between United States and Russia over US missile defense project in the

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<sup>59</sup> “US, Russian leaders sign new arms control deal in Prague”, available from <http://www.radio.cz/en/section/corraffrs/us-russian-leaders-sign-new-arms-control-deal-in-prague>, retrieved at 15 December 2011.

previous Bush administration that was planning to deploy in Czech Republic and Poland.

In November 2010, Obama and Medvedev met on the G20 industrialized states in Seoul, South Korea, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Summit in Yokohama, Japan, and at the NATO-Russia summit in Lisbon, Portugal. At the NATO-Russia Council meeting in Lisbon the heads of state agreed to work on cooperation on common security challenges, to resume theater ballistic missile defense exercises, to identify opportunities for Russia to cooperate with NATO's new territorial missile defense capability, to expand Russia's support for NATO operations in Afghanistan, and to explore revitalizing and modernizing the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. President Obama hailed the agreements as part of the reset in NATO-Russia relations and as indicating that Russia is a partner rather than an adversary of NATO.<sup>60</sup>

#### **E. General differences of Soviet Union and Russia's policy**

There several main factors that can elaborate the difference between Soviet Union and Russia in the post-Soviet Union. Soviet Union was an imperial state while Russia has no imperial status and the population decreased by 110 million with the breakup of fifteen states after the dissolution of Soviet Union. The size of armed forces between Soviet Union and Russia also differ significantly with 5 million owned by Soviet Union compare to 1.2 million owned by Russia today. Soviet Union industry previously 80 per cent of its output was

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<sup>60</sup> Jim Nichol, "Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests", available from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33407.pdf>, retrieved at 14 December 2011.

for military but Russia only 10-25 per cent for industrial of military purpose. Russia only produces 40 helicopters and 21 military aircraft per year while Soviet Union reaches 690 and 620 respectively. The USSR had the second biggest GNP in the world, whilst modern Russia comes only 14th.<sup>61</sup>

Soviet Union foreign policy was based on ideology that Militarization of the economy, social relations and spiritual life; confrontation; expansion; and isolation as the main features of foreign policy, were the direct consequence of this policy. The Isolation foreign policy orientation that adopt by Soviet Union was due to the wealth of the state. According to K.J. Holsti the political units that adopt an orientation of isolation are usually economically and socially self-sufficient. In order to maintain a "way of life", including social values, political structures, and economic patterns, the political unit does not have to change the external environment in its favor. That ideology appeared, for example, in the famous Khrushchev speech to the UN, threatening the world during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the concept of 'Cold War' had also been a visible characteristic of world revolution ideology.<sup>62</sup>

In other hand, Russia foreign policy is based on Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances with the spirits of liberalism and pragmatism to gain real cooperation with the Western countries. It can be seen by Russia involvement in NATO-Russia Council and peacekeeping settlement to maintain Europe security.

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<sup>61</sup> Vladimir Mantusov, SNG:Economicheskaya kooperatsiya ili pazvod? (Moscow: OLIMP 2001) p. 11.

<sup>62</sup> Rick Fawn, "Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy", pp 10-13.

It can be explained by the status of Soviet Union as the world's second superpower but Russia has no significant status recently except as a state nuclear superpower. The new political elite of Russia also difference with Soviet Union that confront with the Western states while Russia do not want to confront with the Western.

Moreover, K.J. Holsti also define that government that seeks to construct Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances foreign policy orientation assume that they incapable to achieve their objectives, defend their interests, or deter perceived threats by own capabilities. Russia position in the post-Cold War Era was weakens by its economic and military deterioration. Therefore, Russia foreign policy orientation is adopting Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances in order to strengthen its roles and positions in Europe.

The decline of Russia economy was also becomes one of difference compare to Soviet Union. After the dissolution of Soviet Union felt 70 per cent of its population was living in the poverty line while in the Soviet times it does not occur. Not only economy decline but also political influence over Europe has decline significantly in recently Russia's era. The NATO expansion toward Eastern Europe seems proves that Russia has no power to stop the enlargement while mostly all of the former Soviet States now become the members of NATO

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **RUSSIA'S RATIONAL CHOICE TO IMPROVE COOPERATION WITH NATO**

In this chapter the writer will elaborate several phenomena that urged Russia in deciding rational choice in order to enhance the bargaining in international relations especially in Europe. The writer will elaborate start from Russia's economic decline, Russia's demographic and military capability decline, NATO enlargement to the central and eastern former Soviet Union, and rational choice concerning NATO enlargement and Russia political decline position in Europe. The writer also borrows the rational model from Karen Mingst in order to identify the problem that face by Russia and how to overcome it.

#### **A. Russia's Economic Decline**

The objective of this subtitle chapter is that to explain and elaborate of Russia's economic decline that in turn motivated Russia to improve its cooperation with NATO. The writer believe if the economic decline was one of the major reasons beside demographic and military decline as well as NATO enlargement which urged Russia to enhance relations with NATO in order to overcome the national interests. Moreover, there were other problems that exacerbate the economic condition as follows; crimes, corruptions, and inflation cause the people suffer the most.

