


Proceeding

International Joint Seminar

**Muslim Countries and Development :
Achievements, Constraints and Alternative Solutions
(Multi-Discipline Approach)**

Yogyakarta, 2nd December 2006



Organized by:




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Universitas
Muhammadiyah
Yogyakarta



International
Islamic
University
Malaysia



Education and
Cultural Attache
Embassy of The Republic
Indonesia in Malaysia

**MESSAGE FROM THE RECTOR OF
UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH YOGYAKARTA (UMY)**

Assalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh

All praise be to Allah SWT, Lord of the world. Peace and blessings on Muhammad SAW, His Servants and Messenger.

First of all, as the rector of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY), I would like to welcome to the honourable guests, Rector, Dean of Postgraduate Studies (CPS), Dean of ISTAC, Dean of IRKHS, Deputy Deans and Head Departments from various Kulliyah, lecturers, postgraduate students of International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), and all participants in this joint seminar.

Academic cooperation between UMY and IIUM started several years ago. The cooperation between us is based on a solid foundation; both us are Islamic universities having same missions to develop Islamic society, to prepare future generations of Islamic intellectuals, and to cultivate Islamic civilization. In fact, improving academic quality and strengthening our position as the producers of knowledge and wisdom will offer a meaningful contribution to the development of Islamic civilization. This responsibility is particularly significant especially with the emergence of the information and knowledge society where value adding is mainly generated by the production and the dissemination of knowledge.

Today's joint seminar signifies our attempts to shoulder this responsibility. I am confident to say that this joint program will be a giant step for both of us to open other pathways of cooperation. I am also convinced that through strengthening our collaboration we can learn from each other and continue learning, as far as I am concerned, is a valuable ingredient to develop our universities.

I sincerely wish you good luck and success in joining this program

Wassalamu'alaikum Wr, Wb.

Dr. Khoiruddin Bashori

Rector, UMY

**MESSAGE FROM THE RECTOR OF
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA (IIUM)**

Assalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh

In the name of Allah, the most Gracious and the most Merciful. Peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W).

First and foremost, I felt honoured, on behalf of the university to be warmly welcomed and to be given the opportunity to work hand in hand, organizing a respectable conference. Indeed, this is a great achievement towards a warmer bilateral tie between the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) and Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY) after the MoU Phase.

I would also like to express my heartfelt thanks to Centre for Postgraduate Studies (CPS), Postgraduate Students Society (PGSS), contributors, paper presenters, participants and our Indonesian counterpart for making this program a prestigious event of the year.

This educational and cultural visit is not only an avenue to foster good relationship between organizations and individuals and to learn as much from one another but a step forward in promoting quality graduates who practices their ability outdoor and master his or her studies through first hand experience. The Islamic platform inculcated throughout the educational system namely the Islamization of knowledge, both theoretical and practical, will add value to our graduates. This comprehensive excellent we strived for must always be encouraged through conferences, seminars and intellectual-based activities in line with our lullaby: The journey of a thousand miles begin by a single step, the vision of centuries ahead must start from now.

My utmost support is with you always. Looking forward to a fruitful meeting.

Ma'assalamah

Wassalamu'alaikum Wr, Wb.

Prof. Dato' Dr. Syed Arabi Iddid

Rector, IIUM

**MESSAGE FROM EDUCATION AND CULTURAL ATTACHE
EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
KUALA LUMPUR**

Assalamu 'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh

All praise be to Allah SWT. This is the moment where implementation of MoU between Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY) and International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) comes in the form of action by organizing this Joint Seminar. The efforts of both sides to implement the MoU are highly appreciated, especially, in the context of which both universities effort to enhance the quality of education.

Substantially, I believe that this Joint Seminar will bring many benefits. In term of the development of knowledge, it is a means for developing academic quality, for exchanging of information on academic development, as well as for constructing intellectual atmosphere at both universities. In term of international relations, both universities have taken part in increasing close relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia. RUM and UNY as well are using 'soft power' to increase bilateral relations among citizens which brings a lot of benefits for both nations.

Therefore, I hope that both RUM and UMY can make use of this program as a 'kick-off' for other programs in the future, especially in using UMY's vast networks with other Muhammadiyah Universities in various cities in Indonesia as well as IIUM's network. The support of IIUM for UMY also means a progress for IIUM and UMY. I hope such joint program will continue in future for betterment of both Indonesia and Malaysia. Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Kuala Lumpur will always support these efforts.

To our honorable guests, Rector, Dean of Postgraduate Studies (CPS), Dean of ISTAC, Dean of IRKHS, Deputy Deans and Head Departments from various Kulliyah, lecturers and students of IIUM, I warmly welcome you to Yogyakarta. I hope you enjoy your stay in the cultural city of Yogyakarta.

Finally, as the Attache of Education and Cultural, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Kuala Lumpur, I sincerely wish you good luck *and a successful program with unforgettable memories.*

*Wabillahit Taufiq Wal Hidayah
Wassalamu 'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh.*

M.Imran Hanafi

Education and Cultural Attache, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia

MESSAGE FROM DEAN CENTRE FOR POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

Assalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh

Praise be to Allah. May the peace and blessings of Allah be on the last prophet and messenger, our master Muhammad and on his household and companions. It is a great privilege for me to foreword this message to this wonderful event that is jointly organized by the Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY) and International Islamic University (IIUM).

First and foremost I would like to record my special gratitude to management of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta for their co-operation.

