

CHAPTER IV

THE US RESPONSES ON HOMEGROWN TERRORISTS

Combating homegrown terrorists is a new challenge for the US law enforcement. There are two broad context used by US counterterrorism. The first is by addressing radicalization, mostly occurs in the field of ideas where consumers weigh competing ideologies within the context of free speech. And for the second context is more operational and encompasses both terrorist plots and the police work to dismantle terrorists. This includes investigative, prevention, prosecution, and intelligence activities as well as engagement with communities to enhance collaboration.

A. CONFRONTING THE CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF JIHADISTS

A.1 Deradicalization

To win in this crucial element – the ideological element – of US strategy in the war on terrorism, US authorities are working to de-legitimate Jihadist; and Support models of moderation, especially in the Moslem world. The spread of democracy and the success of democratic institutions in the Arab world and the Moslem world generally are essential parts of the US strategy to defeat terrorist as a threat to the US interest.

Most of Jihadists are anti-Western ideas like democracy, liberal ideas, capitalism etc., and most are motivated by the idea of establishing an ultimate

Islamic Caliphate as Daxing Baile instead of ...

confront the idea of terrorist, the US authorities has conducted several strategy including challenging and exposing the inaccuracies in their views on questions of Islamic interpretation, exposing their relationships with illegal groups and activities, publicizing the consequences of their violent acts, demonstrating their inability to rule to the benefit and positive development of their communities, targeting these messages especially to young people, to pious traditionalist populations, to Muslim minorities in the West, and to women, avoiding showing respect or admiration for the violent feats of fundamentalist extremists and terrorists, instead casting them as disturbed and cowardly rather than evil heroes and encouraging journalists to investigate issues of corruption, hypocrisy, and immorality in fundamentalist and terrorist circles.

And according to the Defense department, the US Defense Department in its quadrennial defense review report:

“The United states is involved in a war that is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. A war in which, ultimate victory, will be achieved only when extremist ideologies are discredited in the eyes of their host populations and passive supporters”.²⁹

The literature of deradicalization and de-jihadization are becoming one important strategy in America’s War on Terror. If the term *radicalization* is defined as “the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal

²⁹ Kaplan, David E. *Hearts, Minds and Dollars*. US News & World Report <http://www.usnews.com/business/news/articles/050425/05>

change.”³⁰ Deradicalization, therefore, is the process of abandoning of radical worldview and concluding that it is not acceptable to use violence to effect social change.³¹ As a part of the deradicalization process, there is a recognition that social, political, and economic transformation will only occur slowly and in a pluralistic environment.

Islamism is another popular term to define Muslims that believe on Islamic-based political agendas, but this definition is too broad to be useful. The US Government and terrorist experts partially defined Islamists as those who reject the separation of religious authority from the power of the state or social life. Islamists seek to establish some version of an Islamic political and legal structure. It should be noted that this definition encompasses both violent and nonviolent Islamists.³² Although they also consider that there are many different types of Islamists, many of whom are non-violence, US counterterrorist body was concerned primarily with the extremist faction that is strongly influenced by the ideas of the Egyptian theorist Sayyid Qutb. The definition includes, but is not limited to, the brand of terrorism associated with or inspired by al-Qaeda, as well as terrorist groups with more limited aims, and unaffiliated extremists willing to

³⁰ Charles E. Allen, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland*, written testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C., March 14, 2007

³¹ United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, *First Report of The Working Group on Radicalization and Extremism That Lead to Terrorism*, September 2008. As of March 6, 2010:
www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/Report%20of%20the%20Working%20Group%20-%20Workgroup%202.pdf

³² Angel Robson, et al. *Deradicalizing Islam: A Field Experiment in Guatemala*. Cato Institute

engage in violence.

