Street or Senayan?
FPI Between Contentious Politics and Transformation into Party

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Abstract

Transformation of s a social movement into a party is interesting in the realm of political science since it joins two theories, namely party theory and social movement theory. It is also interesting because there are some social movements that turns into party while the other does not. This paper tries to figure out why FPI as a social movement organization does not transform into party, even though FPI met preconditions of a transformation. The author uses four preconditions of transformation previously employed in examining a successful transformation of Five Star Movement (FSM) into a party in Italy. This paper shows that those four preconditions does not works since they did not considered one factor that is the capacity of the state in enforcing regulations toward the violation that have been done by social movements. The low capacity of the state eventually influencing the option of FPI in maintaining their traditional ways as a social movement. From a rational choice point of view FPI feels that the incentive structure to be a party is much smaller than remaining to be a social movement organization. For FPI, street is more promising compared to *Senayan*.

Keywords: FPI, transformation, social movement, political party, contentious politics, low state capacity

A. Introduction

The speech of Jakarta Governor, Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok) in *Kepulauan Seribu* on September 27th 2016, which was considered to be a religious blasphemy seemed to have given blessing to various movements previously opposed to him. One of those movements is the *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) or Islamic Defenders Front, an Islamic mass organization under the leadership of Al-Habib M. Rizieq bin Husein Syihab or Habib Rizieq, which is labeled as radical and often uses naked means of violence in achieving its ends. Ahok's remarks became a momentum for FPI to reposition its image in the midst of society. Allegations of blasphemy that intertwined with the momentum of elections in Jakarta Special Region where the incumbent Ahok ran for the governor position immediately bear demands "*Penjarakan Ahok*" or "Imprison Ahok" which manifested into various mass movements led by several Islamic organizations including FPI.

There were at least two great movements which do have the support and extraordinary public sympathy as a mass demands to imprison Ahok, those are the Action 411 that held in November 4th 2016 and Action 212 that held in December 2nd, 2016. Both actions are considered important in Islamic politics in Indonesia for at least two reasons. First, those actions successfully attracted so many masses to join in, both individually and organizationally. That was interesting since Indonesian moslems in many cases tend to split into many streams and interests. Secondly, not only unite Indonesian moslems in one movement and command, both actions seemed to be a turning point of FPI position and image in the eyes of society. Many sympathizers and members of large Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah participated in these actions, by choosing not to comply with the appeal of the leaders of those mass organizations who prevent the involvement of their members into the movements. They even opted to follow the command of FPI as one of leading organization in those movements.

The slogan of "SuperDamai" or "Super-Peace" smartly attributed to those actions has considerably changed the image of FPI which has previously been identified as an intolerant and vigilant mass organization. FPI which previously only been on the periphery of the Indonesian political stage with his actions which by most people is categorized as radical and even anarchist suddenly seemed to be one of the center of resistance movement in opposing the attitude of government which positioned as not firmly, partial, and even impressed protecting Ahok the blasphemy actor of Holy Qur'an, by spearheading the National Movement of Fatwa Guards of the Indonesian 'Ulama Council (GNPF-MUI) which are at the forefront of those acts. The FPI, suddenly got a very important role (Wildan, 2017). Even in the survey result of the Alvara Research Center in 4 provinces in early November 2016 and with the number of respondents 1626, FPI ranked as the third most recognized Islamic organization known by Indonesians after Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. (Kompas, 2017)

Despite the frequent acts of anarchy in the noble mission of "*Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*", the *Qur'anic* edict means "enjoining the good and forbidding evil", but in fact so far it is not clear the benefits of those violent acts carried out by FPI to this organization itself, except the controversies and criticism from various parties, in which some of those even lead to demands for the dissolution of FPI by rival groups. Moreover, there has been no research that systematically examines the relationship between violent acts committed by FPI with the diminishing of "*kemunkaran*" or evil in Indonesia. FPI leader Habib Rizieq was even repeatedly imprisoned for his actions in organizing violence for carrying out their collective actions.

Some criticisms suggested that FPI actions and vigilantism should not be allowed since they endanger the basic values that are the foundation of Indonesian diversity. The FPI is also accused of being an elite tool to beat political rivals. On the other hand, FPI supporters insist that FPI should still exist because even if people do not agree with its violent actions, Islamic society must have a representation of a movement that promotes the mission of "*nahi munkar*", or "forbidding evil" a mission that had been left behind by many religious, especially Islamic organization, in Indonesia. Moreover FPI also actively enjoins the *ma'ruf*, such as by conducting humanitarian actions for disaster victims. (CRSC, 2017).

In this paper, the author considered FPI as a social movement organization (SMO). In social movement theory, SMO is perceived as an organized element of a social movement. SMO is usually only one part of a social movement. In other words, a social movement usually consists of many SMOs, namely social organizations that have a common goal (Zald & McCarthy, 1997: 21). If it traced from the definition of a social movement, FPI clearly meets the criteria as an organization that is part of the social movement. For example the definition presented by Macionis (1999: 607) which states that social movement is an organized activity intended to encourage or impede a social change (encourages or discourages social change). From the definition given by Macionis, a social movement at least has two main characteristics, namely: (1) organized activities; and (2) the purpose associated with a social change.

According to Wilson (2008:201) FPI made its first public appearance during the political turmoil of 1998 as part of the pro-Habibie Pam Swakarsa militia established by General Wiranto to curtail the pro-reform student movement. Soon after, the group was involved in a bloody confrontation against Ambonese gangsters in Ketapang that left 15 dead. Unlike any other Islamic radical movements, FPI does not call for an Islamic state. Rizieq argued that prophet Muhammad never discussed the specifics of an Islamic state and was concerned only with the creation of a society based on Sharia (Wilson, 2008: 200).