In order to obtain comprehensive excellence, the Centre for Postgraduate studies has always facilitates postgraduate students of the university to achieve the highest quality in their academic work. This seminar is one of the many programs that Centre for postgraduate studies has to ensure quality graduates.

I would therefore like to thank all the participants and programme coordinators who have worked hard to realize this event.

May Allah SWT shower His blessing upon us.

Wassalamu'alaikum Wr, Wb.

Prof. Dato' Dr. Wan Rafei Abdul Rahman
Dean, Centre For Postgraduate Studies

**MESSAGE FROM THE ACTIVE
PRESIDENT OF POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS'**

Assalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh

On behalf of Postgraduate Students' Society (PGSS), my gratitude and appreciation to our beloved Dean of Studies, the Embassy of Indonesia in Kuala Lumpur, Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta and the organizing committee of IIUM and the Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta for their huge success. Postgraduate Students' Society (PGSS) under the supervision of the Center for Postgraduate Studies (CPG) is pleased to host this event.

As I strongly believe that the initial stages of unity are the key to building the new generation, who will represent the future more, such programs, not only achieve the mission of our universities but to achieve the global mission and vision. Therefore, I believe today, we have to have understanding and then only we can appreciate our diverse cultures. We should acknowledge the different strengths and weaknesses through knowledge in this age of information. I am sure this joint seminar will initiate unity among the future generations along with integrating them.

Thank you,

Mohd Nabi Habibi

Active President Postgraduate Students' Society (PGSS)

MESSAGE FROM PROGRAM DIRECTOR

Assalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh.

Praise be to Allah. May the peace and blessings of Allah be on the last Prophet and Messenger, our master Muhammad and on his household and companions.

Honestly speaking, we are pleased to be trusted by Postgraduate Students' Society (PGSS) and Centre for Postgraduate Studies (CPS) to organize the programme named Educational and Cultural Visit to Yogyakarta, Indonesia. For this, We express our gratitude to the management of both PGSS and CPS. This programme is of immense value. It has the potentials to promote intellectual endeavor, develop leadership capabilities and enrich cross-cultural understandings. We sincerely believe and hope that program of this kind will be organized in a regular fashion in future.

It is a great privilege for us to play twofold role in organizing this event: *as a host* and *as guest*. In fact, this is a fascinating experience to manage this event. Since our inception here, we have found meaningful interaction of students in an interweaving of cultures into complicated, yet beautiful, embroidery of social fabric. We are proud to say that this dearly loved university has produced graduates of high quality, who are distinct from those of the local universities.

Finally, we wish to express our special thanks to Bapak M.Imran Hanafi, Education and Cultural Attache of Indonesian Embassy, Bapak Herdaus, S.H., Assistant of Immigration Attache of Indonesian Embassy, Bapak Tharian Taharuddin for their immensely valuable assistance and co-operation in making this program a success. I sincerely appreciate all local committees at Yogyakarta, the colleagues and program coordinators and committee members who worked diligently to materialize this event. We wish to pass on good wishes to the PGSS for their valuable efforts it expended for this event.

May Allah s.w.t shower His blessing upon us.

Wassalam,

Nasrullah

Programme Director

Todi Kurniawan

Co-Programme Director

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State and Islamic Human Development (A Political Perspective)*

Tulus Warsito**

University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

Abstract

Talking about the state and Islam, especially about human development, is like an endless discussion. Since the human development engages with; the average life expectancy, education index, adult literacy percentage, level of poverty, GDP per capita, level of gender equality and the like, then there will be no different talking it between the one in Islamic or that of non-Islamic states. State, as a management of resources, including human resources, is the main institution should be applied for human development in whether Islamic or non-Islamic society. Despite containing socio-political set of values, Islam as a set of religious teachings has no single practical model of society. If there is any model of state in Islam, it is the ideal type of heavenly state, a state of God, an universal welfare state. The state, particularly a nation-state, is a secular state emerged in modern times in response to religious infighting that plagued Europe for over century. The Hundred Year War posed a serious threat to the then emerging modern Europe, underscoring the need to keep the state and church at a comfortable distance. While the secular state was designed to prevent organized religion from controlling public institutions, it did not necessarily aim at undermining religiosity per se, or alienating religious communities. Rather, it was perceived as multi-religious society, best defense against the imposition of religious values and world view of one community on another. The paper argues that human development in Islamic perception could never be separated from the secular state since human's life is set in a real phenomena rather than in an ideal heavenly type of living.

Introduction

It is difficult to give a detailed picture of Human Development in the Islamic world, given the large number of Muslim nations with their varied geographical distributions and population. The Islamic world spans all three divisions of human development (high, medium and low) outlined in the 2001 Human Development Report issued by the United Nations Development Program. The majority of the Islamic world lies in the middle and low categories of human development, a clear indication that the Islamic nations needs to increase their

* Presented in IIUM-UMY International Join Seminar, *Muslim Countries And Multi-Sector Development; Achievements, Constrains, and Alternatives Solutions*, December 2nd- 2006, Kampus Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

** Lecturer in The Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.

focus on human development. It is a multi-effort of state and civil societies that have to be imposed time to time. Therefore, a better growth of Islamic human development depends on the role of state and the citizen, neither the state is a religious or secular.