Throughout most in the Cold War Era NATO military has prepared and

to fight against Soviet Union hegemony in Europe. This preparation and

planning succeeded to counterbalance the Soviet Union power even stronger. As Soviet Union formally dissolves in 1990 the Cold War ended as well. Nowadays, Russia inherited the Soviet Union legacy of deterioration that encompassing mostly in all aspects of life inside of the country. There is no one can argue if Russia is still remain as a great power in Europe. Otherwise, Russia today face enormous problems inside of the country that encompass of economic, demographic, and military capability decline.

A declining state's weakness may invite attack from other states that see a window of opportunity to increase their own power through victory and/or conquest.<sup>63</sup> Geoffrey Blainey points out that wars are fought because combatants believe they can win. The decline of an adversary may well foster such a belief, while the declining state may not realize the extent of its weakness and fail to capitulate. A variety of factors of regime transition—revolution, for instance—can lead outsiders to see a state as weak and vulnerable (rightly or wrongly).<sup>64</sup> Decline and state failure are less ambiguous in telegraphing weakness than is regime transition, and therefore might be considered even more likely to spur aggression on the part of others. If the states involved are great powers, their actions tend to have a significant impact throughout the international system, and the dangers of spreading conflict are similarly increased.

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<sup>63</sup> see Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," *International Security*, Vol.18, No. 2, Fall 1993, pp. 125-153.

<sup>64</sup> Geoffrey Blainey, *The Iron Law of Backwardness*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1966, p. 32

Following the complete collapse of the Russian economy in 1998, the number of people living below the official poverty line--in Russia, a measure of truly desperate conditions--rose to nearly 40%. Seniors in urban areas--with no access to jobs or land--were the hardest hit. Unlike those in rural areas, who could subsist on homegrown food, they had nowhere to turn. As in Soviet times, Russians were waiting in lines, hunting for scarce goods, and hoarding what they could find. The devastation of Russian life was by all measurements worse than America's Crash of 1929. U.S. unemployment at the end of 1929 reached 1.5 million, representing 1.2% of the total population, but more than 11.3 million Russians were jobless at the end of 1998--7.7% of the nation's total population. In the 1929 crash, stock prices fell 17% by year-end--and 90% by the depth of the Great Depression, four years later. By contrast, the Russian stock market lost 90% of its value in 1998 alone.<sup>65</sup> Millions of ordinary men and women who had deposited their money in Russian banks lost everything.

Russia started its transition from Socialism to Capitalism in the early 1990 as a middle-income country. David Kotz argues that unlike in China, where the state socialist system remained in place which capitalism was allowed to develop gradually, the existing system was dismantled in Russia and firms were expected to privatize and function in an unplanned system with no support or backup.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, it created unbalance in Russia Capitalism which is the companies did

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<sup>65</sup> 1998: years of bad advice culminate in Russia's total economic collapse, available from <http://www.fas.org/news/russia/2000/russia/part08.htm>, retrieved at 24 April 2012.

<sup>66</sup> David M. Kotz, "Is Russia Becoming Capitalist?" *Science and Society*, Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer



not get support from the government. Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry Ickes describe Russia's current economic system as a "virtual economy," one in which value is destroyed rather than created. They trace the problem less to the legacy of the Soviet system and more to the effects of "incomplete" shock therapy (the notion that a quick, albeit painful transition to a market economy is the best mechanism for reform).

The United Nations International Comparison Project, which calculates cross nationally comparable income figures, estimates that Russia per capita GDP as of 1989 was \$8,210 just around the level of Ukraine, Argentina, Latvia and South Africa. In 2005, Russian GDP (at \$763,720 million) was just below that of Mexico (\$763,468 million), about \$4000 million below that of Canada (\$1,115,192 million), and roughly a third of Chinese GDP (\$2,228,862 million), with the United States at \$12,455,068 million.<sup>67</sup> Russian economy decline continues in 2009 that the data from federal statistic service showed the country's gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 7.9 percent and Russia was the worst among all the G-20 member states. Among the group of emerging economies known as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), Russia was the only one to experience negative growth in 2009.<sup>68</sup>

The cause of Russia economic decline was huge of debt from IMF that intentionally to support the market reform but in the fact it exacerbates the

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<sup>67</sup> World Bank, "2005 International Comparison Program," available from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/ICP-report-prelim.pdf>, retrieved at 20 December 2011, pp. 22–24.