Instead, it demands the change in Indonesia's constitution to include adherence to Shariah law. FPI's primary objective is to implement the principles of Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar in all aspects of life (Jerard, 2014: 92). Syihab (2008) also claims that FPI is a traditional, moderate Islamic organization. Traditional means that FPI is respectful of local culture, not anti-*mazhab* (Islamic Schools) and honors classical and modern Ulama (Muslim scholars). Moderate means that FPI does not focus on Islamic rituals only, or follow a certain *sufi* order. FPI emphasizes the balance between the "world" and the "hereafter."

By citing Tarrow, Klandermans (Sukmana, 2016: 4) defines social movement as a collective opposition by people who share the same solidarity and goals in a process of continuous interaction with the elite, the opponent, and the authorities. FPI's actions, both in order to discipline nightclubs, gambling arena, and some other places considered as evil venues are a form of mistrust and opposition of the FPI against legal regulations and government apparatus which are deemed not to be strict in prohibiting the operation of those places. Referring to these definitions, and juxtaposed with FPI organizational movement patterns, it can be concluded that FPI is a social movement organization.

Interestingly, the FPI is a Social Movement Organization that still chooses to be in the form of a social movement organization through an extra-parliamentary means, rather than intra-parliamentary mechanism by shaping or transforming into a political party, precisely when incentives for it are widely available as well as political opportunity for it to be widely opened in the post-Soeharto era. FPI is interesting to observe because *firstly*, in an era of party democracy that spoils political parties with a lot of privileges, FPI actually enjoys its role as a vigilante that places it members in many acts of violence that compel them face to face, physically with many elements of society. By turning into a party, the locus of the FPI activities and struggle will be mostly done through electoral politics as a consequence of party democracy. The energy that FPI has used to commit acts of violence and vigilantism could be minimized and thus transformed into actions that are more accountable and positively correlated to the institutionalization of the democratic system in Indonesia. *Secondly*, this possibility is largely opened, since FPI never reject the party or forbade its cadres to enter the party as long as it has similar purpose with the FPI.

According to Zollner (2016: 1) systematic research that tries to explain the transition from social movement has not been much discussed in various literatures, both successful and moreover the "failure" to be a party. However, the authors found there was at least a small amount of writing that focused on the success of transformation abroad such as green parties and new-left libertarians in the United States (Schwarz, 2016), or FJP (Freedom and Justice Party) in Egypt, Harakat an-Nahda in Tunisia, (Pickard, 2013: Tavana, 2013), in Latin American countries such as MVR in Bolivia, as well as domestic transformation phenomena, such as the Democratic People's Party (PRD) (Argenti, 2016) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia. As for, systematic research in terms of to what extent social movement does not turn into a party is a field work that is still widely open since there is not much availability of literatures or the foundation of sufficient theory. From this point of view the author will begin this writing. The author will try to elaborate why in a party democracy, there is still a social movement that is not transformed into a political party. Therefore, this article seeks to explain why FPI is not transformed into a political party.

B. Discussion

1. Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front)

a. The Birth of FPI

According to Munajat (2012: 66), there were at least two major conditions that facilitated and shaped the emergence of FPI. The first was the fall of Suharto's military authoritarian regime and the second one was the emergence of new conflicts and chaos across Indonesia that specifically victimized the Muslim community. The Ketapang riots, Madura-Dayak conflict in Kalimantan, Ambon conflict, are among those conflicts put Islam as victim. For FPI, the fall of Suharto was an opportunity for Habaib (*Hadrami* Family), 'ulama and muslim preachers to form an Islamist movement called FPI. The conflicts that victimized Muslims united these Muslim leaders on the importance of the establishment of an organization defending Islam and Muslim interests. Syihab, in Munajat (2012:67) argues that FPI should function as a group that pressures the government to actively improve morality and to develop a social, political and legal structure that obeys the values of the Islamic *shari`ah*. In doing so, the Islamic concept that is adopted to achieve these concerns *Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar* (AMNM), or Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Evil (Syihab 2008:126).

Syihab, co-founder and leader of FPI stated in his book that the background of the establishment of FPI was motivated by: 1) the suffers of Muslim in Indonesia caused the weaknesses of the civil and military government, and in turn they also committed several human right violations and injustice, and 2) the Islamic obligation to take care and defend the dignity of Islam and Muslims (Syihab, 2008:589). These FPI's concerns are also reflected in the name of FPI (*Front Pembela Islam*) itself. The word *Front* means that FPI is expected to be the front line of society in the struggle against injustice and immorality. Therefore, the orientation of FPI is to do things that are real or physically obvious in implementing *Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*; the term *Pembela*, or defenders, means that FPI will always defend the values of righteousness as well as justice; and *Islam* means that FPI organization is based solely on Islamic tenets. By combining all of this, Syihab claimed that FPI will be ready on the front line to defend and struggle for the application of Islamic *shari`ah* in Indonesia (Syihab, 2008:129).

Based on these reasons some Muslims leaders – led by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab–or well-known as Habib Rizieq -declared the establishment of *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) or Islamic Defenders Front in the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) of al-Umm, located in Kampung Utan, Ciputat, somewhere in southern Jakarta on August 17th, 1998. Among those muslim leaders contributed in declaring the establishment of FPI were K.H. Cecep Bustomi, Habib Idrus Jamalullail, K.H. Damanhuri, Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab and K.H. Misbahul Anam. Initially, members of FPI were the only followers of these FPI founders. According to Jahroni, those founders of FPI are mostly well-known charismatic muslim leaders in their community. Some of them also ran Islamic boarding houses and schools. The amount of their followers vary from hundreds to thousands of people (Jahroni, 2008).