The Secular State

For many Muslims, however, the secular state is viewed as an instrument used to undermine religious heritage and deny the relevance of moral teachings to public life. While this perception has an element of truth, it does not necessarily depict the general nature of western secularism. Evidently, Muslim perceptions of secularism are not formed through an understanding of the original purpose and historical circumstances of western secularism, but is influenced by the Muslim experience of secular dogmatism and the intolerance of the secular state in contemporary Muslim societies, most notably that of Turkey, many Arab and Central Asia states.

To respond the secular dogmatism, populist Islamic groups have advanced a conception of the state that, while different in substance, is similar in purpose and form to very secular state they oppose. Like Muslim secularists, Islamic populists see the state as an instrument in the hands of ruling powers for imposing a particular conception of the world on the rest of society. They insist, therefore, that the Islamic state should be charged with the duty of imposing Islamic law on the larger society.

Essentially, secularism refers to complex and multifaceted attitudes and practices that cannot be easily captured in a brief description or rendered into a simple definition. While one may find certain similarities between modern secularist attitudes and practices, and those that existed in pre-modern societies, it is fair to say that secularism as we know it today is a purely modern phenomenon that grew in the modern West, and later took roots in different societies. Secularism denotes a set of notions and values whose aim is to ensure that the state is neither engaged in promoting specific religious beliefs and values, nor uses its power and offices to persecute religion.

To prevent state officials from using their political authority to impose a narrow set of religious attitudes and values on the larger society, and to foreclose the possibility of using religious symbol to agitate one religious community against another, western intellectuals embarked on a project that aimed at separating political authority from religious affiliation. To do that, the Enlightenment scholars embraced a set of concepts and principles, and used then as the basis for reconstructing modern Europe consciousness. The new political ideology advanced by Enlightenment activists and thinkers emphasized concepts such as equality, freedom of conscience and conviction, and the supremacy of law, all of which were advocated by the Religious Reformation that put an end to the ancient regime of Europe.

The fundamental socio-political morality advocated by the pioneers of the secular state in Europe was derived from the religious tradition delineated by religious reformists of fifteenth century Europe, but argued in rational terms and common-good logic. Early advocates of the separation of state and church, such as Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, had no intention to undermine

religion, or faith in the divine, but rather predicated their reformist ideas on the notion of God and civil religion.¹

Similarly, Rousseau, while critical of the way religion was traditionally taught and practiced, recognized the need, even the necessity, of religious commitment and faith for modern state to function properly. He identified a number of “dogmas”, and argued for the inclusion in the “civil religion” he advocated: “The existence of an omnipotent, intelligent, benevolent divinity that foresees and provides; the life to come; the happiness of the just; the punishment of sinners; the sanctity of social contract and the law – these are positive dogmas. As for the negative dogmas I would limit them to a single one: no tolerance”²

Even Kant, who limited the notion of truth to empirical experience and labored to set morality on rational foundation insisted that “without a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for, the glorious ideals of morality are indeed objects of approval and admiration, but not springs of purpose and action.”³ However, by denying the possibility of transcendental truth, and as a result of relentless attack on the authority of revelation as a source of ethical and ontological knowledge, secularist scholars have been able to successfully marginalized religion and undermine morality. The effort to ground morality in utility and cost-benefit calculation, rather than truth, proved to be counter intuitive and futile, and gave rise to egoism and moral relativism.

The essential secularist sentiment is, therefore, rooted in the religious reformation; more specifically, it is rooted in the Protestant revolt against religious hierarchy and centralized religion. Secularism was not originally intended as a way to political action, but only to isolate the state from the church structure and to separate religious and political authorities.

The Muslim Society

Many Muslim intellectuals insist today that Islam is an integral part of state. The state in a society committed to Islam, they stress, is by definition an Islamic state since political authorities are bound to Islamic law (*shariah*), which has a direct bearing on constitutional law. This has created confusion about the nature of the Islamic state, and has given rise to apprehension on the part of modernist scholars who feared that remarrying Islam and the state is bound to give birth to theocracy.

The confusion is, of course, not limited to outside observer and commentators who tend to extrapolate in their analysis from the historical experience of western society, but also affect those who advocate the formation of political state on the basis of Islamic value. The difficulty arises from the efforts to combine the principle of popular government with that of a state bound by the rules of Islamic law. This confusion is the result of equating the political structure of the *Ummah* (citizen) with the political structure of the state, and consequently,

¹ See Apter, David C., *Introduction to Political Analysis*, Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi, 1981.

² *ibid.*

³ *ibid.*

mixing up the *Shariah* function with that of the state. It is not restricted to obscure works. Rather it is found the works of influential contemporary Islamic thinkers. There are at least two objectives of The Islamic State need to point out; negative objectives like deterring the aggression and preserving the freedom of people and defending the state; and positive objectives such as banning all forbidden things which have been condemned by the Qur'an.⁴

It is impossible for Islam state to limit its framework, because it is a totalitarian state encompassing the whole human life, and painting every aspect of human life with its moral color and particular reformist programs. So nobody has the right stand up against the state and exempt himself from liability by saying that this is a personal matter, so that the state does not intrude. In brief, the state encompasses human life and every area of civilization according to its particular moral theory and particular reformist program. By the way, it is similar to the communist and fascist state. But despite this totality the Islamic state is free from the color that dominates the totalitarian of our age. Thus the Islamic state does not curtail the individual freedom nor has it much room for dictatorship or absolute authority.

The Islamic state, it should be emphasized, is not an institution devoted to advancing the interest of the Muslim community, but a political system based on universal principles, and one committed to maintaining peace, security and welfare for all citizens, irrespective of their doctrines, religions, nationality, race, or gender.