<sup>68</sup> Andrea Peters, "Russian economic crisis fuels political tensions", available from <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/feb2010/russ-f08.shtml>, retrieved at 20 December 2011.

condition inside of the country. Russia received its first loan from the IMF in April 1992, for \$1 billion. In 1993, the Russian government took out another loan, this time for \$1.5 billion. A year later the IMF provided still another \$1.5 billion. By December 31, 1995, the Russian central government had borrowed over \$10 billion through the IMF. When on March 26, 1996, the IMF and Russian central government reached final agreement on a new loan of \$10.2 billion, the second-largest loan ever made to any borrower by the IMF that made many outside observers were dumbfounded.<sup>69</sup>

Moreover, corruption is also contributed as a key factor behind Russia's economic problems. Russia consistently ranks poorly in international comparisons of corruption. For example, probably the most widely quoted source, the Transparency International (TI) survey, placed Russia 82nd out of 99 countries in 1999, with a score of 2.4 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). An aggregate indicator of graft compiled from numerous sources by Kaufmann et al. (1999a) places Russia 113th out of 155 countries. In a 1997 survey conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit, the CIS emerged as markedly more corrupt than any other region of the world, with Russia (along with the other four CIS countries included in the survey) receiving the maximum rating for corruption among public officials.<sup>70</sup> A more practical assumption is that corruption in Russia, as in other countries, results from a combination of opportunities and incentives, however these may have arisen over time. Opportunities for abuse of power abound in areas such as Russia's complex tax and customs systems, in capital

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<sup>69</sup> 1998: years of bad advice culminate in Russia's total economic collapse, available from <http://www.fas.org/news/russia/2000/russia/part08.htm>, retrieved at 24 April 2012.

<sup>70</sup> Kaufmann, D., S. GOBBETT, and J. ROY. 1997. CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA: Scale of corruption, pp. 1-10.

controls and financial market regulation, in wide-ranging regulations on businesses, and in the management of state-owned assets, including their privatization.

#### **B. Russia's Demographic and Military Capability Decline**

There is no doubt that the legacy of Soviet Union brought tremendous misery effect toward Russian population. Russia nowadays is facing a growing public health crisis and a series of critical demographic challenges. Despite the significant influx of ethnic Russians from neighboring republics during the early to mid-1990s, over the past nine years Russia's population has shrunk by over 3 million people (458,400 during the first six months of 2001).<sup>71</sup> Population forecasts are even grimmer. Russia's population today can be estimated at about 144 million. Population projections for the Russian Federation in 2015 range from an optimistic assessment of 147.2 million to around 130 million. By 2050, argues Murray Feshbach, a leading Western analyst of Russian society and environment, the Russian Federation could have a population as low as 80 million. For comparison purposes, it is projected that by 2050 the population of the United States will have increased by nearly 45 percent over current numbers. For Russia, the expectation (based on the low-end Feshbach estimate) over the same time period would be a decline of 45 percent.<sup>72</sup>

Russia's fertility rates (on average, 1.2 children born per woman per lifetime), while among the lowest in the world, are not dissimilar from fertility

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<sup>71</sup> "Russian Population Continues to Decline," *RFE/RL Newswire*, Vol. 5, No. 158, Part I August 21, 2001

<sup>72</sup> Murray Feshbach, "A Sick and Shrinking Nation," *Washington Post*, October 24, 1999, A23

rates in Spain or Italy. Moreover, Russia's abortion rate—at 70 percent of pregnancies one of the highest in the world—has been declining recently because of the greater availability of birth control. Although abortion was legal in the Soviet Union and remains legal in Russia, the stigma (medical records were public knowledge) led many women to seek illegal abortions, which often led to health problems or even death. Alcoholism, violence, and infectious and noninfectious diseases contributed to an estimated 2.8 million premature deaths in Russia between 1991 and 1998.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, DaVanzo and Grammich note that per capita alcohol consumption rates in Russia are above levels that the World Health Organization deems dangerous. Traditional Russian drinking habits, which often involve ingesting large quantities of hard alcohol in a single sitting, are probably also a factor. Further evidence lies in the far lower rates of alcohol-related death in Islamic parts of Russia, which also tend to have higher fertility rates.

Moreover, the rising rate of HIV infection and drug abuse were contributed to the death rates. The number of HIV cases reported in the first ten months of 2001, 70,000 people was 1.6 times the number reported in the first ten months of 2000, according to the Russian Federal Center for Prevention and Combating AIDS, which estimated the total for 2001 as potentially as high as 100,000.<sup>74</sup> Indeed, drug abuse and addiction are yet another growing health challenge for Russia. In September 2001, President Putin described Russia's drug

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<sup>73</sup> DaVanzo and Grammich, *Dire Demographics*, pp. 37-48

<sup>74</sup> Over 70,000 New HIV Cases Registered in Russia in 2001..." *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol 5, No. 223, Part I, November 27, 2001

problem as sufficiently serious to threaten the country's national security. Some 20 percent of Russian conscripts admit to having used drugs, while government estimates suggest that some 80 percent of teenagers have experimented with illegal substances. Moreover, the number of drug users registered in urban clinics increased by 600 percent between 1996 and 2001. In 2000, government estimates of those registered between the ages of 13 and 25 alone topped 3 millions.<sup>75</sup>