In this context, they refer *Islamist radicalization* as adopting the belief that, to recreate an Islamic state, Muslims must not only adhere to Islam as a political believe but also wage jihad, defined as armed struggle against the enemies of Islam, including non-Muslim nations (especially the United States) and the current rulers of Muslim states who have apostate and become ally to Western hegemony. *Islamist deradicalization* is therefore defined as the process of rejecting this creed, especially its beliefs in the permissibility of using violence against the so-called democracy and concepts of civil liberties as currently understood in liberal-democratic societies.³³

In the International Politics of today, the mistrust of world communities toward America with its foreign policy and its allies are increasing than before. Millions of people in the world society are having doubts on the reasons of America's invasion to Iraq on order to eradicate Weapon of Mass Destruction and to fight Terrorism, especially in Islamic World. Since decay image of America and its allies in Islamic World, America is now spending millions of dollar to recover its image in International arena.

In last April 2005, David E. Kaplan wrote a long article about the US attempts to change and to recover its image in Muslim World. This article was based on serious research entitled "Hearts, Minds and Dollars". Kaplan wrote that United States through CIA is now attempt to approach strategic groups in the Islamic society: Islamic Medias, scholars, preachers and Islamic political

³³ Omar Ashour, *The Deradicalization of Violent Terrorists: A Case Study of Jihadists*

parties.³⁴ Bush administrations were worried, since America's invasion to Iraq was assumed as an attack on Arabs and Islamic Worlds. The hatred on United States is widely spread around Muslims World. Many of the region's leaders believe America is at war with the Arab world, or with Islam itself.

Cheryl Bernard a sociologist and member of Rand Corporation, has done a lot of researches providing analysis to the US Department of Defense on how to combat Islamic fundamentalist. He wrote a report containing strategies in fighting fundamentalism that considered being the most dangerous threat for the West and for the United States in particular. This report divides Muslims in four categories and shows how to deal with these groups. These for categories are:

Fundamentalists, a group who reject democratic values and contemporary Western culture. They want an authoritarian, puritanical state that will implement their extreme view of Islamic law and morality. They are willing to use innovation and modern technology to achieve that goal.³⁵

Traditionalists, who want a conservative society. They are suspicious of modernity, innovation, and change.³⁶

Modernists, who want the Islamic world to become part of global modernity. They want to modernize and reform Islam to bring it into line with the age.³⁷

³⁴ Kaplan, David E. *Hearts, Minds and Dollars*. US News & World Report <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050425/25roots.htm>. Accessed on March 21st 2010

³⁵ Cheryl Bernard, *Civil Democratic Islam: Post-9/11*, *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Spring 2002, p. 15

Secularists, who want the Islamic world to accept a division of church and state in the manner of Western industrial democracies, with religion relegated to the private sphere.³⁸

These groups hold distinctly different positions on essential issues that have become contentious in the Islamic world today, including political and individual freedom, education, the status of women, criminal justice, the legitimacy of reform and change, and attitudes toward the West.

The fundamentalists are hostile to the West and to the United States in particular and are intent, to varying degrees, on damaging and destroying democratic modernity. Supporting them is not an option, except for transitory tactical considerations. The traditionalists generally hold more moderate views, but there are significant differences between different groups of traditionalists. Some are close to the fundamentalists. None wholeheartedly embraces modern democracy and the culture and values of modernity and, at best, can only make an uneasy peace with them.

The modernists and secularists are closest to the West in terms of values and policies. However, they are generally in a weaker position than the other groups, lacking powerful backing, financial resources, an effective infrastructure, and a public platform. The secularists, besides sometimes being unacceptable as allies on the basis of their broader ideological affiliation, also have trouble addressing the traditional sector of an Islamic audience.

Traditional orthodox Islam contains democratic elements that can be used to counter the repressive, authoritarian Islam of the fundamentalists, but it is not suited to be the primary vehicle of democratic Islam. That role falls to the Islamic modernists, whose effectiveness, however, has been limited by a number of constraints, which this report will explore.³⁹

Consider that fundamentalist as the greatest enemy, deradicalization therefore is a part of US strategy. Hard measure approached seemed to be insufficient to reduce and eliminate all potential heading to terrorist acts. Even America considers this approach of being ineffective to combat the root of terrorism in comprehensive manner. Same thing with the law enforcement that seemed powerless to create significant effects and reach the root of radicalism. Even though it appears sufficient to disrupt, but lack in prevention and rehabilitation so that the problem of terrorism is continuo growing. Deradicalization or counter-radicalization in this context can be referring as attempts in form of strategic and tactical approach to cut down all stimulant variables that create "terrorism". This program is more of "soft approach", toward the society in Muslim world, particular Islamic groups or individuals involved in the Islamic group's network labeled as "radical", "fundamentalist" and so forth.

