

CHAPTER II

THE DYNAMICS OF ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA

(ISIS)

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria commonly known as ISIS is a resistance group that operated in the region of Iraq and Syria, moreover the group has now conquered the territory in Western Iraq and Eastern of Syria region, the region that approximately six and a half million people lived there. Although created as one of al-Qaeda's manifesto, but different from al-Qaeda, ISIS became an organization that evolves quickly, evolve using a variety of strategies in addition to terror and insurgent tactics, into an organization that is more organized. After seizing some territories in Iraq and Syria, in mid-2014. ISIS calls upon the international public by setting up an Islamic State, they claim authority over political and theological exclusively over the Muslim world. (Laub & Masters, 2014, p. 1).

According to the Council on Foreign Relations (2015, p. 23) that, its state-building project, however, has been characterized more by extreme violence, justified by references to the Prophet Mohammed's early followers, than institution building. Successful self-publishing, and attracts international attention, particularly in the recruitment of thousands of foreign members, who want to join them. This became the concern of Western intelligence.

In the history of its development, they have gradually growing processes. Starting from the bottom, where at the beginning of their existence was unknown by the public, even international public, even so it is hard to trace the beginning of their existence. However, there is some information that is slowly sticking above the surface of the information about what is ISIS, and where they came from. Because ISIS with surprisingly announced the formation of the Islamic State, their dominance in most areas of Iraq and Syria, under the leadership of Al-Baghdadi. (Schweitzer, Einav, & Editors, 2016).

The Islamic State, was established about 2 years ago. Starting from their actions that belong to different from his predecessor. Starting from their actions in Iraq, unlike their action in Syria. Their action is always an extreme and uncompromising, until softened, even cleverly exploit the circumstances surrounding it into an opportunity. Now they became an influential element in the area as well as a challenge for the international community.

A. From Jama'at al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad (JTWJ) to Islamic State in Iraq

According to Lister (2014, p. 6) As he has been paying attention to the activities of ISIS:

“Over the years, ISIS fighters have frequently been heard proclaiming *“baqiya wa tatamadad”* (lasting and expanding). This simple statement represents ISIS fundamental modus operandi as an organization. ISIS has deep roots dating back to at least 1999, when its notorious father figure, Ahmad Fadl

al-Nazal al-Khalayleh (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) was released from prison in Jordan.”

In the process, ISIS in a long period of time has evolved. Answering the challenge from various parties, especially military challenge under United States military leader, then led the invasion and occupation in the Middle East especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other hand, it turns out that this answers the desires of the organization, namely, the realization of their desire to be "lasting and expanding"

Lister (2014, p. 7) Suggests that the early establishment of the ISIS can be known when that moment:

“Zarqawi was released from Jordan's al-Sawwaqa prison after serving 5 years of a 15-year sentence for weapons possession and being a member of the Bayat al-Imam, a militant organization. Zarqawi then moved to Afghanistan, where he made contact with al-Qaeda's leadership and established his own jihad group, Jund al-Sham, which he renamed within months to Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTWJ). JTWJ quickly attracted international attention for its plot to attack Amman's Radisson Hotel and at least two other popular tourist sites in December 1999. Zarqawi's JTWJ fought alongside al-Qaeda and Taliban forces before eventually fleeing to Iran in December 2001.”

In March 2003, U.S. forces invaded Iraq. Zarqawi had been first founded a small organization based in Biyara, province of Kurds Sulaymaniya. Where at the time, the area was the initial target of the air attack campaigns led by the United States. JTWJ became one of the targets by the U.S. Coalition forces, but at the

time they argued that Zarqawi is a threat to the throne in Iraq Sunni and other regions. Because Zarqawi has three main goals: a traditional enemy of Zarqawi ' Jordan ', the international community and Shia. (Riedel B. , 2010, p. 94). On the other hand, Zarqawi believed his organization could take advantage of the resulting chaos to cast itself as the defender of the Sunni community and to usher in the establishment of an Islamic state.

This is evidenced by his, in support of its action, he spread the longhand results of his thoughts.

“Zarqawi's writings were consistently riddled with anti-Shia rhetoric harking back to the words of historical Islamic ideologues. His final public address before his death on 7 June 2006, Zarqawi exclaimed, *"The Muslims will have no victory or superiority over the aggressive infidels such as the Jews and the Christians until there is a total annihilation of those under them, such as the apostate agents headed by the rafida (Shia)."* (Lister, 2014, p. 9).