The demographic decline indirectly affect to the military scope. The challenge for Russian armed forces today begin with the young men who are drafted into the military each year, one-third or more of whom (40 percent in 2001) are deemed ineligible for health reasons.<sup>76</sup> The health crisis has significant impact to the Russia military incapability. Indeed, the young men seek for falsified medical waivers when they are in conscription. Moreover, the impact of narcotics abuse in Russia's military is aptly illustrated by tales of soldiers in Chechnya who traded weapons to the enemy in exchange for drugs.<sup>77</sup> Hazing, or *dedovshchina*—the systematic harassment, rape, and torture of young recruits by older soldiers continues to be prevalent. Authorities turn a blind eye who hundreds of young Russian men die each year (some directly as a result of injuries

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<sup>75</sup> Paul Goble, "Three Million Young Russians Addicted to Drugs," *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 4, No. 146, Part I, August 1, 2000; "Putin Says Drug Problem Threatens Russian National Security," *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 5, No. 185, Part I, October 1, 2001.

<sup>76</sup> Nail' Gaftulin, "Yet another crisis"; Brantsen, "Russia: Poor Fitness of Conscripts Points to Public Health Crisis."

<sup>77</sup> Aleksandr Sinitzin, "In Mozdok they drink to life" (in Russian), *Vesti.ru*, available from [http://vesti.ru/docs/news/2000/01\\_27/15chobaya/](http://vesti.ru/docs/news/2000/01_27/15chobaya/), retrieved at 25 April 2012.

from beatings; others indirectly through suicide) .<sup>78</sup> *Dedovshchina* remains a problem even in combat: a soldier interviewed in a military hospital early in 2000 had survived the bloody 1999-2000 battle of Grozny unscathed. It was a beating from his comrades that had caused him to be hospitalized.<sup>79</sup>

The increasing of crime inside military armed forces level reportedly has become prevalence 8 percent of them have criminal record. As of early 1998, more than 20,000 of the 1.4 million people serving in Russia's armed forces had a criminal past, with convictions ranging from hooliganism to robbery. In today's force, 40 percent of conscripts are deemed by their commanders to be insufficiently trustworthy to lead. An equal number is precluded from access to strategically important assets or information.<sup>80</sup>

Crime and corruption were the variety of Soviet legacy after the Cold War era which the soldiers sell illegally of military hardware. These include the "fire sale" of individual weapons by Soviet/Russian forces stationed and then withdrawn from Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as what is reportedly a significant underground market in heavy equipment, perhaps even armored vehicles and fighter aircraft. Arrests and prosecutions of military personnel for such actions confirm that they continue. Russian officers and men deployed to international peacekeeping operations,

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<sup>78</sup> Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Criminal Army," *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 11, No 6 June 1999, pp. 8-10.

<sup>79</sup> Sergei Krapivin, "War does not have a 'parade' face" (in Russian), *Vecherniy Cheliabinsk*, January 28, 2000

<sup>80</sup> Vladimir Mukhin, "Every other youth has never studied anywhere" (in Russian), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, available from [www.ng.ru/events/2000-04-05/2\\_youth.html](http://www.ng.ru/events/2000-04-05/2_youth.html), retrieved at 25 April 2012

including in the former Yugoslavia, have sold everything from weapons parts to fuel on local black markets.<sup>81</sup>

Russian aircraft and other systems are increasingly out of date and lack many modern components, such as night-vision capability.<sup>82</sup> Some argue that even before they began to old, these systems were inferior to U.S. built weaponry, required far more frequent repairs. Russian tanks are highly vulnerable to foreign antitank capabilities, which are developing more quickly than are Russian defensive systems. Russian precision weapons are dependent on laser sights that can be easily defeated by smoke-screens (and can reveal the location of Russian forces).<sup>83</sup> Reports indicate that even new systems are problematical: according to Mikhail Rastopshin, Russia's new antitank weapons are only some 50 percent effective against the reactive armor that is standard on many potential adversary tanks.<sup>84</sup>

### C. NATO Enlargement to the Central and Eastern former Soviet Union

Initially, the formulation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 was to deter the Soviet Union expansion to the western states. Otherwise, in the post-Cold War era NATO began to conduct the same ambition as Soviet Union to expand the membership eastward of former Soviet countries. NATO enlargement

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<sup>81</sup> See Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., *Mafia in Uniform: The Criminalization of the Russian Armed Forces*, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1995, available from [www.call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/mafla.htm](http://www.call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/mafla.htm); retrieved at 25 April 2012.

<sup>82</sup> Sergei Sokut, "Making sense of the Chechen experience," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, August 10, 2001.

