

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIC STATE**

Since declaring itself to be the Islamic State by mid-2014, and includes large parts of Northwestern Iraq and Eastern Syria. The experts are still debating about the origin of the ideology espoused by the Islamic State (Hassan, 2016). It's important to understand the ideology embraced by Islamic State, as a crucial step to defeat them. Even the Commander-in-Chief of the military of the United States stressed how important it is to know the steps or solutions to fight it. As Major General Michael Nagata, a former commander of the U.S. special operations forces in the Middle East, has noted, "*We do not understand the movement, and until we do, we are not going to defeat it*" (Schmitt, 2014). This is also expressed by one of the field commanders who say that in their efforts against the movement of the Islamic State in Syria, they hampered related to the ideology, it is difficult for his troops to mobilize. One of these occurs, when they get a rejection and hard to recruit the fighters in the area, because most of them refused to fight against the Islamic State. Even they don't want to join the Islamic State. This is especially the case for efforts backed by Western powers. Ideology can therefore have practical implications in the fight against the Islamic State.

There are several parties agreeing to blame over the confrontational ethos and violence perpetrated by the Islamic State. Some argue that the Islamic State is the result of a long history of violence in the past (Crooke, 2014). Other attributes

argue, that the presence of influence when the Iraq invasion in 2003 became the trigger for their brutal action and also the role of Iran for their support on the influence of the Shiite forces in the area. Some panellists showed that political Islam as well as the beginning of an attitude of intolerance of the Islamic State, and others suggested that the Islamic State as a sect that is driven by political opportunism and filled with regional political players. (Dalrymple, 2014).

The ideology of the Islamic State, which is diverse and cannot be traced only in individuals, time period, and their movements. In fact, even though it refers to books or writings used or created by the Islamic State, not at all informed how to understand about their ideology. But it would be nice to try researching how these groups understand, propagate and teach their ideas.

Constructivism believes that the normative and ideational factors have a structural characteristic in which they are able to influence the political and social actions. It believes that the material sources of actors only have meaning because the actors have the structure of knowledge or normative, and ideational structures embodied inside the actors (Reus-Smit, 2005, p. 202). Normative and ideational factors here mean that metaphysical aspects such as ideas, belief, value, culture, and norms which embodied inside the actors. This chapter explores the Islamic State's ideology in context, drawing on primary sources and direct testimonies from Islamic State clerics and members in Syria and Iraq.

## **A. The Salafist-jihadi Movement**

The Islamic State declares that they are one of the representatives of a group that applies the values of Islam as a whole, as exemplified by the early generations of Muslims. This refers to the presumption that what IS stated by is referring to the Group of Salafism. People who apply Salafism, called Salafist. At the time of the postcolonial and modern, there are many groups that declare themselves as Salafist. Salafist stated that the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad is the best and ideal where Islam flourished. The things they make reference and vision to establish an Islamic State, as done by modern Salafist, where it began in Egypt, which aims to restore Islam into early form, back to the heyday of Islam where Islam reached its peak. The Islamic State is known as the Group of adherents of Islamic Jihad Salafist doctrine, one of the branches of a Sunni Islamic extremist factions, which aims to revive Islam through jihad, and the fight against internal and external enemies (Brown, 2011, pp. 6-8).

According to Haykel notes, committed to expanding Dar al-Islam (Islamic State), the land of Islam, even, perhaps, with the implementation of monstrous practices such as slavery and amputation but at some future point. Their first priority is personal purification and religious observance, and they believe anything that thwarts those goals such as causing war or unrest that would disrupt lives and prayer and scholarship is forbidden (Wood, 2015).

The term Salafist now has been synonymous with villainized and violence, because many criminals when it comes down in war carrying and waving the

symbol of Salafist. Al-Baghdadi was Salafist, considering he was the leader of the Islamic State that is synonymous with violence and terror, then the public assumes that the Salafist identical to violence. Inversely proportional to the original Salafist, where many of them is not a fan of violence, nor to war without a clear reason. In fact, most of them refused to admit the Islamic State.

In isolation, Salafism and political Islam do not produce an Islamic State member or catalyse extremism. On the contrary, both Salafism and political Islam have safeguards that may inhibit the kind of extremism adopted by the Islamic State. Similarly, political or moral outrage alone does not drive people to the Islamic State. The group has flourished in a context of political oppression, governance failures, and sectarian fissures, but this same political context can, and often does, lead individuals to insurgent groups that hold moderate views (Hassan, 2016).

