

**THE STRENGTHENING OF JAPAN-PHILIPPINES
STRATEGIC COOPERATION IN 2015**

AN UNDERGRADUATE THESIS



Arranged by:

Ghiffari Yusuf Mohammad Arsyad

20120510057

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES

UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH YOGYAKARTA

2016

AN UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

**“THE STRENGTHENING OF JAPAN-PHILIPPINES
STRATEGIC COOPERATION IN 2015”**

Submitted As A Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Attainment of the Degree of *Sarjana Ilmu Politik* (S.IP) in the
International Relations Department,
Faculty of Social and Political Science,
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.

Written by:

Ghiffari Yusuf Mohammad Arsyad

20120510057

Thesis Advisor:

Prof. Dr. Tulus Warsito.,M.Si

**INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH YOGYAKARTA
2016**

ENDORSEMENT PAGE

This undergraduate thesis entitled:

THE STRENGTHENING OF JAPAN-PHILIPPINES STRATEGIC COOPERATION IN 2015



Ghiffari Yusuf Mohammad Arsyad

20120510057

This undergraduate thesis has been examined and endorsed by the board of examiners from the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta on:

Day/Date : Tuesday, 20th December 2016
Time : 08.00 AM
Place : Examination Room-D, International
Relations ASEAN Conference Simulation
Room

Acknowledged by:

Advisor/Chief of Examiner

Prof. Dr. Tulus Warsito M.Si

NIK.19531010199003163008

Examiner I

Examiner II

Dra. Grace Lestariana W, S.IP., M.Si

NIK.19690509199409163028

Drs. Husni Amriyanto P, M.Si

NIK. 19690301199406163026

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this undergraduate thesis is my own work. This undergraduate thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purpose.

I certify that the intellectual content of my undergraduate thesis is the product my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this undergraduate thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

Yogyakarta, December 24th 2016

Ghiffari Yusuf Mohammad Arsyad

QUOTATIONS

“Indeed ALLAH is with the patience”

- Holy Quran, Al-Baqarah v.153

“Be like a duck, paddling and working very hard inside the water, but what everyone sees is a smiling and calm face.”

- Manoj Arora

“If you do good, you do good to yourselves. (Likewise) if you do evil, you do evil to yourselves”

- Holy Qur'an: Al-Isra, v.7

“Life isn't about finding yourself. Life is about creating yourself”

- George Bernard Shaw

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This academic paper is presented as a form of respect and thankfulness towards the people that contribute towards the making of this paper and also writer's personal development.

Firstly, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude towards my thesis advisor, Prof. Dr. Tulus Warsito M.Si, for his concern and guidance since the beginning of this undergraduate thesis until its final phase. And also Mrs. Grace Lestariana Wonoadi.,S.IP.,M.Si as the first Examiner and also Mr. Husni Amriyanto Putra, M.Si as the second examiner that helped in making this paper to be more comprehensive with their constructing inputs and comments.

Second, for my mother Dra. Wahyuni Budiasih and father Drs. Supriyanto M.T, without their love and support none of this would have been possible. And also, my dear brother Mardhotullah Ahmad Fauzan the troublemaker yet the most artistic one. I am thankful for everything you've had done in making me who I am today.

For my significant other that currently on pursuit of her dream, thank you for all the support, motivation and beautiful distractions that has occurred during the making of this thesis, thanks from the bottom of my heart.

Also many thanks to all individuals that has accompany me through the dynamics of university life; Family of ambarketawang B2: M. Linggar Pangestu (The mistress), Ilham Hertantyo (The Hermit), Wahyu Widodo (The Slark), and Reza Fernando (The Jocks)..

BPH Squad of KOMAHI UMY and *Pengembangan Wacana* division, and also all my fellow comrades in IPIREL batch 2012 especially the The "Teams" that colored my days in this 4 years. Thank you for all the stories that we've made, the moments will be unforgettable.

And also, for the Penjelajah Langit astronomy community, as the place where I meet individuals with same interest and passion to develop their knowledge to understand about the night sky.

Dear beloved:

Ibu, Bapak, dan Ado

This is for you...

FOREWORD

My highest gratitude goes to the Almighty Allah (SWT), all praise and glories are for Him alone for His uncountable blessings towards his entire believer. Peace and blessing of Allah (SWT) be upon our noble prophet Mohammad SAW, to his family, his companions, and those who follow his path till the day of resurrection.

Firstly, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude towards my thesis advisor, Prof. Dr. Tulus Warsito M.Si, for his concern and guidance since the beginning of this undergraduate thesis until its final phase. special mentioning for my beloved JAPFORP lecturer during my study in DLSU, Mr. Benjamin San Jose, with his keen and active way of teaching has inspired me learn more about Japan foreign policy and resulted in this undergraduate thesis, *Maraming Salamat Po!!*

A very special thanks for both of my parents, dearest mother Dra. Wahyuni Budiasih and father Drs. Supriyanto M.T, without their love and support none of this would have been possible. also, my dear brother Mardhotullah Ahmad Fauzan. I am thankful for everything you've had done in making me who I am today, a person who manage to complete this paper.

Writer hopes this undergraduate thesis could help people, especially students to understand about the Japan-Philippines strategic partnership. Writer acknowledges that this paper is still far from perfect, thus further research and inputs towards this title will be very appreciated, to extend the benefits of this paper even further

Yogyakarta, December 2016

Ghiffari Yusuf M. Arsyad

ABSTRACT

In June 2015, President of The Republic of the Philippines Benigno S. Aquino III paid an official state visit to Japan, and held a meeting with prime minister of Japan Shinzo Abe. Both of the state leader declared that the relationship between the two countries has entered the stage of Strengthened Strategic Partnership¹.

This boost up in bilateral relations of Japan-Philippine in the recent year especially since 2010, as a respond of the growing tension produced by the advancement of China's assertive actions in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Japan as a state need to fulfill its national Interest to secure it self from the threat in their own region, and also need to support the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, because of its strategic importance for the security and economy of Japan. This paper will explain and analyze the reasons why Japan strengthen it strategic cooperation with the Philippines in 2015

Keywords: Japan-Philippines Relations, Japan Foreign Policy, Strategic Cooperation, China, South China Sea.

¹ Ministry of Foreign Affair of Japan. (2011, September 27). *Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister; Japan-Philippines Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Promotion of the "Strategic Partnership" between Neighboring Countries Connected by Special Bonds of Friendship*. Retrieved May 28, 2016, from Ministry of Foreign Affair of Japan website: http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/noda/joint_statement110927.html

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Japan rose as a strong imperial power after the end of World War I, and gained a permanent seat in the League of Nations after the war. The Showa recession in 1926, and internal political instabilities later contributed to the rise of Japanese militarism in the late 1920s to 1930s. On 1941 December 7–8, Japanese forces carried out surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, British forces in Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong and declared war on the United States and the United Kingdom, bringing the US and the UK into World War II in the Pacific.²

After the end of World War II, Japan rebuilt it self under the close relation and protection from the United States, which provided Japan with the ability to have concentrated development on economic sector while avoiding to take part to any major initiatives related to the international situation. With the constitution of Japan forbid the establishment of a standing army but still will be protected by United States, Japan has these advantages which is to maintain political neutrality in foreign affair while expanding its economic relations wherever possible.

Relations between Japan and the Philippines has begun since Muromachi period of Japanese history, during this period Japanese merchants and traders had settled in Luzon. Especially in the suburb of Manila, Dilao, which was a

²(インドネシア独立運動と日本とスカルノ (2), (2009-10-02), Retrieved 9 7, 2016, From: <http://www.sankei.co.jp/seiron/koukoku/2005/0504/ronbun3-2.html>

*Nihonmachi*³ (Japantown) of 3,000 Japanese around the year 1600. After the World War II, United States grant The Philippines independence and The Philippines also take part as the signatory in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan. The diplomatic relations between Japan and The Philippines re-established in 1956, when a war reparations agreement was concluded. Japanese companies and individual investors had begun to return to the Philippines by the end of the 1950s.

Picture 1.1: Geographical position of Japan and The Philippines



Source: <https://amti.csis.org/atlas/>

Japan and Philippines have similarities in their geographical properties as an archipelagic nation, with both located adjacent to Pacific Ocean makes both of the country experienced direct effect if there are political changes in the near

³*Nihonmachi* is a term used to referring historical Japanese communities in Southeast and East Asia. The term has also been applied to several modern-day communities, though most of these are called simply "Japantown", in imitation of the common term "Chinatown".

waters. The location of Japan and Philippines make's up whats called the first-island chains”(Castro, 2013), surrounding the inner sea of East and South China Sea from the open water of Pacific.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda chose Manila to deliver his famous “Fukuda Doctrine” speech in 1977 to show Tokyo’s new approach to Southeast Asia which had been spoiled by Japanese occupation during WWII⁴. Economics has long been a major part of the relationship between Japan and the Philippines, but growing anxiety about Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas have led both countries to strengthen their defense ties under a strategic partnership first inked in 2011⁵. Tokyo has provided Manila a low-interest loan to be used for the purchase of ten new Japanese high-speed patrol vessels.

Japan and Philippines developed their relation into a strategic partnership during President Benigno S. Aquino III, Official Working Visit to Japan from 25 to 28 September 2011. President Aquino paid a State Call on His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and visited Ishinomaki City in Miyagi Prefecture, a disaster-affected area of the Great East Japan Earthquake⁶. Contained inside the Strategic

⁴The Philippine Star.(2010, 1 10).*Japan and Phl: A special friendship*. Retrieved 3 26, 2016, from PhilStar Headline: <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/01/10/895207/japan-and-phl-special-friendship>

⁵Parameswaran, P. (2015, 6 5).*Asean Beat, The Diplomat*. Retrieved 3 27, 2016, from The Diplomat Website: <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/japan-philippines-declare-strengthened-strategic-partnership/>

⁶Ministry of Foreign Affair of Japan. (2015, June 4). *Countries & Regions, Japan-Philippines Relations, Japan-Philippines Joint Declaration A Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and Goals of Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and Beyond*. Retrieved May 28, 2016, from Ministry of Foreign Affair of Japan Website: http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/ph/page4e_000280.html

Cooperation joint statement by the government of Philippines and Japan, are two main initiatives which is; (1) “Maintaining and strengthening high-level bilateral relations” by conducting three main aspects which is:

- a) Mutually beneficial cooperation in economic field, by conducting Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement, Promotion and enhancement of investment, continuation of economic cooperation, environment and climate change.
- b) Mutual Trust in political and security aspects, convening of multi-layered policy dialogues, cooperation in the field of maritime affairs, peace in Mindanao.
- c) Mutual Understanding at the people-to-people level. Conducted in Tourism, and Youth exchange programs(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015).