Due to its prominence and extensive international recruitment networks, JTWJ became the centre of overshadowing the growth activities of jihad in Iraq, joining other groups into the same thought. In September 2004, after a long negotiation process. Zarqawi is working with al-Qaeda, to promise faithfully under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden. This is the next point where the JTWJ began to be known as Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or commonly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Lister (2014, p. 9) Exposes the rapid development of al-Qaeda in Iraq:

“On 15 January 2006, AQI announced its merger with five other groups (*Jaysh al-Ta'ifa al-Mansura, Saraya 'Ansar al-Tawhid, Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami, Saraya al-Ghuraba and Kataib al-Ahwal*) to form Majlis Shura al-Mujahideenn (MSM), a coalition whose aim was to unite and better coordinate Iraq's jihadi insurgency. Zarqawi's death on 7 June 2006 catalysed a strengthening of the organisation. Within five days, AQI appointed Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (Abu Ayyub al-Masri) as its new leader, and four months later the MSM announced the establishment of *al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq*, or the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), with a fully structured cabinet. Then, on 10 November, Masri pledged bayah (allegiance) to ISI leader Hamid Dawud Muhammad Khalil al-Zawi (Abu Omar al-Baghdadi).”

Levitt (2014, p. 1) In his website suggests that:

“The establishment was intended to represent a qualitative evolution whereby an insurgent group transformed into a military-political actor responsible for governing territory. By late 2006, it had reached financial self-sufficiency, raising \$70-200 million per year through a combination of ransoms, extortion, and oil smuggling.”

However, similar to what is experienced by AQI, the contents still proved reluctant to compromise with their absolute ideology. Where they are trying to set up a society, that ended with a rejection, and opposed their presence in its territory. Put simply, ISI overestimated its capacity to engender Sunni support and overstretched its forces, leaving them vulnerable to what was coming.

In Iraq, ISI likely to continue to disrupt the social dynamics and influence the public perception of the Sunnis will reign Haidaer al-Abadi that he is not defending their rights. Particularly in Iraq, the instability of the availability of the fuel, and the occurrence of conflict into a source of strength for ISI to unite a diverse group of other Sunnis. Because of the absence of the Union of a number of such groups, it takes struggle more to get the full legitimacy.

Variety of ways done by ISI, such as adopting a strategy of diverting, and initiating the information campaign that aims to affirm the validity of their Islamic State project. These strategies are achieved by doing a terror at once informed that they have the strength to realize their projects. As was the case in mid-2009, where their group increases its attack by killing around 400 people in Central Baghdad.

According to The Economist (2013) the aggression 2009 done by ISI was not their first attack, ISI was also spread the terror in 2007.

“This shift in dynamics encouraged ISI to lash out against rival Sunni insurgent groups and minority communities, including on 14 August 2007 when four ISI car bomb attacks against Yazidi villages in northern Iraq killed nearly 800 people.”

After doing various kinds of assault, in 2008, for the first time ISI is in a depressed condition due to many foreign fighters leaving Iraq, and the onset of sectarian conflict. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the Sahwa forces also

experienced weakening caused by the discourse of u.s. military forces withdrawal in Iraq, from June 2009 until August 2010.

The switched of the headquarters of the ISI in the northern city of Mosul, becomes one of important decision, because in that area is occurring the conflicts between Arab-Kurdish. In Mosul, the operation of ISI is under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, with Abu Qaswarah al-Maghribi as the deputy. Then, Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani continued al-Maghribi's leadership after his death in October 2008. (CBS News, 2008).

On April 18, 2010, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri had been killed. Then Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed as leader of the ISI. In mid-2010, ISI offers to the members of Sahwa to join them with higher salaries than giving by the Iraq government. In early 2010, ISI is also working to regenerate their senior leader after many of their previous leaders were killed or captured. (Lister, 2014, p. 10).

In Military aspect, ISI consolidates his power in Mosul. By hiding their ambitions to the other political groups, such as those conducted by the JRTN. A similar campaign was also carried out in the province, including the cities of Anbah Hit Ramadi and Haditha, also in the province of Ninawa and Salah ad Din parts of the city.

In addition to a number of such campaigns, ISIS also did a kind of rebellion, integrated campaign by doing large scale bombing continuously until you reach the centre of security in Kirkuk and Diyala. ISIS also launched a propaganda

campaign aimed at bringing Sunni aspirations against international protests, and indirect invasion in Iraq. In the absence of real political progress in Baghdad, management perception that more might be done. It appears that ISIS will gradually widen the target area bombing and other attacks in the capital. They also are trying to trigger sectarian conflict between Shia militias, it is an attempt to disrupt the process of reconciliation between the Sunni-Shia in the Central Government.

B. Mergering Islamic State In Iraq (ISI), Jabhat al-Nusra l'Ahl as-Sham into Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

The occurrence of civil war in Syria, became the trigger for the establishment of a branch of al-Qaeda in Syria in August 2011, led by the leader of the ISI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which appointed Mohammad Suriah Abu al-Golani as a command centre. In an effort to topple the Assad regime and set up an Islamic State, the Golani and his colleagues across the border of Iraq into Syria to help liberate a number of Islamist groups which was captured from Syria's military prison. This process lasts from May to June 2011, active resistance against Syrian security forces (Blake & Benotman, 2013).