Initially, the Salafist movement focused on religious studies and the winning of hearts and minds (Da‘wah) as a way of creating an Islamic society and a state ruled by Islamic law. However, within the Salafist movement an extremist faction called Salafiyya Jihadiyya (i.e., jihadi Salafism) developed, from which Al-Qaeda and the global jihad organizations, including The Islamic State, have emerged. An ideologically important contribution to the development of the movement was made by Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian ideologue whose ideas inspired the establishment of Islamic organizations that supported violent struggle (including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s successor as leader of Al-Qaeda) (R, Springer, Regens, & Edger, 2009, p. 50).

The goal of achieving a caliphate is one shared by many extremist Islamic organizations, al-Qaeda included. The aim of ISIS is actually to reach this goal and it is well on its way to doing so. The group is also extremely intelligent in terms of expanding its remit and as we may see in the coming months, political objectives will begin to come more to the forefront than ever before.

Its first goal would be to control as much of the Middle East as physically possible. This would provide it with legitimacy and give it more credence in the eyes of its followers. The second goal would be to carry off a spectacular attack against the West. A 9/11-esque attack would once and for all place Islamic State at the top of the 'terrorist pyramid' and for it and its followers signal the death knell for al-Qaeda (Withnall & Romero, 2015). They have stated that it wants to build a caliphate, and they have a careful, steady and organized plan to demonstrate the strength of their conviction and purpose, their military strength and the strength of their right to be the saviours of what they see as Islam, while they are aiming towards a long-term strategy, they have very specific ways in which they're doing it.

According to a map produced by the US Department of Defence in mid-September 2014, (C-Span Created by Cable, 2014) reported that the US Government assesses the territorial ambition of The Islamic State to extend by 2016 to cover the Sunni areas of Iraq to the north and west of Baghdad, Syria is excluding Damascus and the west of the country, and a small area of Northern Jordan.

From a Salafist-jihadi perspective, Muslims must strive to disseminate and implement Islam in all areas of life by liberating the lands of Islam from other cultures (especially Western culture) through jihad (holy war), which is perceived as the personal duty (fard ‘ayn) of every Muslim. This Muslim must fight the enemies of Islam through violent and uncompromising military struggle. Moreover, according to the Salafist-jihadi perception, the enemies of Islam are not only external (mainly the US and the West), but also Arab regimes that cooperate with the West or secular Arab regimes that are considered “infidel.” Therefore, according to Salafist jihadists, Islamic religious law justify overthrowing them.

## **B. The Return of the Golden Age of Islam**

The return to the Golden Age of Islam, according to the Islamic State, takes place through the reestablishment of an Islamic Caliphate, based on the Salafist-jihadi interpretation of Islamic religious law (the sharia). The Caliphate State, whose establishment was declared by The Islamic State, currently includes large parts of Iraq and Syria, from the outskirts of Baghdad to the outskirts of Aleppo. However, Islamic State seeks to expand its self-declared Caliphate State to the rest of Iraq and Syria, topple the regimes in Baghdad and Damascus, and subsequently spread from there to the rest of the region, most of it included in Greater Syria (Bilad al-Sham) according to ISIS: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, and even Kuwait (Crethiplethi, 2014).

On June 29, 2014, the ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani declared the establishment of the Islamic State, headed by Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The announcement was made by a spokesman on an audiotape posted to YouTube and elsewhere. On the occasion of the establishment of the Islamic State, Caliph al-Baghdadi announced an amnesty for detainees held by the Islamic State (SITE Intelligence Group, 2014).

The Islamic State is aimed to restore the “Khilafa” (Caliphate), a transnational Islamic state that would prevail over the European carved borders established within the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement of World War I, also called Asia Minor Agreement, (May 1916), secret convention made during World War I between Great Britain and France, with the assent of imperial Russia, for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The agreement led to the division of Turkish-held Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine into various French- and British-administered areas. Negotiations were begun in November 1915, and the final agreement took its name from its negotiators, Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and François Georges-Picot of France ( Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016).

Islamic State’s ambitions extend beyond the areas of Greater Syria. According to its vision, the Caliphate in Greater Syria will be the core of an extensive Islamic Caliphate. It will include the countries of the Middle East; North Africa; parts of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan (Khorasan); European countries that were conquered from the Muslims in the past (Spain, the Balkans); and other Muslim countries (Turkey, the Caucasus).