And (2) “Contribution to the regional and international community” which includes several points of actions in fields of; Maritime Security, Promotion of regional economic integration, regional cooperation on disaster prevention, special attention on The Korean Peninsula, Climate change negotiations, UN Security council reform, and UN peacekeeping operations(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015).

In May and June 2015, the Maritime Self Defense Force and the Philippine Navy held their first joint exercises. Manila and Tokyo even explored a visiting forces agreement, which would grant Japanese forces access to base in the

Philippines. The Philippines has expressed its interest in acquiring used Japanese P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft, which would significantly enhance Manila's ability to keep an eye on its maritime territory and near seas⁷.

President of The republic of the Philippines Benigno S. Aquino III paid an official state visit to Japan, and held a meeting with prime minister of Japan Shinzo Abe on 4 June 2015. Both of the state leader declared that the relationship between the two countries has entered the stage of Strengthened Strategic Partnership⁸. Both countries are fully committed towards strengthening the Partnership, and aware of the increasing and complex challenges facing the region and the international community, and both country agree on establishing guiding principles for the future relationship between the two countries in "Action Plan for Strengthening of the Strategic Partnership" which consist of 6 main aspects which is: Strategic Partnership for Shared Principles and Goals, Joint Contribution to Secure Regional Peace and Stability, Towards Enduring Peace in Mindanao, Collaboration for Economic Growth of the Region, Close Coordination in the International Arena, and Strengthening Dialogues and Exchanges.

With this undergraduate thesis, writer wishes to be able to explore relevant information and able to analyze about the reasons of the strengthening strategic partnership between Japan and The Philippines in 2015.

⁷Mazza, M. (2015, 10 5). *National Interest Security Section*. Retrieved March 25, 2016, from Nationalinterest.org : <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-japans-battle-influence-southeast-asia-14006>

⁸Ministry of Foreign Affair of Japan. (2011, September 27). *Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister; Japan-Philippines Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Promotion of the "Strategic Partnership" between Neighboring Countries Connected by Special Bonds of Friendship*. Retrieved May 28, 2016, from Ministry of Foreign Affair of Japan website: http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/noda/joint_statement110927.html

B. Research Question

After discussing and analyzing the background of Japan foreign policy towards the strengthen of its strategic partnership with The Philippines, writer formulates the main research question for this thesis proposal as follows:

“Why Japan strengthened its strategic partnership with The Philippines in 2015?”

C. Theoretical Framework

In order to the analyze the reason why Japan has strengthened its strategic partnership with The Philippines, writer will use two concepts as the tools to analyze the information and data that has been gathered, which are the concept of National Interest and Balance of Power:

1. Concept of National Interest:

The concept of national interest could be understood as a country's goals or ambitions in economic, military, or cultural sector. In other word national interest could be defined as the goals and aims of a nation. The early thinker of this concept is Niccolò Machiavelli in his book the Prince (*Il Principe*) in 1513 which further develop the school of realism and considered as the founder of modern political science studies.

Other scholars According to Thuau, National Interest is: “..a form of reason "born of the calculation and the ruse of men" and makes of the state "a knowing machine, a work of reason"; the state ceases to be derived from the divine order

and is henceforth subject to its own particular necessities” (Thuau, 1966). Thuau argues that state, as a “knowing machine” that work for a reason, this so called reason should be related to the goals and aim of the state which should be followed realistically. More specifically, Jack C. Plano and Ray Olton define national interest as:

National interest is the fundamental objective and ultimate determinant that guides the decision-makers of a state in making foreign policy. The national interest of a state is typically a highly generalized conception of those elements that constitute the state’s most vital needs. These include self-preservation, independence, territorial integrity, military security, and economic well-being. (Jack C. Plano, 1988)

Plano defines national interest as a vital interest of a state that should be fulfilled in order to preserve its existence. A states *vital needs* according to Plano includes; Self-preservation, independence, territorial integrity, military security, and economic well-being. Self-Preservation means the needs of a state to ensure its survival from any threat which may harm the state, Independence means the needs of state to exercise its independent actions as a form of sovereignty, territorial integrity means the need of states to protect the integrity of its territory from any possible harm, and the economic well-being means the interest of state is related to its effort to secure its economic sector. Thus according to Plano, every act of a state in form of foreign policy has these vital needs as the main needs that should be fulfilled.

In relation to the case of Japan and Philippines strategic cooperation, both Japan and The Philippines have the same concern towards China’s aggressive

claims in South China Sea. China claims almost over the entire sea as the sovereign territory of China. Japan together with its key-allies United States, concern China's assertiveness because of strategic position of South China Sea, which connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Guaranteeing freedom of navigation in these waters is vital to the global economy, in fact one third of world Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) passes through the strait of malaca and South China Sea, in 2011 3.4 trillion cubic feet of Japan's LNG pass through South China Sea⁹, indicates the importance of South China Sea for Japan and other country.

China's dramatic increases in military spending, and its military infrastructure buildups in artificial islands in South China Sea, has improved its strategic position in the sea. Thus China has been able to act much more assertively throughout the region and produce a security threat to neighboring countries in the East China Sea and the South China Sea(Castro, 2013).

Using Plano's concept of vital needs in his concept of national interest, writer will analyze "military security" and "economic well-fare" as vital needs of Japan in regards to analyzing Japan's reasons behind the strengthening of its strategic cooperation with the Philippines in 2015.

2. Balance of Power (BoP) Theory:

The balance of power theory in international relations, suggests that national security is enhanced when military capability is distributed so that no one state is

⁹Center of Strategic and International Studies.(2014). *18 Maps that explain maritime security in Asia*. Retrieved June 7, 2016, from Asia maritime transparency initiative: <http://amti.csis.org/atlas/>

strong enough to dominate all others (Wittkopf, 2005). According to this theory, if one state becomes much stronger than others, it will take advantage of its strength and dominate weaker neighbors, thereby providing a necessity for those countries that feel threatened to unite in a form of defensive coalition to counter the possible threat from the dominant power.

China claims almost 80% of the South China Sea by its U-shape nine-dash line map that is along with the Paracels and Spratly Islands, which are also claimed in parts by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam (Castro, 2013). The map indicates not only China's sovereignty over the island and waters of South China Sea, but also its transportation, fishing, and mineral extraction rights over "all the waters within the nine-dash line" (International Herald Tribune, 13 August 2012). By this maritime claim, China ensures its national security and enhances its territorial integrity. The other states view this development as a sign of Chinese maritime expansionism in an area of key strategic location and potential resources (Scott, 2007).

The concept of balance of power by Stephen M. Walt suggests that there will be different ways a state will act towards the dominant threat, According to (Walt, 1987): "When confronted by a significant external threat, states that look to form alliances may *balance* or *bandwagon*. *Balancing* is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat, while states that have *bandwagoned* have aligned with the threat."

Japan with all historical and rivalry with China in East China Sea certainly could not *bandwagon* to china in the case of its south china sea assertiveness, thus Japan need to do *balancing* actions, which is allying with others against the prevailing threat. According to Sudo (2009),Japan relies on two instruments to try balancing China's influence in South China Sea which is; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the provision of maritime security assistance.

With Walt's concept of Balance of Power, writer will try to analyze the means of the strengthening strategic cooperation between Japan and The Philippines in relation to Japan's effort to balance China in South China sea through the maritime security assistance included in the strategic cooperation between Japan and The Philippines.

D. Hypothesis

As a hypothesis, writer has prepared two hypothesis answering the research question of this research paper. Japan strengthens its strategic partnership with the Philippines in 2015 because of:

- a. The needs of Japan to fulfil its vital needs by ensuring its Economic well-being and military security from China's influence in South China Sea.
- b. And as a form of balancing action towards the influence of China in South China Sea.

E. Research Method

This thesis will be using a qualitative method of analysis and use secondary data sources obtained by conducting library research, finding journals,

articles and also other source of information related with Japan – Philippine relations and its action plans to strengthen the relations.

By using this method, writer hopes to collect as many data and information as possible related towards the topic.

F. Research Purpose

1. To understand the reason why Japan strengthens its Strategic cooperation with The Philippines in 2015.
2. To fulfill the requirement for achieving the bachelor degree of International Relations, in Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

G. Scope Of Research

To keep this paper specific, writer will limit the scope of analysis in relation with the Japan-Philippines strategic cooperation since 2011 until 2016, and the Action Plan for Strengthening of Japan-Philippines strategic cooperation in 2015. However writer will also gather data with strong relation with the topic that may beyond the mentioned periods.

H. Organization Of Writing

To construct this Undergraduate Thesis to be a good scientific research paper, writer will organize this paper in several chapters.

Chapter I : The first chapter will discuss the introductions to this Undergraduate Thesis, which contains background, research question, theoretical framework, research method, hypothesis, research purpose, scope of research, and organization of writing

Chapter II : The second chapter will discuss about Japan foreign policy, related to its dynamichistorical developments, and further will discuss also its character towards the current situation in the nearby region, especially Southeast Asia and the disputes in the area of South China Sea.

Chapter III : The third chapter will discuss more specifically on the Japan and Philippines relations in started by discussing via historical context and followed by a deeper discussion on the establishment of strategic cooperation between Japan and the Philippines.

Chapter IV : The fourth chapter will discuss on implementing theoretical framework to find out the reason of the strengthening of the strategic cooperation between Japan and The Philippines in 2015. The analysis will then used to challenge the hypothesis proposed in the first chapter.

Chapter V : The fifth chapter will be the conclusion of this undergraduate thesis which explains the findings and result of this research.

CHAPTER II

THE JAPAN FOREIGN POLICY

The arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853 marked the first period of Japan starting to be open and interact with the modern world. At the previous time, Japan was an isolated country with landlords' who fought with their samurai to resolve conflicts. The arrival also marked the beginning of Japan's first period of modern foreign policy as well as an effort to integrate itself into the world system.

The next significant period of Japan foreign policy changes were the period of Meiji Era until the stage of World War II, the Cold War, and also the post-Cold War (Cooney, 2006). Each of the periods poses distinctive events and different foreign pressure that determine how the foreign policy would develop by the government of Japan. The policy was made responded in its own unique way to adapt in every period as an effort to position it self, in a fast changing and dynamic world of nations.