In October 2011 and January 2012, al-Golani has performed a number of meetings in Rif Dimashq and Homs, which aims to determine the formation of a group. Officially, al-Golani announced the existence of the group named "Jabhat al-Nusra l'Ahl as-Sham" (Front-end Support for the People of the Sham) on January 23, 2012. (Abouzeid, 2014).

Jabhat al-Nusra l'Ahl as-Sham army consists of Syrian jihadists, aiming to overthrow the Government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and to create an Islamic State under Sharia law, with emphasized from the beginning of their resistance is on the 'near enemy' i.e. Syria's regime than the global jihad (Stanford , 2016).

“Syrian members of the group claim that they are fighting only the Assad regime and would not attack Western states; while official policy of the group is to hold the United States and Israel as enemies of Islam, and to warn against Western intervention in Syria, al-Nusra Front leader Julani has stated that *"We are only here to accomplish one mission, to fight the regime and its agents on the ground, including Hezbollah and others"* (Al Jazeera, 2015).”

Iraq's deputy interior minister said in early February 2012 that weapons and Islamist militants were entering Syria from Iraq (AFP, 2012). The Quilliam Foundation reported that many of Nusra's members were Syrians who were part of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Islamist network fighting the 2003 American invasion in Iraq; (Blake & Benotman, 2013) the Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari agreed to that in 2012. The British ‘the Daily Telegraph’ stated in December 2012 that many foreign al-Nusra fighters were hardened veterans from conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (Sherlock, 2012).

In July 2012, ISI initiated a 12-month campaign entitled “Breaking the Walls” with the principal objective of freeing its imprisoned members. ISI launched eight major attacks on Iraqi prisons over the following year (Lewis, 2013, p. 12). The

September 2012 attack on Tikrit's Tasfirat Prison liberated 47 senior ISI leaders from death row (Arango & Schmitt, 2014). The campaign's finale was an assault on Abu Ghraib prison on July 21, 2013 that enabled approximately 500 prisoners to escape.

On April 9, 2013, Baghdadi confirmed in an audio statement that Jabhat al-Nusra was an offshoot of ISI and that henceforth, it would be subsumed into the expanded Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In February 2014 Zawahiri announced that *"ISIS is not a branch of the al-Qaeda group, we have no organizational relationship with it, and the group is not responsible for its actions."* (Tharoor, 2014)

Sami al-Oraydi in 2014 acknowledged that the formation of the Group was influenced by the teachings of al-Qaeda members, namely Abu Musab al-Suri. In the Guidebook Abu Musab, there are strategies adopted by them, which are: provided services to the community, attempts to minimize the presence of labeling as a group of extremists, establish strong relationships with local communities and other fighter groups, and focus to fight against the Government. (Hassan, 2014).

“On 10 June 2015, al-Nusra fighters shot dead at least 20 Druze civilians in a village after one of them, a supporter of the Assad regime, opposed the expropriation of his house by a Nusra commander. Al-Nusra's leadership issued an apology and claimed that they had been carried out against the group's guidelines” (Gartenstein-Ross & al-Tamim, 2015).

Gartenstein-Ross & al-Tamim (2015) as the writer of the Foreign Affairs magazine, contends that Al-Jazeera is engaged in actively whitewashing Al-Nusra, said that there is absolutely no reference to the Druze in Al-Nusra's "apology", since Al-Nusra forced the Druze to renounce their religion, destroyed their shrines and now considers them Sunni.

Al-Nusra and ISI are both against the Druze, the difference being that Nusra is apparently satisfied with destroying Druze shrines and making them become Sunnis while ISI wants to violently annihilate them as it does to Yazidis.

Hubbard (2015) noted that, this could give al-Nusra Front a greater long-term advantage. The tactics of al-Nusra Front differs markedly from those of rival jihadist group ISI; whereas ISI has alienated local populations by demanding their allegiance and carrying out beheadings, al-Nusra Front has cooperated with other militant groups and has declined to impose sharia law where there has been opposition.

In early 2015, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri instructed al-Nusra Front leader Jolani to pursue the following five goals: Better integrate his movement within the Syrian revolution and its people, coordinate more closely with all Islamic groups on the ground, contribute towards the establishment of a Syria-wide sharia judicial court system, use strategic areas of the country to build a sustainable al-Qaeda power base, cease any activity linked to attacking the West.

Al-Qaeda and al-Nusra tried to take advantage of the resurrection of ISIS, with the shows themselves as a moderate group compared to ISIS. Even though

they have the same goal to enforce Sharia law and the Caliphate. They intend to implement them by way of a gradual, al-Qaeda, and al-Nusra criticizing the way ISIS in applying Sharia law, fully and immediately, as the consequences, they alienate many people. Al-Qaeda and al-Nusra prefer the slow and gradual approach, that is to prepare the public to accept Sharia law and suggesting communities through education before applying Islamic hudud-aspect (Joscelyn, 2015).