<sup>83</sup> Mikhail Rastopshin, "In old wineskins even new wine will soon go sour," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, August 10, 2001

<sup>84</sup> Mikhail Rastopshin, "From an armaments program to a disarmament program," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, January 19, 2002.

is considered by many people as a project to create a single security space and relationship over Europe with the spirit of democratic values, respect for human rights, economy cooperation and peace. The enlargement that conduct by NATO and the promotion of democratic transformation could generate strained relationship especially with Russia. From a realist or geopolitical perspective, the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance weakens Russia's position in Europe. Moreover, Russia apparently adopts democracy as well but its different version of democracy that based on state believes. Here, the writer will elaborate the NATO enlargement started from the reunification of Germany to the end.

As the West and East Germany were unified, the formal recognition of unified Germany membership in NATO with Chancellor Kohl visits Soviet Union in 14-16 July 1990 in Moscow. The two leaders signed the exchange papers related with the treaty of partnership and cooperation between Germany and Soviet Union. The leader of Soviet Union Gorbachev recognized that Germany should regain full of sovereignty and agreeing Germany remain in NATO, but with certain condition that NATO had to take into consideration that its authority could not be extended to the territory of the former GDR (German Democratic Republic) for a transitional period, that is, for as long as Soviet troops continued to be stationed there.

Gorbachev agreeing the Germany inclusion to NATO was with the reasons that neutral Germany in the future would gain to seek nuclear weapons. Moreover, the presences of United States on the formulation of NATO not contradict with European security but assure the condition. In addition, the idea of neutralization



of Germany not only failed to attract support from United States but also the Warsaw Pact themselves. In the mid of March, Warsaw Pact held a conference in Prague concerning whether Germany should neutral or belong to NATO. Jiri Dienstbier as the Czechoslovak foreign minister stated that neutrality would be the worst option. Moreover, The Polish foreign minister, Krystof Skubiszewski added neutral Germany would not good for Europe and fostering Germany tendencies to acting as great power.<sup>85</sup>

After the inclusion of unified Germany into NATO membership in the early of 1990, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary were the first former Warsaw Pact that started to negotiate with NATO membership. The invitation for membership to those countries came at NATO summit in Madrid on 8 July 1997. All of Foreign Ministers from Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary signed the protocols agreed of accession to NATO membership in Brussels on 16 December 1997 that in turn Canada and Denmark were the first NATO member states that ratified the protocols on 2 February 1998. Moreover, United States President Bill Clinton ratified the protocols of accession on 30 April 1998. Thus, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary got NATO membership in 12 March 1999.

Initially Czech foreign policy orientation was return to Europe. Therefore Warsaw Pact suggests that NATO and the Warsaw Pact would together form the basis of a new European security order. However, NATO has no intention to cooperate with Warsaw Pact that consequently; the governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland reacted by advocating to dissolve of the

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<sup>85</sup> J. Dienstbier, "East-Central Europe's First Eastward Enlargement", p. 18.

Warsaw Treaty Organization. The revolt was occurring in summer 1991 with the spirit of anti-Gorbachev and dissolving the pact. The Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary integrates effectively started with the country involvement in NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Balkan that in turn signing the Dayton Peace Agreement that launched by NATO with UN-mandate to formulate IFOR, and SFOR. In February 1996 Czech Republic remains its commitment in IFOR and SFOR operation and contributes 850 soldiers and several officers in that operation. In 1999, the Kosovo war was sparked and it is really illustrate that Czech Republic already well prepared to become a NATO member with its contribution with NATO invasion. The air attacks were launched just ten days after Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary formal accession to NATO membership.


The next phase of enlargement goes to seven new states that were formally invited at the Prague Summit in 2002. Moreover, in 29 March 2004 these countries have formally joined to NATO membership by delivering their accession documents to the United States Secretary of the State Colin Powell in Washington. These seven new states, which have joined NATO, are Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia.<sup>86</sup> Previously, the accession has strong objection by Russia that claimed the NATO enlargement toward these states especially the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) would deteriorate the relations between NATO and Russia. Otherwise, after the terrorist attacks in 11 September 2001 in United States, Russia orientation was to strengthen cooperation with Western States especially United

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<sup>86</sup> R. G. Gidadhubli, "Expansion of NATO: Russia's Dilemma", available from

States to deter the terrorisms. It was give the seven states to integrate closely in the alliances and end up by the accession became NATO member states. Here the picture of NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe:

Table 4.1. The picture of NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe



The most recent of NATO enlargement were Albania and Croatia joined the alliance in 1 April 2009 at the Alliance's summit in Strasbourg/Kehl. Albania had participated in "Membership Action Plan" (MAP) since its inception in 1999 and Croatia joined in 2002. At NATO Bucharest summit in 2008 Croatia and Albania officially invited to become full-fledged members in the alliances and then finally recognize as the member in Strasbourg/Kehl summit in 2009. Albania is one of the countries where popular support for NATO membership is the highest and at the beginning of 2009, accession to the Alliance was supported by

over 90% of citizens.<sup>87</sup> On signing the Treaty, countries voluntarily commit themselves to participating in the political consultations and military activities of the Organization. Although each and every signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty is subject to the obligations of the Treaty, there remains a certain degree of flexibility which allows members to choose how they participate.<sup>88</sup> The future enlargement will consider Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine in the next talking series with NATO.