In order to understand the trend and find out the reasons why Japan conducted certain foreign policy towards other states, this chapter will discuss the dynamic changes of Japan foreign policies based on the important historical periods that shows distinctive tendency of how Japan conducting its foreign policy. Furthermore, upon discussing the Japan foreign policy in the recent times, writer will narrow down the case studies by discussing more on Japan policy towards the South East Asia Country, and in the last part, writer will explain about

the interests of Japan in the South China Sea region, specifically in economic sector.

A. Historical Era of Japan Foreign Policy developments

Japan foreign policy start as early as the Meijiera.The era witnees the changes of Japan,from a feudal society to a modern industrial nation that has able to compete withthe powers from Europe. The driving force for the change was the realizationof Japan that it needed to industrialize or it would be colonized by more powerful, modern nations.(Cooney, 2006)The main force that led Japan to modernize was the fear that Japanwould be dominated by foreigners. This anxiety can be seen as Japan has become an anti-foreigncountry in the sense that if foreigners had stayed away from Japan.

There were also internal elements thatpushed for reform in Japan, such as the “Iishi”, or a small group of Japanese eliteswho banded together and made it their cause to drag Japan with many suffering from its people into the nineteenth century. However, in the end, the fear of foreigninfluence was the main driving force for change; thus, the pressure for structuralchange had come from outside of Japan. An important development during the Meiji period was the establishment of ademocratic constitution.

In 1889 the Meiji constitution was implementedin response to popular demand of democratic reforms by the people of Japan. At that time, a small group ofbureaucrats ran the government of Japanese, these bureaucrats wanted to keep control centralized rather than diffused tothe people in a democratic system. They

created the Diet and developed a constitution based on the German constitution instituted by the German Chancellor Bismarck, a constitution that kept power centralized in the hands of the selected bureaucrats while giving minimal power to the people (Cooney, 2006). Eventually, the lack of real power in the hands of the people through their democratically elected representatives in the Diet led to military rule and the disaster of World War II where the next changes of Japan foreign policy occurred (Cooney, 2006).

1. World War II

The second major period in modern Japanese foreign policy was the rebuilding of Japan after the destruction during World War II and the Cold War period. The rewriting of Japan's Meiji Era constitution were included during this period. The constitution dictated and greatly limited Japan's foreign policy. During the occupation of Japan by U.S. after World War II, headed by General Douglas MacArthur as the head of the occupation government, met with with Japan's cabinet, rewrote and revised the Japan's constitution. The new constitution was then nicknamed the Japanese Peace Constitution, a reference to the famous renunciation-of-war clause. Article Nine states:

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.

The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” (Japan Const. Art.ix. 1947)

Article Nine was written before the occurrence of the Cold War. Then, as a result of the East and West block tensions, Japan was pressured by the United States to establish the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) with its only purpose was to maintain defensive capabilities. As an example, Air-SDF could have fighter planes but not bombers or mid-air refueling capabilities that would allow it to take any conflict to the attacker's home soil. The most important point of this setting is the existence of the United States-Japan Security Treaty, which gives Japan the promises of support from U.S. If ever Japan is attacked, eliminating the need for Japanese force offensive capabilities. (Cooney, 2006)

2. Cold War

Still in the process of occupying Japan after the World War II, another war seemed to have started by the early of 1948. The government of the United States was convinced by another threat in the Asia region, the United States should deal with the Soviet Union and the rise of communism in Asia.

This condition triggered a new war namely the Cold War between the West Bloc and the East Bloc, an ideological fight led by United States versus Soviet Union. During the Cold War, Japan seemed to be more passive rather than their last participation in the Second World War. It might be caused by the consequence of the loss in the Second World War and damages in many sectors.

Thus Japan needed to maintain its status as a pacifist country and should not try to get involved with it. However, as a country that was under the protection of

United States, need to follow the tendency of US to focus more on the issue of war against communism. Still in the ongoing occupation in Japan, Douglas MacArthur transferred the troops from Japan to Korea to deal with communist there. Moreover, MacArthur issued a de facto order on July 1950 to the Japanese government to create the “National Police Reserve” consisting of approximately 75,000 men, (Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain, p 138).

Both the government and the citizens of Japan consider this situation as a great distraction. As the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers which firstly ordered Japan to deal with the Constitution on article 9, now easily being turned in ordering Japan government to rearm. Despite not getting deep involvement in the Cold War, Japan became one of crucial point for the United States during the period of Cold War. Japan which was formerly the enemy of the United States in the Second World War II, has become the close ally of United States to face same enemies in the cold war.

3. Post-Cold war

Many beliefs of economic multilateralism combined with security bilateralism were the character of Japan’s approach in regional relations in Asia. But, in 1991 the leaders of Japan started to support multilateral approaches to the security problems in the region. Thus blurring the early dichotomy entitled to its character. The example of this change is the Nakayama Initiative, a diplomatic initiative started by the Foreign Minister of Japan, Nakayama Taro (Sansoucy, Japan's Regional Security Policy In Post-Cold War Asia, 2002).

Japan, under the Foreign Minister Nakayama, proposed the creation of new regional multilateral security dialogue on the existing Post-Ministrial Conference (PMC) of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) (Midford, 2000).

Following the Initiative, Japanese leaders firmly opposed the development of the multilateral security institutions in Asia because of the fear that it may destabilize the alliance with the United States. After the wake of Gulf War in the early 1990s, Japan was heavily criticized by many countries over its failure of contribute by sending personnels to the multinational coalition assembled in the Gulf, Japan policy was famous among the countries with the name of “checkbook diplomacy” since it only provided materials and financial support. Responding towards the criticism of being “self-indulgent” during the crisis and engaged in “contemptible tokenism,” policy makers of Japan were dedicated to show the United States that they could take the initiative diplomatically in contributing to the maintenance of global security (Purrington, 1992). Furthermore, the fear that the United States would withdraw militarily from the region in the early 1990s with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, were not so far from becoming reality.

The United States announced in 1990 that it would make a ten percent reduction of its forces in the region (Martin, 1990). The withdrawal of American forces from the Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines in 1992 increase the blur of America’s intentions regarding its long-term military commitment to the Asian region, until in 1995 with the release of Nye Report, “U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region,” (United States Department of Defense, 1995). In the

perspective of Tokyo, multilateralism was a useful tool to keep the United States engaged in the region and as an effort to respond to American demands for increased burden sharing on the Alliances.

Even though Foreign Minister Nakayama's efforts to create a regional security dialogue resulted in an unexcited support from ASEAN, his diplomatic initiatives did have three important effects on the security policies of the major powers in the region according to the notes of as Peter Katzenstein (Okawara, 2001). First, the Initiative propelled ASEAN into developing plans to set up its own multilateral security dialogue as part of the ASEAN-PMC. Eventually, These plans materialized into the creation of ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 (Midford, 2000). Second, Japan's support in the early 1990s for multilateralism nudged the United States into changing its own position toward multilateral security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region (James A. Baker, 1991/1992).

Finally, the Nakayama Initiative gave Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi some political movement in pushing forward for multilateral security initiatives in the early 1990s. Such as the passage of the United Nations Peacekeeping Cooperation Bill in 1992, and Japan's contribution to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) by sending unarmed Self-Defense Force (SDF) personnel and civilian police (Peter J. Katzenstein, 2008). Thus even though Nakayama's proposal failed to materialize, as Paul Midford has noted, but it did set the stage for the later establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (Midford, 2000), and furthermore contribute toward creating the pathway for Japan's foreign policy in Asia.

B. Japan Foreign Policy in South East Asia

Japan-Southeast Asia security relations already began since the colonial period, by the implementation of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, which actually was a cover for Japanese expansionism aimed at exploiting natural resources in Southeast Asia. Then during the Cold War, as a part of the U.S. strategy to contain Communism, Japan became an industrial hub and driving force for East Asia's economic growth. This resulted in turning the region into a shield against Chinese Communism as well as restoring Japan's economic relations with Southeast Asia. Japan focused on a policy of economic diplomacy with limited involvement in Southeast Asia's security affairs under Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (1946-47, 1948-54), and Japan continued its minimal involvement in the political and security affairs of Southeast Asia through 1974, except in 1968, when Japan participate in international peace observation in Indochina, and also in 1970 when Japan send mediation team to end the Vietnam War. (Nguyen, 2016)

The fundamental change in Japan's policy to Southeast Asia occurred during the 1975-1989 period, when Japan began considering relations with ASEAN countries as a vital significance to its foreign policy in Southeast Asia. ASEAN, according to Japan's perspective was an important institution for political stability in the region and as a important source of economic security, resources, investment, markets, and maritime communication (Sansoucy, 2002). Furthermore, ASEAN also played an important role in keeping the balance of

power in the region because of its members at the time (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) were anti-Communist and have very good relations with non-Communist states. Japan initiated the Fukuda doctrine in 1977, confirmed Tokyo's willingness to take up larger role in Southeast Asian security, by act as a mediator between ASEAN and Indochina, and assist in constructing a stable order for Southeast Asia.

In the post-Cold War period, Japan continued to enhance its security relations with Southeast Asia countries by seeking deeper involvement in regional affairs. Japan's relations with Southeast Asia changed from economic cooperation to became more engaged in political and security issues in the region. (Nguyen, 2016). In general Japan, has become an active participant in multilateral security affairs in Southeast Asia and maintained a positive security influence on the region since 1975. One of the most significant contributions Japan made to regional security was its support for ASEAN in the establishment of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. It was the first multilateral security dialogue discussing security issues and regional stability in Southeast Asia..

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the only multilateral security institution in the Asian region. Founded by the six ASEAN member states at the time: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand and ASEAN's seven dialogue partners: the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, and the European Community. The ARF was designed as a means for consultations among member states on regional political

and security issues (Sansoucy, 2002). It established based on an extension of the Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) within ASEAN. Originally the ARF was composed of the six ASEAN states, the seven dialogue partners, plus the states that ASEAN wanted to engage: Russia, China, Vietnam, and Laos. Its goals are to increase confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, non-proliferation, and arms control in the Asian region (Acharya, 2000). the ARF operates in both inter-sessional support groups (ISG) and inter-sessional meetings (ISM), a governmental working groups that focus on defense white papers, military observers, military exercises, the South China Sea, the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone, and peacekeeping operations (Johnston, 1999).