Obama administration is now applying a new national security strategy, by emphasizing on the importance of international diplomacy and using military power as final attempt. Obama declared that he refuse the Bush's doctrine that

emphasize on unilateral relations and unilateralism. This

national strategy focuses on what Hilary Clinton called as “*smart power*”, Clinton insist to use several foreign policy’s tools including public diplomacy, economic reform, development finance, education and also military. Briefly, this new national security strategy seems differ from Bush’s doctrine. However, military power is still become one important element of US strategy in war on terror.

US authorities see that radicalization is a complex and highly individualized process, often shaped by a poorly understood interaction of structural and personal factors. And just as there is no grand theory of radicalization and no common terrorist profile, there is no single explanation for why people deradicalize or disengage from a militant group. The factors that trigger this process are as many and varied as those that lead individuals to radicalize. Aware of these complexities, most authorities have understood the need to adopt highly flexible approaches to counter radicalization. There is broad consensus that no single approach will work in all cases, and in some cases none will. Methods used in radicalization prevention might not be appropriate in deradicalization. Therefore, deradicalization programs will likely remain a necessary part of larger US counter-radicalization and counterterrorism strategies.

Because of such facts, the US is now planning a serious war propaganda strategy that will be executed around the globe. Through USAID, the US government spent millions of dollars to develop “liberalism” and “Sufism” in Islamic world. For example in Indonesia, USAID now helps fund over 30 Muslims organizations in the country. Among the programs: media production,

academic to Islamic universities. Also in the grant list: Islamic think tanks that are fostering a body of scholarly research showing liberal Islam's compatibility with what they call "democracy and human rights."

Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize the prevention of terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab communities. "Embedded within these communities," notes Professor Deborah Ramirez, "are the linguistic skills, information, and cultural insights necessary to assist law enforcement in its efforts to identify suspicious behavior. In order to have access to these critical tools and information, law enforcement recognized the need to build bridges required for effective communication with these groups."⁴⁰ At the same time, Muslim and Arab-Americans recognized the need to define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like all Americans, desire to help prevent another attack.

Scholars who have studied the circumstances that are associated with voluntary cooperation by Muslim-Americans in anti-terror policing efforts have identified strong evidence that when authorities are viewed as more legitimate, their rules and decisions are more likely to be accepted. Engagement is one strategy by law enforcement to build trust and enhance community perceptions of legitimacy.

The concept of building trust through engagement and partnership is rooted in the community-policing model developed by law enforcement professionals in the 1990's. The Justice Department defined community policing

⁴⁰ Deborah A. Ramirez, Sasha Cohen O'Connell, and Rabia Zafar, *The Partnering for Prevention and Community Safety Initiative, A Promising Practices Guide Executive Summary*, 2004, p. 2, <http://www.ojp.gov/ncj/210181/DEPT-Exec-Summary-5-04.pdf>

as “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”⁴¹ One of its key features is the establishment of collaborative partnerships between law, enforcement agencies and individuals and organizations they serve to develop solutions to problems and increase trust in police.