#### **D. Russia's Rational Choice to Improve Cooperation with NATO Concerning State's Decline and NATO's Enlargement**

Since NATO began to pursue foreign policy on enlargement, Russian elite political leaders encompass from Communist, extreme nationalist and indeed pro-Western democrats have strongly opposed and blamed to NATO enlargement. This anti-enlargement consensus permeates all government institutions, from President Yeltsin's staff to the foreign and defense ministries to virtually all factions of the Russian parliament.<sup>89</sup> Russia objected to NATO enlargement began in Yeltsin presidency and warn that it could impact on deteriorate of Russia-NATO relationship. It worsen by state's decline that encompassing economic, demographic, as well as military decline position. At that time Russia was threatened would not signed the ratification of START II treaty, abrogation of the

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<sup>87</sup> Beata Górka-Winter and Marek Madej, "NATO Member States and the New Strategic Concept: An Overview", available from [http://www.pism.pl/zalaczniki/PISM\\_Report\\_NATO\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.pism.pl/zalaczniki/PISM_Report_NATO_ENG.pdf), retrieved at 19 December 2011.

<sup>88</sup> NATO, "Member Countries: About Member Countries and their Accession", available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_52044.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm), retrieved at 19 December 2011.

<sup>89</sup> Steven Woehrel, "NATO Enlargement and Russia", available from <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/394.pdf>, retrieved at 19 December 2011, p-1.

CFE Treaty, increased defense spending, stationing of tactical nuclear weapons on Russia's borders, targeting new NATO members with strategic nuclear weapons, establishing a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) defense union or at least a Russia-Belarus defense union, and forging alliances with China, India, Iran or other countries.<sup>90</sup> Russia hope by these tactics could convince the Western countries that NATO enlargement would create new tensions between Russia and NATO. The opinion polls have shown that both of Russian elite politics and ordinary people oppose the NATO enlargement, as the table indicates to us below:

Table 4.2. Comparison of mass and elite attitudes toward NATO, April 2004<sup>91</sup>

Question	Mass sample (a)	Elite sample (b)
<i>Nature of NATO (c)</i>		
Aggressive	58	68
Defensive	17	28
Don't know	26	4
<i>NATO and Russian interests (d)</i>		
Tend to coincide	17	33
Tend to diverge	47	65
Don't know	35	2
<i>Attitude toward 2004 enlargement (e)</i>		
Positive	11	18
Indifferent	36	20
Negative	40	60
Don't know	13	2
<i>Military threat after enlargement (f)</i>		
Greater	52	63
No change	24	36
Don't know	24	1

Notes

<sup>90</sup> Ibid

<sup>91</sup> Timothy J. Colton, "Post-postcommunist Russia, the international environment and NATO" p.

- a) From national survey by Public Opinion Foundation, as reported at [http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/dominant/edominant2004/edom0415/edomt0415\\_1/ed041508](http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/dominant/edominant2004/edom0415/edomt0415_1/ed041508).
- b) From Public Opinion Foundation telephone interviews with “100 experts representing the regional and media elite of Russia.” [http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/dominant/edominant2004/edom0415/edomt0415\\_1/ed041524](http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/dominant/edominant2004/edom0415/edomt0415_1/ed041524).
- c) Question same as in Table 3 above. Mass data repeats column 5 of Table 3.
- d) Question reads: “According to one opinion, the interests of Russia and NATO are more likely to coincide, while according to a different opinion, they are more likely to diverge. Which of these two opinions is closest to your own?”
- e) Question reads: “How do you feel about the fact that seven Eastern European states have joined NATO: positive, negative, or indifferent?”
- f) Question reads: “As a result of NATO’s expansion, do you believe the military threat to Russia has grown, or not?”

From the table above we can see that the majority both of Russian ordinary people and elite politics assume if NATO enlargement was a bad idea and worsen the relationship between Russian and NATO. NATO in the first of its formulation assume being defensive alliance and the guarantor of peace in Europe, perceived by Russian as offensive alliance create greater threat to Russia. President Vladimir Putin himself also strongly disparaged enlargement in the summer of 2005 when he contended that it did not improve world security.<sup>92</sup> His anger at enlargement was palpable when he sharply attacked the United States and NATO in May 2007, on the 62nd anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, and made provocative allusion to the Third Reich.<sup>93</sup> Putin also fear to the state decline position that could be deteriorating Russia bargaining position in Europe.


According to Karen Mingst, Rational Choice theory is appropriate to apply in the time of conflicts or crisis because need short time to make decision while

<sup>92</sup> Boston Globe, “Putin Questions NATO Enlargement,” 7 May 2005.