Japan has played the role of a mediator in the territorial disputes over the South China Sea as far back as 1995, when China constructed permanent structure on Mischief Reef. Japan had urged China to handle the dispute with the Philippines peacefully. Japan has also become an active contributor to other Southeast Asian security affairs, especially in terms of human security. Japan today seeks to avoid a direct military engagement approach toward regional security issues of the region due to its military occupation of Southeast Asia during World War II. Thus, Tokyo relies on human security cooperation as a way to further its security role beyond economic influence in Southeast Asia (Nguyen, 2016).

Beside providing long-term official development assistance (ODA) to help Southeast Asian economies to generate growth and jobs, Japan has actively

contributed to and participated in disaster relief and peacekeeping activities in the region (ER, 2006). Including the financial assistance in the aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis to stabilize the regional economies and restore social and political stability, peacemaking operations in Cambodia and Aceh, and peace building in Timor-Leste, Aceh, and Mindanao (ER, 2006). Another good example is Japan's proactive role in joint training, information-sharing, fact-finding, and joint patrolling with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore to combat piracy in the Strait of Malacca.

Through its continuous active contributions and participation in regional security issues, Japan has been successful in building trust and confidence in its security relations with Southeast Asian nations. The perception of ASEAN nations gradually changes from the image of a militaristic Japan in World War II to a more reliable and trustworthy Japan.

C. Japan Interest in South China Sea


Japan's policy towards the South China Sea likely will have a considerable effect on the shape of future regional order in the South China Sea region even though, the competition of US-China and the reaction of the other countries around the sea area will have more decisive effects.

China has been reinforcing its claims to most of the South China Sea through political, economic, military and legal means, Japan has as one of the top world trading nations with considerable political, economic and strategic interests

in Southeast Asia, as a security alliance partner of the US, and as a country which has territorial as well as Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) border disputes with China in the East China Sea, need to become more involved in the matter (Drifte, 2016).

The involvement of Japan could be seen clearly because of the deteriorating and lack of mutual trust relationship, between Japanese-Chinese. Not only because of the disputes in East China Sea, but also the mutual suspicion that generated because of the diverging perceptions of either countries military developments. China's policy in the South China Sea has become a threat to Japan, while China also sees Japan as a "Troublemaker" at the side of United States, that already conflicting with China (Drifte, 2016).

Picture 2.1: South China Sea Liquefied Natural Gas Flows, in Trillion Cubic Feet (2011).



Source: <https://amti.csis.org/atlas/>

Through trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Japan has established in Southeast Asia a so-called network economy (Drifte, 2016). 85%– 90% of Japan's oil imports and 33% of Japan's Light Natural Gas (LNG) imports pass through the sea lanes of communication of the South China Sea, according to the report of U.S. Department of Energy. Natural resources such as fishery and energy in South China Sea also become the interest of Japan.

Other Important economic interests related to Japan's involvement in the off-shore and onshore prospection and extraction of oil and gas resources in the region, pursuing the goal to diversify the supply of hydrocarbon as well as an effort of marketing of Japan's high technology services in the energy sector. However, some of the off-shore oil and gas blocks currently tendered by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Indonesia were inside the China's 9-dash line claim which overlaps with the EEZs and continental shelves of these countries(Drifte, 2016).

The central importance of Japan in the region was not only the economic interests but also the geostrategic concerns that have made the stability of the ASEAN member states. Japan were dependent on the policy of freedom of navigation through the South China Sea, it is the connection of Japan with its security alliance with the US and the interdependence of the security in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Standing up to Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and supporting the other littoral states of the region is necessary to maintain United State's support against Chinese policies in the East China Sea,

such as the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the unresolved EEZ border separation which have given rise to considerable tensions (Drifte, 2016).

Japan mostly contributed to stability of the region through economic policies, such as; trade, investment and Official Development Assistance (ODA), and through supporting ASEAN's economic and political resilience and cohesion (Drifte, 2016). Until recently, With China's more assertive policies, the parallel perception of the tensions in the South China Sea and East China Sea, doubts of some Asian leaders about the US commitment to balance the Chinese policies, and ASEAN's fragmented position relating to the disputes in South China Sea. Japan's economy-centered policies seem no longer sufficient and Japan need to switch it policies to focus more on certain countries and on policies which are more security-related (Drifte, 2016).

Japanese government has started helping the vocal South China Sea claimants' states with their coast guard and military capacity. Japan enhanced its security cooperation to produce stronger defense diplomacy, use of ODA for coast guards, and naval support. Promoted by the US various new bilateral defense policy agreements, the increase of Japanese involvement in the security of the South China Sea so far Japan has resisted proposals to join multilateral air or naval patrols in the region(Drifte, 2016).

One difficulty for Japan's involvement in the South China Sea disputes is the difference of opinion among the surrounding countries regarding their security

priorities and the mix of policy tools on the territorial issues to confront China (Drifte, 2016). Another problem is the differences between Japan and the US in emphasizing of which region is more important and where/how to deploy resources. Finally, there is China's strong opposition to any country outside the South China Sea region to involve with its advances in the region, and the political and military means in China's disposal, prevent Japan from trying to slow it down (Drifte, 2016).

The next chapter will discuss more deeply about the relation between Japan and Philippines to understand further about how Japan utilize its support and cooperation towards Southeast Asian country, and explain the strategic cooperation between both of the country, until the establishment of action plans to strengthen the strategic cooperation.

CHAPTER III

THE JAPAN-PHILIPPINES STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Japan and the Philippines have begun their relation as early as the period of Muromachi of Japanese history, during this period Japanese merchants and traders had settled in the suburb of Manila, Dilao, which was a *Nihonmachi*¹⁰ (Japantown) of 3,000 Japanese around the year 1600. Japan and the Philippines have built up its economic and even military cooperations, seen in the involvement of Japan in supporting the struggle of the Philippines to gain independence during the Philippine-America war, eventhough the Meiji government of Japan were unable to give official support because of the risk of rising tension with United States.

In the modern time, Japan and the Philippines relation has started to focus more on the assertive behaviour of China in both South and East China Sea. The clash between the countries were concentrated around disputed islands and territory claims in both sea region. Continuous breach of Japan airspace and water territory by Chinese commercial flight and fishing ships around the area of dispute were able to ensure that the tension between both countries would not cool down any soon.

In this Chapter, writer will discuss the development of Japan – Philippines relation based on its historical records until the recent years, and later writer will discuss more specifically towards the strategic cooperation between Japan and

¹⁰*Nihonmachi* is a term used to referring historical Japanese communities in Southeast and East Asia. The term has also been applied to several modern-day communities, though most of these are called simply "Japantown", in imitation of the common term "Chinatown".

The Philippines and how this cooperation is closely related towards the assertiveness of China in the Region.

A. The History of Japan and the Philippines Relations

Japan relations with the Philippines during the Spanish Colonial Period closely related to the Filipino revolutionary organization “*The Katipunan*”, they had asked for assistance from the Imperial Japanese government to obtain financial support and weapons to fight the colonial government, but the plan was unsuccessful (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016). The Japanese government already established a consulate in Manila in 1889, but it was closed in 1893 and later re-opened in 1896, just before the outbreak of the Philippine Revolution against the Spanish Empire (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016).

Later, The establishment of Treaty of Paris resolved the Spanish–American War in December 1898, and when Spanish sovereignty of the Philippines was transferred to the United States, the First Republic of The Philippines, established by President Emilio Aguinaldo filed a diplomatic protest as reaction towards the treaty. On February 4, 1899, the Philippine-American War broke out. A handful of Japanese *shishi*, or ultranationalists landed in Manila, led by Captain Hara Tefought alongside President Aguinaldo’s forces in Bataan (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016). The Japanese indirectly supported the establishment of the First Republic, as evidenced by numerous Japanese newspaper articles headlining about the first Asian republic (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016).

With the increasing volume of trade and number of Japanese residents in the Philippines that totaling up to 9,874 individuals in 1919, the Japanese consulate in Manila was converted to Consulate General to compensate the development. Philippines have 113% of increase in Japan's share in trade while Japan's share in trade with United States only increased 32%(Yu-Jose, 1999). Japan became the Asian largest trading partner of the Philippines in 1929 (Jose, 2003).

Following the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in 1935 allowed President Manuel L. Quezon to began good-natured relations with Japan. President Quezon engaged in informal diplomacy to Japan: by visiting officially in January 31 to February 2, 1937 and privately in June 29 to July 10, 1938. (Ocampo, 2014). Even though as regulated by Article XVII, Section I of the 1935 Constitution, matters of the Commonwealth's foreign affairs were held exclusively by the United States. President Quezon's visits aimed at strengthening economic ties with Japan after independence (Wingo, 1938). This visits were in the middle of Japanese intrusion in China and fear of further Japanese expansion (Official Gazette of The Philippines, 1958).

When the Second World War in the Pacific broke out, Emerging Philippine-Japanese diplomatic ties were disrupted. Japan ended the resistance of Philippine and American forces with the Fall of Bataan and Corregidor and the occupation of Manila in January 1942 (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016). The Japanese government established a military administration over the

Philippines, including the Philippine Executive Commission, composed of Filipino leaders to replace the Commonwealth.

During the war, Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo visited the Philippines and delivered a speech in Rizal Park on 6 May 1943, promising Philippine independence. In October 1943, Dr. Jose P. Laurel, Jorge Vargas, and Benigno S. Aquino Sr. were invited to Tokyo to discuss a Pact of Alliance with Japan and during the visit, Laurel and Vargas were conferred the Order of the Rising Sun, First Class, and Aquino was conferred the Order of the Sacred Treasure on October 1, 1943. These decorations were bestowed for distinguished civil merit. (Kratoska, 2001)

After that, on October 14, 1943, the Second Republic was inaugurated in ceremonies in front of the Legislative Building in Manila, and Jose P. Laurel, the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee on Philippine Independence (PCPI) assumed office as President (Official Gazette of The Philippines, 2016). In the same year on 5th and 6th November, by the invitation of the Japanese Government, seven Asian nations attended the Greater East Asia Congress in Tokyo to promote the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. These nations were Japan, China, Thailand, Manchukuo, The Philippines, Burma, and Free India (Official Gazette of The Philippines, 2016). The Philippine delegates present were President Jose P. Laurel, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Claro M. Recto, and Minister of Public Works and Communication Quintin Paredes. On November 6, 1943, the

Greater East Asia Congress published a Joint Declaration of Cooperation with Japan (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016).

