

## CHAPTER III

### THE DYNAMICS OF YOUTH MOVEMENT IN UZBEKISTAN

#### A. Movement strategies system

Strategies to move the activities of the group are based on two main factors; working on the awareness of people and protests, reforming activities.

#### B. Research and Brainstorming:

The Research is to bring new and innovative ideas in the framework of the nonviolent & peaceful change, global coverage, the universality and indivisibility of human rights, democracy and mutual respect

#### C. The project is divided into three parts:

##### 1 The destruction of idols and stop the sanctification of the President:

This campaign aimed to carry out active and wide activities, on the Internet and the streets to urge people not to panic and fear of the President, and urge people not to sanctify him. And the dissemination of the idea of, that the President of the Republic was an official elected in accordance with his agenda and that people had the right to charge him for his mistakes. Establishing the principle, that democracy was the only solution for the problems of Uzbekistan.

## **2 The Media Part:**

This is the part that's concerned with public awareness, through all Social Networks, Facebook, Twitter, blogs, websites and newspapers, the Internet and mobile phone messages, and this was to encourage people to control and detect irregularities and corruption in public dissemination and spread positivity among people, through continuing pressure campaigns.

## **3 The Public Part:**

The concerned with the campaigns with the public, and filming the corrupt officials who took bribes and exposing them to the public, and to encourage people in the streets to participate in the campaign and encourage people to be positive, and the need to implement real democracy and the need for the retribution of officials. All the youth people would begin to plunge the Internet, and mobile calls and letters to show the true feelings towards the president by raising the flags of Uzbekistan as an expression of their love for their country. The mobilization and call for the event would be through the Internet and mobile phone messages.

The Uzbek Justice Ministry has registered the public youth movement Kamolot, the information service of the Uzbek Justice Ministry told Interfax on Tuesday 15 May. The founding conference of the new movement took place in Tashkent on 25 April. Six hundred delegates from all regions of the republic attended the conference. Participants in the conference adopted the program and the charter of the new public movement and elected its

governing bodies. "The main goal of the movement is uniting young people, raising them on the basis of the requirements of a healthy lifestyle, assisting them in finding a proper place in society, universal protection of their interests, and organization of the conditions that are necessary for the full realization of their intellectual potential," the programmer reads. At the moment, Uzbekistan has four officially registered political parties and two public movements--Birlik and Kamolot.<sup>17</sup>

Uzbekistan differs from many post-communist transitions in that, along with other Central Asian states, post-Soviet politics in Uzbekistan is characterized didn't liberalization, but rather, by sustained if not increasing Authoritarianism. Despite fifteen years of independence, Central Asian states continue to rely on the same strategies of rule as did their Soviet predecessors. As the May 2005 unrest in Uzbekistan illustrates, though, the success of these Soviet era strategies is not guarantee. Instability marks authoritarian change in Central Asia just as it challenges democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, while Kazakhstan's Nazarbaev regime, for example, has thus far proven adept in maintaining uncontested power through a mixture of state-led economic growth and patronage politics, Uzbekistan's Karimov regime has become ever more embattled, incapable of maintaining either the loyalty of the political elite or the support of society at large. And just as democratic liberalizers in Ukraine and Georgia called on young activists during periods of

---

<sup>17</sup> For more on *Kamolot's* history, see "Molodezh—Dvizhushchaya Sila bez Burokratizma," *Narodnoe Slovo* (February 23, 2001), p. 1.

struggle, so too has the embattled yet brutally autocratic Karimov government turned to youth mobilization in an attempt to limit growing contestation within Uzbekistan's divided political and economic elite. In contrast to Kazakh president Nazarbaev, who has used oil wealth to successfully promote an ideology of state-orchestrated economic growth and to maintain effective control over central and regional political elite, Uzbek president Karimov's<sup>18</sup> comparative lack of economic resources has eroded both his popularity and his ability to sustain patronage politics. Unable to co-opt elites, the Karimov regime has sought to divide and thereby weaken unruly bureaucrats by pitting regional identity networks and government ministerial groupings against one another. Youth politics, the attempt beginning in the late 1990s to mobilize and acculturate new, state-oriented cadres, is the Karimov regime's response to the paradox of patronage politics, to these increasingly powerful regional and familial networks of political contestation. The ability of youth politics to counter these growing networks of political contestation, this study finds, will shape the tenure and viability of the Karimov regime.

The Soviet Union is one of the most important developments that the history recorded. Initially, this dramatic development led to the emergence of a wave of optimism in the West. Many regarded the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a golden opportunity for the freedom-thirsty people who had lived under the totalitarian rule to adopt democratic forms of governance. However,

---

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.movement/system.strategies.uz> and Ozbekiston-Yoshlar-Harakati-Pro-democracy-Uzbekistan-Youth-Movement/151169388282505 15 September 2008

in the course of time it became apparent that the collapse of the Soviet Union would not lead to the establishment of democratic regimes in Central Asia in the short run. With the emergence of regimes which have provided the presidencies with very broad ranges of powers and which have not hesitated to restrain the rights of individuals for the sake of stability, Central Asia proved to be a region which dashed the hopes of people who expected that democratic values would be embraced in the region. The Central Asian States, which were exposed to undemocratic rule through their history, did not rush to engage in democratic reforms. The transition to democracy will apparently prove to be a much more difficult process than the West initially expected. The collapse of the Soviet Union has given way to the emergence of very complex challenges for Central Asians. Making democratic reforms has not been the only task to accomplish for these newly independent states. Central Asia is the core region of the Asian continent and stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to China in the east and from Afghanistan in the south to Russia in the north. It is also sometimes referred to as Middle Asia, and, colloquially, "the 'STANS"<sup>19</sup> (as the five countries generally considered to be within the region all have names ending with the Persian suffix "-stan", meaning "land of") and is within the scope of the wider Eurasian continent.