The City State of Madinah

The notion of the Islamic state advance today by populist writers is a mixture of the nationalist structure of the modern state with the communal structure of historical *Shari'ah*. The concept of the state that emerges as a result is in a complete contradiction with the nature and purpose of the polity found by the Prophet, or developed historically by successive Muslim generations. A brief review of the guiding principles of the first Islamic polity reveals the disparity between the two. The principles and structure of the early Islamic polity are epitomized in the Compact of Madinah (*Sahifat al-Madina*) that formed the constitutional foundation of the political community established by the Prophet.⁵

The compact of Madinah, established a number of important political principles that, put together, formed the political constitution of the first Islamic State, and defined the political right and duties of the members of the newly established political community, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and drew up the political structure of the nascent society. The most important principles included in this Compact are as follows:

First, the Compact declared that the *Ummah* is a political society, upon the individuals committed to its principles and values, and ready to shoulder its burdens and responsibilities. It is not a recluse one, whose membership rights and securities are restricted to a select few. The right to membership in the *Ummah* is specified in: (1) accepting the principle of the Islamic system, manifested in the

⁴ See A.H.Ridwan, *Reformasi Intelektual Islam*, Ittaqa Press, Yogyakarta, 1998

⁵ See Abdul Wahid Hamid, *Islam the Natural Way*, MELS, London, 1989

commitment to adhere to the moral and legal order; (2) declaring allegiance to the system, through practical contribution and struggle to actualize the objectives and goals of Islam. Thus, allegiance and concern for public good are the principles determining the membership of the Ummah as defined in the first article of the document: This is a compact offered by Muhammad the Prophet, (governing the relations) among believers and Muslims of Quraish and Yathrib (Madinah), and those who followed, joined, and labored with them."⁶

Second, the Compact delineates a general framework that defines individual norms and the scope of political action within the new society, but preserved the basic social and political structures prevalent then in tribal Arabia. The Compact of Madinah preserved tribal structure, while negating tribal spirit and subordinating tribal allegiance to a morally based legal order. As the Compact declared that the nascent political community is "an *Ummah* to the exclusion of all people", it approved a tribal division that had already been purged of tribal spirit epitomized by the slogan "my brethren right of wrong", subjecting it to the higher principles of truth and justice. The Compact therefore declared that the emigrants of the Quraish, Banu al-Harith, Banu al-Aus, and other tribes residing in Madinah, according "to their present customs, shall pay the blood wit they paid previously and that every group shall redeem its prisoners".⁷

Islam's avoidance of the elimination of tribal division can be explained by a number of factors that can be summarized in the following three points. (1) The tribal division was not mere political divisions but also social divisions providing its people with a symbiotic system. Therefore, the abolition of the political and social assistance provided by the tribe before developing an alternative should have been a great loss for people in society. (2) Apart from its being a social division, the tribe represented an economic division in harmony with the pastoral economy prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula before and after Islam. The tribal division is the ideal division of the pastoral production as it provides freedom of movement and migration in search of pasture. Any change in this pattern requires taking an initiative first to change the means and methods of production. (3) Perhaps, the most important factor that justified the tribal division within the framework of *Ummah* after the final message had purged the tribal existence of its aggressive and arrogant content, is the maintenance of the society and its protection from danger of central dictatorship, that might come into existence in absence of a secondary social and political structure and concentration of political power in the hand of a central authority.

Therefore Islam adopted a political system, based on the concept of the one *Ummah* as an alternative for the divisional tribal system and upheld the tribal division having cleared it from its aggressive element. It left question of changing the political structure to gradual development of economic and production structures.

Third, the Islamic political system adopted the principle of religious tolerance based on freedom of belief for all the members of the society. It conceded to the Jews the right to act according to the principles and the rulings in which they believed. The Compact emphasized the fundamentality of cooperation between

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ *ibid.*

Muslims and non-Muslims in establishing justice and defending of Madinah against foreign aggression.

Fourth, the Compact stipulated that the social and political activities in the system must be subject to a set of universal values and standards that treat all people equally. Sovereignty in the society would not rest with the rulers, or any particular group, but with the law founded on the basis of justice and goodness, maintaining the dignity of all. The Compact emphasized repeatedly and frequently the fundamentality of justice, goodness, and righteousness, and condemned in different expressions injustice and tyranny.

Fifth, the Compact introduced a number of political rights to be enjoyed by the individuals of Madinan State, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, such as (1) the obligation to help the oppressed, (2) outlawing guilt by association which was commonly practiced by pre-Islamic Arab tribes, (3) freedom of belief, (4) freedom of movement from and to Madinah.⁸

State and Religion

Adhering to the guidance of revelation, the *Ummah* has respected the principle of religious plurality and cultural diversity during the significant part of its long history. The successive government since the Rashidun period have preserved the freedom of faith and allowed non-Muslim minorities not only to practice their religious rituals and proclaim their beliefs, but also to implement their religious laws according to an autonomous administrative system.⁹ Likewise, the *Ummah* as a whole has respected the doctrinal plurality with both its conceptual and legal dimensions. It has resisted every attempt to drag the political power to take side with partisan groups, or to prefer one ideological group to another. It has also insisted and downsizing the role of the state and restricting its functions to a limited sphere.