And then, in October 1944, The liberation of the Philippines by Filipino guerrillas and the Allied forces began with the landing of the Allies in Leyte and their engagement with the Japanese forces in the Battle of Manila in February 1945, led to the capital's liberation. The war destroyed much of the Manila and devastated the Philippine economy (Jose, 2003) . Field Marshal Douglas MacArthur, declared all the acts of the Second Republic to be nullified during the reestablishment of the Commonwealth government in Tacloban, Leyte,, a decision upheld by the Philippine Supreme Court. He returned the civil government to President Sergio Osmeña on February 28, 1945, in a ceremony in Malacañan Palace (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016).

After the war, the Philippines and Japan slowly began the process of normalization on diplomatic ties and economic relations of both country. The Philippines entered a trade agreement with U.S.-occupied Japan on May 15, 1950. With all official diplomatic channel must through the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) the trade maximum limit was set at \$50 million. The next year, Quirino appointed a committee to assert the Philippine claim for reparations amounting to \$8 billion in the peace negotiations.

On September 9, 1951, 48 countries signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which required Japan to pay for the damages it caused during the world

war II. The Philippines was represented in the treaty signing but did not sign the treaty due to reservations concerning reparations.

President Quirino, took steps to show gestures of goodwill toward the Japanese. As an example, the case of President Quirino pardoned 52 convicted Japanese war criminals on June 27, 1953 (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016). The pardon changed their death sentences to life imprisonment with certain conditions. They were released on July 15 and departed to Japan on the same day with a promise they would never return to the Philippines (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016). On the eve of their departure, the prisoners were sent a message by Quirino, who was at that time hospitalized in the United States. Quirino decided to pardon the prisoners though it was the hardest thing for him to do after his wife, three children and another five members of his family were killed because of the Japanese during the Battle of Manila (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016). He said he made the decision in the belief that “the Philippines and Japan share the destiny to be good neighboring countries” (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016) On that same month, the National Diet of Japan passed a joint resolution expressing deep gratitude towards President Quirino and the Philippine government for the pardon as a response (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016).

Finally, on 1956, the diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Japan were established when the Philippine Senate ratified the “Reparations Agreement between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines”. Since then, the

bilateral ties of the Philippines and Japan have increasingly grown in warmth, mutual respect, and solidarity (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016).

Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi as the first postwar Japanese prime minister visited the Philippines on 1957, and on December 1, 1958, President Carlos P. Garcia visited Japan to reciprocate the visit (Official Gazette of The Philippines, 1958). President Garcia was the first Philippine president to address the joint session of the Japanese National Diet, on December 2, 1958. The Japanese government agreed to source financial reparations amounting to U.S. \$50 million. This was followed by the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, approved in 1960, and which allowed Japan to send instruments and machinery as reparation to the Philippines (Official Gazette of The Philippines, 1958).

And on November 1962, for the first time, a successor to the Chrysanthemum throne, Crown Prince Akihito, came to the Philippines on a five-day state visit (Official Gazzete of The Philippines, 2016). He was welcomed by President Diosdado Macapagal and was conferred the Grand Collar (Raja) of the Order of Sikatuna in a state dinner hosted for the Prince and his wife Crown Princess Michiko at Malacañan Palace on November 5, 1962. The royal couple also visited former President Emilio Aguinaldo in his home in Kawit, Cavite (Macapagal, 1968).

On September 28, 1966, President Ferdinand E. Marcos and First Lady Imelda Marcos went on a state visit to Japan and were met personally at the

Tokyo International Airport by the Emperor Shōwa, and the Empress Kōjun. The emperor then conferred on President Marcos the Grand Cordon of the Supreme Order of the Chrysanthemum. In return, Marcos conferred the Order of Sikatuna, Rank of Raja, on the emperor (Stars and Stripes, 1966).

In the year of the fall of the Marcos dictatorship 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino went on a state visit to Japan. She met with the National Diet, Japan's legislature, in a private reception to inform them of the return of democracy to the Philippines, and to ensure political stability after the EDSA People Power Revolution. She also met with Emperor Shōwa who conferred the Supreme Order of the Chrysanthemum with the rank of Grand Cordon on her (Cory Aquino Foundation, 2010). Benigno S. Aquino III accompanied his mother during this visit and during two other visits to Japan: the funeral of the Emperor Shōwa on February 24, 1989, and the enthronement of Emperor Akihito on November 12, 1990.

During the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's visit to Japan in December 2002, Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement or JPEPA was initiated. President Arroyo and then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi agreed on major elements of JPEPA that would lead to the immediate removal of tariffs on certain fruits, vehicles, steel products, electronic appliances, and garments. The agreement was signed in Helsinki, Finland on 9 September 2006 (Senate Economic Planning Office, 2007).

Japan is the second largest trading partner of the Philippines next to the US. The leading Philippine exports to Japan consist of electronic products,

woodcraft furniture, ignition wiring sets, fresh bananas, and iron ores. In 2006, Japan amounted to US\$7.9 billion or 17% of the country's total exports. Japan is our biggest export market for asparagus, bananas, papayas, nata de coco, mangoes, chicken, shrimps and prawns, and yellowfin tuna (Senate Economic Planning Office, 2007).

President Arroyo's visit was the second time that a Philippine president addressed the National Diet, the first was during the era of President Carlos P. Garcia. President Arroyo's speech was also the first speech delivered at the Diet by a woman head of state (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2002). She was conferred the Grand Cordon of the Supreme Order of the Chrysanthemum by the emperor.

President Benigno S. Aquino III undertake a state visit to Japan, in June 2 to 5, 2015, under the invitation of the Japanese government. The President was received by Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. In the visit, President Aquino conferred the Grand Collar (Supremo) of the Order of Lakandula on Emperor Akihito and the Grand Collar (Raja) of the Order of Sikatuna on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. President Aquino was conferred the Supreme Order of the Chrysanthemum by the Emperor.

The President also hold a meeting with Prime Minister Abe, during which the two leaders discussed the enhancement of the Philippine–Japan Strategic Partnership and exchange views on recent regional developments. As an addition, Prime Minister Abe's maternal grandfather, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, was

the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit the Philippines after the Second World War. Abe's father, Shintaro Abe, was the longest serving Foreign Minister of Japan; he held office when Japan recognized President Corazon C. Aquino's government (Official Gazette of The Philippines, 2016).

Since the era of Spain colonization, until the era of modern Philippines, and despite of the changes in their regional and domestic situation in both country, Japan and The Philippines maintained a good and friendly relations that also preserved until the present era with dynamic changes in the region.

B. Japan - Philippines in 21st Century

In 21st century, the growing tension between China and Japan in East China Sea also has effect towards the relations between Japan and The Philippines. The Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came into power in the middle of intense territorial clash between Japan and China over the Senkaku Island in the East China Sea. In 16 December parliamentary election, PM Abe declared "that the islands are the inherent territory of Japan... We own and effectively control them. There is no room for negotiations about them" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

In the first few months of his term, Japan-China relationship became extremely strained because of the Senkaku Islands dispute. PM Abe did not acknowledge the existence of a dispute over the islands, continuing the policy of his predecessor. China responded Abe's posture by increasing the number and the frequency of civilian ships deployed around the islands. In the face of heightened

tension in the Senkakus, several significant steps have been taken by PM. Abe to expand Japanese security policy. From his point of view, China's assertive behavior in East Asia is a source of grave security concern for Japan (Singh, 2015).

On 28 February 2013, Abe calling on China - without mentioning China by name, to refrain from any dangerous acts with regard to the Senkaku and underscored that Japan's interests are unchallengeable forever and that aggression must be prevented at all costs and the fundamental rule for the entire world, must prevail against the use of force (Przystup, 2013).

During the 2014 Shang-rila Dialogue in Singapore, PM Abe implied that "China is attempting to change the status quo by force, rather than by the rule of law." He cited that the declaration of an Air Defense Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, the repeated intrusions by Chinese civilian planes and ships into Japanese territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, and the locking of fire control radar on SDF surface combatants by PLAN warships were examples of China's aggressive behavior in East China Sea. (Przystup, 2013)

He mentioned China's aggressive behaviors in the South China Sea including the unilateral announcement of the regulations, that require all fishing vessels in the disputed waters to seek permission from Chinese authorities, the tense 2012 stand-off between Philippine and Chinese civilian vessels at the Scarborough Shoal, and China's deployment of an oil rig deep inside the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Vietnam (Singh, 2015).

Japan decided to strengthen its defense posture to face China's intrusions in Japanese waters and airspace, growing naval might, and assertiveness in the East and South China Sea. It also conducted a coordinated diplomatic strategy to resolve the potentially fluid and dangerous regional balance of power in cooperation with the U.S. and the neighboring countries in East Asia. Specifically, the Abe Administration undertook three major security measures that could be regarded as defensive (Przystup, 2013).

The three major security measures undertaken by the Abe administration were: First, Prime Minister Abe announced an increase in defense spending in 11 years and a review of the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) (Przystup, 2013). Second, in October 2013, Japan and the U.S. convened a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) or 2+2 in Tokyo. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the alliance and announced a review of the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines which hasn't been updated since 1997, as a reflection of the changes in regional and global security environment (Szechenyi, 2014). The meeting mentioned several priorities for cooperation that included ballistic missile defense, space and cyber defense, joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities, dialogue on extended deterrence, joint training and exercises, realignment of U.S. forces in Okinawa, and convening of trilateral and multilateral security cooperation among U.S. allies in East Asia (Szechenyi, 2014).

Finally, Japan launched the “multilayered security cooperation” on a regional and global scale with U.S. allies in the region with same views towards the regional situations, such as South Korea, Australia, as well as with U.S. alliance/partner countries whose coastal territories are critical to Japanese sea-lanes of communications (Matsuda, 2012). Japan will strengthen its diplomacy and security cooperation with ASEAN countries concerned to settle disputes in the South China Sea, not by force, but in accordance with the rule of law as mentioned in the *2013 National Security Strategy of Japan* (Government of Japan, 2013). Although the document did not name specific countries, two states are located along Japan’s Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) and have ongoing disputes with China in the South China Sea were Vietnam and the Philippines.