<sup>93</sup> Andrew E. Kramer, “Putin Is Said to Compare U.S. Policies to Third Reich,” New York Times, 10 May 2007. Available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/world/europe/10russia.html>

face threatening situation. How to identify the problems Karen Mingst uses Rational Model in order to chooses the best outcomes. NATO enlargement into Soviet sphere of influence indirectly threat and affect Russia national security. Moreover, state's declines also influence the condition. From the facts above Russia only could object the NATO expansion by protesting but no tangible actions that did by Russia. Russia roles and positions sharply deteriorate with military and economic decline in the post-Cold War era. Rationally, if Russia continues against NATO enlargement in former Soviet countries it will impacted on Russia weak positions in Europe. The only rational choice is that Russia not objects to NATO enlargement and set close relationship with NATO countries. Here, the writer will elaborate more use Karen Mingst Rational Model in order to identify the problem and define the best outcomes.

Table 4.3 The Rational Model of Decision-making (Karen Mingst)



From the table above Russia is the *unitary actor* that responds toward NATO enlargement into former Soviet countries. Furthermore, the writer tries to *clearly indentify the problems* that face by Russia. There are several problems that face by Russia. As NATO enlargement continues, Russia's place in international relations was steady to decline time to time. Therefore, the weak Russia Federation make its state cannot hurdle or even stop NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern former Soviet Union that claimed as Russia political sphere of influence. The decline began in Boris Yeltsin presidency when the GNP shrank up to 50 percent while at the same time United States and China grew rapidly. In 2005, Russian GDP (at \$763,720 million) was just below that of Mexico (\$763,468 million), about \$4000 million below that of Canada (\$1,115,192 million), and roughly a third of Chinese GDP (\$2,228,862 million), with the United States at \$12,455,068 million.<sup>94</sup> Fortunately, Russia was benefiting from the rising of oil price and driven to its recovery over past six years even though it is still long way to go and re-enter the list of great world powers. Russian economy decline continues in 2009 that the data from federal statistic service showed the country's gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 7.9 percent and Russia was the worst among all the G-20 member states. Among the group of emerging economies known as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), Russia was the only one to experience negative growth in 2009.<sup>95</sup> The industrial

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<sup>94</sup> World Bank, "2005 International Comparison Program," available from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/ICP-report-prelim.pdf>, retrieved at 20 December 2011, pp. 22–24.

<sup>95</sup> Andrea Peters, "Russian economic crisis fuels political tensions", available from [http://www.uscis.org/articles/2010/feb2010/russ\\_08.html](http://www.uscis.org/articles/2010/feb2010/russ_08.html), retrieved at 20 December 2011



production decline up to 10.8 percent in 2009 with automotive and construction industries were the worst.

Economic decline was accompanied by demographic decline in the 1990s and the early years of this decade, resulting from very low birth rates and increasing mortality, particularly among males.<sup>96</sup> The population decline was reflected by the economic decline that happen in Russia while high male morbidity caused by excessive alcohol and tobacco consumptions. As the President Putin took office the population rated at 146.3 million in 2000 and decline to 141.75 million in 2010 with the calculations 2004 annual growth rate being  $-0.5\%$ .<sup>97</sup> If it is continue to decline it will create such problems in Russia industrial process because require much of workers.

The next Russia important part of declining was the military power capability. In the Cold War era NATO really worried about Soviet Union capacity in military that designed against the alliances, for example Soviet Union capability in deploying the nuclear weapons in Europe. However, the performance of Russian military started from its Soviet dissolution decline drastically. Alexander Khranchikhin, an expert with the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, said the continuing decline of nuclear forces meant that they would shrink to a level far below that of the United States and would be comparable to

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<sup>96</sup> S. Neil MacFarlane, "Russia, NATO Enlargement and the Strengthening of Democracy in the European Space, p-42.

<sup>97</sup> World Bank, "Russian Federation Data Profile", available from [http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=&REPORT\\_ID=9147&REQUEST\\_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED](http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED), retrieved at 20 December 2011.

China's.<sup>98</sup> Putin has cut the military budget as impact of economic collapse that make Russia military continues to suffer. Moreover, Khramchikhin said corruption was the rooted of problem that cause the military bought fewer weapons. Corruption was key factor that behind the economic collapse problem in Russia. Indeed, Russia consistently gets poorly ranks of corruption. the Transparency International (TI) survey, placed Russia 82nd out of 99 countries in 1999, with a score of 2.4 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean).<sup>99</sup>

In sum, Russia has no agenda like it was in Communist era that Soviet Union have strong ideological believe that affecting to development of the state. Russia felt the economic collapse, loss of political influence sphere in former Soviet countries, policy ineffectiveness, corruption, and widespread criminality that started by 1990, strongly push Russia to rationally choose the pragmatism foreign policy concerning NATO enlargement. Russia has witnessed loss of Warsaw Pact countries and mostly of former Soviet countries that joined to NATO alliances. NATO has enjoyed further penetrates in deepening presence in number of other former Soviet countries extending from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, EU has expanded to Eastern Europe that weakens the position of Russia in international world stage. Russia apparently incapable sustaining political influence in former Soviet countries and preventing NATO

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<sup>98</sup> The New York Times, "Experts see decline in Russia's military", available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/13/world/asia/13iht-russia.4.8320224.html>, retrieved at 20 December 2011.