Jahroni subsequently explained that in general, what FPI means by the application of *shari`ah* is the application of law which is based on God's laws to substitute the men-made law such as those in the Indonesian constitution. (Jahroni, 2008). What has been promoted by FPI is exactly the same idea to the Islamist faction and Islamist movements' during the Sukarno and Suharto regimes. The position of Islamist movements during those two regimes which stretched around 1945 to 1998 was always politically marginal, in opposition to the

state, and was mostly radical. In other words it can be said that over the past 53 years the position of the movements that demanded the application of *shari'ah* was marginal and in opposition to the government. FPI apparently situated itself in conditions that made it likely to play the same role as the older Islamist movements that had adopted radical strategies and maintained opposition with the nationalist government. Thus, FPI became less likely to cooperate with the nationalist government (Jahroni, 2008). Similarly, the government was likely to find it more difficult to co-opt FPI. Therefore, even though FPI deemed to received considerable support from several military elites, FPI still maintained its distance from the government. Nevertheless, it should be noted that different to the other Islamic movements in Indonesia that has connection with trans-national Islamic movement, Jahroni in his book believed that there is no middle-eastern connection or influence behind FPI existence. In accordance to his former argument, Jahroni stated that its *rationale* is authentically Indonesian, in that it was founded to respond to local issues in Indonesian public sphere. (Jahroni, 2008:23).

b. Activities of FPI

The shifting of political system from authoritarian to democratic order after the fall of Soeharto created a new pattern of relation between the state and society. The shifting gives opportunities to societal element such as FPI to freely act and even to put pressure on the government, although initially the appearance of FPI cannot be separated from military elite support in the frame of state-supported paramilitary groups called Pam Swakarsa in the very end of Soeharto's regime. This support was both logistical and financial. (Wilson, 2008:201). In couple months of its emergence, FPI utilized moderate means to achieve their goals. They sent a humanitarian mission to help Muslim victims in the conflict of Ambon. They also established an independent group to investigate the case of "Ninja Killing" that victimized many Muslim leaders in eastern part of Java. FPI also provided recommendations to the government in order to resolve the problems and to push the government to give more quickly and properly respond to the problems that victimized Muslims (Jahroni, 2008).

But that moderate means did not last long as their way of achieving their objectives. After the Ketapang Jakarta incident in October 1998, FPI started using violent means. Jahroni counted that from its establishment in 1998 to 2010, FPI has committed or has been involved in more than 64 cases of violent activities, especially around the capital city of Jakarta. They targeted night clubs, brothels, churches, Ahmadiyah group, the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) community, the American embassy and consulates on the grounds of defending Islam and Islamic moral values (Jahroni, 2008). Meanwhile between 2010 and 2014 Tempo noted there were 9 cases of violence by FPI in 5 provinces. (Tempo, 2014)

Nevertheless FPI has kept using moderate, even humanitarian means. For instance, most of the activities that are associated with the demand for the application of *shari`ah* have been carried out peacefully by conducting a rally. Another illustration could be seen as FPI and GNPF MUI held a series of peaceful actions demanding Ahok case to be processed by the authority. It should be noted that FPI has also been involved in many social activities, such as sending humanitarian aid to the victims of Tsunami in Aceh in 2005 and the victims of the Merapi volcano eruption in Yogyakarta-Central Java in 2010. In its routine activism, FPI also has regularly conducted some social activities, especially around the capital city of Jakarta, like helping the victims of annual flood in Jakarta (Jahroni, 2008). FPI also cooperates with the Ministry of Social Affairs by building more descent houses to the poor.

Unfortunately, those social and humanitarian activities were likely uncovered by mainstream media.

FPI registered its organization to the Department (now Ministry) of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on November 14, 1998. FPI also declared that its organization was legal and that it fulfilled all the state requirements for such organizations. This implies that FPI formally supports the nationalist ideology of the state, namely the Pancasila (the Five Principles). Even though FPI has routinely adopted violent strategies and has been threatened with dissolution several times, FPI has been able to maintain itself as a legal organization. Statement of the Minister of Internal Affair, Tjahyo Kumolo in January 2017 also strengthen the legality of FPI. Commenting some demands constitutes the dissolution of FPI recently, he said that FPI is legally registered in the ministry and it last to 2019. One of the Ministry of internal Affairs official, Dodi Riatmadji said that the dissolution process is not simple. There are some steps according the Laws of 17/2013 about mass organization that should be followed before a mass organization could be dissolved. (kompas.com, 2017).

c. Organizational Structure of FPI

Similar to other modern organizations, especially modern Islamic groups, the organizational structure of FPI generally consists of two parts: a consultative assembly (*majelis syura*) and an executive committee (*majelis tanfidzi*). The consultative assembly is the highest position in the organization that its task is giving advises to the executive committee concerning the general policies as well as activities. This consultative assembly consists of five boards: the Syari`ah, Honorary, Supervisory, Advisory and Supervisory Boards. Since majelis syura is a structure that should be respected and obeyed by executive committee, Syihab stated that all of these positions are usually held by the older respected members or founders of FPI (Syihab 2008:195).