Any one who undertakes to study the political history of Islam would soon realize that all political practices, which violated the principle of religious freedom and plurality, were an exception to the rule. Obviously, Muslims have historically recognized that the main objective of establishing a political system is to create the general conditions that allow the people to realize their duties as moral agents of the divine will, not to impose the teachings of Islam by force. Therefore, the emergence of organization working to compel the *Ummah* to follow a narrow interpretation, and calling for the use of political power to make people obedient to the Islamic norms, to the habit of confusing the role and objectives of the *Ummah* with the role and objectives of the state. While the *Ummah* aims to build the Islamic identity, to provide atmosphere conducive to spiritual and mental development of the individual, and to grant him or her the opportunity to realize his or her role and aims of life within general framework of the law, the state makes efforts to coordinate the *Ummah*'s activities with the aim to employ the natural and human potentials and possibilities to overcome the

⁸ See Chaiwat Satha-Anand, *Agama dan Budaya Perdamaian*, FkBA & Quaker International Affairs, Yogyakarta, 2001.

⁹ *ibid.*

political and economic problems and obstacles that hinders the *Ummah's* development.

Differentiating between the general and particular in the *Shariah* and distinguishing between the responsibilities of the *Ummah's* and the state, is a necessity if we want to avoid the transformation of political power into a device for advancing particular interests, and ensure that the state agencies and institutions do not arrest intellectual and social progress, or obstruct the spiritual, conceptual, and organizational development of the society.

Human Development in The Islamic Countries

To discuss about the state and Islamic human development is by then similar to talk over human development in the Islamic countries since no single criteria should applied to term "Muslim Country" or "Islamic State". As what have been mentioned above, Muslims Society could be reckoned as Muslims living in the formally declared Islamic countries like in Islamic Republic of Iran, or Afghanistan for instance, or in the country where Muslims population is the majority. Islamic state does not have to engage neither secular state or religious government of form of theocracy.

It is difficult to set a detailed picture of Human Development in the Islamic world, since the large number of Muslims nations with their varied geographical distribution and population. The following report attempts to a brief overview of the general current status of human development in the Islamic world. The countries included in the figures were selected based on their membership in the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference).

Tables 1A, 1B and 1C (according to the level of High, Medium and Low Human Development Index-HDI in the Islamic Countries) provide some rough figures showing the state of human development in the selected Islamic states. Sorted according the HDI rank, HDI value, the average of life expectancy, education index (1 being the highest score, and 0 the lowest), adult literacy percentages, an estimate of the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP, in terms of the Purchasing Power Parity – PPP in US\$), and the GDP per capita minus the HDI rank.

The last data column (GDP rank minus HDI rank) represents the difference found between a country's wealth and the actual development of its human resources. Countries with large, negative values for GDP rank minus HDI rank (such as Qatar, Oman and Algeria) indicate a gap in translating the society's wealth into positive social development. Yet such high differences also indicate the potential for these countries to make strides in the currently lagging human development. On the other hand, country with a large, positive GDP rank minus HDI rank (such as Uzbekistan, Yemen and Sudan) show that the pace of social development has exceeded the pace of economic development, an encouraging indicator.

Table 1-A HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS OF SELECTED ISLAMIC NATIONS

HDI Rank	HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	Human Development Index (HDI)		Life Expectancy At Birth (Years)	Education Index	Adult Literacy Rate (% Age 15 & up)	GDP Per Capita In PPP US \$	GDP Per capita Rank (US \$ PPP) Minus HDI rank
		Rank	Value					
32	Brunei Darussalam	32	0.857	75.7	0.86	91.0	17,868	-4
40	Bahrain	40	0.824	73.1	0.85	87.1	13,688	-3
43	Kuwait	43	0.818	76.0	0.74	81.9	17,289	-14
45	United Arab Emirates	45	0.809	74.8	0.73	75.1	18,162	-19
48	Qatar	48	0.801	69.3	0.79	80.8	18,789	-24

Closely related to the trends of human development are the trends in poverty levels within a country. Tables 2A, 2B and 2C show the availability data on poverty levels found within the selected countries. A Human Poverty Index (HPI) rank sorts the countries, while other data fields tell of the HPI value, the percentage of the country's population living on less than US\$1 per day and below the national poverty line.

Although the data is incomplete, the list of countries that have the necessary data indicate similar findings as in Tables 1A, 1B and 1C. Low human development countries like Pakistan and Uganda have low HPI rankings, as nearly 35-40% of their populations live below national poverty line.

Another important indication of the progress and status of development in society is statistics related to the level of gender equality. The media often portrays Islamic society negatively due to the status of women in Muslim countries. Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C that the Islamic nations with higher level of human development is also have greater gender development(i.e. Brunei Darrusalam), while countries with lower level of human development and lower economic development have greater different between female and male literacy and lower female literacy.

The countries are sorted by Human Development Index (HDI) rank, and the information includes the Gender Related Development Index (GDI) rank, GDI value, adult female and male literacy rates, and the different between the HDI and the GDI.