The government of Philippines also conducting several policy to improve the naval capabilities of the Philippines during the campaign period for the presidency in June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino vowed to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) aligned with the process to shifting its focus from internal security to maritime/territorial defense. The incident that occurred at Reed Bank between two Chinese patrol vessels and a Philippine survey ship in 2nd of March 2011, followed by China’s dismissive response to the Philippines’ diplomatic act in demanding explanation for the case, prompted the Aquino administration to hasten the AFP’s modernization. China has badgered the Philippines and other claimant states of South China Sea disputes to recognize Chinese sovereign over sea area. China’s arrogant and hostile attitude towards the Philippines and Vietnam in the first half of 2011 has escalated the territorial

dispute (Castro, 2016). At the time President Aquino clearly saw that the Philippines has a potentially on a direct collision course with China regarding the South China Sea issue. That's why, the current modernization of the Philippine military influenced by the external factor of the changes in the balance of power in East Asia generated by a geo-strategic reconfiguration of national capabilities in the light of an emergent China (Santiago, 2012).

The Philippines squared off with China during the standoff at the Scarborough Shoal in 9 April to 18 June 2012. A triangle—shaped, 150 square kilometers of barren reefs and rocky islets, the shoal is about 135 miles from the Philippines and 543 miles from China. The standoff began on 10 April 2012 when the Philippines flagship *BRP Gregorio del Pilar*, tried to capture several Chinese fishing boats at the shoal. Two Chinese maritime surveillance vessels intervened and prevented the arrest of the Chinese fishermen who were hauling corals, clams, and live sharks into their boats. To defuse the tension generated by the incident, the Philippines replaced its surface combatant with a smaller coast guard vessel. Instead of reciprocating, China increased the tension by deploying the *Yuzheng 310* its most advanced and largest patrol vessel equipped with machine guns, light cannons, and electronic sensors. This incident underscores an international reality that Chinese economic and naval power overshadow the Philippines and Vietnam capabilities, which are at the forefront of a maritime dispute with China in the South China Sea. During the stand-off, China did not show any desire to de-escalate and end the crisis (Voltaire T. Gazmin, 2011).

In December 2012, six months after the tense Scarborough Shoal stand-off, President Aquino signed into law Republic Act 10349 extended the AFP modernization program of 1995. The implementation period of the original AFP modernization law Republic Act 7898 expired in December 2011 without any significant arms acquisition for the Philippine military. RA 10349 extends the military modernization program up to 2027, to give the PN and PAF time to acquire new weapon systems needed for maritime security. The law also streamlined the procurement process and shortened the 29 stages into two assessment levels including the actual procurement and contracting stages (Rodulfo-Veril, 2012).

The *Defense Planning Guidance for 2016-2022* emphasized the importance of defending “the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, specifically in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea)” which accordingly “poses the primary security challenge” to the Philippines and the AFP (Voltaire T. Gazmin, 2011). Thus, it requires optimization of all available resources at the government’s disposal to achieve a credible defense posture in territorial defense and maritime security. In building up the country’s territorial defense capabilities, the Aquino administration concentrate more into challenging China’s expansive claims as China has directly encroaches into the Philippines’ EEZ in the South China Sea.

The Philippines’ territorial defense goal is to develop a credible posture for territorial defense and maritime security by organizing a competent force capable of safeguarding the country’s interests and the land features it occupies in the

SouthChina Sea.(Castro, 2016) Despite this modest objective, the Aquinoadministration is still immobilized by scant financial resources. Given its current pace and budget allocation, the AFP's territorialdefense build-up would hardly compete with the PLAN in the contested sea because the latter has procured modern surface combatants and submarines since the start of the 21st century(Bitzinger, 2011). The military imbalance between the Philippines and China will not be resolved in the foreseeable future even if the AFP develops a credible defense posture. Thus, the Philippines has no recourse but to seek a security guarantee from its only strategic ally, the U.S., and at the same time, to request military assistance and diplomatic support from other American allies that share a common interest with the country in maritime security(Castro, 2016).

C. Establishment of Japan – Philippines Strategic Partnership

China's assertive behavior in the second decade of the 21st century pushed both Japan and the Philippines to explore a strategic partnership. At the start of the two-month Scarborough Shoal stand-off in April 2012, Japanese Ambassador to the Philippines Toshio Urabe stressed the "close-knit triangular relationship among Japan, the Philippines, and their closest ally—the United States"(Asia News Monitor, 2012).

Three JMSDF surface combatants arrived in Manila in May 2012 for a four-day port call. The visit came after the government of Japan announced its plans to provide the Philippines with 10 new patrol vessels to boost Philippines maritime patrol capability. The newspaper, *Yomiuri Shimbun* linked the ship visit to

the ongoing Scarborough Shoal standoff and editorialized that Japan could not justly stand by and wait for China and the Philippines to clash openly. It also underscored that it is in “Japan’s national interest to ensure that its sea-lanes remain safe.” (BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, 2012)

The JMSDF’s ship visit to the Philippines happened just a few days after the U.S. Navy’s Virginia-class attack submarine, the *U.S.S. North Carolina*, made a supposedly port-call at Subic Bay in Luzon. These ship visits were actually routine port calls. However, their visit was made during the Scarborough stalemate and was extensively publicized. In a sense that Washington and Tokyo were trying to imply that they would not hesitate to act jointly if the Philippines is threatened by any form of Chinese assertiveness (Almazan, 2012).

As the result of the Scarborough Shoal stand-off, Tokyo became more straightforward towards its extending security assistance to the Philippines. In July 2012, Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto and Philippines Defense Secretary Gazmin, agreed on a bilateral agreement on maritime security. The agreement calls for high-level dialogues between defense officials and reciprocal visits by the MSDF chief-of-staff and the PN flag commander. It also features various security related activities such as the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia-Pacific (MCAP); Multilateral Logistic Staff Talks (MLST); Training Exchanges and Subject Matter Exchanges on HADR and Logistics; and Exchange Visits and Student Exchanges in the two countries’ respective staff colleges (Castro, 2016). Then Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario announced that Tokyo was likely to provide the PCG with ten 40-meter

boats as part of Japan's ODA to the Philippines by the end of the year. Newspapers also reported that Japan were considering for the transfer of two additional bigger vessels to the Philippine government as a donation.

A few weeks after his return to power, PM Abe sent Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida on a four-country Asia/Pacific diplomatic tour to convey Japan's growing concern over Beijing's expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea (Castro, 2016). In Manila, Minister Kishida met with then Philippine Foreign Secretary Del Rosario. They discussed the difficulties China's neighbors' face in defending their positions *vis-à-vis* the East China and South China Sea issues while managing their economic relations with China, which is now a major economic power (Cuneta C. L., 2013). The two foreign ministers agreed to closely work together in enhancing cooperation in maritime security (Asia News Monitor, 2013). 10 multi-role response vessels were pledged to the Philippine Coast Guard (PSG) by Minister Kishida to improve the patrolling capabilities in the Philippine maritime territories (Cuneta C. L., 2013). Minister Kishida also announced Japan's provision of essential communication system equipment to the PCG for maritime safety.

During his visit, he also promised more development assistance for the Philippines, the expansion of trade relations, increased investments, and closer maritime cooperation. He also announced that Japan will open its doors for more Filipino nurses and caregivers and finance the extension of the country's two light rail transit networks, and the construction of the new airport in the province of Bohol (Asia News Monitor, 2013). Mr. Kishida then met President Aquino and

reaffirmed the commitment of Japan to foster its relations with the Philippines based on mutual respect and understanding (Asia News Monitor, 2013). Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera and Philippine Defense Secretary Gazmin in 27 June 2013 confirmed the continuous “exchanges of information aimed at strengthening Philippine-Japan defense relations and on working together to make U.S. strategic rebalancing a reality in Asia” (BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, 2013).

As a means to increase the defense cooperation, both Japan and Philippines undertake several activities: Reciprocal visits between the Chiefs-of-Staff of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) and the Flag Officer of the Philippine Navy (PN); the holding of the Japan Philippines Maritime Chief of Staff Meeting; port calls in the Philippines of JMSDF vessels; and active participation in the Pacific Partnership 2012. The two defense ministers also extended the two countries’ security cooperation to the field of aviation highlighted by the visit to the Philippines by the Chief-of-Staff of the Japanese Air Defense Force (JASDF) (Castro, 2016). Secretary Gazmin raised the possibility of allowing the Japanese SDF access to the former American military bases in the Philippines if Tokyo is interested in such arrangement (Embassy of Japan in Manila, 2013).

Japan’s willingness to extend security assistance to the Philippines became evident during its participation in the multilateral Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations in Tacloban City, that heavily devastated by a category five typhoon with the international name of Hayan in mid-November

2013. Locally known as Yolanda, the super typhoon killed more than 6,000 people and left more than three million Filipinos without homes in five major island-provinces—Leyte, Samar, Panay, Cebu, and Palawan. It destroyed nearly 550,000 residential houses and damaged several farmlands and fishponds in these islands province, which account for about 12% of the country's gross domestic product. (Cuneta C. L., 2013). Japan immediately joined a U.S. - led international coalition that immediately provided humanitarian assistance to the victims of Typhoon Yolanda. It sent three JMSDF destroyers carrying nearly 1,000 Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) personnel to deliver emergency supplies to the remote areas of Samar and Leyte (Obe, Hayashi, & Martine, 2013).

Furthermore, to assist the multinational forces involved in the international HADR operations in the Central Philippines, Japan also dispatched three CH-46 transport helicopters, three UH-1 utility helicopters, the transport vessel *Osumi*, two KC-767 air tankers, seven C-130 transport aircraft, and U-4 utility support aircraft. (Asia News Monitor, 2013) The ASDF C-130 carried the typhoon victims, U.S. Marines, aid agency officials, and Philippine government officials between Manila and Tacloban. In addition to its military assistance, Tokyo also gave Manila more than US\$50 million in direct aid and grant (Murtagh, 2013). President Aquino continued his thorough consultation with PM Abe on the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region during his state visit to Japan in early June 2015 (The Philippines News Agency, 2013).

With the tension in the region that continues to escalate, both Japan and Philippines government agree to enhance their strategic cooperation to adapt with

the dynamic condition. During his official state visit to Japan in 2015, President Aquino meet with PM Abe and signed a joint declaration on “A Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and Partnership and Goals for Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and Beyond”, and agreed to enhance the strategic partnership between their countries on shared principles and goals even further (The Philippines News Agency, 2015).

The document includes the two countries’ commitment to ensure maritime safety and security, the South China Sea and their serious opposition to unilateral actions to change the status quo in the South China Sea including large-scale reclamation and building of outposts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015). This document specially directed towards China’s constructions of artificial islands in the contested sea. Specifically, the joint statement commits Japan to the following: 1) enhancing the capacity of the PCG; 2) cooperate with the Philippines on maritime security and on maritime domain awareness, and c) explore the prospects for the transfer of Japanese defense equipment and technology to the Philippines (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015).