The executive committee is the body of the organization that runs the daily activities of FPI. Since its establishment, the executive committee has been chaired by Habib Rizieq. The chairman of the executive committee is assisted by several deputies, such as a secretary general and treasurer. In order to run its programs, FPI also formed departments, specialized agencies, autonomous bodies, and also organizational wings, as explained in table (Syihab 2008:194-202) as follows:

Table 1
Divisions of Organizational Structure of FPI

No.	Department	Specialized Agencies	Autonomous Body	Organizational Wings
1.	Religion	the Investigation Front	the Immorality Watch Front	The Paramilitary Islamic Defenders
2.	Foreign Affairs	the Anti-terror Front	the Propagation Front	the Women`s Paramilitary of Islam Defenders
3.	Internal Affairs	the Recruitment Front	Economics Front	the Labor Union Front
4.	State Defense and Jihad	the Expert Front	the Advocacy Front	the Islamic Students Front
5.	Socio Politics Law and Human Rights			
6.	Education and Culture			
7.	Economics			
8.	Research and Technology			

Source: processed from Syihab, 2008

Munajat stated that among these divisions of organizational structure, only the Paramilitary Islamic Defenders, or LPI (*Laskar Pembela Islam*), is the most visible in relation to FPI's violent activities (Munajat, 2012). Based on previous studies by Jahroni (2008) and Ngatawi (2006), the organizational structure of FPI is traditional and its scope is limited, especially in comparison to NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah which have a bigger and more complex structure. Although the divisions in the organizational structure seemed to follow the standard format and the trends of a modern organization, Munajat asserted that its activities are still centralized by a few elite leaders, like its leader Habib Rizieq Syihab, Ahmad Sobri Lubis, Munarman, KH. Misbahul Anam and Habib Salim Bin Umar Al-Attos. (Munajat, 2012).

According to Jahroni (2008), the development of FPI has been much determined by the networks of its leaders, namely the *hadrami* or *habaib* networks. Some of FPI top leaders are from *hadrami* or *habaib* families. Many leaders of FPI local branches also come from the *hadrami* families, such as branches in the city or district of Brebes, Tegal, Pemalang, Bogor, Depok and Sukabumi. According to Jacobsen, hadrami refers to the community of Muslims in Indonesia who are descendants of Muslim Arab who migrated toIndonesia from Hadramawt (Yemen) approximately two to three centuries ago. There are two classification of Hadrami, those are the sayyid or habib and the common Hadrami. Sayyid or Habib are the Hadrami who has direct descendants with prophet Muhammad, therefore they usually enjoyed special status among Indonesian muslims (Jacobsen, 2009). However, Syihab rejected the idea that FPI is dominated by the persons from *habaib's* family because they only made up five percent of FPI's committee members (Syihab 2008).

Despite of the clear hierarchical structure of the organization, communication and coordination in FPI tend to be loose and open. Syihab argues that, financially, all FPI's branches are independent from each other and from the central committee. The central committee gives freedom to FPI's branches to establish their own policies (Syihab 2008). Syihab's claim is proven for at least in the case of FPI in Surakarta, Central Java. FPI Surakarta have even claimed to be completely independent from the central board of FPI in Jakarta, although FPI Surakarta have been involved and has the similar concerns such as pro shari'ah, anti-communism, and anti-immorality (Jahroni, 2008).

d. Membership Structure and Characeristic

In an interview with CNN Indonesia in around October 2014, one of FPI Leader, Muchsin Alatas claimed that the number of FPI members are around seven million, stretched from Aceh to Papua (CNNIndonesia.com, 2014). Similar to the organizational structure, the membership of FPI is also open and loose. Any Muslim can become a member of FPI without going through specific rituals (*bai`at*) and formal organizational procedures. Therefore, if someone joins the activities of FPI and shows his or her enthusiasm, he or she can be regarded as a FPI member. According to Al-Zastrouw, FPI does not systematically recruit potential members. Many Muslims joined FPI because their religious leaders joined FPI. The loyalty of members towards their religious leader binds them to FPI (Al-Zastrouw 2002). Syihab acknowledged what had been claimed by Al-Zastrouw that initially, members of FPI were only followers of FPI leaders, or the members of Islamic circle led by FPI leaders. But after the incident of Ketapang Jakarta, Munajat argued that FPI started to formally recruit its membership. By citing Jampanx, Munajat (2012) also stated that FPI even recruited former '*preman*' (hoodlums); they often became the front line during AMNM operations that targeted immoral places. Apparently, Wilson's work in 'As Long as it's Halal':

Islamic Preman in Jakarta supported Munajat statement by featuring an interview in 2005 with a *preman* convert to FPI (Wilson, 2008:193).

Al-Zastrouw divides FPI members by four social characteristics: *awam* (ordinary people) are followers of FPI leaders (*ulama* and *habaaib*); *intelektual-akademisi* (higher educated people) are members consisted of students or faculty members of a university; but most of them are from secular universities; *mantan preman* (former hoodlums) are former hoodlums who usually take part in violent activities; and the *habaib* and the ulama who become somekind of think tank of the organization and mostly hold important positions in the organization (Al-Zastrouw 2006). It seemed that awam and intelektual-akademisi joined to FPI since FPI has a noble mission: Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar. They have not gone through formal initiation in FPI prayer sessions at local mosque. They constitute a big part of FPI called jama'ah division. Meanwhile the bulk of the membership consist of *preman*, street kids, and unemployed youth who have been recruited into the FPI militia, Laskar Pembela Islam (Wilson, 2008:201).

2. Party, Social Movement, and Democracy

In the debate of the theory of democracy, social movements and political parties occupy an equally crucial position, although both are in different theoretical spaces. A political party is an organization aimed at gaining government posts through competitive elections (Sartori, 1976: 64). Through the election, the fate of party will be determined. If the party wins the election, the party will fill the available government positions in a political system. The party is thus assumed to work in a procedural and institutionalized polity. Therefore, political parties become so relevant when associated with theories of electoral, procedural, liberal, or representative democracy.