The problems of illiteracy and poverty will not solve themselves, resources must be mobilized to make a concerted effort in addressing the situation, It is no surprise that the nations which scored amongst the lowest among Muslim nations in

Table 1-B HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS OF SELECTED ISLAMIC NATIONS

HDI Rank	MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	Human Development Index (HDI)		Life Expectancy At Birth (Years)	Education Index	Adult Literacy Rate (% Age 15 & up)	GDP Per Capita in PPP US \$	GDP Per capita Rank (US \$ PPP) Minus HDI rank
		Rank	Value					
56	Malaysia	56	0.774	72.2	0.80	87.0	8,209	-4
59	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	59	0.770	70.3	0.83	79.1	7,570	-5
64	Suriname	64	0.758	70.4	0.89	93.0	4,178	23
65	Lebanon	65	0.758	72.9	0.83	85.6	4,705	13
68	Saudi Arabia	68	0.754	71.3	0.71	76.1	10,815	-26
71	Oman	71	0.747	70.8	0.66	70.3	13,356	-33
75	Kazakhstan	75	0.742	64.4	0.92	99.0	4,951	1
77	Maldives	77	0.739	66.1	0.90	96.2	4,423	7
79	Azerbaijan	79	0.738	71.3	0.88	97.0	2,850	27
82	Turkey	82	0.735	69.5	0.77	84.6	6,380	-21
83	Turkmenistan	83	0.730	65.9	0.92	98.0	3,347	16
85	Albania	85	0.725	73.0	0.80	84.0	3,189	16
88	Jordan	88	0.714	70.1	0.78	89.2	3,955	2
89	Tunisia	89	0.714	69.9	0.71	69.9	5,957	-23
90	Iran	90	0.714	68.5	0.75	75.7	5,531	-21
92	Kyrgyzstan	92	0.707	67.4	0.87	97.0	2,573	15
93	Guyana	93	0.704	63.3	0.87	98.4	3,640	0
97	Syria	97	0.700	70.9	0.70	73.6	4,454	-14
99	Uzbekistan	99	0.698	68.7	0.84	88.5	2,251	15
100	Algeria	100	0.693	69.3	0.69	66.6	5,063	-26
102	Indonesia	102	0.677	65.8	0.79	86.3	2,857	3
103	Tajikistan	103	0.660	67.4	0.88	99.1	1,031	36
105	Egypt	105	0.635	66.9	0.62	54.6	3,420	-8
109	Gabon	109	0.617	52.6	0.71	63.0	6,024	-44
112	Morocco	112	0.596	67.2	0.49	48.0	3,419	-14
124	Comoros	124	0.510	59.4	0.51	59.2	1,429	7
125	Cameroon	125	0.506	50.0	0.64	74.8	1,573	2

It is a sad state of affairs when military spending and debt financing are greater than education and health spending, nearly across the board. Absolutely, government must step up their focus on these crucial aspects of human development, even if non-governmental organizations are doing their part. Tables 4A, 4B and 4C show the government allocations (in % GNP, Gross National Product) towards education; other figures include percentages for health, debt servicing, and military spending.

Table 1-C HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS OF SELECTED ISLAMIC NATIONS

HDI Rank	LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	Human Development Index (HDI)		Life Expectancy At Birth (Years)	Education Index	Adult Literacy Rate (% Age 15 & up)	GDP Per Capita In PPP US \$.	GDP Per Capita rank (US \$ PPP) Minus HDI Rank
		Rank	Value					
127	Pakistan	127	0.498	59.6	0.43	45.0	1,834	-5
128	Togo	128	0.489	51.6	0.58	56.3	1,410	5
132	Bangladesh	132	0.470	58.9	0.39	40.8	1,483	-4
133	Yemen	133	0.468	60.1	0.47	45.2	806	16
136	Nigeria	136	0.455	51.5	0.57	62.6	853	11
137	Djibouti	137	0.447	44.0	0.50	63.4	2,377	-28
138	Sudan	138	0.439	55.6	0.49	59.6	664	19
139	Mauritania	139	0.437	51.1	0.41	41.6	1,609	-14
141	Uganda	141	0.435	43.2	0.59	66.1	1,167	-4
144	Cote d'Ivoire	144	0.426	47.8	0.43	45.7	1,654	-20
145	Senegal	145	0.423	52.9	0.36	36.4	1,419	-13
147	Benin	147	0.420	53.6	0.41	39.0	933	-4
149	Gambia	149	0.398	45.9	0.39	35.7	1,580	-23
150	Guinea	150	0.397	47.1	0.33	35.0	1,934	-32
153	Mali	153	0.378	51.2	0.36	39.8	753	0
155	Chad	155	0.359	45.5	0.38	41.0	850	-7
156	Guinea Bissau	156	0.339	44.5	0.37	37.7	678	0
157	Mozambique	157	0.323	39.8	0.36	43.2	861	-11
159	Burkina Faso	159	0.320	46.1	0.23	23.0	965	-17
161	Niger	161	0.274	44.8	0.15	15.3	753	-7
162	Sierra Leone	162	0.258	38.3	0.30	32.0	448	0
	Afghanistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Iraq	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Palestine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Somalia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source : Human Development in The Islamic World.htm¹⁰¹⁰ These data are based on the year of 1997 and 1997

Table 2-A HUMAN & INCOME POVERTY IN THE DEVELOPING MUSLIM NATIONS

HDI Rank	HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	Human Poverty Index (HPI)		Population below Income Poverty Line %	
		Rank	Value	\$ 1 a day	National Poverty Line
32	Brunei Darussalam	-	-	-	-
40	Bahrain	-	-	-	-
43	Kuwait	-	-	-	-
45	United Arab Emirates	-	-	-	-
48	Qatar	-	-	-	-

