

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The unrest situations have been happening in Southern Thailand which the central Thai government has to realized, how does the suitable policy to implemented. The Muslim people in Southern Provinces are feeling as the minority who live in Thailand. Therefore, as the people who has different ethnic, culture and religion which Thai government must understand them. Moreover, insurgent groups who has been set up in Southern Provinces in order to fight against to any government action since the previous after King Rama V of Siam kingdom, which they have difference opinions about the way to fight with Thai government.

If comparing between before Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and during his position. The insurgents groups have more attack to Thai government than before because it was clearly the government action that its influence to insurgent responding. Nowadays, the insurgent groups could be divided into 2 groups, the first, moderate insurgent groups which preferred to use peaceful means than violence respond. This group also has foreign supporting to fight against with Thai government into non-arm forces. Most of them are attempting to participate into political process in order to use bargain power because they thought that the violence way unable to overcome with Thai government and foreign country could not interfere into Southern Provinces. So, the only way of the Muslim People must play the role in politics.

Meanwhile, another groups that never believe on the peace way such as negotiation, offer any conditions to Thai government's considered, government policies unable to implemented as well. The second group is called radical insurgent

groups that nowadays, these groups have set up in every village as the small arm forces. They will conduct the violence to military bases, sometimes they are moving their group to support in other villages.

The ideology of those groups are sometimes flexible within the groups because of they have difference opinion among a members such as the last negotiation between BRN and the representative of the government conducted the negotiation in Kuala Lumpur. Many radical insurgent groups are supporting because the representative of BRN on peace talk has no authority to ceasefire. BRN is actually one of the radical insurgent group who never agreed with negotiation process, therefore the last negotiation among them has unable to ceasefire in Southern Thailand.

The contours of a political resolution to the conflict in southern Thailand have long been in the public domain, but Bangkok has been unable to commit to a comprehensive and decisive approach. A promising three-year policy issued by the National Security Council in early 2012 recognizes a political dimension of the violence and codifies decentralization and dialogue as official strategy, but its implementation is likely to be impeded by political and bureaucratic infighting. The government should reverse the militarization of the Deep South, lift the draconian security laws and end the security forces impunity, all of which help stimulate the insurgency. Thai leaders should also forge a broad national consensus for bold action to resolve the conflict, including decentralization of political power, earnest engagement with civil society and sustained efforts to cultivate a peace dialogue with the insurgency. Talking to its representatives, changing the way the Deep South is governed, delivering justice, and recognizing the region's unique culture are all elements of a comprehensive approach to reducing the violence. As Bangkok differs

the insurgents are growing bolder and more capable. They are conducting attacks that are attracting, if not deliberately seeking, more attention. Thailand has been fortunate that the militants have considered it in their strategic interest to contain the fight within their proclaimed territory, but the violence has evolved at a pace that is starting to challenge the ability of the government to respond on its own terms. Without more creative thinking and deft action, Bangkok risks losing the initiative.

Table : The similarity and difference between radical insurgent group and moderate insurgent group.

<p style="text-align: center;">Group</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Content</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Radical insurgent</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Moderate insurgent</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Method</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Violence.</li> <li>➤ Military front to fight against.</li> <li>➤ Employ the terrorism instruction and guerilla warfare.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Political solution</li> <li>➤ Negotiation process</li> <li>➤ Avoid the violence</li> <li>➤ Shadow of the government.</li> </ul>
<p style="text-align: center;">Network</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Foreign Islamist terrorism network or global Jihadism such as Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Swedish Muslim For Peace and Justice toward Southern Thailand.</li> </ul>
<p style="text-align: center;">Supporter</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Illegal trading such as oil smuggling, drug trafficking, human trafficking.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Civil society in Southern Provinces.</li> <li>➤ Malaysia government.</li> <li>➤ Organization of Islamic conference.</li> </ul>

<p style="text-align: center;">Leader</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Kabir Abdul Rahman, he was the leader of PULO.</li> <li>➤ Tengku Yala Nasae and Tengku Mamud Muhaiyiddin, both of them have been established the BNPP.</li> <li>➤ Haji Karim Bin Hasun, he was the Islamic scholar who was set up the BRN.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Haji Sulong Abdul kadir was Islamic scholar who claimed 7 demands to Thai government.</li> <li>➤ Dr. Wan Gadae Jeaman, he was the president of BERSATU to use the political solution.</li> </ul>
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The number of population in Southern Thailand which consist of 3 provinces as Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala that totally around 1,424,728 people. In Pattani is around 529,726 people, Yala is around 416,628 people and Narathiwat is around 478,374 people. Moreover, the number of population which divided into 2 main religions as Islamic and Buddha. Islamic has estimate 1,213,387 people or 85.16 percent and Buddha has estimate 207,033 people or 14.58 percent.<sup>53</sup> The government of Thailand reported that the number radical insurgent groups under control by insurgent had only 429 people. Several small groups have conducted to be vexations in every provinces of the Southern Thailand and ready to fire attack with armed force to get self demand.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>53</sup> <http://www.ryt9.com/s/cabt/146831>

<sup>54</sup> Sriamphob Jitniramon. "The Southern Border in August 2000: Struggle in Eastern in Pattani". Dooe Sa...

The recommendation to the government of Thailand to implement any policies to the Southern Thailand is following:

1. Develop a unified approach to transforming the conflict based on full implementation of the National Security Council (NSC) Administration and Development Policy for Southern Border Provinces, 2012-2014, by undertaking to:
  - a) create a cross-party consensus, possibly embodied in a national accord, that resolution of the conflict is a national priority
  - b) establish a durable non-partisan mechanism mandated by the prime minister's office and including respected individuals, in and out of government, to pursue dialogue with insurgent representatives
  - c) commit to serious consideration of political decentralization, consistent with the principle of a unitary state as enshrined in the constitution, with the aim of drafting legislation
  - d) engage with civil society initiatives that seek to foster more representative government and peaceful conflict resolution.
2. Lift the emergency decree and martial law in those districts where they remain in effect and, until further reforms are feasible, rely on the Internal Security Act (ISA) instead, ensuring that all regulations invoked are consistent with the preservation of human rights.
3. Ensure accountability for human rights abuses committed by security forces, including past incidents.

To the Separatist Movement:

4. Acknowledge that the protracted violence is detrimental to the well-being and development of the population in the southern provinces

5. Observe obligations of non-state armed actors under international humanitarian law and abide by the rules of engagement issued by the Patani United Liberation Organization, which prohibit attacks on civilians, displacement of the civilian population and acts of retribution.

6. Recognize that self-determination and maintenance of Thailand's territorial integrity and sovereignty are compatible and prepare to respond to initiatives by state representatives and civil society to pursue dialogue on peaceful conflict resolution.

To Civil Society Organizations:

7. Expand bases of popular support through continued community outreach, while maintaining channels of communication with officials and militants.

8. Avoid advocating preconceived political agendas and instead inform debate on political reform and conflict resolution by identifying and expressing popular