The social movement is a form of collective action that has relative durability, and aims to strengthen or resist social change. Social movement can survive because of the very high commitment of its supporters who are interested in the purpose of a movement. If the party works in an institutionalized polity, the social movements operate outside the arena by using strike actions, demonstrations, street protests, along with other more conventional forms of political activity to offer a challenge to power holders. Social movement thus becomes relevant when elaborated using the theory of communitarian democracy. Due to working in two different domains, having different reason and methods, it is natural that the emergence of social movements in developed countries in the 50-60s decade such as the new left-libertarian social movement is often thought to revive communitarian democracy theory and challenge the practice of competitive contemporary elite democracy that mainstreamed and provided privileges to political parties.

While in post-authoritarian countries, the existence of social movement is often judged to play a crucial role in democratic transition for at least two reasons. First, they are a decisive force in opposing authoritarianism. Second, social movement is also considered important in the transition of democracy because they are the embryo or foundation of the emergence of political parties. (Zollner, 2016). Being in a different theoretical space, with different reason and method, it becomes a very interesting phenomenon when social movement transformed into a political party. As O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue, the establishment of political parties and the holding of elections as a result are a positive indication of a willingness to move towards democratic governance.

3. The Transformation of Social Movement into Party

The transformation of social movement into party took place in various parts of the world. In America, the emergence of Green Parties derived from mainly environmental movements is the most frequently presented example to display this phenomenon. In the European region, in addition to ecological parties, radical new right-wing parties are also born out of transformation. In the Asian region, the phenomenon of Arab Spring left a legacy of transformation of social movements into parties, for instance in Egypt and Tunisia.

In Indonesia too, history also noted some social movements that transformed into a political party. One example of this phenomenon is that of the *Sarekat Islam* (SI) which was previously called *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (SDI). The *Sarekat Islam* was transformed from a religious and economic social organization as a form of resistance front from the indigenous traders of the Muslims to Chinese merchants and colonial government policies that marginalized indigenous and economic powers into political parties around 1916 and then sent their representatives into the *Volksraad* in the year 1917. Despite its status was party, the nomenclature of party was officially adopted in 1923 when the Seventh Congress of the *Sarekat Islam* in Madiun agreed that *Central Sarekat Islam* was renamed the *Partai Sarekat Islam* (PSI). In 1927 the name of *Partai Sarekat Islam* was later changed to Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII). Nonetheless, the nomenclature of this party was fully achieved by the PSII in 1955 when it first entered electoral politics following elections.

During the New Order period, the transformation of the social movement organizations into political parties also occurred. One illustration of this phenomenon was one experienced by the pro-democratic elements that previously challenging the authoritarian New Order. This anti-Soeharto movement transformed into the Democratic People's Party (PRD) at its first congress, April 15, 1996. Despite it had become a political party at the end of the New Order, PRD did not have an opportunity to participate in the 1999 election, due to the restriction of the regime. After all, the age of the party was not long, because after the July 27, 1996 incident at the PDI office in Diponegoro Street (*kudatuli incident*), this organization was declared as a banned organization by the New Order government and many of its main figures were subsequently taken away by the authorities. It was not until Soeharto's fall that the reformed government began to open the tap for political liberalization in Indonesia. The PRD after experiencing an intense internal debate process ultimately chose to move from the street social-political movement to the election-fighting party in which its post-reform debut began in the 1999 elections.

PKS is another example of the transformation from social movement to political party. The origin of this organization can be traced down from various campus propagation movements spread across universities in Indonesia in the decade of the 80s led by members of *Jamaah Tarbiyah*, which used an Ikhwanul Muslimin-style cell system to recruit cadres. (Dijk, 1981). The campus propagation movement in 1986 agreed to establish a Forum of Fellowship of Campus Da'wah Institution (FSLDK), which later gave birth to KAMMI, one of the most vocal institutions voicing the demands of reforms to fight Soeharto. After the decline of Soeharto, KAMMI leaders agreed to form *Partai Keadilan* (PK) or Justice Party which was declared on July 20, 1998 in Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta. Due to the failure to meet the electoral threshold for the 2004 election, PK was later officially renamed the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in 2003.

From some of the available literature on the transformation of social movement into political parties, the writer's search shows that there are at least three perspectives on how to explain the phenomenon. First, a perspective that seeks to see transformation from the perspective of transformation methods and the type of party resulting from transformation.

From this perspective, at least two patterns appear, namely the pattern in which the party then undergoes a perfect metamorphosis process. The social movement as the parent organization then turns into a party and stops its informal political activism. The party will usually stop its "out-of-space" activism and become an "obedient" political party to the institutionalized rules of democracy. While the second pattern, the pattern in which the metamorphosis is not perfectly occurred. This pattern produces a party that still has the characteristics of a thick movement. One of the highlights here is the writings of Schwarz (2016) who wrote about the party movement in America, which has attributes both as a party and as a social movement. Like a political party, the party movement wants seats in the legislature. While as a social movement they often use non-institutional means to express their messages. They are emerged to fill the gap between social movements and political parties to merely represent their interests and achieve their goals. Transformation in this way occurs because a social movement wants to express their interests by walking in two paths, namely the institutional political path that becomes the party domain and the non-institutional political path that becomes the arena of social movement. The breath of the movement did not stop when it transformed into a political party.