A study by the Homeland Security Institute found that “community policing has been applied with notable success in places such as New York City, Chicago, Boston, and San Diego, and has been widely adopted (at least in name) throughout the United States.” A Homeland Advisory Council (HSAC) working group chaired by Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley found that Community-Oriented Policing works:

“Effective public-private partnerships, designed to enable civic engagement, problem-solving, and violent crime mitigation provide the foundation for efforts to prevent, protect against and respond to violent criminal activity - including that which may be motivated by ideological objectives.”⁴²

Recently, numerous US agencies are conducting outreach, engage, and partner with Muslim-American over issues relating to civil rights, civil liberties,

⁴¹ DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Community Policing Defined*. April 3, 2009., p.3, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e030917193-CP-Defined.pdf>. Accessed on March 25th 2011

⁴² A report by Jerome P. Bielopera & Mark A. Randel, *Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex*

and domestic terrorism issues. US government also tried to carefully recruit their partner in the Muslim community to ensure that they are working with reliable voices with grassroots support and those who promote ideas contrary to liberal democracy. They identified “moderate” Muslim intermediaries and strengthen these groups to enable them to compete with fundamentalists or Jihadists in the war of ideas. One of these intermediaries is Syamsi Ali, a preacher in New York City, claiming that he preaches against terror and violence by giving speeches on issues like moderate Islam, liberty, peace to American Muslim community.

In the area of prison, US authorities applied Prison-Based Collective Deradicalization. It was done only when the state has defeated militants by killing or imprisoning most of militant’s group leader. They relied on hard-line counterterrorism measure as well as soft-line measure to encourage militants to deradicalize or disengage from the group they involved.

A.2 Disengagement

Another strategy used by the US authorities to confront terrorists is *disengagement*. Disengagement is the process of changing one’s behavior by refraining from violence and withdrawing from a radical organization. John Horgan notes that disengagement can be the product of psychological factors (for example, disillusionment) or physical factors (most notably, imprisonment). He further argues that disengaging from a terrorist organization does not necessarily entail leaving the group; rather, a person disengages from terrorism by not executing violent attacks, even if that person remains affiliated with the radical

organization.⁴³

There are at least three stages an individual disengage from “radical organization”. The process of disengagement begins as the result of a trigger, which is frequently a traumatic event or emotional crisis; this creates a cognitive opening and doubts about remaining in the group. During this period of questioning, an individual makes a simple calculation weighing the pros and cons of exiting. Whether this internal debate ultimately leads a person to exit depends on the strength of “push” and “pull” factors, the benefits of remaining with the group, and the barriers to exit, which together determine whether the expected utility of leaving exceeds the expected utility of remaining. When this condition manifests, the person reaches a turning point and decides to disengage from the terrorist organization.

The next stage is when a radical he or she begins to seriously considered the costs and benefits of staying or exiting from radical organization. To create such situation US authorities had tried to identify negative factors that incite disengagement, positive factor that draw an individual from radical group, and issues that make it difficult for an individual to leave from radical organization.

The third stage is when a person decides to make the turning point of leaving a radical group after he or she concludes that the expected benefits of leaving is greater than the expected benefits of staying in the group. After exiting, the individual is physically disengaged from the terrorist group or cell but still needs to create a new identity and reintegrate into mainstream society. Although

⁴³ John Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism*, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 100.

there are not enough data to conclusively identify the factors that influence the probability of returning to prison, there are some plausible hypotheses about the probability of successful reintegration into society or recidivism. If the former militant is able to develop a new social network that encourages moderate behavior, secure steady employment, and be accepted by the community, he or she will be less likely to reengage in radical behavior. Conversely, if the former militant cannot locate a supportive social network, find a job, or is ostracized by the community, the probability of recidivism will correspondingly increase.

An individual may become a member of a terrorist organization because of a strong belief in the group's ideology; because friends and acquaintances belong to the group; for practical reasons, such as financial and other incentives provided by the group; or for a combination of these factors. Regardless of the reasons for joining, once an individual is in a radical organization, he or she is socialized to accept the group's ideology, develops deep emotional ties to other members, and relies on the group to provide for many basic needs. Independent of the reasons for the original decision to join, there are other factors that now tie the person to the group.

Another factor that could lead a person disengages from radical organization is the level of commitment of such individual in the group. The longer and individual belongs to a group and the greater his or her involvement in the group's activities, the less likely it is that the individual will leave the group. However, commitment necessitates more than just length of membership and

level of participation. Individual who disengage from radical organization

more attach to the group emotionally. Therefore, commitment depends on the length of involvement in a radical group along with the degree to which a militant's relative, profession, politics and religion are incorporated into the organization.

