PERAN BUDGET-BASED INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, SOCIAL INCENTIVES, TARGET KINERJA, DAN KOMPLEKSITAS TUGAS TERHADAP KINERJA INDIVIDU
Abstract
This study aims to analyze the Role of Budget-Based Incentives Contracts, Social Incentives, Performance Targets, and Task Complexity to Individual Performance (Experimental Studies). The subject in this study are students S1 Accounting Department Faculty of Economics and Business University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta who have taken courses Management Control Systems and Management Accounting. In this study, sample of 144 participants were selected using random sampling method.
Based on the analysis that have been made the results show that individual performance is higher when incentives are given based on budget-linear contract compared to budget-fixed contract, the individual performance given by social incentives and budget-linear contract will tend to be the same in improving individual performance while the influence of social incentives is greater than budget-fixed contract in improving individual performance, individual performance is higher when performance targets are set than if no performance targets are set, and individual performance is higher when the given less complex task than if given complex task.