The Caliphate would be governed by sharia law and ruled by a caliph; someone considered to be a successor to Muhammad’s political authority. On

June 29th, 2014 the announcement restoring of the Caliphate was made. Baghdadi (who the world knows very little about) revealed his 'real' name and became self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim II, ostensibly showing his lineage to Caliph Ibrahim I who ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1640-1648 (Dawson, 2014).

Within the territory that IS has appropriated, life is analogous to any state government. The Islamic State builds and maintains supermarkets, power lines, roads, religious schools, and post offices. They even have a police force and consumer protection office. An important component of their governance is their social services sector, where they help run bread factories and give out fruits and vegetables to local residents. In the Syrian town of Raqqa, Islamic State established a food kitchen to help the needy and an Office of Orphans to poor orphans with families. Although this seemingly beneficent "hearts and minds" component seems adequate for life, the Islamic State's form of justice is comparable to Hammurabi code: thieves have their hands chopped off in public and apostates are crucified in town centres (Zelin, 2014).

The Islamic State embraces some of these goals, but even where there is agreement in principle. The Islamic State's strategy is to control territory, steadily consolidating and expanding its position. Part of this is ideological: it wants to create a government where Muslims can live under Islamic law (or the Islamic State's twisted version of it). Part of this is inspirational: by creating an Islamic state, it electrifies many Muslims who then embrace the group. And part of it is basic strategy: by controlling territory it can build an army, and by using its army to control more territory.

The Islamic State evolved out of the civil wars in Iraq and Syria, and its tactics reflect this context. The Islamic State seeks to conquer; thus it deploys artillery, massed forces, and even tanks and MANPADS as it sweeps into new areas or defends existing holdings. Terrorism, in this context, is part of revolutionary war: it is used to undermine morale in the army and police, face a sectarian backlash, or otherwise create dynamics that help conquest on the ground. But it is an adjunct to a more conventional struggle.

In territory it controls, the Islamic State uses mass executions, public beheadings, rape, and symbolic crucifixion displays to terrorize the population into submission and “purify” the community, and at the same time provides basic (if minimal) services: the mix earns them some support, or at least acquiescence due to fear, from the population. A decade ago Zawahiri chastised the Iraqi jihadists for their brutality, correctly believing this would turn the population against them and alienate the broader Muslim community, and he has raised this issue in the current conflict as well. The Islamic State’s lesson from Iraq, somewhat incredibly, is that it was not brutal enough. The Islamic State has gained support from a number of important jihadist groups. Boko Haram in Nigeria and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt, both formally pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and are now considered official affiliates or “provinces” of the Islamic State; the Islamic State often exaggerates its own prowess and role to the point of absurdity (Byman & R, 2015).

The Islamic State’s impressive social media efforts and overall appeal also make it better able to mobilize “lone wolves” to attack in the West. Many of these

individuals will have had little or no contact with the Islamic State as an organization, but they find its ideology and methods appealing and will act on their own. Ironically, some of these individuals may have preferred to go to Iraq and Syria, but Western disruption efforts make it easier for them to attack at home.

This was giving them confidence to challenge the great enemies of the past, the final aspect of the Islamic State narrative is a focus on the end times, drawing extensively on Hadith literature, selectively (and occasionally figuratively, in contrast to the group's claims to literalism) applied. This explains why their related the focus on 'Rome' (or Byzantium, read: the United States) and 'Persia' (Iran), the two great enemies of the growing Islamic empire in the eighth century and beyond. It also draws on the location of the battle. The town of Dabiq, in northern Syria, features in some prophecies as the location of one of the great battles of the end times. In every issue of the propaganda magazine of the same name, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is quoted: "*The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify by Allah's permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq*" (Hassan, 2016).

The primary target of the Islamic State is looking for an "apostate" regime in the Arab world, namely, the Asad regime in Syria and the Abadi regime in Iraq. Like his predecessors, Baghdadi favours purifying the Islamic community first by attacking Shi'a and other religious minorities as well as rival jihadist groups. The Islamic State's long list of enemies includes the Iraqi Shi'a, the Lebanese Hizballah, the Yazidis (a Kurdish ethno-religious minority located predominantly

in Iraq), and rival opposition groups in Syria (including Jabhat al-Nusra, the official Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria) (Byman D. L., 2015).

### **C. Holy War Against Internal & External Enemies**

When it declared its territories as a caliphate one year ago, Islamic State stated its ultimate aim as the establishment of a single, global state under its interpretation of Islamic rule. Conquering the whole world is clearly a target for the extreme long term, particularly for a group which appears to be struggling to advance much beyond its swathe of northern Syria and Iraq. (Withnall & Romero, 2015) According to the panel of leading experts that tried to figure out what actually Islamic State want and their militants goal that claim they can practically achieve.