A lot of researchers within the US officials divide at least four elements that involved in militant organization, hard-core members, activist, newcomers, supporters and sympathizers. The hard core is composed the most deeply committed members. They have been involving in the organization for a long period of times, they usually involved in planning and executing terrorist activities. Activists are also often directly involved in terrorist activity, however they may not have been members as long. Newcomers are current recruits who have involved in terrorist group for a short period and thus have lesser involvement in planning and executing terrorist activities. Supporters have even fewer areas of their activities and the organization, they are not a full-time members but also assist the organization for activities like funding the organization. Sympathizers are those who are not actively involved with terrorist organization but have similar goals and ideology with the organization and may passively assist or support the organization.

The longer an individual is in radical organization and the more spheres of his or her lives that are connected to the group, the less likely is that this person will leave the group because the cost living will be too great. However, there are a number of prominent examples of deeply committed members who disengage from terrorist group like the former Indonesian Jama'ah Islamiyah, Nasir Abbas

B. CONFRONTING THE OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF JIHADISTS

B.1 Enforcement Activities

There are three main strategy conducted by US government in fighting Homegrown terrorist, intelligence approaches, preventive policing and investigative approach. In a report by Congressional Research Service, December 2007, it was mentioned that a group of intelligence and terrorism experts argues that “to infiltrate terrorist plots, identify and head off future attacks, and build the knowledge base required to rapidly investigate when incidents do occur requires human intelligence.”The US Department Of Justice and FBI operate 106 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) in the United States created since 9/11. These interagency entities include 4,433 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and agents who “investigate acts of terrorism that affect the US its interests, property and citizens, including those employed by the US and military personnel overseas.”As this suggests, their operations are highly tactical and focus on investigations, developing human sources (informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots. JTTFs offer an important conduit for the sharing of intelligence developed from FBI-led counterterrorism investigations with outside agencies. These task forces also connect state and local law enforcement with the US Intelligence Community on terrorism-related matters. To help facilitate this, especially as the threat of homegrown jihadists has emerged, the number of top-secret security clearances issued to local police working on JTTFs has increased from 125 to 878 between 2007 and 2009.

In the field of preventive policing since the 9/11 attacks, the US government

has taken a more proactive, intelligence-driven posture in its investigations. While serving as Deputy Attorney General, Paul McNulty described the Justice Department's aggressive, proactive, and preventative course as:

“The only acceptable response from a department of government charged with enforcing our laws and protecting the American people. Awaiting an attack is not an option. That is why the Department of Justice is doing everything in its power to identify risks to our Nation's security at the earliest stage possible and to respond with forward-leaning - preventative - prosecutions.”⁴⁴

One observer has described intelligence gathering in this context as “driven by a theory of preventive policing: in order to anticipate the next terror attack, authorities need to track legal activities and focuses not on crime, but on the possibility that a crime might be committed at some future date.”⁴⁵

The FBI and US Department Of Justice emphasized their forward-leaning approach with its September 29, 2008 revision of the *Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations* which they claim “make the FBI's operations in the United States more effective by providing simpler, clearer, and more uniform standards and procedures.”⁴⁶ This revision went into effect on

⁴⁴ Prepared Remarks of Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty at American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, May 24, 2006. http://www.Justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag_speech_060524.html. Accessed on March 25th, 2011

⁴⁵ Thomas Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy,” *The Public Eye*, Summer 2009, <http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques.html>. Hereafter: Cincotta, “*From Movements to Mosques*.” Accessed on March 16th 2011

⁴⁶ DOJ Press Release, “Memorandum for the Heads of Department Components: The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations” September 29, 2008

December 1, 2008. In large part, the guidelines sprang from the post-9/11 national security context in which the FBI surmised that it could not simply react to crimes. It had to preemptively search for criminal, counterintelligence, and terrorist threats to the homeland.