They particularly criticised ISIS's enthusiasm for punishments such as executing gay people, chopping limbs off, and public stoning. However, Al-Qaeda agrees that hudud punishments should be implemented in the long term. The main criticism of defectors from ISIS is that the group is killing and fighting other Sunni Muslims, and that they are unhappy that other Sunnis like Jabhat al-Nusra are being attacked by ISIS.

C. From Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to Islamic State

The Islamic State or well-known as ISIS, the name have been stealing the attention of the jihadists. They have occupied some areas of Iraq and Syria, and declared the caliphate system to control the region. It attracted the attention of the militant from another region, ranging from Libya to Afghanistan. The Islamic State insists to the other groups to join them, if not, then regarded as the enemy, this tactic has alienated many areas under their control. Public execution conducted by ISIS, including beheading Western hostages, prompting the U.S. military to form a coalition to do the bombing, invasion.

Sunni disenfranchisement of citizens in Iraq and Syria led to the existence of a vacuum, exploited by the Islamic State. The Sunni minority in Iraq, had been ruled out in their national politics after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime by the United States in 2003. In 2011, in Syria occurred a civil war between a Government dominated by Shiite parties Alawi, and the opposition, the majority Sunnis., spawning sectarian violence.

The rebellion that occurred in Syria in 2011 to further ease the expansion carried out by the Islamic State. Analysts argued that actually have occurred a non-aggression pact between the militant of the Islamic State shrouded with the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and each of them choose to focus for anti-Government forces fight to retain power in its region. Extremist groups have come to dominate the northern and eastern Syria, and moderate forces invaded. Assad claimed by validated the opinion that his Government can defend against them.

According to the Reuters (2011), the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, and the expansion done by ISIS are undoubtedly being the power to the base of the organization. That reversion of their strength and expansion done already clearly visible before the year 2011.

“In early 2011, with the Arab Spring in full flow, the ISI continued the process of expansion and professionalization that it had begun in late 2009. It significantly escalated its military operations in Iraq, both geographically, incorporating southern Shi‘ite areas and the Kurdish north, and in terms of scale, carrying out 20-30 attacks in multiple provinces, often within the space of an hour. For example, suspected ISI militants carried out 22 seemingly coordinated

bombings in Baghdad and 12 other locations across Iraq on August 15, 2011” (Reuters, 2011).

The existence of a volley of attacks and covers a large area, aiming not only caused material damage for the Government but also to break the morale of the security forces, and are expected to occur in Syria..

The last three years have been extremely consequential for ISI's dramatic evolution and grown into an organization capable of conquering and governing territory. Most significantly, ISI has expanded into Syria, exploiting that country's revolution and civil war. In the following six months of 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra operated similarly to ISI, but insisted it had no links to ISI or al-Qaeda, but by mid-January 2013 the group had led the seizure of two major military facilities in Northern Syria.

Islamic State expansion in Iraq and Syria has benefited greatly from tremendous regional instability and the weakening of nation-state borders. By exploiting and exacerbating such conditions, IS has been able to gain military power, a multiplying international membership, and unprecedented financial resources.

In Syria, IS is seeking to consolidate its control in the capital of Raqqa and in the rest of the governorate. Its offensive campaign in the northwestern, largely Kurdish governorate of Hasakah, meanwhile, will continue towards uniting the areas it controls in northwestern Iraq with northeastern Syria. This will increase clashes with the *Yerkineyen Parastina Gel* ‘People’s Protection Unit’ (YPG),

which may potentially begin to draw on assistance from Iraqi Kurdistan and place the United States in a position of needing to (directly or indirectly) support what is technically a wing of the terrorist-designated *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan* 'Kurdistan Worker Party' (PKK) as was demonstrated around Mount Sinjar in August (Tharoor, 2014).

The northern Syrian city of Raqqa is often cited as the Islamic State's de facto capital. There, the group has established some new institutions (e.g., judicial, police, economic) and co-opted others (e.g., education, health, and infrastructure) to provide residents a modicum of services and consolidate its control over the population.

Having consolidated its capital in Raqqa, ISIS forces in Iraq exploited conditions in the Sunni heartland of Anbar march into Fallujah and parts of Ramadi in January 2014. This marked ISIS's renewed venture into overt territorial control in Iraq and set the stage for its gradual expansion in Anbar, particularly along the Syrian border. ISIS issued a series of coordinated media releases marking the start of Ramadan. The most significant of these was an audio recording, released on June 29 in five languages, which announced the establishment of the Islamic State and the caliphate.