On a practical level, the movement is determined to occupy territory wherever it can. The logical ancillary to this is to project the group as an ever-growing power and a popular slogan “*baqiyya wa tatamaddad*” (remaining and expanding) (Al-Tamimi, 2014). By calling the group The Islamic State, and making a point of bulldozing the berm that separates Syria and Iraq and destroying border posts, Abu Bakr has underlined his rejection of the colonial boundaries established by the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. This is calculated to appeal to three separate constituencies: the local tribes who span the border, the Arab nationalists who resent the continued colonial legacy of divide and rule, and those members of the Muslim Umma who believe that they should form one nation based on their shared faith (Black, 2014).

From a religious point of view, The Islamic State should have as an early objective the conquest of the Hejaz as the location of the two holy places, Mecca and Medina, but it has not given this as its aim. The challenge to the religious authority of the king of Saudi Arabia is clear enough, but in purely political terms, Abu Bakr's group still reflects its origins as an Iraqi movement with Iraqi objectives though now with an increasing stake in Syria.

The change of name to The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria was an attempt to capitalize on the energy created by the civil war in Syria and use it in support of the insurgency in Iraq, making a common cause of Sunni disaffection with the Shia regimes on both sides of the border - albeit that in Syria the Sunni comprise some 70% of the population whereas in Iraq they make up only about 30%. By changing its name to The Islamic State, Abu Bakr broadened the appeal of the movement beyond Syria and Iraq without necessarily changing its short-term objectives. The removal of the geographic limitations in the name reinforced his challenge to al Qaeda as the leader of global 'jihad' and gave further reason to foreign fighters to join him.

Although The Islamic State has threatened countries outside Iraq and Syria since its earliest days, al Adnani's call for attacks against the coalition does not signify a change in its immediate strategic objectives. The military ambition of the State remains the capture and control of further territory in Iraq and Syria, and the consolidation of what it already has. In due course it may try to move into Jordan and Lebanon, where it already has supporters, and then into Saudi Arabia, but it does not seem to be making plans to do more. Unlike al Qaeda, therefore, it does

not appear to have set up camps within its territory to attract and train foreign recruits to commit terrorist acts elsewhere (Barret, 2014).

Beyond increasing its territory, The Islamic State aims to consolidate its rule through proselytising its Salafist/takfiri creed (Dawa), imposing sharia-based rule in order to enhance its authority and build its apparent legitimacy, providing education as a form of indoctrination and recruitment, and offering public services and humanitarian assistance in order to win public support (Barret, 2014).

IS's main goal is creating a state under a Caliph in Muslim-majority lands. Its expansion should be regarded in similar terms to that of the Nazis in Europe, they wanted to expand like the Nazis did in Europe and the ambitions it has on the key capitals of the region; namely Baghdad and Damascus. Islamic State has already begun the eradication of the borders of Iraq and Syria and would like to do the same elsewhere. It will focus on the most tempting targets where similar conditions existed prior to their takeover in much of Iraq and Syria. The weakening of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) could allow for expansion there (Withnall, 2014).

The second is they want to consolidate their rule, their ultimate goal has ever been the establishment of the caliphate, i.e. controlling a certain geographical area and turning into a "real" state. This is the ultimate goal for all jihadist groups. Practically, right now it is to hold their territory and consolidate their rule, while they also have to push away competing jihadist groups (Bradley, 2014). The writer also thinks that they already overrun Iraq, and now they are concentrating

more on Syria and Assad. After establishing an effective state, what is abundantly clear is that IS falsely uses the name of Islam to commit barbaric atrocities against Muslims and non-Muslims. Their claims to have established an effective state for Iraqis and all Sunni Muslims. But the reality is the reverse; people face hunger, disease and violence. Furthermore, they wanted to rule the entire world, they also want all Muslims to declare allegiance to its caliphate and the caliphate to rule the entire world. Its more practical objectives are to survive and expand which it has so far succeeded in doing.

The writer thinks that their ability to get their goals will only be prevented if we understand that we all need to believe and act. We need to understand that the threat is not just the Islamic State but the demographic that is being affected, and the virtual armies that will be around long after the Islamic State is gone. The group is expansionist and thrives on gaining more territory. The sky is the limit for it, unless it is forced to remain in its territories and then shrink. Its ideology is global and inspires like-minded adherents throughout the world.