Table 2-B HUMAN & INCOME POVERTY IN THE DEVELOPING MUSLIM NATIONS

HDI Rank	MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	Human Poverty Index (HPI)		Population below Income Poverty Line %	
		Rank	Value	\$ 1 a day	National Poverty Line
56	Malaysia	13	10.9	-	15.5
59	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	27	16.7	-	-
64	Suriname	-	-	-	-
65	Lebanon	11	10.2	-	-
68	Saudi Arabia	29	17.0	-	-
71	Oman	52	32.2	-	-
75	Kazakhstan	-	-	1.5	34.6
77	Maldives	25	15.8	-	-
79	Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-
82	Turkey	19	12.9	2.4	-
83	Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-
85	Albania	-	-	-	-
88	Jordan	7	8.5	< 2.0	11.7
89	Tunisia	-	-	< 2.0	14.1
90	Iran	30	17.3	-	-
92	Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-
93	Guyana	15	11.4	-	-
97	Syria	34	19.8	-	-
99	Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-
100	Algeria	40	23.5	< 2.0	22.6
102	Indonesia	38	21.3	7.7	27.1
103	Tajikistan	-	-	-	-
105	Egypt	50	31.7	3.1	22.9
109	Gabon	-	-	-	-
112	Morocco	62	36.4	< 2.0	19.0
124	Comoros	47	29.9	-	-
125	Cameroon	49	31.1	-	40.0

Table 2-C HUMAN & INCOME POVERTY IN THE DEVELOPING MUSLIM NATIONS

HDI Rank	LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	Human Poverty Index (HPI)		Population below Income Poverty Line %	
		Rank	Value	\$ 1 a day	National Poverty Line
127	Pakistan	65	39.2	31.0	34.0
128	Togo	63	38.3		32.3
132	Bangladesh	73	43.3	29.1	35.6
133	Yemen	70	42.5	15.7	19.1
136	Nigeria	59	36.1	70.2	34.1
137	Djibouti	57	34.7	-	-
138	Sudan	58	34.8	-	-
139	Mauritania	82	47.2	28.6	57.0
141	Uganda	69	41.0	-	44.4
144	Cote d'Ivoire	72	42.9	12.3	-
145	Senegal	80	45.9	26.3	-
147	Benin	79	45.8	-	33.0
149	Gambia	85	49.6	53.7	64.0
150	Guinea	-	-	-	40.0
153	Mali	83	47.8	72.8	-
155	Chad	87	53.1	-	64.0
156	Guinea Bissau	86	49.6	-	-
157	Mozambique	84	48.3	37.9	-
159	Burkina Faso	-	-	61.2	-
161	Niger	90	63.6	61.4	63.0
162	Sierra Leone	-	-	57.0	68.0
	Afghanistan	-	-	-	-
	Iraq	-	-	-	-
	Palestine	-	-	-	-
	Somalia	-	-	-	-

Table 3-A GENDER RELATED DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS OF SELECTED ISLAMIC NATIONS

HDI RANK	HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	GDI Rank	GDI Value	Female Literacy Rate (% Age 15 & up)	Male Literacy Rate (% Age 15 & up)	HDI Rank Minus GDI Rank
32	Brunei Darussalam	30	0.853	87.3	94.3	1
40	Bahrain	41	0.814	82.2	90.5	-2
43	Kuwait	40	0.815	79.4	84.0	2
45	United Arab Emirates	45	0.798	78.0	73.8	-2
48	Qatar	48	0.788	82.6	80.1	-2

Table 3-B GENDER RELATED DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS OF
SELECTED ISLAMIC NATIONS

HDI RANK	MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	GDI Rank	GDI Value	Female Literacy Rate (% Age 15 & up)	Male Literacy Rate (% Age 15 & up)	HDI Rank Minus GDI Rank
56	Malaysia	55	0.768	82.8	91.1	-1
59	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	61	0.748	66.9	90.2	-4
64	Suriname	-	-	-	-	-
65	Lebanon	66	0.741	79.8	91.8	-5
68	Saudi Arabia	75	0.719	65.9	83.5	-11
71	Oman	77	0.715	59.6	79.1	-10
75	Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	-
77	Maldives	69	0.735	96.2	96.3	2
79	Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	-
82	Turkey	71	0.726	75.9	93.2	4
83	Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	-
85	Albania	74	0.721	76.9	90.9	3
88	Jordan	81	0.698	83.4	94.5	-1
89	Tunisia	80	0.700	59.3	80.4	1
90	Iran	83	0.696	68.7	82.7	-1
92	Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-	-
93	Guyana	88	0.693	97.9	98.8	-4
97	Syria	90	0.677	59.3	87.7	-3
99	Uzbekistan	86	0.695	84.0	93.1	3
100	Algeria	91	0.673	55.7	77.4	-1
102	Indonesia	92	0.671	81.3	91.5	0
103	Tajikistan	93	0.656	98.7	99.5	0
105	Egypt	97	0.620	42.8	66.1	-2
109	Gabon	-	-	-	-	-
112	Morocco	101	0.579	35.1	61.1	0
124	Comoros	113	0.503	52.1	66.3	0
125	Cameroon	114	0.496	68.6	81.2	0

Table 3-C GENDER RELATED DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS OF SELECTED ISLAMIC NATIONS