The declaration includes a detailed action plan for strengthening the two countries’ strategic partnership. The areas of cooperation in the security realm includes the sharing of information on security environment and challenges; information exchange and policy coordination on respective security policies; collaboration on maritime matters; and humanitarian assistance; and most importantly, the terms regarding defense equipment and technology. The Philippines and Japan are currently exploring a strategic partnership to

complement their respective bilateral alliances with the U.S. On the one hand, the Philippines has to leverage its alliances and defense engagements with foreign militaries to support its military capability and effectively in responding to security threats (Rodulfo-Veril, 2012).

Japan finds it necessary to assist Southeast Asian countries in active dispute with China in the South China Sea because “if China’s strategic position improves in relative terms in the South China Sea, then it is likely it would adopt a similar assertive attitude and actions against Japan in the East China Sea” (National Institute for Defense Studies, 2011).

The relation of Japan and The Philippines has developed into a dynamic and strategic oriented cooperation as a result of dynamic condition of the region, mainly affected by the China’s dramatic growth in both economy and military power. China’s assertive actions by confronting with Japan over the Senkaku Island, also its unilateral claims together with construction of military base over the South China Sea poses significant threat for the major partners of United States in both region, Japan and the Philippines.

In the next chapter, writer will analyze the strategic cooperation between Japan and The Philippines related to Japan’s economic and security needs as the main basis of Japan’s foreign policy towards the Philippines. The next Chapter will discuss about the implementation of the foreign policy and balance of Power concept towards the Strengthening of strategic cooperation of Japan and the Philippines in 2015.

CHAPTER IV
DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN - PHILIPPINES STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIP IN 2015

Japan has experienced dynamic changes in its foreign policy since the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853 which has marked the first period of Japan starting to open and interact with the modern world. Since then Japan foreign policy was changed based on the condition of the current international situation, and also the demand of its closest ally the United States. Japan Relationship with China probably, were the most important theme in Japan's foreign policy at the outset of the 21st century. For both countries, the relationship is one that interweaves "cooperation and coexistence" with "competition and friction." (Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, 2002).

President Aquino and PM Abe signed a joint declaration on “A Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and Partnership and Goals for Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and Beyond”, and agreed to enhance the strategic partnership between their countries on shared principles and goals. The areas of cooperation in the security realm includes the sharing of information on security environment and challenges; information exchange and policy coordination on respective security policies; collaboration on maritime matters; and humanitarian assistance; and most importantly, the terms regarding defense equipment and technology. The Philippines and Japan are currently exploring a strategic partnership to

complement their respective bilateral alliances with the U.S. (Rodulfo-Veril, 2012).

China's military buildup pose a serious threat to Japan and other countries of the region thus, Japan demands for transparency regards China's burgeoning military budget to lower the existing tension. There has been increasingly large mutual dislike, hatred, and hostility between Japanese and Chinese people in recent years. A 2014 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center showed 85% of Japanese were concerned that territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries could lead to a military conflict¹¹. This tension were not only in the East China Sea region where Japan is located, but also spread to the south to the region of Southeast Asia country surrounding the South China Sea, where China claims almost 80% of the South China Sea by its U-shape nine-dash line map that along with the Paracels and Spratly Islands, which are also claimed in parts by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam (Castro, 2013). By this maritime claim, China ensures its national security and enhances its territorial integrity. The other states view this development as an sign of Chinese maritime expansionism in an area of key strategic location and potential resources (Scott, 2007).

The Philippines has the same concern with Japan towards China's aggressive claims in South China Sea. China claims almost over the entire sea as the sovereign territory of China. Japan together with its key-allies United States,

¹¹Pew Research Center. (2014, July 14). *Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes and Trends*. Retrieved February 14, 2016, from Pew research center web site: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-4-how-asians-view-each-other/>

concern China's assertiveness because of strategic position of South China Sea, which connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Guaranteeing freedom of navigation in these waters is vital to the global economy. President of The republic of the Philippines Benigno S. Aquino III paid an official state visit to Japan, and held a meeting with prime minister of Japan Shinzo Abe on 4 June 2015. Both countries are fully committed towards strengthening the Partnership between both countries and aware of the increasing and complex challenges facing the region and the international community, the state leaders declared that the relationship between the two countries has entered the stage of Strengthened Strategic Partnership¹².

This Chapter will discuss the hypothesis proposed in the first chapter of this undergraduate thesis, by analyzing data collected in the first, second, and third chapter by using the theoretical framework that has been explained in the first chapter.

A. The strengthening of Japan Philippines Strategic Cooperation as the national interest of Japan to ensure its Economic well-being and military security from China's influence.

A countries foreign policy will be closely related to its national interest, Japan's foreign policy is also governed by the same principle, in which its national interest determine how the foreign policy will be conducted. According

¹²Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2011, September 27). *Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister; Japan-Philippines Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Promotion of the "Strategic Partnership" between Neighboring Countries Connected by Special Bonds of Friendship*. Retrieved May 28, 2016, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website: http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/noda/joint_statement110927.html

to Jack C. Plano, national interest is a vital interest of a state that should be fulfilled in order to preserve its existence. Further, he define five states's vital needs as the main reasons of a state's interest, which is; Self-preservation, independence, territorial integrity, military security, and economic well-being(Jack C. Plano, 1988).

In the case of Japan foreign policy towards the Philippines, in the strengthening of its strategic cooperation, we will use only military security, and economic well-being as the most vital needs, that become Japan's main interest in conducting those specific foreign policy towards The Philippines.

1. Military Security

A state's military security needs can be determined by its need to increase military power as a means to protect itself from an emerging threat. Despite its pacifist constitution that has stated, Japan would not maintain any standing army, still in anyway under constant pressure to be able to maintain a strong capabilities to overcome any threat that may harm the existence of Japan. In the 21st century, China's assertive behavior in East Asia is a source of grave security concern for Japan (Singh, 2015).

The water in the East China Sea region has been heated up by the tension from the extremely strained Japan-China relationship because of the Senkaku Islands dispute. The declaration of an Air Defense Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, repeated intrusions by Chinese civilian planes and ships into Japanese territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, and the locking of fire

control radar on SDF surface combatants by PLAN warships were examples of China's aggressive behavior in East China Sea. (Przystup, 2013)

In the face of heightened tension in the Senkakus, several significant steps has been taken by PM. Abe to expand Japanese security policy. Japan stated China to refrain from any dangerous acts with regard to the Senkaku and underscored that Japan's interests are unchallengeable forever and that aggression must be prevented at all costs and the fundamental rule for the entire world, must prevail against the use of force (Przystup, 2013).

During the 2014 Shang-rila Dialogue in Singapore, PM Abe implied that "China is attempting to change the status quo by force, rather than by the rule of law." He also mentioned China's aggressive behaviors in the South China Sea including the unilateral announcement of the regulations, that require all fishing vessels in the disputed waters to seek permission from Chinese authorities, the tense 2012 stand-off between Philippine and Chinese civilian vessels at the Scarborough Shoal, and China's deployment of an oil rig deep inside the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Vietnam (Singh, 2015).

Japan decided to strengthen its defense posture to face of China's intrusions in Japanese waters and airspace, growing naval might, and assertiveness in the East and South China Sea. It also conducted a coordinated diplomatic strategy to resolve the potentially fluid and dangerous regional balance of power in cooperation with the U.S. and the neighboring countries in East Asia.

Specifically, the Abe Administration undertook three major security measures that could be regarded as defensive (Przystup, 2013).

First, during his first few months in office, PM Abe announced an increase in defense spending in 11 years and a review of the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) (Przystup, 2013). Second, in October 2013, Japan and the U.S. convened a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) or 2+2 in Tokyo. Both sides reaffirming the importance of the alliance and announcing a review of the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines which hasn't been updated since 1997, as a reflection the changes in regional and global security environment (Szechenyi, 2014). The meeting mentioned several priorities for cooperation that included ballistic missile defense, space and cyber defense, joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities, dialogue on extended deterrence, joint training and exercises, realignment of U.S. forces in Okinawa, and convening of trilateral and multilateral security cooperation among U.S. allies in East Asia (Szechenyi, 2014).

Finally, Japan launched the "multilayered security cooperation" on a regional and global scale with U.S. allies in the region with same views towards the regional situations, such as South Korea, Australia, as well as with U.S. alliance/partner countries whose coastal territorial's are critical to Japanese sea-lanes of communications (Matsuda, 2012). Japan will strengthen its diplomacy and security cooperation with ASEAN countries concerned to settle disputes in the South China Sea, not by force, but in accordance with the rule of law as mentioned in the *2013 National Security Strategy of Japan* (Government of Japan,

2013). Although the document did not name specific countries, two states are located along Japan's Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) and have ongoing disputes with China in the South China Sea were Vietnam and the Philippines.

Japan finds it necessary to assist Southeast Asian countries in active dispute with China in the South China Sea because "if China's strategic position improves in relative terms in the South China Sea, then it is likely it would adopt a similar assertive attitude and actions against Japan in the East China Sea" (National Institute for Defense Studies, 2011).

2. Economic Well-being

A sovereign country needs to preserve its economic condition, since economy are the basis of a country activity. Through trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Japan has established in Southeast Asia a so-called network economy (Drifte, 2016). 85%– 90% of Japan's oil imports and 33% of Japan's Light Natural Gas (LNG) imports pass through the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) of the South China Sea, according to the report of U.S. Department of Energy. Natural resources such as fishery and energy in South China Sea also become the interest of Japan. Other Important economic interests related to Japan's involvement in the off-shore and onshore prospection and extraction of oil and gas resources in the region, pursuing the goal to diversify the supply of hydrocarbon as well as an effort of marketing of Japan's high technology services in the energy sector (Drifte, 2016). However, some of the off-shore oil and gas blocks currently tendered by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and

Indonesia were inside the China's 9-dash line claim which overlaps with the EEZs and continental shelves of these countries.

Japan mostly contributed to stability of the region through economic policies, such as; trade, investment and Official Development Assistance (ODA), and through supporting ASEAN's economic and political resilience and cohesion (Drifte, 2016). Until recently, With China's more assertive policies, the parallel perception of the tensions in the South China Sea and East China Sea, doubts of some Asian leaders about the US commitment to balance the Chinese policies, and ASEAN's fragmented position relating to the disputes in South China Sea. Japan's economy-centered policies seem no longer sufficient and Japan need to switch it policies to focus more on certain countries and on policies which are more security-related (Drifte, 2016).