<sup>99</sup> James Roaf, "Corruption in Russia", available from <http://www.informaworld.com/external/ukho/6/cominar/2000/invcst/pdf/roaf.pdf>, retrieved at 20 December

penetration near the border of the state. Russia is only can rejects and critics NATO enlargement to the former Soviet countries while incapable to stop it.

There are several options that Russia might to rationally choose in *elucidates the goals*. Russia can continue to critics and rejects the NATO enlargement while Russia position in Europe is weak. Second, Russia builds a new alliance like CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and uses it as a tool to fight NATO enlargement. The third is that enhances and keeps close relationship with NATO in order to ensure national security and national bargaining in Europe. In *determines policy alternatives* the writer argue that Russia might to strengthen the military forces though the state is in economic crisis. In *analyzes costs and benefits of alternatives* the writer argue that only keep cooperate with NATO is the most advantages for Russia. If Russia uses CIS to fight against NATO enlargement it will expense huge budget and it also prevail when Russia strengthen military forces in economic crisis. Therefore, in *selects action and produces the best outcomes* the writer argue that Russia rational choice is to keep and improve the cooperation with the Western countries especially NATO in order to ensure Russia positions and security in Europe, even though NATO enlargement create tensions between Russia NATO relationship

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The ups and downs of Russia relations with NATO were began during Cold War era. Russia was still under the authority of Soviet Union that tried to spread Communism believed in Europe. As a respond of Communist movement, the Western countries as follows: United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Denmark, Portugal Norway, Iceland, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg for the first time signed North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949 to deter Communist influence in Europe. In other side, Soviet Union as the biggest country in the world responds it by formulates Warsaw Pact to challenge North Atlantic Treaty. The Warsaw Pact is the name commonly given to the treaty among Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Soviet Union that was signed in Poland on 1955 and was officially called by "The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance". Both of Soviet Union and NATO view each other as a threat for national security; therefore they strengthen the military forces to defense their interest.

The new phase of Russia-NATO relationship began when Soviet Union collapse. There was a transformation of foreign policy orientation in Russia to respond the NATO presence in Europe. Russia no longer assumes NATO as enemy and views it not only as a potential partner but also a potential ally. Isolationist and hostile foreign policy orientation that used by Soviet Union no

and Military Alliances to enhance cooperation with NATO. The starting point of NATO-Russia cooperation was occur in Yeltsin presidency era with the formulation of NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) that change into Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as a medium the Western countries to normalize relationship with former Soviet countries. Russia actively participates on PFP (Partnership for Peace) that remain as the program that aim to establish the military security alongside NATO and partner countries. Furthermore, Russia and NATO agreed to enhance the cooperation with the signing of Founding Act on Mutual Relations in May 1997 that indicate Russia would intimately involve and discuss certain security issues. Moreover, in Putin era Russia seriously cooperate with NATO with the formulation of new council namely NRC (NATO-Russia Council). Russia has a privilege to work as equal partner with NATO members in NRC that provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action concerning security issues in Euro-Atlantic region.

Unlike Soviet Union that adopt Isolation foreign policy orientation due to the wealth self-sufficient of the state. In contrary, Russia has transformed its foreign policy orientation based on Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances with the spirits of liberalism and pragmatism to gain real cooperation with the Western countries. Russia assume that it will harmful for national interest and security if continue the traces of Soviet Union in conducting foreign policy. Russia would isolate in international stage if not cooperate with NATO that became the new guarantor of security in Europe. It prove started by the first president Boris Yeltsin up to Medvedev that closely connected with NATO in

securing Europe to combat terrorism from outer threat, and peacekeeping management in conflict areas. It due to Russia perception that after Cold War era there is no longer enemies except terrorism that really harmful for all of countries.

Concerning NATO enlargement into former Soviet countries, Russia is asking for NATO pledge to not move eastward. Otherwise, NATO violated the pledge and invite mostly former Soviet countries to become NATO permanent members. Moreover, NATO enlargement to the Central and Eastern former Soviet countries got support from mostly former Soviet countries themselves. They believe that integrate with NATO would ensure their security and national interest. NATO enlargement indirectly impacted on Russia political influence in former Soviet countries. Russia view the enlargement was worsening the security especially in the border. Otherwise, Russia is only capable to rejects and protests the enlargement because of weak political influence in Europe. Russia was in declining in term of economic, military, and human resources therefore Russia has no power to stop NATO enlargement in the contiguous borders. Concerning the state's declining position Russia rational choice is only keeps close relationship then improve cooperation with NATO in order to strengthen Diplomatic position and enhance Russia's roles in Europe.

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