HDI RANK	LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	GDI Rank	GDI Value	Female Literacy Rate (% Age 15 & up)	Male Literacy Rate (% Age 15 & up)	HDI Rank Minus GDI Rank
127	Pakistan	117	0.466	30.0	58.9	-1
128	Togo	116	0.468	39.6	73.6	1
132	Bangladesh	121	0.459	29.3	51.7	-1
133	Yemen	131	0.410	23.9	66.6	-10
136	Nigeria	123	0.443	54.2	71.3	1
137	Djibouti			52.8	74.9	
138	Sudan	129	0.413	44.9	68.9	-4
139	Mauritania	126	0.428	31.4	52.2	0
141	Uganda	125	0.428	55.5	75.8	3
144	Cote d'Ivoire	132	0.409	37.2	53.8	-1
145	Senegal	130	0.413	26.7	46.4	2
147	Benin	134	0.402	23.6	55.4	-1
149	Gambia	136	0.390	28.5	43.1	-1
150	Guinea					
153	Mali	138	0.370	32.7	47.3	0
155	Chad	140	0.346	32.3	50.1	0
156	Guinea Bissau	143	0.308	18.3	58.3	-2
157	Mozambique	141	0.309	27.9	59.3	1
159	Burkina Faso	144	0.306	13.3	33.0	0
161	Niger	146	0.260	7.9	23.0	0
162	Sierra Leone					
	Afghanistan					
	Iraq					
	Palestine					
	Somalia					

Table 4-A PUBLIC SPENDING PRIORITIES OF SELECTED ISLAMIC NATIONS

HDI Rank	HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	Public Expenditure On Education (As % of GNP)	Public Expenditure On Health (As % of GDP)	Total Debt Service (As % of GDP)	Military Expenditure (As % of GDP)
32	Brunei Darussalam	-	-	-	7.6
40	Bahrain	4.4	2.6	-	5.0
43	Kuwait	5.0	-	-	8.3
45	United Arab Emirates	1.7	0.8	-	3.2
48	Qatar	3.4	-	-	-

Table 4-B PUBLIC SPENDING PRIORITIES OF SELECTED ISLAMIC NATIONS

HDI Rank	MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	Public Expenditure On Education (As % of GNP)	Public Expenditure On Health (As % of GDP)	Total Debt Service (As % of GDP)	Military Expenditure (As % of GDP)
56	Malaysia	4.9	1.5	5.9	2.3
59	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	-	-	-	-
64	Suriname	3.5	-	-	-
65	Lebanon	2.5	2.2	3.1	3.6
68	Saudi Arabia	7.5	-	-	13.2
71	Oman	4.5	2.9	4.2	10.1
75	Kazakhstan	4.4	3.2	8.6	0.9
77	Maldives	6.4	5.1	4.3	-
79	Azerbaijan	3.0	-	2.1	2.6
82	Turkey	2.2	-	7.4	5.0
83	Turkmenistan	-	4.1	14.5	3.4
85	Albania	-	3.5	1.0	1.4
88	Jordan	7.9	5.3	8.0	10.0
89	Tunisia	7.7	2.2	7.3	1.7
90	Iran	4.0	1.7	4.2	2.7
92	Kyrgyzstan	5.3	2.9	9.4	1.7
93	Guyana	5.0	4.5	15.5	-
97	Syria	3.1	0.8	1.9	5.6
99	Uzbekistan	7.7	4.6	3.1	1.7
100	Algeria	5.1	2.6	11.1	3.8
102	Indonesia	1.4	0.6	12.5	1.1
103	Tajikistan	2.2	5.2	2.6	1.4
105	Egypt	4.8	-	1.9	2.7
109	Gabon	2.9	2.1	12.4	0.3
112	Morocco	5.3	1.2	8.9	-
124	Comoros	-	-	4.0	-
125	Cameroon	-	1.0	6.0	1.5

Table 4-C PUBLIC SPENDING PRIORITIES OF SELECTED ISLAMIC NATIONS

HDI Rank	LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	Public Expenditure On Education (As % of GNP)	Public Expenditure On Health (As % of GDP)	Total Debt Service (As % of GDP)	Military Expenditure (As % of GDP)
127	Pakistan	2.7	0.9	5.2	4.4
128	Togo	4.5	1.3	2.8	-
132	Bangladesh	2.2	1.7	1.7	1.6
133	Yemen	7.0	-	2.3	5.6
136	Nigeria	0.7	0.8	2.6	1.4
137	Djibouti	-	-	1.0	4.4
138	Sudan	1.4	-	0.6	2.6
139	Mauritania	5.1	1.4	11.0	2.3
141	Uganda	2.6	1.9	2.9	2.1
144	Cote d'Ivoire	5.0	1.2	12.9	0.9
145	Senegal	3.7	2.6	5.0	1.5
147	Benin	3.2	1.6	3.0	-
149	Gambia	4.9	1.9	5.4	0.8
150	Guinea	1.9	2.2	3.8	1.4
153	Mali	2.2	2.1	4.1	2.2
155	Chad	2.2	2.3	2.1	1.2
156	Guinea Bissau	-	-	4.4	1.3
157	Mozambique	-	2.8	3.1	2.4
159	Burkina Faso	3.6	1.2	2.4	1.6
161	Niger	2.3	1.2	2.5	-
162	Sierra Leone	-	0.9	3.2	1.6
	Afghanistan	-	-	-	-
	Iraq	-	-	-	-
	Palestine	-	-	-	-
	Somalia	-	-	-	-

The report above is of course far from a complete comprehensive study of human development in the Islamic world, but at least could be considered as a brief introduction and a summary of its recent position. Most Islamic nation fall in the low and medium human development category, a clear sign that much work must be done. Key indicators of the progress should be tracked in order to assess the progress of development in education, health, life expectancy, gender, literacy, and overall poverty. Many of the countries have a long way to go, but there many examples of successful Muslim nations for them to follow.