During the President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo's visit to Japan in December 2002.Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreementor JPEPA was initiated.President Arroyo andthen-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumiagreed on major elements of JPEPAthat would lead to the immediate removal of tariffs oncertain fruits, vehicles, steel products, electronic appliances, and garments. The agreement was signed inHelsinki, Finland on 9 September 2006 (Senate Economic Planning Office, 2007).

Japan is the second largest trading partner of thePhilippines next to the US. The leading Philippine exports to Japanconsist of electronic products, woodcraft furniture,ignition wiring sets, fresh bananas, and iron ores.In 2006,

Japan amounted to US\$7.9 billion or 17% of the country's total exports. Japan is our biggest export market for asparagus, bananas, papayas, nata de coco, mangoes, chicken, shrimps and prawns, and yellowfin tuna (Senate Economic Planning Office, 2007).

With all the data provided, clearly Japan foreign policy towards the Philippines and its strategic cooperation was closely related to the national interest of Japan, to fulfill some of its vital needs as a nation. Two vital needs of Japan discussed in this paper have proven to be relevant with the foreign policy of Japan to strengthen its strategic cooperation with the Philippines.

In the vital need of "Military Security", Japan needs to contain the assertive actions made by China in both East and South China Sea region. While in East China Sea Japan could directly encounter China, in South China Sea, Japan needs to gain support and maintain strategic cooperation with claimants' country in the South China Sea disputes. Considering the long story of relations and cooperation between Japan and The Philippines, and since The Philippines were also a claimants country which also has strong stance against China in the disputes, Japan needs to maintain and increase its supports toward Philippines through several cooperation policy, which increase the capabilities of Philippines to be able to match China's assertive actions in the South China Sea. Through multilateral and bilateral agreement, Japan tries to ensure its military security, from the merging threat from China in the near Sea of East China Sea, and also South China Sea.

In the vital needs of Japan to maintain its “Economic Well-being”, South China Sea serve as the main route of Japan’s energy imports from the Middle East and other country, which needs to pass South China Sea in order to reach Japan in the Eastern part of Asia. The abundant natural resource and potential hydrocarbon deposits in the area of South China Sea also become one of the consideration why Japan needs to involve in securing the South China Sea Region. Many of Japan’s off-shore and on-shore oil production assets were located in the claimed area of China’s 9-dashed line, thus China’s assertiveness in South China Sea poses a significant threat towards Japan’s economy. By supporting the countries that have been currently participating in the disputes with China, especially Philippines, Japan is actually securing its economy in indirect way and also maintaining the already established economic cooperation between Japan and the Southeast Asia Countries.

The first hypothesis proposed in this paper was: “Japan strengthen its strategic cooperation with the Philippines because of the needs of Japan to fulfill its vital needs by ensuring its Economic well-being and military security from China’s influence in South China Sea“. The hypothesis is proven to be correct based on the data gathered in this paper, and also based on the analysis using the proposed theoretical framework.

B. The strengthening of its strategic cooperation between Japan and The Philippines as a form of balancing the influence of china in South China Sea.

According to the balance of power theory in international relations, national security is enhanced when military capability is distributed so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others (Wittkopf, 2005). According to this theory if one state becomes much stronger than others, it will take advantage of its strength and dominate weaker neighbors, thereby providing a necessity for those countries that feel threatened to unite in a form of defensive coalition to counter the possible threat from the dominant power.

Stephen M. Walt suggests that there will be different ways a state will act towards the dominant threat, According to (Walt, 1987): “When confronted by a significant external threat, states that look to form alliances may *balance* or *bandwagon*. *Balancing* is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat, while states that have *bandwagoned* have aligned with the threat.” By using his concept, we try to analyze and prove the action of Japan by strengthening its strategic cooperation with The Philippines was an act of *Balancing* towards the imminent threat from China. Japan relies on two instruments to try balancing China’s influence in South China Sea which is; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the provision of maritime security assistance.

China claims almost 80% of the South China Sea by its U-shape nine-dash line map that extend along with the Paracels and Spratly Islands, which are also claimed in parts by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam (Castro, 2013). The map indicates that not only China’s sovereignty over the island and waters of South China Sea, but also its transportation, fishing, and mineral extraction rights over “all the waters within the nine-dash line” (International

Herald Tribune, 13 August 2012). By this maritime claim, China ensures its national security and enhances its territorial integrity. The other states view this development as an sign of Chinese maritime expansionism in an area of key strategic location and potential resources (Scott, 2007).

Japan decided to strengthen its defense posture to face of China's intrusions in Japanese waters and airspace, growing naval might, and assertiveness in the East and South China Sea. It also conducted a coordinated diplomatic strategy to resolve the potentially fluid and dangerous regional balance of power in cooperation with the U.S. and the neighboring countries in East Asia

When we take into account on the historical memory between Japan and China, Japan certainly cannotbandwagon to China since there will be to many things to be risked. China's assertive behavior in the second decade of the 21st century pushed bothJapan and Philippinesto explore a strategic partnership. At the start of the two-month Scarborough Shoalstand-off in April 2012, Japanese Ambassador to the Philippines Toshio Urabe stressed the "close-knittriangular relationship among Japan, the Philippines, and their closest (mutual) ally—the U.S."(Asia News Monitor, 2012)

A few weeks after his return to power, PM Abe sent Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida on a four-country Asia/Pacific diplomatic tour to convey Japan's growing concern over Beijing'sexpansive territorial claims in the South China Sea(Castro, 2016). Minister Kishida then met President Aquino and reaffirmed the commitment of Japan to foster itsrelations with the Philippines based on mutual

respect and understanding(Asia News Monitor, 2013). Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera and Philippine Defense SecretaryGazminin 27 June 2013 confirmed the continuous “exchanges of information aimed atstrengtheningPhilippine-Japan defense relations and on working together to make U.S. strategic rebalancing areality in Asia”(BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, 2013).

After analyzing the data in the previous chapter, we could see that Japan choose to balance China’s assertive actions by assisting U.S. with their Freedom of Navigation Operations and also took part in the multilateral dialogues with Southeast Asian countries via ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to maintain influence in the South China Sea region. Especially with The Philippines by strengthening the strategic cooperation as a form to leverageits alliances and defense engagements with foreign militaries to support itsmilitary capability and effectively in responding to security threats in the region(Rodulfo-Veril, 2012).

The second hypothesis that says: “Japan chooses to strengthen its strategic cooperation with the Philippines as a form of balancing the influence of china in South China Sea disputes.” is proven to be correct since Japan chose to strengthen its cooperation with Philippines as it allies, and also to engage in a multilateral forum of countries in Southeast Asia, as an effort to balance and control the assertive actions of China in the South China Sea region, to prevent the same assertiveness to be exercised in the East China Sea where China could encounter Japan directly.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Relations between Japan and the Philippines has begun since Muromachi period of Japanese history, during this period Japanese merchants and traders had settled in Luzon. Especially in the suburb of Manila, Dilao, which was a *Nihonmachi*¹³ of 3,000 Japanese around the year 1600. After the World War II, United States grant The Philippines independence and The Philippines also take part as the signatory in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan. The diplomatic relations between Japan and The Philippines re-established in 1956, when a war reparations agreement was concluded. Japanese companies and individual investors had begun to return to the Philippines by the end of the 1950s.

Relationship with China is the most important theme in Japan's foreign policy at the outset of the 21st century. For both countries, the relationship is one that interweaves "cooperation and coexistence" with "competition and friction." (Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, 2002). Japan argues that China's military buildup could pose a serious threat to Japan and other countries of the region and demands for transparency regards China's burgeoning military budget to lower the existing tension. The tension between China and Japan or also

¹³*Nihonmachi* is a term used to referring historical Japanese communities in Southeast and East Asia. The term has also been applied to several modern-day communities, though most of these are called simply "Japantown", in imitation of the common term "Chinatown".

known as Sino-Japanese rivalries currently has the greatest potential to trigger a major regional conflict (Castro, 2013)

President Aquino and PM Abe signed a joint declaration on “A Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and Partnership and Goals for Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and Beyond”, and agreed to enhance the strategic partnership between their countries on shared principles and goals. The areas of cooperation in the security realm includes the sharing of information on security environment and challenges; information exchange and policy coordination on respective security policies; collaboration on maritime matters; and humanitarian assistance; and most importantly, the terms regarding defense equipment and technology. The Philippines and Japan are currently exploring a strategic partnership to complement their respective bilateral alliances with the U.S. (Rodulfo-Veril, 2012).

Japan’s foreign policy towards Philippines to strengthen the strategic cooperation certainly based on several factor related towards its national interest, some of the main factors related to Japan towards the policy was to ensure Japan’s military security, and also its economic well-being. “Military Security” since Japan needs to contain the assertive actions made by China in both East and South China Sea region. While in East China Sea Japan could directly encounter China, in South China Sea, Japan needs to gain support and maintain strategic cooperation with claimants’ country in the South China Sea disputes. Considering the long story of relations and cooperation between Japan and The Philippines,

and since The Philippines were also a claimants country which also has strong stance against China in the disputes, Japan needs to maintain, and increase its supports toward Philippines through several cooperation policy, which increase the capabilities of Philippines to be able to match China's assertive actions in the South China Sea. Through multilateral and bilateral agreement, Japan tries to ensure its military security, from the merging threat from China in the near East China Sea, and also South China Sea.

The other factor is the "Economic Well-being"; South China Sea serve as the main route of Japan's energy imports from the Middle East and other country, which needs to pass South China Sea in order to reach Japan in the Eastern part of Asia. The abundant natural resource and potential hydrocarbon deposits in the area of South China Sea also become one of the consideration why Japan needs to involve in securing the South China Sea Region. Many of Japan's off-shore and on-shore oil production assets were located in the claimed area of China's 9-dashed line, thus China's assertiveness in South China Sea poses a significant threat towards Japan's economy. By supporting the countries that currently participating in the disputes with China, especially Philippines, Japan were actually securing its economy in indirect way, and also maintaining the already established economic cooperation between Japan and the Southeast Asia Countries.

Japan also chose to strengthen its cooperation with Philippines as its allies, and also engaging in a multilateral forum of countries in Southeast Asia, as an effort to balance and make alliance to contain the assertive actions of China in the

South China Sea and East China Sea. Since the growing military might of China proven to be a threat for Japan and several countries in South China Sea, Japan need to engage in a multilateral forum and also strengthen its bilateral cooperation with its allies in the region, especially with its long standing ally in the region, The Philippines

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