Especially the state of youth culture in Central Asia with the focus on Uzbekistan, it examines how youth of Central Asia is, on one hand being

---

<sup>19</sup> Critchlow, James, "Nationalism and Islamic Resurgence in Uzbekistan" in Hafeez Malik, *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994

challenged and contested by the state ideology on the other, by Islamic religious movements, thus creating the situation that adds up to the conflict potential and youth exclusion in the region. The authorities of Uzbekistan are not only fighting religious movements that appeal to young people, but they are also pouncing attacks on various aspects of youth culture which is at the same time being excessively politicized by the government. Thus, alternative and vanguard youth are being marginalized, demonized, and excluded in the society<sup>20</sup>

**D. Age and Perceptions of Mobilization and the State on youth movement**

Public opinion surveys do suggest that, at least in some areas, youth do perceive the Uzbek government more favorably than do older cohorts. A US Department of State survey commissioned in July 2002 for example, demonstrates that Uzbek youth are more likely to perceive the Karimov government as making positive strides in combating corruption than are older Uzbeks. As Table 1 summarizes, 53.5 percent of Uzbeks between the age of 18 and 24 rate positively government efforts to combat corruption while only 29.2 percent of Uzbeks 64 and older share a similarly positive view<sup>21</sup>

Table 1: How are state authorities dealing with the problem of corruption?<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, the collapse of USSR 1924-1991*  
[www.BBC.morninig.com](http://www.BBC.morninig.com)

<sup>21</sup> Author's interviews with the supporters of imprisoned Karshi imam, Rustam Klichev, August and November 2004.


<sup>22</sup> [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/061109\\_ruseura\\_mcglincheyaaass.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/061109_ruseura_mcglincheyaaass.pdf)

	1—Very Poorly (%)	2—Rather Poorly (%)	3—Fairly Well (%)	4—Very Well (%)	Do Not Know (%)	Mean Score b	N <sub>c</sub>
<b>M18-24</b>	16.9	12.4	33.5	20.0	16.2	2.69(.09)	153
<b>25-34</b>	14.2	17.0	35.6	13.9	18.0	2.61(.06)	261
<b>35-44</b>	14.8	19.7	32.8	13.8	17.7	2.56(.06)	247
<b>45-54</b>	21.1	18.9	30.3	9.2	18.9	2.35(.08)	147
<b>55-64</b>	16.7	18.8	29.2	8.3	25.0	2.40(.12)	70
<b>65&amp;older</b>	21.7	11.3	19.8	9.4	34.0	2.27(.14)	66

A population pyramid illustrates the age and sex structure of a Country's population and may provide insights about political and social stability, as well as economic development. The population is distributed along the horizontal axis, with males shown on the left and females on the right. The male and female populations are broken down into 5-year age groups represented as horizontal bars along the vertical axis, with the youngest age groups at the bottom and the oldest at the top. The shape of the population pyramid gradually evolves over time based on fertility, mortality, and international migration trends.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/centralasia/uzbek-people.htm>  
The Uzbekistan – People-in 2012



**E. Islam Karimov's Rise to the Presidency and the Executive**

Islam Abdughanievich Karimov was born on 30 January 1938 in Samarkand. He attended the Central Asian Polytechnic Institute and graduated as a mechanical engineer. Afterwards, he attended Tashkent Institute of Economy and received a doctorate in economics. Having completed his education, he worked first at Tashkent Farm Machinery Plant. In 1966, Karimov started to work in the Uzbek SSR's Office of State Planning Agency (Gosplan). He continued to work for this office for seventeen years, becoming a vice-chairman of the agency in the early 1980's.<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile, the developments at Uzbek political life were setting the scene for Karimov's future political carrier. After the sudden death of Sharaf

<sup>24</sup> Resul Yalçın, op. cit., pp. 147, 148



Rashidov, Imanjan Usmankhojoev was appointed as the first secretary of Uzbek Communist Party. Usmankhojoev's rise to the position of first secretary paved the way for Karimov's promotion to a position of political importance<sup>25</sup>. Having won the favor of Usmankhojaev, in 1983, Karimov was appointed Minister of Finance and in 1986, he became Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and simultaneously Chairman of the State Planning Committee. However, soon Usmankhojaev was ousted on the basis of the allegations that he was ineffective in fighting against corruption and Rafik Nishanov replaced him. Usmankhojaev's removal from office was not good news for Karimov because it seems that Nishanov did not favor Karimov. Nishanov ousted Karimov from office and sent him to the distant terrain of Kaska-Darya Oblast to serve as the Oblast Secretary of Kashkadaria. However, this did not prove to be fatal blow to the political carrier for Karimov. Fortunately for Karimov, Nishanov's inability to address the interethnic tensions in the Fergana Valley culminated in latter's removal from office and forced Uzbek Communist Party to look for a new leader.

---

<sup>25</sup> Roger D. Kangas, op. cit., p. 133