The second perspective, is the writings that try to see how the transformation takes place from the aspect of the relationship between the social movement that is the parent of the party with the political party that formed, for example what Zollner wrote about the transformation of social movement into the party in Egypt and Tunisia (Zollner, 2016). There are two patterns that can be elaborated in this perspective. The first pattern, is when a political party does not have independence from its parent organization. For example, the FJP is only the electoral wing and lobbying tool of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The second pattern, occurs when the party generated from the metamorphosis process has independence from the organization of its origin. The second example is Harakat an-Nahda in Tunisia, also of Muslim Brotherhood, but is able to mobilize its capacity to reconcile different interests, rather than merely being the mouthpiece or political wing of its parent organization.

Third, perspectives that try to see the factors that cause social movement transformed into a political party. One of the writings that can be an example of this perspective is the writings of Anria (2013) who observed the transformation process that took place in the body of MAS, the political party that became the political vehicle of Evo Morales who managed to escort him to the presidency of Bolivia. MAS is one of the movement-based parties that gradually abandons the remnants of the nature of its movement when it is in power. Interestingly, this organization according to Anria is hybrid because it works using different organizational logic when operating in rural and urban areas (Anria, 2013: 20). In his writings Anria says that there are at least four elements that influence MAS change from social movement to "political instrument", namely (1) implementation and continued crisis of neoliberalism; (2) resistance to the abolition of coca farmers and state violence; (3) a permissive institutional environment that provides opportunities for all social movements and political parties to flourish, and (4) crisis of party system and acute state institutions (Anria, 2013: 25).

The next article that takes this perspective comes from Mikecz which highlights how the formation of party structures by a social movement is a strategic choice as a manifestation of the internal dynamics of a social movement (Mikecz, 2015: 102). Mikecz focuses his research on the structural changes occurring in the two parties in Hungary, namely the right radical Jobbik party and the LMP ecological party, both from social movement. Mikecz concludes that there are three factors that drive a social movement to

take the form of a party, namely (1) an open opportunity in the electoral sphere; (2) lack of political consultation; And (3) the lack of a strong ally.

Table 2
Perspectives on Social Movement Transformation into Party

Perspectives	Author	Cases	Conclusion
Method of transformation and party type resulted from the transformation.	Schwarz, 2007	Interactions Between Social Movements and US Political Parties	There are two pattern of transformations: perfect transformation and imperfect transformation
	Argenti, 2016.	Transformation of PRD (Democratic People Party) in Indonesia	By using Schwarz tipology, PRD experienced an imperfect transformation
Relation between party and its mother organization (*social movement*)	Zollner, 2016	FJP in Egypt and Harakat An-Nahda in Tunisia	There are two types of this perspective: independent party and dependent party
Factors/preconditions of transformation	Finn, 2009	Transformation of Rebel Movement in El Salvador and Zimbabwe	There are three factors influencing decision to transform: a) nature and influence of international to the rebel movement; b) the level of society support to the rebel; c) the types of electoral system
	Kirdic. 2011	Kirdic conducted his research to five Islamic movement in three in three states: Turkey, Morocco, and Jordan	Kirdic perceived there is a connection between the strategy employed by a social movement and its transformation into party
	Anria, 2013	MAS, a movement based-party in Bolivia	Preconditions of transformation: 1) implementation and crises of neoliberalism; (2) struggle against coca farmer abolition; (3) institutional environment; (4) acute party system and state institutions crises
	Halkjelsvik, 2016	Transformation of Five Star Movement of Italy	There are four proporitions encouraging transformation: (1) social media; (2) charismatic leader; (3) neglected topics; and (4) thelackof trust toward existing parties

Source: processed from many sources

Although those three perspectives have several dimensions of difference, they both represent a same transformation typology. First, those patterns of transformation are in a political space that does provide a structure of incentive and a political opportunity for a social movement to metamorphose into a political party (Nasiwan, 2015) that happens in either advanced democracy as well as in post-authoritarian countries. Secondly, all of these works represent the success of the transformation process from social movement to a political party, apart from the problem of durability or sustainability of the transformation. In fact, not all social movements move into political parties, although there is an incentive

structure or a political opportunity. There are also some social movements that remain stand still, faithful to its original form. One of the social movements does not change into political parties is the FPI.

4. FPI and the Preconditions of Transformation

According to Zollner (2016: 1) systematic research that tries to explain the transition from social movement has not been much discussed in literatures. However, the authors found there were at least a small amount of writing that focused on the success of transformation, whether abroad such as green parties and new-left libertarians in the United States (Schwarz, 2016), or FJP (Freedom and Justice Party) in Egypt, *Harakat an-Nahda* in Tunisia, (Pickard, 2013: Tavana, 2013), in Latin American countries such as MVR in Bolivia, as well as domestic transformation phenomena, such as the Democratic People's Party (PRD) (Argenti, 2016) and the Justice Party Prosperous (PKS). As for, systematic research on in terms of what social movement does not turn into a party is a field work that is still open very wide because there is not much availability of literature or the foundation of sufficient theory.

Since talking about how social movement transformed into a political party, the researchers will to use a combination of two theories, namely the theory of social movement and the theory of political party formation. Therefore this study will depart from the writings of Halkjelsvik (2016) on FSM (the Five Star Movement) in Italy. Halkjelsvik's writing has provided a theoretical foundation that is able to describe the pre-conditions that cause a social movement to transform into a political party. He described how a successful social movement transformed into a political party. There are four factors in her thesis that facilitate the transformation, namely: (1) Social media that facilitated the transition from an anti-establishment social movement to a successful political party; (2) The charismatic leader that was the main reason for the smooth transition for a new anti-establishment social movement to become a political party; (3) Focus on seemingly neglected topics that facilitates the transition from an anti-establishment social movement to a successful political party, and (4) The lack of trust in established institutions and the political parties made way for a new anti-establishment/anti-party movement. Anyway, those four propositions relatively fail to explain why social movement does not transform into party, at least in the case of FPI.