The most prominent changes to the guidelines concern “assessments” that agents and analysts may now use outside of investigations. The guidelines have established six authorized purposes, check leads on individuals or activities, check leads on groups or organizations, collect information to analyze potential threats and vulnerabilities, gather information for intelligence analysis or planning, vet and manage the agency’s confidential human sources (informants), and collect foreign intelligence. Assessments offer terrorism investigators a variety of techniques, including public surveillance and the use of confidential informants to penetrate conspiracies.⁴⁷

Major challenge for law enforcement is to gauge how quickly and at what point individuals move from radicalized beliefs to violence. Because not all terrorist suspects follow a single radicalization roadmap on their way to executing plots, US law enforcement also faces the task of discerning exactly when radicalized individuals become real threats.

Among the tools employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of Internet and social networking sites. The use of the Internet by al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups has expanded the threat to US homeland security. The sophisticated and organized Internet campaign being waged by Jihadist around the

<http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines-memo.pdf>. Accessed on March 25th 2011

⁴⁷ See FBI, *Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide*, (DIOG) redacted, December 16, 2008, pp. 76-85, available at <http://www.fbi.gov/foia/82641354>. Accessed on March 25th 2011.

world has the potential to challenge the US National Defenses. By speaking directly to potential followers in the United States, al-Qaeda and others are able to control their message, suppress dissent, and offer a hateful worldview that dictates, based on a perversion of the Islamic faith, that Jihad is the only remedy to rectify perceived wrongs. It is very possible that the core terrorist enlistment message espoused over the Internet will drive more individuals in the United States to conduct actual attacks.

The USA PATRIOT Act authorizes the FBI to use National Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to email and Internet use from Internet Service Providers.⁴⁸ In addition, according to an internal Justice Department document obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, law enforcement agents may also go undercover into social networking sites with false online profiles to exchange messages with suspects, identify a target's friends or relatives, and browse private information such as postings, personal photographs and video clips.⁴⁹ The Obama Administration is seeking approval from Congress to expand FBI authority to obtain records related to the context of emails and other Internet-based communications without first obtaining a warrant from a judge. "The proposal would add 'electronic communication transaction records' - like email addresses used in correspondence and Web pages visited - to a list of the categories of

⁴⁸ Laura K. Donohue, *The Costs of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 236-243.

⁴⁹ Richard Lardner, "Break the Law and Your New 'Friend' May Be the FBI," *Associated Press* cited by *abcnews.com*, March 16, 2010, <http://abcnews.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10111664>

information that FBI agents can demand.”

The last strategy used to preemptively stop terrorists, law enforcement requires accurate and timely intelligence. To counter violent terrorist plots, US law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been described by one scholar as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.”⁵⁰ These tactics have long been implemented in wide variety of issues. The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur cases, (often called sting operation) government undercover operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. Historically, these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. While these techniques combined with the cultivation of informants as well as surveillance (especially in and around Mosques) may be effective in stymieing rapidly developing terrorist plots, their use has fostered concern within US Muslim communities.

B.2 Combating Homegrown Terrorist Through Partnership: Engagement With Communities

US law enforcements also build partnership with Muslim community inside America. One of them is conducted by Department of the Treasury seeking to identify, disrupt, and dismantle illicit financial networks that support terrorist groups. The department has identified cases where terrorist organizations have

⁵⁰ Lorenzo Vidino, “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?” *Journal of American Studies*, 47 (2013): 1-22.


established or infiltrated the charitable sector and used charitable funds and well-intentioned donors in order to provide cover or support terrorist activities or agendas.