According to Halkjelsvik (2016), the fundamental basis of the Resource Mobilization Theory is that social movements develop from a significant increase in the level of resources available to support an emergence. Those resources could be in the form of solidarity, organization, as well as external support. If we consider their use of the social media as a resource in itself, it has had a great influence on the movements formation cost, and therefore its successful transition. Theory on political parties also talks about formation costs. Formation costs are something concrete that can stagnate a potential party's progress. A potential party needs resources to be able to maintain their goal of becoming a fully-fledged political party (Hug 2001, 56-57,99). In traditional politics, it takes a lot of funds to run for office. In recent years however, some parties have begun taking advantage of new methods of mobilization that do not involve expensive electoral campaigns. Social media has opened the electoral arena to those who know how to take advantage. In the case of Five Star Movement in Italy, the use of social media succeeded in transform the consciousness of a large segment in the Italian population, and get so many people to actually vote for them.

In the case of FPI, social media is unable to facilitate FPI to transform into political party. As any other social movements, the Central Board of FPI also actually uses social media as well as an effort for making fresh and uncontaminated image organization as well

as a method of mobilization. FPI uses many popular media social such as website, twitter, facebook, and also instagram. FPI official website is fpi.or.id. PI use this website to upload recent activities of FPI. Three accounts related to FPI was @DPP-FPI, @syihabrizieq, and @HumasFPI. FPI's official facebook account is frontpembelaislam. Meanwhile, instagram account of FPI is dpp_fpi. In one occasion they use twitter as a form of resistance toward public negative sentiment in Fitsa Hats case with a hashtag #KoplakAdalahMereka. Fitsa Hats case is a BAP of Police while examined an FPI elite, Habib Novel, in which in that BAP Habib Novel had been written as worked instead of a Pizza Hut, but "Fitza Hats" precisely. But according to CNN Indonesia, those three twitter accounts right now had been suspended by twitter (CNN Indonesia, 2017). Since FPI's instagram account had been permanently suspended, therefore FPI creates their new instagram account, frontpembelaislam_fpi. In many occasions, the effort of FPI to give a positive image through the social media has been massively battled by other accounts. There is a cyber-war in the cyber-world that put FPI under massive attacks. FPI's use of organized violence in maintaining *Amar Ma''ruf Nahu Munkar* also prevent large part of Indonesian element to give sympathy and joint into FPI agenda. Although FPI has use almost all of social media, but eventually the social media fail to facilitate FPI to transform into party. From this point, it raises a question for further research, to what extent social media facilitate the transformation and to what extent social media does not facilitate the transformation?

In addition to social media, Halkjelsvik (2016) also proposed that the other factor facilitate a smooth transformation of movement into party is a charismatic leader. An example of political scientists who support this argument are Aldon D. Morris and Staggenborg (2008, 171). They describe leaders as critical to social movements for many reasons. Leaders inspire, mobilize resources, create and recognize opportunities, devise strategies and frame demands. In sum, we can say that they are the very essence of the social movement. Leaders of social movements can be defined as strategic decision-makers who inspire and organize others to participate in their form of organization. When we consider the this issue in relation to theory surrounding political parties there is a similar argument to be made. Several political scientists have underlined the importance a leader can have for the establishment of a political party. Hug says (2001, 14-15) that a party can originate as an idea from an individual who present candidates to office based on this person beliefs. For example, the Anders Lange's Party in Norway, which today is a one of the parties in government. Another example is the FSM in Italy with its charismatic leader Beppe Grillo. The notion of charismatic leadership involves assigning a key role to the followers in imputing charisma to leaders. There will be an emotional character of the community and the appointment of officials will be based on the loyalty to the charismatic leader (Morris and Staggenborg. 2008, 172). A charismatic party, or leadership-dominated parties, are usually created top-down by an individual or a small elite (Bolleyer 2013, 63).

Similar to Beppe Grillo of FSM in Italy, FPI also has Habib Rizieq as its charismatic leader. As a head of *tanfidzi* board of FPI, Rizieq is responsible for almost all of FPI activities. Rizieq was born in Jakarta in 1965, of a mixed Hadhrami Arab-Betawi heritage. His status as habib, in particular one who studied in Saudi Arabia, Rizieq commanded a certain reverential authority amongst traditional Betawi society in particular. So charismatic he is, even FPI members often stated that they considered Rizieq as reflecting characteristic of the Prophet Muhammad (Teik, Hadiz, Nakanishi, 2014). Anyway, the charismatic leader has no impact on the transformation of FPI into party. From this point, it raises a question for further research, to what extent charismatic leader facilitate the transformation and to what extent charismatic leader does not facilitate the transformation?

The third factor facilitating the transformation according to Halksjevik (2016) is the focus on seemingly neglected topics. In the realm of Social Movement Theory, social movements develop when a feeling of dissatisfaction spreads and the existing institutions are unable to respond (Porta and M. Diani, 2006:13). Halksjevik argued that the dissatisfaction people feel is because of a mismatch with their desires and the actual policies that are being fronted by other parties. Therefore when a new social movement manage to represent new issues they sauté the dissatisfaction people have with the existing institutions. Meanwhile in the realm of party theory, new issues or unresolved political problems should therefore lead to the emergence of new parties (Hug 2001, 54, Bolleyer 2013, 28-29). One example of this is that problems with *immigration* increase the chance that new right-wing parties manage to consolidate and be successful. Another example is the discussion on *nuclear energy* that has said to have paved the way for green- and left-libertarian parties (Hug 2001, 3). A third example is a focus on environmental issues. There is a general thrust of a larger part of the literature that suggest that new parties are primarily the consequence of new issues or values ignored by other existing political parties (Harmel and Robertson 1985, 502). That the poor representation of peoples anxieties and urgent demands by the other parties, favored the electoral emergence of this new party (Conti and Memoli 2015, 531).