Treasury maintains that overcoming the challenges requires a strong partnership with the charitable sector and frames its efforts to conduct outreach, issue guidance, and develop a partnership with the charitable sector. Treasury meets frequently and collaborates on projects with specific communities and organizations, including Muslim-American communities, as well as with representatives from the broader charitable sector. Department of the Treasury also join in interagency outreach events with Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

C. The Result And Challenges

Even though the US authorities cannot completely defeat homegrown terrorist within their own soil, especially when Obama took the chair of US president. Yet in 2010, there were lesser incidents of homegrown terror occurred compare to the year of 2009. Six incidents of radicalization leading to violent activity were reported. An attempt to bomb New York's Times Square and a Somali-recruitment case. And also some individuals who have connection with

**Figure II: A Comparison Incident of Homegrown Terrorist Plots Between
2002-2010 In United States**



The figure above concludes us that US domestic territories are not immune from homegrown terrorism. The United States does not have a domestic counter-radicalization strategy, much less deradicalization programs. Nevertheless, the results of the programs analyzed here can have important implications for the United States. First, Islamist extremism and terrorism constitute a global threat. Second, the United States could derive lessons from the experiences of some of these programs for the purposes of preventing domestic radicalization or to put in

counterinsurgency operations (for instance, in Afghanistan).

A question eventually appears, can the United States adopt a domestic counter radicalization or deradicalization approach at the national or local level? One part of the answer relates to the characteristics of the Muslim population in the United States and the nature of the domestic terrorist threat. It has been noted that American Muslims are well integrated into American society, are well educated (a majority are college graduates), and have per capita incomes that are higher than those of the US population at large have a large Muslim prison population, as is the case in some European countries, although there is certainly a risk of prison radicalization.⁵¹

Nevertheless, some of the same features that facilitate the spread of Islamist extremism in Europe are also present in the United States. Most disturbingly, there has been an uptick in the number of Islamist terrorist plots and attacks over the past two years, which suggests that the United States is not immune to the same risks of radicalization and into terrorist groups that have been observed in Europe.

There are legal, political, and cultural reasons for the lack of an official US interest in domestic counter-radicalization. For constitutional reasons, it is difficult for any level of government in the United States to address the religious component of radicalization, or even radicalization itself. US governmental bodies lack the tools and legal authority to reach out to individuals at risk of radicalization if these individuals have not yet committed crimes. M... US

authorities have been reluctant to address the ideological challenge of radical Islamism. All these factors make a counter ideological approach to Islamist radicalization in the United States very challenging.

In the field of engagement with Muslim community, some experts warn of significant challenges in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events. A study of policing in Arab-American communities sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, for example, highlighted four key obstacles hindering outreach between US Arabs (Christian and Muslim) and law enforcement: “Distrust between Arab communities and law enforcement, lack of cultural awareness among law enforcement officers, language barriers, and concerns about immigration status and fears of deportation.”⁵²

Terrorism expert Marc Sageman cautions that engagement can be a sign of government focus on Muslim communities when instead it should be stressed that Muslims are Americans just like everyone else. He sees another challenge arise when engagement on the government side is led by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. “It can send the message that we are only interested in Muslims because they are potential law breakers. No other foreign or religious communities in the United States get this type of scrutiny.”⁵³

Mohamed Elibiary, the President of the Freedom and Justice Foundation, a

⁵² Nicole J. Henderson et al., *Law Enforcement and Arab American Community Relations After September 11, 2001: Engagement in a Time of Uncertainty*, Vera Institute of Justice. New York, 2006

⁵³ Jerome P. Bjelopera & Mark A. Randol. *Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*. Congressional Research Service, CRS, 2016

Muslim community group based in Carrollton, TX, has told Congress that “while the government has publicly claimed a desire for ‘partnership’ with the mainstream American Muslim community, law enforcement has only offered the community a conduit to ‘inform’ on community members of concern.” He argues that this “securitization” of government interactions with Muslim-American communities would be counterproductive. Outreach may be most effective when US Muslim communities initiate it and community government contact revolves around countering the messages popular among homegrown terrorist. Marc Sageman suggests it would be more appropriate for local authorities, such as a mayor’s office, to perform the engagement role because they know these communities better than federal officials. An important role at the federal level is to lead efforts to combat discrimination against Muslim-Americans, an activity in which the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice is currently engaged.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ DOJ Civil Rights Division, “Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash,” July 25, 2008 http://www.justice.gov/crt/leaders/leadership_initiative.asp, accessed May 1, 2011.