In the context of FPI, the focus of this organization on neglected topics can be traced down from the socio-political background of this SMO emergence and its goals. The background of socio-political situation of FPI establishment, among others; *First*, the long suffering experienced by Indonesian Muslims as a result of human rights violations committed by the authorities. *Secondly*, the failure of state apparatus to enforce the law and ensure public order; *third*, the obligation of every Muslim to maintain the dignity of Islam; and *fourth*, the obligation for every Muslim to be able to uphold the *Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*. Apparently, FPI background of birth can not be separated from the reform event as the momentum of social and political change in Indonesia. (Al Zatrouw, 2006: 90). The purpose of the FPI establishment, as written in the FPI doctrinal documents and lines of struggle, is to conduct *Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*, and to assist the government in eliminating social problems such as prostitution, gambling, and alcohol and drug transactions. According to FPI activists, one of the efforts that can be taken to overcome the moral crisis that plagued this nation is by doing harmonious cooperation from all elements of society, which includes the '*ulama* (moslem scholars), *umaro*' (government leaders), and all Muslims (Syaefuddin, 2014: 262). From the socio-political background and the goals of this SMO, it could be concluded that some topics in which become the focus of FPI are neglected by the state. Anyway, it was not proven to be effective in facilitating FPI to transform into party.

The last preconditions of transformation according to Halksjevik is the lack of trust in established institutions and the political parties that made way for a new anti-establishment/anti-party movement. FPI has become well-known for its controversial acts since 1998, particularly those that had been conducted by its paramilitary wing, Laskar Pembela Islam. Rizieq as chairman of the FPI often said that the FPI's assertive actions are a reflection of the principles and attitudes. According to Rizieq, what is done by FPI is the impact of infertility law enforcement system. What had been stated by Rizieq means that there is a distrust of FPI toward the state. Nevertheless, the lack of trust toward established institutions still unable to facilitate the transformation of this movement into party.

5. Untransformed FPI, Contentious Politics, and Low State Capacity

The elaboration toward four preconditions of transformation has proven as fail in explaining the FPI option which still chose to be a social movement instead of transform into political party. The author will try to argue why those preconditions is failed to provide an appropriate explanation by using state capacity approach and contentious politics approach. State capacity is the extent to which the government or the state controls resources, activities and citizens. Low capacity of the state tends to promote violence. Since the collapse of the Suharto military authoritarian regime in mid-1998, Indonesia has experienced a new phase of democracy. The fundamental rights of democracy, such as the freedom to speak and to form an association have become available since that time. Individuals and groups have been able to express their views without being scrutinized by the government. Benefitting this opportunity, number of political and social movements emerged and reemerged. Most of these movements used conventional nonviolent means to pursue their goals because democracy is inherently nonviolent, which allows movements to use a number of reasonable tactics. Ironically, in the new Indonesian democracy, an Islamist movement, FPI (Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders' Front) also emerged and adopted disruptive and violent strategies to pursue their goals. Using the symbols of Islam, FPI committed at least 64 cases of conspicuous violent collective actions from 1998 to 2010.

Meanwhile contentious politics is a theory that is often used to explain conflict dynamics related to social changes in response to formal and informal political institutional restructuring. The motive behind the dispute refers more to the goals or political interests of certain parties who identify themselves as groups or organizations based on an identity entity. Contentious politics consists of public, collective making of consequential claims by connected clusters of persons on other clusters of persons or on major political actors, when at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a third party to the claims. Thus defined, contentious politics is a causally coherent domain with distinctive properties. It is causally coherent in the sense that similar cause-effect relationships apply throughout the domain. It is distinctive in the sense that some features of contentious politics appear nowhere else in social life (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2007:2). Later, Tilly defines contentious politics as "interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interest, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties (Tilly, 2008: 5).

What had been done by FPI can be observed from the contentious politics approach. Conflict and violence using religious symbols of Islam are used as means to pursue its goals and to obtain attention from the government. Contentious politics surrounding vigilantism and FPI-style violence can continue to occur due to low state capacity. This low capacity of the state cannot be separated from the reality that usually behind those violent groups there are parties and security apparatus who give back up to their activities. There is a mutualism symbiosis patron-client relation between those violent groups and certain officials. Thus, the capacity of the state should be a factor that should be considered in elaborating transformation process from a social movement to political party. A low state capacity tends to let the social movement to continue their old ways, including FPI which eventually is not stimulated to transform into party since in its old ways FPI's interest is relatively secured, achievable and affordable, although basically FPI met all the preconditions of transformation suggested by Halkjelsvik.

C. Conclusion

Although democratic political system in Indonesia post-New Order offers a political opportunities and structure of incentive for a social movement to transform into party, and FPI internally is supported by a complete organizational structure and a large number of members that enables it to transform into a party, but FPI still chooses to become a social movement organization. The theory of social movement transformation into party suggested by Halksjevik who successfully explained the transformation of Five Star Movement case in Italy failed to operate in the case of FPI in Indonesia. According to the authors, it is because Halksjevik ignores the State's capacity factor in enforcing the rule of law for existing community organizations and operating in its political system. Low state capacity in enforcing regulations leads to radical organizations such as FPI feel free to carry out their vigilant actions, so from a rational choice point of view FPI feels that the incentive structure to be a party is much smaller than it is to remain a social movement. For FPI, street is more promising compared to *Senayan*.

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